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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis was to generate a series of propositions identifYing the elements most 
likely to be found in 'durable' employee-owned organisations. Previous studies in the field 
had often been marked by the assumption that benefits associated with employee share 
ownership, including reduced 'social divisions' between employees and their managers and a 
greater propensity among the former to work harder, would follow in all employee-owned 
enterprises, Few researchers had addressed the 'empirical reality' and 'diversity' of 
individual employee share ownership conversions and the circumstances in'whiCh systems 
had been created, implemented and subsequently managed by organisations.' Areas covered 
by the thesis included an examination of employee participation structur'es in different 
employee share ownership environments and 'feelings of ownership and commitment' among 
employee shareholders. The thesis also considered whether the 'traditional' trade union role 
would be undermined by new forms of representation and participation resulting from the 
introduction of employee share ownership programmes, Applying an extensive 'multi­
method' approach, quantitative and qualitative data were collected over an eighteen-month 
period from six organisations in the UK bus industry - regarded by the mid 1990s as the most 
important locus of employee-owned companies. In 1994, some twenty-five UK bus 
companies were defined as 'employee-owned', generally consisting of non-managerial 
employees holding at least 25 per cent of the equity in their work places, Results from the 
investigation revealed that 'direct monetary investment' by employees and extensive 
information and communication programmes were among the elements characterising durable 
employee-owned organisations, Preservation of the 'traditional' trade union role was also 
evident, with employee shareholders generally content to participate in company matters 
through their union, More broadly, the thesis concluded that recognition in future research of 
the interplay of different variables was essential to increase understanding in relation to 
employee commitment, participation and industrial relations outcomes. 
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1.0 Outline of research programme 
1.1 Introduction 
The programme of research sets out to examine varIOUS systems of employee share 
ownership (ESO), their origins and key characteristics and outcomes of 'feel ings of 
ownership', employee participation (EP), organisational commitment, industrial relations 
and 'employee ownership durability'. Pierce et al (2001, 1991) concluded that different 
models of ESO were likely to have implications for attitudes to ownership and for the 
subsequent ownership expectations, rights and responsibilities that were created' in the 
minds of 'employee owners', as weIl as those with responsibility for managing the 
ownersh ip system (see also Rodgers 2003). 
Within the ESO literature, a number of studies have examined the capacity of ESO to 
'transform' the employment relationship via changes in the attitudes and behaviours of 
employees. Far fewer, however, particularly at the empirical level, have examined in 
detail the key characteristics of different ownership models, the context in which 
conversions to ownership have occurred, the key parties involved in conversions and how 
all of these variables might be related to attitudinal and behavioural outcomes (Trewhitt 
1999a). Pendleton (2001: 14) argued that the interplay of different variables in ESO 
conversions had 'a powerful effect on configurations of participation and governance, and 
on the outcomes of these'. The author additionally highlighted the need for a more 
systematic explanation within case study accounts of the differing circumstances and 
outcomes of ESO. Wilson et al (1995) similarly called for a recognition among 
researchers of the 'contingent characteristics' (p. 11) of different ownership models, 
adding that differences in outcomes - for example, in the attitudes of employees - could 
exist independently of the fact of ownership. 
The focus for the current investigation is a group of six UK bus companies. During the 
1980s and 19905 the UK bus industry was particularly significant for ESO, both in terms 
of the number of employee-owned bus companies electing to pursue this strategy and the 
'rich diversity' of ESO found within the industry. Given the 'diversity of ownership' 
characterising the companies presented in this thesis, the research aims to address some 
of the limitations levelled at previous studies that have tended to portray ESO as a 
._­
singular concept. The remainder of this chapter outlines the context of the study, setting 
out the main areas for investigation and outlining the approach undertaken to achieve the 
research aims. 
1.2 Defining employee share ownership 
ESO has been described as a 'multi-dimensional' phenomenon (Kruse 2002; Pierce et al 
1991; Shperling and Rousseau 2001), encompassing a range of meanings across different 
audiences (Centre for Tomorrow's Company (CTC) 2001). It is credited with providing 
'the most promising way of securing the desired joint commitment to business success' 
(Oakeshott 2000: 18) and of being 'central to the creation of an enterprise in which a 
"new industrial relations" based on co-operation and shared goals' can emerge (Walley 
and Wilson 1992: 126). On one level, ESO may be defined as 'financial participation': 
in addition to a 'financial stake' in their company, employees have access to financial 
information, the profits of the company, plus a legal claim to the assets of that company 
should it be sold. At a further level, ESO may encompass 'socio-psychological' factors 
including social standing, social responsibility and 'psychological ownership' (Rousseau 
and Shperling 2000). The notion of psychological ownership stems from the theme that 
has 'pervaded virtually all of the literature on employee ownership' (Pendleton 2001: 9) 
over the past twenty-five years - that of EP in decision-making. Ben-Ner and Jones 
(1995) observed that, in addition to 'return rights', such as financial rewards resulting 
from ownership of an asset, ESO also consisted of rights to 'control' that asset. 
Moreover, Pierce et al (1991) described the opportunity to exercise some degree of 
decisional influence as an integral part of ESO, adding that ownership systems without 
this 'right and responsibility' (p. 128), would be regarded by employees as being 
incomplete. The authors concluded that subsequent outcomes arising from 'incomplete' 
ownership systems would differ from those where EP was firmly embedded. 
1.3 Context of the study 
The significance of EP in employee-owned organisations is based on the application of 
'principal-agent theory' (see Conte and Svejnar 1990; Jenson and Meckling 1979), 
2 
---
whereby ESO provides employees (agents) with an incentive to share information with 
their employers (principals). Financial rewards are linked to overall company 
performance and so employees have an incentive to share information about work 
processes that can benefit their organisation and that may, in some cases, be superior to 
information held by employers. The company benefits, therefore, from better-informed 
decisions and from a breakdown in bureaucratic centralised decision-making and lower 
agency costs (Wilson 1992). Employees in turn show commitment to their organisation 
via greater personal effort, increased scrutiny of colleagues' work behaviour and a 
reduced propensity to leave the organisation (Pendleton et al 1998). A fall in the turnover 
rate may also increase the average skill level present in the company over a period of time 
(for a given investment in training) and encourage additional investments in company­
specific skills or human capital (Wilson 1992). 
A number of studies (GAO 1987; Klein 1987; Long 1979; Pendleton et al 1998; Rhodes 
and Steers 1981) have highlighted the importance of EP in decision-making for bringing 
about attitudinal change in employee-owned organisations and these are discussed in 
Chapter 3. An equally extensive section of the ownership literature (see for example, 
Blasi and Kruse 1991; Jones and Kato 1993) has found that organisations with ownership 
systems generally maintain 'conventional' management hierarchies and patterns of 
contro!' Moreover, Heller et al (1998) described systems of ownership as 'often 
undemocratic' (p. 20), providing employees with few control rights. Notwithstanding, 
there is an assumption that employees with a financial stake in their firm are more likely 
to work harder for its success (Marchington 1995), though this outcome may depend upon 
whether the employees themselves are able to identify such a link (Trewhitt 2000). 
Much may also depend on the model of ownership present in the organisation and the 
circumstances in which it has been introduced. The CTC (200 I) referred to a 
'kaleidoscope of alternative patterns of ownership' (p. 8) originating from different 
traditions. For example, systems of ownership have been formed to take advantage of tax 
breaks (Blasi and Kruse 2001; Smith 1993), to obstruct hostile take-overs, and to secure 
the commitment of employees during 'plant-rescue' buy-outs (Heller et al 1998: 34) or 
privatisations (Walley and Wilson 1992). In contrast, very few have been formed to 
advance industrial democracy (10) within firms (Heller et al 1998; Hyman and Mason 
1995; Klein and Rosen 1986). 
3 
The objectives and philosophies of the parties involved in mounting conversions to ESO 
are also important for EP and other related outcomes, including commitment to the 
organisation. Where 'management' has been the dominant influence in the design of the 
ownership system, it may be anticipated that the primary objective is risk sharing or some 
other performance-oriented objective, rather than any extension of 10 that cou Id 
challenge the management prerogative (Pendleton et al 1995a). Alternatively, where 
employees have been an equal or dominant influence on the design of the ownership 
system, there may be a greater concern to develop institutions that pass some control of 
decision-making to them, such as the appointment of employee directors (Pendleton et al 
1996). 
The CTC (200 I) has drawn a distinction between 'employee-owned' companies and those 
with 'employee share ownership'. Employee-owned companies are defined as having a 
'deliberate culture and philosophy' of employee ownership (CTC 2001: 10), providing 
employees with a 'significant shareholding' either directly, or through a trust, to share in 
the success of the company. In contrast, 'employee share ownership' is defined as a 
mechanism used by companies to enhance commitment and the performance of their 
employees. Broad-based ownership systems, including 'conventional' share schemes 
such as save-as-you-earn (SA YE), have often been subsumed under the umbrella of 
'employee share ownership'. Typically involving only a small proportion of equity being 
passed to employees, generally between 2 and 3 per cent, conventional share schemes 
have rarely formed part of a large-scale attempt to reshape corporate governance or EP in 
companies (see for example Baddon et al 1989). Rather, their primary aim has been to 
provide additional remuneration for employees (Pendleton 200 I). 
It is posited, moreover, that where managers have fared better than employees from such 
schemes, any unifying intentions have often been defeated (see for example, Hyman and 
Mason 1995; Millward et al 1992; Ramsay et al 1990). Nichols and O'Connell Davidson 
(1992) highlighted the example of British Telecom, where the distribution of shares 
among executives and employees was particularly skewed. The average employee 
shareholding amounted to 270 shares, while 1.3 million shares were distributed among 
just five senior executives. In addition, conventional share schemes have often been 
viewed with suspicion by the trade union movement. The Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
(1979) observed that share schemes did little to counteract inequalities of wealth, since 
4 
those on the highest incomes, typically senior executives, were most likely to benefit. 
Moreover, share schemes have generally fallen outside the remit of collective bargaining 
(CB) (Baddon et al 1989; Pendleton 1992), which means that arrangements for share 
distribution, once set, cannot be modified in annual pay negotiations. 
At the other extreme is a subset of ownership systems where share ownership among 
employees may be set at high levels and intertwined with considerations of governance 
and participation (Pendleton 2001). Applying the CTC's definition, companies electing 
to adopt ownership systems of this nature may be defined as 'employee-owned'. For 
example, where transfers of shares to employees are substantial- in excess of25 per cent 
- ownership may become a 'centrepiece of company philosophy and organisation' 
(Pendleton et al 1995a: 44). For more than a decade through the 1980s and 1990s, two of 
the more commonly-used ownership mechanisms among UK 'employee-owned' 
companies were 'employee share ownership plans' (ESOPs) and direct ownership 
schemes. Particularly prevalent in UK bus company management-employee buy-outs 
(MEBOs) in the aftermath of privatisation (see for example, Oakeshott 2000), both 
mechanisms were regarded as offering the potential to facilitate far greater levels of EP 
in decision-making (Pendleton et al 1996). 
ESOPs initially proved a more popular method in some of the earlier bus buy-outs. The 
distinguishing feature of an ESOP is an employee benefit trust (EBT), which acquires, 
holds and distributes equity to employees (Trewhitt 1999a). Moreover, the EBT 
normally has powers to borrow money to finance the acquisition of shares for eventual 
allocation to employees. Participation rates have, therefore, often been very high 
(Pendleton et al 1995a) since shares are usually passed to employees at no direct cost. In 
the UK there are two main forms of ESOP in terms of legal and taxation characteristics ­
the 'case law' and the 'statutory' ESOP. These are discussed more fully in Chapter 2. 
By comparison, a direct ownership approach has usually required substantial amounts of 
capital from employees (Trewhitt 1999b). Therefore, members of the workforce either 
unable or unwilling to provide the necessary finance have often been excluded from 
participating, making inequalities in ownership more likely. Notwithstanding, advocates 
of direct ownership have argued that it provides a more immediate and direct sense of 
ownership compared with ESOPs. Employees in ESOP companies may have to wait for 
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up to three years to receive their shares, whereas direct ownership arrangements allow 
employees to receive their share certificates at the outset, thereby helping to make 
ownership more 'meaningful' (Pendleton 2001). Direct ownership arrangements may be 
particularly important in smaller firms where the percentage of employee-owned stock is 
large enough to influence the direction and strategy of the company (Cotton 1993). In 
some cases direct share subscriptions have been used in conjunction with an EBT, 
whereby shares might initially be placed in an EBT as part of the purchase of the 
company but then more or less offered immediately for sale to employees. EBTs have 
also been created to buy back shares from departing employees in buy-outs that were 
brought about primarily by direct share acquisition. 
At the same time, companies with direct share ownership pose a much higher degree of 
risk than ESOP companies, since employees in the former have to finance the share 
acquisition themselves. Ben-Ner (1988) referred to the 'inescapable bundling' (p. 290) 
of employees' human capital, equity capital and employment in employee-owned 
organisations and their subjection to the same risk. It is argued, however, that the level 
of often considerable financial commitment from employees in direct ownership 
companies engenders a more 'responsible' form of ownership, in terms of how they view 
their own work behaviour as relating to the success of the company (Pendleton 2001). 
1.4 Industry focus 
Case studies presented in the thesis are drawn from the UK bus industry. From 1987 
through to the mid 1990s, the bus industry was regarded as the most important locus of 
employee owned companies in the UK (see for example, Wilson et al 1995). The primary 
impetus for ownership activity in the industry was provided by the policies of successive 
Conservative governments towards UK bus operators during the 1980s involving 
deregulation, privatisation and financial, industrial relations and legislative reform 
(Pendleton and Winterton 1993). By March 1994, twenty-five bus companies employing 
around 35,000 employees were 'employee-owned' - generally consisting of non­
managerial employees holding at least 25 per cent of the equity of their organisation and 
management holding the majority share of the remaining equity (Pendleton et al 1995b). 
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It may be considered surprising that ESO became so widespread in an industry where 
average union membership exceeded 90 per cent during the period (Pendleton et al 
1995b). Concerns that financial participation could lead to employer and employee 
interests becoming intertwined, thereby contradicting the principles and functions of 
unions (McElrath and Rowan 1992), had been common in the trade union movement 
since the 19505. Some thirty years later, however, trade unions began to look upon 
financial participation, and particularly ESOPs, more favourably (Pendleton 2001). 
Since that time, employee-owned companies have often been found in highly unionised 
sectors and so major changes to company operations via the creation of an ESOP or 
direct ownership scheme have generally required trade union support (Pendleton 1992). 
The Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) concluded that ESO was 'the only 
way for many TGWU members to retain some sort of union control over their jobs 
against the ravages of deregulation and privatisation' (TGWU 1990: 4). Oakeshott 
(2000) observed that trade unions regarded ESO as the 'least worst outcome of the 
privatisation process' (p. 290), while there is also evidence to suggest that the 
'traditional' trade union role of employee representation may have in fact been 
strengthened. Pendleton et al (1996) concluded that management and union objectives 
have often 'coincided' (p. 600) in employee-owned companies, as union concerns to 
protect representation have, in practice, cohered with management's primary objective to 
retain 'conventional' management structures. That employee-owned companies do not 
necessarily bring with them 'revolutions in either governance or participation' 
(Pendleton 2001: 3) has been reinforced by the work of Heller et al (1998) and Toscano 
(1983). 
In recent years, the majority of UK employee-owned bus companies, or those with 
employee ownership arrangements, have been consolidated into a far smaller number of 
transport operators. At the time of writing, only one 'employee-owned' company 
remams. The company was established in 1993 and has succeeded in maintaining 100 
per cent 'insider' equity via a direct share ownership arrangement. Aside from this one 
exception, what is perhaps most striking about the demise of ESO in the UK bus industry 
is the rate at which companies were sold on to other operators (Pendleton et al 1998). 
The life-span of employee-owned bus companies has often been very short, with firms 
resold at a value considerably in excess of the initial buy-out price (Thompson et al 
1990). In 1992, Wright et al (1992) reported that the average exit period of fifteen bus 
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buy-outs eventually sold on to other groups was 2.02 years. By the end of the 1990s, 
when most of the remaining UK bus companies had been 'sold on', the average exit 
period had risen to 3.7 years (Pendleton 2001). 
A number of factors are said to have contributed to the demise of ESO within the 
industry. First, opportunities for EP in bus companies were often limited, varying little 
from opportunities in companies without any form of ESO. Second, non-payment of 
share dividends by these bus companies provided employees with no clear financial 
reward (Pendleton 200 I). Third, companies were often unable to respond to competitive 
threats. Even before privatisation. local bus companies had been under pressure to make 
themselves profitable by shedding labour, increasing prices and placing more emphasis on 
profitable routes (Oakeshott 2000). Ironically, the most profitable employee owned bus 
companies often faced the greatest difficulties in trying to compete with other firms. In 
some cases, shares gradually became too expensive for new employees to purchase, 
subsequently placing companies under increasing pressure to repay buy-out loans. An 
emphasis on loan repayment led to under-investment in many companies, leaving them 
unable to respond to competitive threats. As a result, the rewards to be derived from 
'selling on' were seen as far exceeding the financial and psychological rewards of 
ownership (Pendleton 200 I, Trewhitt 1999b). This issue is addressed further in Chapter 
8. 
1.5 Research methodology overview 
Results presented in the thesis are based on primary data collected from six UK bus 
companies during 1997 and 1998. Three of the companies selected were 'employee­
owned' organisations for all or most of the duration of the primary fieldwork and 
following the aims of the research, offered scope for an examination of different 
ownership models originating from different backgrounds. The remaining three 
companies were selected on the basis that they had moved from 'ESQ' to consolidation 
by other major UK transport groups some years earlier, which in turn allowed for an 
examination of the birth and life-span of employee-owned companies, as well as their 
demise and aftermath. The background to all six cases is discussed more fully in Chapter 
5. 
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An initial list of approximately ten employee-owned bus companies, or those with 
'ownership arrangements', was drawn from business directories and professional 
associations including the ESOP Centre, the Involvement and Participation Association 
(IPA), the Centre for Employee Ownership and Participation (CEOP), and the Industrial 
Common Ownership Movement (ICOM). On completion of the list, companies were 
contacted either by phone or letter to establish levels of interest for the study. The first 
point of contact in each case was either the managing director, a senior member of the 
management team, or alternatively, a trade union representative or employee director. 
From the ten companies contacted, a final list of six was drawn up. Further details are 
given in Chapter 4. 
Data collected for the thesis were drawn from a range of sources. During the research 
period, a quantitative employee attitude survey and a series of semi-structured interviews 
with senior managers and trade union representatives were undertaken in each company. 
The employee attitude survey set out to examine levels of organisational commitment and 
EP and to explore employee-manager and employee-trade union relationships. At the 
interview stage, questions to respondents focused upon the design and operation of the 
ownership system and the circumstances in which it had been introduced. Respondents 
were also asked to give individual assessments of their own company's ownership system 
in relation to employee attitudinal, behavioural and industrial relations outcomes. Where 
companies were no longer 'employee-owned', respondents were asked to detail events 
leading to the 'selling on' of their company and to give their own personal reflections on 
ESO. Attendance by the researcher as a non-participant observer at an 'EBT' and a 
'Central Negotiating Committee' (CNC) meeting was also permitted by one company. 
Primary data and observations were supplemented by documentary information gathered 
from each of the companies, including annual company reports, in-house journals and 
newspapers. Statements of corporate philosophy, where available, were also collected to 
help place in context data obtained from the survey and interview stages. Further 
research methodology details are given in Chapter 4. 
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1.6 Focus of research 
1.6.1 Feelings of ownership and organisational commitment 
The first of the main research topics is presented in Chapter 6 and examines 'feel ings of 
ownership' and 'organisational commitment' among employee shareholders in three 
'employee-owned' organisations, each representing a different model and degree of 
'insider ESO' (details are given in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5). 
If ESO is to result in changes to the attitudes and subsequent behaviours of employees, 
then it is likely that employees need to experience a tangible 'sense of ownership' 
(Pendleton 200 I). Pierce et al (1991) concluded that the extent to which employees 
would experience a sense of ownership, or 'psychological ownership', would depend on 
the extent to which they were satisfied with the system of ownership in their own 
company and the salience of ownership. Sparrow (200 I), in turn, observed that the 
psychological consequences of ESO would differ according to the degree and variation 
of ownership found in companies. Within the ownership literature, researchers have 
hypothesised that employees with a 'sense of ownership' to their company will also be 
committed to the company. Klein (1987), for example, identified three alternative but 
not mutually exclusive models of the psychological effects of ESO - the 'intrinsic', 
'extrinsic' and 'instrumental' models of satisfaction. Underpinning each model was the 
assumption that if employees were satisfied with their company's system of ownership, 
they would feel committed to the company and motivated to remain working there. In 
turn, each of Klein's models predicted that different employee ownership conditions 
were associated with high levels of employee satisfaction to ESO, high organisational 
commitment and low turnover intentions. A more extensive discussion of Klein's model 
appears in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 6 explores the premise that employees working in a 'direct ownership' company 
derive a greater 'sense of ownership' than employees in companies with an ESOP. 
Where ownership is more 'meaningful' to employees and they draw satisfaction from the 
experience of ownership, a greater sense of commitment to the organisation is, in turn, 
anticipated. The study also suggests, however, that the context in which the conversion 
to ownership occurs and the reasons behind the choice of ownership model are 
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important. Specifically, outcomes of ownership and organisational commitment between 
employee-owned companies may differ, even where similar systems of ownership are in 
place. Chapter 6 therefore attempts to shed light on the importance of the varying 
circumstances of ownership for outcomes of psychological ownership and organisational 
commitment. 
1.6.2 Employee share ownership, employee participation and industrial relations 
The second major area of the research programme examines employee attitudes to 
participation in decision-making across all six organisations and seeks to establish levels 
of perceived and desired EP at the job, departmental and organisational levels. Results 
from this stage of the research are presented in Chapter 7. Following the work of 
Pendleton (200 I), EP in the current research context is defined as participation by 
employees (allowing employees a 'voice') in work-level decisions, whether as 
individuals or groups, affecting them as employees. Within the literature, employee 
influence in decision-making has been defined in a number of ways including 
'organisational democracy', 'power', 'involvement', 'participation' and more recently, 
'empowerment' (see for example Heller 1998; Heller et al 1998; Hyman and Mason 
1995). Moreover, the Influence and Power Continuum, developed initially by Likert 
(1967) and extended by Heller and Yuki (1969) and later by the Industrial Democracy in 
Europe research group (1981), identified six alternative degrees of influence and power 
sharing (Heller 1998). These ranged from 'not involved', where no, or a minimum 
amount of information is shared, through to 'decide on my own', where an individual or 
group is given a degree of autonomy or control. Further discussion of the terminology 
features in Chapter 2. 
It may be assumed that employee-owned companies generally would provide greater 
opportunities for EP in decision-making than more 'conventional' firms: ownership is 
said to confer rights on owners to control an asset, as well as enjoy its returns (see for 
example, Ben-Ner and Jones 1995). However, a number of studies, (see for example 
HeIler et al 1998), have concluded that ESO is rarely associated with substantial 
employee control. Moreover, while it may be assumed that employees, given the 
opportunity to participate more fully in workplace decisions would welcome the 
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prospect, some studies (discussed in Chapter 3) suggest this is not always the case. 
Employees who own shares, for example, may not actively 'seek out' more participation 
if they perceive that managers are best equipped to make the right decisions to safeguard 
their interests (French 1987). A further body of literature, however, has posited that 
employees will often say they want more influence than they actually have at the present 
time (see for example, HeBer 1998). 
Where employees are dissatisfied with their managers or with current levels of 
participation in decisions, it is argued that they will remain committed to their trade 
union, as they regard the union as the most appropriate vehicle for representing their 
interests (see for example, Pendleton et al 1995b). This argument runs counter to the 
assertion, however, that the traditional representational role of trade unions in an 
employee-owned company may be undermined where employer and employee interests 
are aligned (see for example Stern et al 1983). In firms without ownership, employees 
are seen as having interests that are distinct and often arguably opposed to those of the 
owners. Hence, the role of trade unions in such firms is clear - 'to provide independent 
collective representation of employees in their dealings with the owners or their agents' 
(Pendleton et al 1995b: 577). In employee-owned organisations, the distinction is far 
less clear cut, though employees may find themselves able to develop simultaneous 
commitments, or 'dual commitment', to both their union and employer. Factors likely to 
contribute to a 'dual commitment' climate are discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7. 
1.6.3 Durability of employee share ownership 
Using data collected from three 'post employee-buy-out companies', the final stage of the 
research examines whether systems of ownership and the varying circumstances of 
ownership creation are important for employee ownership durability. An alternative 
premise is that the eventual demise of employee-owned bus companies generally was 
perhaps inevitable, regardless of the system of ownership in place and the context in 
which the buy-out occurred. Findings are presented in Chapter 8. While the UK bus 
industry has been a principal focus for studies of ESO in recent years, an empirical 
examination of firms in a 'post ESQ' context marks a departure from the approach of 
previous investigations. Where former employee-owned companies have featured 
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empirically in investigations, they have, in the main, formed part of comparative analyses, 
typically being 'compared' with employee-owned companies in relation to productivity, 
employee turnover and absenteeism outcomes. 
Chapter 8 focuses on four main areas: (1) the original objectives behind the ESO 
conversion in each case; (2) the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the ownership 
system adopted; (3) the perceived impact of ownership upon the attitudes and behaviours 
of employees; and (4) events leading up to and the circumstances of ESO dissolution in 
each case. In his theoretical analysis of employee-owned companies, Ben-Ner (1998) 
concluded that such firms faced dissolution due to either economic failure, or because 
both employees and managers in the firm recognised that separation was the only solution 
to their 'common predicaments' (p. 307). In tum, the proposition presented in Chapter 8 
is that both micro and macro-level factors are important for employee ownership 
durability. These factors are discussed in the chapter. 
1.7 Summary 
Through detailed case study accounts, this thesis aims to highlight the importance of the 
varying circumstances of ownership for future studies of ESO and outcomes of EP, 
organisational commitment, industrial relations and company durability. Given the 
experiences of the UK bus industry, a recognition by employers and policy makers of the 
'diversity of ownership' is vital if ESO is to become a viable and durable strategy for 
organisations in the future. Measures by New Labour to encourage widespread ESO in 
the UK, such as the extension of tax benefits (see Chapter 2), make this recognition 
particularly important. Valuable lessons can be learned from the experiences of the 
companies presented in this study, given the diversity that characterised ESO in the bus 
industry for more than a decade. 
13 
2.0 The development and diffusion of employee share ownership 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 charts some of the key developments in and the diffusion of ESO during the 20th 
Century in the UK, other European states and in the US, while additionally looking at 
progress made in the early part of the 21 st Century. Discussions on some of the main forms 
of ESO, including ESOPs, direct ownership, workers' co-operatives and 'conventional' 
broad-based share schemes are presented alongside an overview of different political 
perspectives of ESO to have emerged over the past twenty-five years. 
2.1.1 Origins of employee share ownership 
ESO is not a recent phenomenon. Its roots can be traced back to the 19th Century and 
identified in the guild system, communal self-help associations, socialism and utopian 
movements (Poutsma et al 2003). During the early part of the 20 th Century, ESO began to 
evolve around the world as business leaders, stimulated by the writings of economic 
historians, recognised the appeal of using collective and co-operative efforts to build a better 
way of life. In 1912, the historian Catherine Webb speculated that 'by making an employee a 
shareholder in the business employing him ... it stimulates his zeal and careful working' 
(1912: 138). Some nine years after Webb's pronouncement, Ernest Bader founded the 
celluloid manufacturing company Scott Bader (the name incorporated his wife's maiden 
name with his own). Originally created as a family-owned and conventionally managed 
concern operating from a single site in central London, Scott Bader was to become one of the 
world's most significant and enduring examples of an 'employee-owned' company. In 1951, 
and with a workforce of around 160, Ernest Bader and other shareholders made the decision 
to 'gift' the company to its employees, both present and future. Bader held strong social 
beliefs and recognised that a world where 'capital' employed 'labour' was not sustainable. 
Rather, he believed that labour should employ capital, acknowledging the equality of 
everyone as individuals, and only a total restructuring of the way industry was managed 
would achieve this aim. A charitable trust, 'The Scott Bader Commonwealth Limited', was 
established to hold the shares of the company. Employees became trustees of the shares, 
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were able to participate in the direction of the company's activities by exercising the voting 
rights of those shares, and became eligible to sit on one of a number of elected bodies 
established to promote involvement, commitment and teamwork. 
A key element of the gift was a constitutional requirement that a minimum of 60 per cent of 
company profits had to be retained within the business for investment and development 
purposes. Of the remainder, up to a maximum of 20 per cent could be paid as a bonus to 
staff, with an equal, or potentially greater amount, given to charity. In this way, whenever 
employees benefited from the profits of their company, they were able to share their gains 
with those less fortunate. By 2001, the company had grown into a multi-national corporation 
with some 700 employees world-wide and was celebrating the 50th anniversary of its 
commonwealth structure (CTC 200 I). Membership of the Commonwealth and with it, co­
ownership of the company, remains open to all employees after a specified period of time. 
Employees are required to follow an education programme in the purposes of the 
Commonwealth, while confirmation of membership is given by the Commonwealth 
management board (Scott Bader 2003). 
Scott Bader is an early example of a wholly employee-owned enterprise originating in the 
UK. At the time of writing, the company has no external shareholders and remains totally 
independent. The constitutional requirements laid down in 1951 are also still in place. Over 
the years, substantial amounts of money have been allocated to charitable projects, including 
the provision of water to rural villages in Africa and India, health care clinics in South 
America and many schemes for the homeless in the UK. Throughout the 20th Century ESO 
emerged in a number of different guises, generally in response to political and economic 
changes such as shifts in government ideology and the privatisation of public utilities. 
Throughout the period there were numerous instances of co-partnership, common ownership, 
joint consultation and co-operative enterprises in distribution and manufacturing (Poutsma et 
al 2003; Wilson 1992). In addition to the UK bus companies that provide the focus for this 
thesis, a number of other and well-known organisations have, at different times and for 
different reasons, looked to ESO structures of some kind (see CTC 2001). The John Lewis 
Partnership, Tullis Russell, the National Freight Consortium (NFC), Tower Colliery and Baxi 
Partnership are among the more significant examples and discussions of these cases can be 
found in Bradley and Nejad (1989), Oakeshott (2000) and Pendleton (200 I ). 
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2.2 Structures of employee share ownership 
In their 1995 publication Managing Employee Involvement and Participation, Hyman and 
Mason said that the concept of financial involvement and participation (FIP) embraces 'a 
potentially rich variety of experiences' (p. 96). The authors identified a number of FIP 
'scenarios', ranging from management-determined monetary supplements to employee 
income at one extreme, through to full economic democracy at the other. Assessing the 
implications of the two extremes for employees, Hyman and Mason (1995) described how 
the former involved no or minimal shifts in capital ownership or organisational control, while 
the latter provided opportunities for plural ownership and social control of an enterprise or 
industry (see also Wright et al 1989). Research by Cotton (1993), Heller et al (1998) 
Oakeshott (2000), Pendleton (2001), Pierce et al (1991), Shperling and Rousseau (2001) and 
Trewhitt (1999a) among others, has similarly examined in detail the different forms of ESO 
and implications for employee control and participation in the workplace. Pierce et al (1991 ) 
proposed that the actual form of ownership had implications for the formal dimensions of an 
ownership system and moreover, for the 'ownership expectations' and 'ownership rights and 
responsibilities' (p. 125) created in the minds of employee owners, as well as those who 
managed the ownership system. More recently, in a comprehensive study of ESOPs, 
participation and governance in the UK, Pendleton (2001: 80) examined how 'the interaction 
of contexts, company characteristics, and actors' objectives' had a powerful effect upon the 
level and type of ownership in organisations (see also Pendleton et al 1995a). 
The recognition that ESO encompasses 'a myriad of meanings' (Rodgers 2003: 1) is not new, 
however. One of the most significant pieces of research in the area was undertaken almost 
twenty-five years ago by Toscano (1983), who observed that an awareness and understanding 
of ownership variation was necessary to 'help explain possible discrepancies in the findings 
of researchers who study sLlch companies' (p. 598). The author had examined a number of 
earlier ownership studies (see for example, Hammer and Stern 1980; Livingston and Henry 
1980; Ross 1980) and on the basis of their findings, concluded that links between ESO, 
increased work satisfaction and improvements to productivity and profitability were not 
inevitable. Rather, the 'form of ownership' was far more likely to be responsible for 
discrepancies found among the conclusions of various studies. 
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Toscano (1983) developed a 'typology of employee ownership' to help explain why 'workers 
in some employee-owned companies have dramatically different attitudes toward their work 
and their firm than do their counterparts in other companies so organised' (p. 598). The 
'typology' identified three general types of ESO - 'worker co-operatives', 'ESOPs' and 
'direct ownership' - and compared each type according to 'eight classificatory factors' (p. 
581). Toscano (1983) claimed that use of the eight factors, shown in Table 1 below, 
permitted comparisons of the different forms of ESO and allowed for identification of the 
most significant types. Moreover, the typology was intended to help raise understanding as 
to how and why different ESO structures have "fundamentally different implications for the 
worker, workplace and the economy' (p. 583). The eight factors are interlinked and need to 
be considered collectively by those seeking to bring ESO into their own organisations to 
ensure that the model chosen is ultimately consistent with the goals ofthe enterprise. 
Table 1: Employee ownership classificatory criteria 
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• Principles that determine the nature of the decision-making process in the company 
Source: Toscano (1983: 584) 
Addressing the first factor - the role that shares play in employee-owned companies -
Toscano (1983) identified three basic share functions. First, shares reflect through their 
market price the value of the company. In most conventional capitalist enterprises, the share 
value rises and falls according to the company's general economic conditions, thereby 
reflecting the 'value' of the company. Second, shares entitle the shareholder to a portion of 
the company's profits, either in the form of a dividend or share appreciation. Third, shares 
may carry voting rights in the company and consequently, a legal right to control the 
company. In such cases the 'formal power of the shareholder' (Toscano 1983: 584) is linked 
to the number of shares held according to the principle of one share, one Yote. 
The way in which employee shareholders perceive their own role as 'owners' of the 
enterprise, however, may be influenced by the manner in which shares are purchased or 
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acquired by employees at the outset and subsequently, the manner in which the shares are 
held. In some employee-owned companies, employees buy their shares directly at the market 
value; they may be looking simply for an investment, seek no actual control of the enterprise 
and the vesting of ownership rights is immediate upon selling the shares. Alternatively, 
shares can be purchased and then exercised at a rate lower than the market rate, although this 
kind of acquisition is generally reserved for managerial employees and does 'not usually 
bring majority employee ownership to companies' (Toscano 1983: 586). A third 
arrangement, generally found among ESOP enterprises, involves transferring the shares to an 
EBT and then distributing them to employees over a period of years. Employees are not 
required to make a financial investment and share concentration is often on the basis of 
seniority. The result has generally been the acquisition of a majority of employee-held stock 
by senior managers, although there are exceptions among some of the case studies presented 
in the thesis and these are discussed more fully in Chapter 5. Equal share distributions are 
most likely to be found in worker co-operatives, where employees may be required to 
purchase one or a number of shares in order to work in the company, gain rights to participate 
in its decision-making processes and acquire a portion of the profits. 
Thus, the nature of the ESO structure and the way in which shares are 'managed' within an 
employee-owned enterprise can have a clear impact upon employees' 'feelings of 
ownership', and moreover, help to explain the contrasting findings of researchers who have 
undertaken studies of employee-owned companies. Toscano (1983) argued that the more 
'indirect' ESOP arrangements could result in employees feeling lesser degrees of 
identification with their finn and perceiving that they had little control within it. Even in 
situations where employees were able to acquire a majority of the stock in an ESOP company 
over a period of time, vesting could take up to ten years. Conversely where ownership was 
direct, vesting of ownership rights could occur immediately when the shares were sold. 
At the same time, since ESO has perhaps been used to counter a plant closure (see Heller et al 
1998), or introduced as a management tool designed to raise employee productivity, its 
presence may rarely alter the 'role' that shares play in an enterprise. There are 'dramatic 
implications', (Toscano 1983: 585), however, for the ability of employee-owned companies 
to maintain their 'distinctiveness' and bring a measure of democratic governance to the 
workplace. Ironically, problems in maintaining ESO often increase as the enterprise becomes 
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more profitable and employees seek to sell or transfer their shares during or after their 
employment. Employees who are planning to retire may experience problems in 'marketing' 
their shares to younger workers if the shares, in reflecting the firm's higher value, become too 
expensive for incoming staff to purchase. Moreover, in situations where employee-owned 
companies are required to purchase the shares of their retiring employees, expensive stock 
may become a severe financial drain (see Oakeshott 2000). Provisions set down for outside 
investors to hold shares in the company may become particularly significant, therefore, when 
the extension ofemployee ownership to new employees is based on their ability to buy shares. 
Retiring employees may have little option but to sell to outside investors who could 
eventually succeed in acquiring enough stock to gain overall control of the enterprise. Any 
developments, therefore, that are encouraged by a legal structure linking the value of shares 
to the financial condition of the company, may ultimately lead to a 'degeneration' of ESO 
(Toscano 1983: 585) as employees gradually sell their shares 'outside' of the enterprise (also 
see Ben-Ner 1988). 
Finally, ESO arrangements also differ according to the principles that determine control over 
decision-making processes in the company. While effective control of the company may be 
in the hands of senior managers, ultimate control in a legal sense remains the province of the 
shareholders and this is true for most though not all companies in which ESO plays a role. In 
the main, these companies depart little in their legal structure or operations from conventional 
capitalist enterprises, with the exception that employees hold shares in the company. Formal 
rights to participate in decision-making processes are derived from the control of capital 
rather than from the performance of work, though there may be variations. In some ESOP 
firms, shares allocated to employees carry no voting power and control of the company may 
be linked to ownership of a certain category of capital. There are also differences in how 
legal control is exercised. In most companies where employee-held shares carry voting 
rights, control of the firm is determined on the basis of the number of shares held, according 
to the regulation of one share, one vote. Toscano (1983) commented that the presence of 
employees' legal rights to control their company via ownership arrangements should not be 
taken as evidence that they actually do so. In reality, employees transfer control rights to 
managers and develop little interest in participating in decision-making as long as their 
investment is protected (see French 1987). Management may often nurture this inactivity 
through subtle manipulation of information or by a reluctance to involve other employees in 
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corporate affairs (see Gates 1998; Hammer and Stem 1980; Mulder and Wilke 1970; 
Pateman 1970). (Aspects of Toscano's typology are developed further in Chapters 5 to 8 
within the context of discussions of the different models of ESO presented in this thesis). 
Using the eight-point criteria, Toscano (1983) then isolated the three general forms of ESO 
arrangement - worker co-operatives, ESOPs and direct employee ownership - and a number 
of subtypes within each. Heller et al (1998) observed that, in practice, the three forms 
overlap and differ mainly in the extent of ESO within the organisation, the purposes for 
which ESO has been established and the level of actual EP. 
2.2.1 Worker co-operatives 
'If democracy is the most advanced, most adult form of government, then the 
worker-led co-operative may reasonably claim to be the most advanced, most 
adult, form of business enterprise. In other words the worker-led co-operative 
can be thought of as representing the ideal "platonic type" of employee-owned 
business.' 
Oakeshott (2000: 109) 
True worker co-operatives satisfY the three basic principles that all employees are owners, 
only employees are owners and every employee owner has an equal say in making major 
decisions connected with the business through voting rights and by electing the board of 
directors (Heller et al 1998; Toscano 1983). In practice, few business ventures legally 
formed as co-operatives, or nominally caIled co-operatives, actually comply with these 
principles. Employees often exert relatively little influence and many co-operatives hire non­
members, at least for temporary jobs. Businesses are also typically very small, involving 
fewer than ten members (Pendleton 2001). 
As an organisational form, worker co-operatives have existed for more than 150 years - at 
least since the 1850s when they emerged in response to the dehumanising characteristics of 
the factory system in the early years of industrial capitalism. New factory-system methods 
were spreading into areas of business previously characterised by workshop production and 
dominated by skilled craftsmen, such as printing and boot and shoe making (Oakeshott 
2000). By becoming owners of their work organisations, employees were released from the 
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role of appendage to the machine and able instead to drive their own work activities and 
direct the overall policies of the firm (Pendleton 2001). Records show that several hundred 
co-operatives were set up in the UK before the First World War, remaining fairly stable in the 
inter-war period and then virtually disappearing after the 1950s. Co-operatives enjoyed a 
resurgence from the mid-1970s, however, increasing from around thirty to nearly 900 ten 
years later. Renewed enthusiasm was encouraged partly by the provision of some support 
from government and additionally, from a more general evolution of social values favouring 
democracy at work. The 1974-9 Labour Government passed the Industrial Common 
Ownership Act in 1976 to promote co-operatives in small-scale manufacturing enterprises 
and established the Co-operative Development Agency (CDA) in 1978 (Pendleton 2001). 
Labour local authorities provided further support to co-operatives in the 1980s by setting up 
local CDAs. 
Despite measures to encourage growth, however. fewer than one hundred businesses reached 
a substantial size or prospered for any length of time in the world's competitive markets 
during the 20th Century (Oakeshott 2000). Even in France and Italy, where 'thousands of 
them have been stalied - and are still being started' (Oakeshott 2000: 110), very few co­
operative enterprises have been long-term survivors. It has been documented extensively in 
the co-operative ownership literature that these businesses will likely degenerate over time. 
As early as 1914, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, social activists and founders of the Fabian 
Society, argued that co-operatives would fail because employees lacked the relevant 
commercial knowledge to manage them and because no one group would be able to co­
ordinate and control the activities of owner managers. More recently, Pendleton (200 I) 
identified the root of the problem as lying in the particular relationship between ownership, 
management and control. Employees 'as owners' not only have complete control of the 
direction of the business; they also typically expect close involvement in the management 
process, especially where self-management and personal development are important ideals in 
the firm. However, the emergence or appointment of professional and expert managers may 
become inhibited as a result. 
Furthermore, co-operatives may be regarded as a 'bad investment' generally. Financial 
problems can occur if members bring in too little capital at the outset, the co-operative is 
starved of investment and employees subsequently lose both their initial investment and their 
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job (Heller et al 1998). Conversely, if the business is successful, the present owners may 
hesitate to share their good fortune with newcomers and as the business expands new 
employees are denied ownership rights, the original owners become the 'bosses' and the 
organisation loses the unique characteristics that defined it as a co-operative. At the very 
least, members who are approaching retirement may be unable to find replacements to buy 
out their investment and elect instead to sell out to a capitalist organisation, or simply shut 
down. Moreover, economists have concluded that co-operative firms will not pursue profit­
maximising objectives, preferring to channel funds into wages that ought to be used for 
investment, thereby maximising revenue per employee rather than profits (see for example, 
Dow and Putterman 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1979). Nevertheless, Robinson and Wilson 
(1993) reported that co-operative members tended to pay themselves lower wages than the 
norm, this being a 'trade-off for employment stability and job security. Similarly, average 
managerial pay in co-operatives was found to be significantly lower than in small private 
firms, though this reinforces the argument that management may often be 'under-developed' 
in a co-operative structure. Notwithstanding, there is evidence to suggest that co-operatives 
can survive as long as small 'conventional' firms, if not longer (see for example Ben-Ner 
1984; 1988. At first, co-operatives are as productive as their capitalist counterparts and 
sometimes more so, particularly those displaying the most 'co-operative features' (Jones 
1984), although this advantage may decline over time (Estrin and Jones 1987). 
Among the more successful examples of co-operative organisations is the 'Mondragon' 
movement in Spain. Located in the Basque region, Mondragon comprises a network of co­
operatives, including manufacturing companies, a large savings bank and technical schools. 
Some 27,000 employee owners are involved and annual sales are around £1.3 billion. The 
general membership of each co-operative meets once a year to elect the board of directors, 
which then hires the rest of the management team (see Heller et al 1998). Each member has 
one vote although jobs are designed in traditional ways with little opportunity for input 
(Cotton 1993). Annual profits are divided three ways: between 10 and 15 per cent is used to 
benefit the community; 15 to 20 per cent goes into a reserve fund; and 70 per cent is 
distributed to members in proportion to the number of hours worked and their rate of pay. 
Profit share is not paid out in cash and instead goes into a fund while the interest is paid to 
members (Zwerdling 1984). During the 20th Century further prominent manifestations of co­
operative organisations included Yugoslav workers' councils and the Israel Kibbutz. More 
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detailed discussions can be found in Barkai (1977), Heller et al (1998), Helman (1992) and 
Rus (1984). 
2.2.2 Employee share ownership plans 
Whereas worker co-operatives take the form of 'labour-managed' businesses, ESOPs can be 
viewed as 'labour-governed' entities (Pendleton 2001). A clearly defined and specialised 
management function is able to operate within an ESOP company without undue day-to-day 
interference or intervention from employee owners. Moreover, since ESOPs permit a form of 
ownership where top managers can have disproportionate ownership rights over employees, 
the former may hold a substantial, possibly dominant role in governance. 
The first UK ESOP was established in 1987 at Roadchef - a motorway service and catering 
company. With the assistance of a loan from the trade union bank Unity Trust, around one­
quarter of the equity was purchased by an EBT and passed to the company's 850 employees 
(Pendleton et a11995a; Wright and Robbie 1992). Roadchefheralded the start ofa series of 
highly publicised ESOP ventures in the UK during the late 80s and early 90s. Managers saw 
ESOPs as a way of avoiding some of the problems associated with worker co-operatives, 
namely possible interference from employees (see Pendleton 200 I). Interest was similarly 
aroused in business, academic and political circles and in 1988, the ESOP Centre was 
established to promote and facilitate the growth of this ownership form in the UK. 
In the main, UK ESOPs have taken the form of 'case law' and, as the term indicates, evolved 
as a result of case law rather than statute (Oakeshott 2000). Case law ESOPs were developed 
in the mid 80s by employee ownership lobbyists and are the offspring of individual company 
initiatives to establish trusts, usually EBTs, for the benefit of their employees and then to 
make payments to them. The EBT acquires equity in a company, in most cases by purchase, 
generally using a loan repayable over five to ten years (Pendleton et al 1995a). In the main, 
Unity Trust was the source of funding for the early ESOPs, including a number of the bus 
company ESOPs, although a wider range of financial institutions became popular in the 
1990s (see McClean 1994). 
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Assuming a company has traded profitability, a portion of the profits is passed to a profit­
sharing trust (PST) each year to purchase shares from the EBT for distribution to the 
workforce. In most cases shares are distributed free of charge to employees in equal amounts 
or according to length of service, though there are no legal restrictions on the way shares are 
distributed and no legal requirement that shares are distributed at all (Pendleton 2001). 
Where the shares are transferred to employees, however, this may be done using an 
Approved Profit Sharing scheme (APS), an approved Sharesave scheme, a Company Share 
Ownership Plan (CSOP), or an unapproved share purchase or share option scheme. Most 
case law ESOPs have used an APS scheme, since it makes shares available to all employees 
reasonably quickly and provides tax benefits to recipients. The EBT then uses receipts from 
the share distribution to repay the original loan and also needs to purchase shares from 
departing employees if the sale of shares is restricted, so further loans or financial transfers 
from the company are necessary to finance these purchases. 
A second form of ESOP found in the UK is the 'statutory' ESOP, which was created amid 
concerns from ESOP campaigners that case law ESOPs were administratively complex and 
expensive to establish. Lobbying by representatives from all of the major political parties to 
provide ESOPs with a clearer legal identity (see Pendleton 200 I) culminated in the 
introduction in the 1989 Budget of the statutory ESOP, which received subsequent formal 
statutory backing in the Finance Act of that same year. Legislation provided for the creation 
of EBTs or Qualifying Employee Share Trusts (QUESTs) to acquire, hold and distribute 
equity. In addition, revisions to the Companies Act, also in 1989, considerably widened the 
scope for listed companies to provide loans and financial guarantees for the purchase of their 
own shares when the shares were to be used for ESO schemes. However, Section 132 of the 
Companies Act stipulated that financial assistance to an ESOP had to be given in 'good 
faith'. The proviso was put in place to prevent boards of companies abusing the ESOP by 
loaning large sums to the EBT to buy up shares and increase the employee shareholding in 
the company to an extent where it became unattractive to a bidding company (McClean 
1994). 
The statutory ESOP had tax advantages over the case law ESOP, mainly in relation to 
corporation tax, though conditions governing the trust composition were far more stringent 
for the former than the latter. Statutory ESOPs required that there be at least three trustees, 
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all of whom had to be UK residents and including at least one 'professional' person, such as a 
solicitor. Directors, or anyone with a material interest in the company, were precluded from 
trust membership while in addition, a majority of trustees had to be employees of the firm 
and selected by a majority of the whole workforce or by their elected representatives. These 
conditions, coupled with the requirement that shares held in trust had to be fully distributed to 
employees within seven years to qualify for tax relief, effectively prevented the take-up of the 
statutory ESOP over the next five years (Oakeshott 2000). In 1994, however, a new Finance 
Act extended the length of time for share distribution to twenty years and removed the 
requirement that a majority of trustees be drawn from the workforce. In addition, only half of 
the non-professional trustees had to be selected by the workforce or their representatives and 
where an election was held, trustees were elected by a simple majority of those voting, rather 
than from a majority of the entire workforce (Pendleton 2001). Moreover, QUESTS could be 
comprised of either individual trustees or a single UK corporate trustee, whose directors had 
to fulfil the same requirements as those set for individual trustees. Further legislation 
introduced in the 1996 Finance Act removed the requirement that beneficiaries had to have a 
minimum of one year's qualifying service. 
Support for ESOPs was maintained in New Labour's programme during the 1997 election and 
with a new Prime Minister seemingly committed to the promotion of a 'stakeholder' economy, 
there appeared at the time to be genuine grounds for optimism (see Oakeshott 2000). No 
specific policies were mentioned, however, and since gaining office, New Labour has 
concentrated on 'conventional' share schemes in genera1, rather than ESOPs in particular. 
This may be considered surprising, since ESOPs were seen as having the potential to achieve 
Labour's traditional goals of common ownership, industrial democracy and improved 
relationships at work, while using mechanisms that had attracted a considerable amount of 
support during the Thatcher years (Pendleton 2001). 
In the 1998 November Pre-Budget Report, the Government stated that its objective was to 
promote long-term shareholding by employees to build a stronger sense of partnership in 
industry and increase productivity. In a report from the Treasury in that same year, the 
Chancellor declared his aim 'to encourage the enterprise culture of team work in which 
everyone contributes and everyone benefits from success' and 'to double the number of 
companies in which all employees have the opportunity to hold shares'. A newall-employee 
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share plan (AESP) was incorporated into the Finance Act 2000. Announced in that year's 
budget, the Chancellor proposed that shares held in a QUEST could be transferred into a new 
trust formed to operate the new AESP without any tax clawbacks. Since there were no 
statutory requirements governing the composition of the new trusts, QUESTS could be more 
flexible in practice. Further details are given in section 2.3. 
Attempts to determine the current total number of 'actual' ESOPs in the UK are problematic: 
'ESOP companies tend to be subsumed within official statistics for the various statute-based 
forms of profit-sharing and share ownership, and no specific statistics exist for firms with 
substantial employee ownership' (Pendleton 2001: 3). The ESOP Centre includes in its 
definition of ESOPs 'all-employee share schemes', even though such schemes tend to 
facilitate transfer of relatively modest amounts of equity to employees, typically less than 5 
per cent. Furthermore, many employees in share-based profit-sharing schemes have 
preferred to take their rewards in cash rather than equity, thereby renouncing ownership 
rights (Pendleton 1992). Hence, schemes are usually marginal in character and have few 
discernible effects on the management of a company (Pendleton et al 1995a). True ESOPs in 
contrast can enable flows of up to one hundred per cent of equity and offer the potential for 
more advanced and extensive structures of EP in the workplace. 
By the mid-1990s, there were thought to be up to one hundred 'proper' ESOPs in the UK 
including around thirty statutory ESOPs, covering between 50,000 and 200,000 employees 
(see Wilson et al 1995). Prior to relaxation of the statutory framework in 1994, it is thought 
that fewer than five statutory ESOPs had been created (IRS Management Review 1998). 
However, Pendleton (200 I: 4) commented that figures were 'based on little more than 
inspired guesswork'. Moreover, after the mid-1990s, a large number of ESOP companies 
were sold on to other firms. There are now many more companies with ESOP structures, but 
most of them are using an ESOP in conjunction with al1-employee share schemes to secure a 
tax benefit, rather than as a means to transform ownership, governance and participation in 
the workplace. Currently, more than 2,000 UK organisations operate all-employee schemes 
covering in excess of3 million employees (ESOP Centre 2004). 
However, the first real wave of interest in ESOPs can be traced back more than fifty years to 
the US and the work of Louis Kelso - a San Francisco investment banker. Kelso argued that 
-
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everyone should own productive capital, ultimately building a personal estate, which would 
not only be more equitable but would also create support for a capitalist system. Growth and 
equity could therefore become mutually supportive policies, rather than being at opposite 
ends of a partisan seesaw. Kelso's ideas were set down in the 1958 publication The 
Capitalist Manifesto, where he declared that the best way to achieve his vision was 'to create 
a mechanism whereby corporate finance would automatically make workers into owners' 
(Rosen et al 1986: 14). However, it took a further fifteen years to convince employers that by 
using an ESOP they could improve productivity and obtain tax breaks: many were concerned 
that the US courts would rule any ESOP structure improper and thus 'make void' possible tax 
benefits. The breakthrough came in 1973 when Kelso met with the southern Democrat 
senator, Russell Long. At that time Long was chairman of the Senate's tax-writing 
committee and 'arguably the most powerful member of Congress' (Rosen et al 1986: 15). 
A year later, Long helped steer through Congress the Employee Retirement and Income 
Security Act, which made contributions to ESOPs tax deductible. What then folIowed from 
the mid-70s through to 1986 was the passing by US Congress of some fifteen pieces of 
legislation granting special tax advantages to ESOPs (Pendleton 2001; Young 1990). During 
the period, two kinds of ESOP were created - leveraged and unleveraged (Oakeshott 2000). 
In un leveraged cases, the costs of the shares transferred to employees were normally financed 
directly, with help from significant tax reliefs. For leveraged ESOPs, the money was 
borrowed and what the company paid for, again nonnally out of tax-relieved profits, was the 
subsequent stream of interest on those borrowings and their repayment. The general purpose 
of leveraged ESOPs was to buy large blocks of shares, with a view to the gradual allocation 
of those shares to employees and in many cases, to acquire 100 per cent of the equity capital. 
From 1974 through to the mid 80s, the total number of ESOPs grew from 300 to nearly 
11,000 and around one-third were estimated to be leveraged (Conte and Lawrence 1992). By 
1986, some 10 million US employees working in companies as diverse as an asbestos mine in 
Lowell, a furniture-manufacturing plant in New York, a knitting mill in Saratoga and a textile 
manufacturer in Lewiston were covered by ESOPs. Judged on take-up after 1974, therefore, 
US ESOP legislation could be regarded as a 'first-class success' (Oakeshott 2000: 496). 'Put 
simply, Long made it in the economic self-interest of owners to adopt share ownership' 
(Rosen et al 1986: 15). 
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Tax breaks are not the only explanation for ESOP growth during the period, however (see 
Conte and Lawrence 1992; Rosen et al 1986). By the end of the 1970s, it had become 
increasingly apparent that US companies needed to be as productive and efficient as possible 
if they were to survive in a much more competitive and global marketplace. In addition, a 
more educated workforce was beginning to demand more from their work than just a wage at 
the end of each month. Employers began to realise that if they could integrate employees 
more effectively into their companies, they could improve productivity and also meet 
employees' demands. Evidence from a number of studies undertaken during the 70s and 80s 
measuring the relationship between ESOP ownership and company performance indicated 
that, 'if linked up with appropriate schemes and policies of non-financial employee 
involvement, significant employee ownership can be followed by measurable improvements 
in performance' (Oakeshott 2000: 496). 'Significant' can be defined in two ways: firstly, for 
the individual employee, the ownership stake needs to be significant and worth considerably 
more than the value of a few days' wages; secondly, for employees as a group, the aggregate 
of ESO needs to be significant - such as to make the group's voice an important and even 
perhaps the dominant one in setting the long-term policies and objectives of the business. 
One study confirming the importance of participative management in ESOP companies was 
undertaken in 1986 by the National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) and based on 
evidence from forty-five ESOP companies and 225 non-ESOP companies (see Rosen et al 
1986). The study found that companies combining ESO with a participative management 
style grew between 8 per cent and II per cent faster per year than would otherwise have been 
expected, based on how they had performed prior to becoming ESOP companies. 
Subsequent studies by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) and by several academics in 
Washington and New York found the same relationship. In addition, studies examining 
participative management alone found a small positive impact on performance, but not 
sufficient to explain the synergy between ownership and participation found by the other 
studies (Oakeshott 2000). The relationship between ESO and company performance is 
discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Despite the findings of the NCEO and others, the number of US ESOPs declined after the 
mid-80s (Conte and Lawrence 1992) and this has been attributed to three main factors. First, 
in 1986, Congress decided to eliminate earlier tax-credit ESOP provisions. These provisions 
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had produced rather meagre amounts of ESO at a rather high tax cost and so Congress was 
quite easily persuaded to revoke them. The two remaining factors arose from changes in the 
economic rather than the tax climate in the second half of the 1980s. After the stock market 
crash in 1987, it was suggested that for some time thereafter, employers were reluctant to 
pass what would have been seen as undervalued shares to their employees. Moreover, as 
economic conditions became tougher, companies became less willing to use profits, even pre­
tax profits, to reward their employees with shares (Oakeshott 2000). 
As in the UK, discrepancies have also been recorded in relation to the number of 'proper' US 
ESOPs. Blasi and Kruse (1991) cited some 10,000 ESOP companies and 10.8 million 
employee shareholders in the US by the end of 1990. For the same period, Conte and 
Lawrence (1992) identified around 7,500 ESOP companies with just over 7 million 
participants. The difference is said to stem from the way in which ESOPs are defined in each 
case (Oakeshott 2000). Conte and Lawrence (1992) focused narrowly on companies with 
'actual' ESOP plans while figures from Blasi and Kruse (1991) included deferred profit­
sharing plans, employee stock-purchase plans and stock-bonus plans. The Blasi and Kruse 
(1991) figures also fixed the threshold of significance at only 4 per cent of the equity capital 
of a business being held by its employees. In many cases, the top management team alone 
could own that percentage of a firm's equity between them (Oakeshott 2000). By August 
2002, some 6,431 US companies with around 3.4 million employees were using actual 
ESOPs, worth a total estimated value of $58 billion (Blasi et al 2003). Figures are based on 
corporate filings to the US Department of Labor and the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Additionally, at the end of 2003, the NCEO calculated that the number of 
ESOPs, stock bonus and profit-sharing plans combined came to 11,000, with a value of more 
than $400 billion and involving 8.8 million employee participants. 
Oakeshott (2000) has observed that the relative stagnation of ESOP numbers in the US in the 
years after the mid 1980s should not obscure the fact 'that the phenomenon of the American 
ESOP dwarfs all experiences at other times and in other places' (p. 500). Compared with the 
US, government support for ESOPs and for other FIP schemes also has generally been far 
more limited in European Union (EU) member states such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Sweden. Where incentives do exist they are 
modest and range typically from tax-free issues of shares or bonds to employees, to tax-free 
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amounts on distributed profits, or a profitable change of the taxation basis (Poutsma and de 
Nijs 2003). During the 1990s, there were strong official appeals to Germany, Ireland, Italy 
and Spain to promote FIP schemes, including ESOPS, in the course of political negotiations 
and these appeals resulted in some successes. Germany substantially improved the possible 
revenues for employees and employers, Ireland developed a National Partnership Programme 
policy and the Belgian Government introduced its first raft of legislation on FIP schemes in 
2000. Blasi et al (2003) concluded that EU employee ownership would be more likely to 
develop if countries expanded citizen partnership in their public stock markets and created 
legislative support for selling smaller family businesses to employees. 
However, as well as the more practical legal arrangements, commentators have argued that 
differences across countries in the take-up of FIP schemes can be attributed to important 
variations in 'ownership philosophy' (see for example, Hyman and Mason 1995). Notably, 
and despite the findings of the GAO and NCEO studies which highlighted the importance of 
participative management for corporate performance in ESOP companies (see p. 28), US 
employee ownership is regarded in some quarters as being deficient in providing direct EP in 
corporate governance (see Blasi et al 2003; Hyman and Mason 1995). Instead, political 
values driving ESOP growth have 'been about the importance of spreading wealth rather than 
about shifting power at the place of work from the agents of capital to the shop floor' 
(Oakeshott 2000: 495; see also Klein and Rosen 1986). Moreover, since the first piece of 
legislation in 1974, US ESOPs have been largely associated with company retirement plans 
and 'have never totally shaken off their image of being a poor substitute for a pension plan' 
(Stevens 1991: 16; see also Hanford and Grasso 1991). Conversely, therefore, if US 
employees are to be provided with reasonable rights to protect their investment risk, the 
country needs to converge with the EU in terms of the latter's greater appreciation of co­
determination rights (Poutsma et al 2003). 
Within the UK, ESOPs have not been tied or related to company-based retirement schemes 
and have been promoted largely as a means of allowing and encouraging employees to 
become shareholders in their own companies. Further, unlike other tax-approved employee 
share schemes, ESOPs could offer majority shareholdings to employees and some observers 
have argued that this is the reason why employer-take-up in the UK has been relatively small 
(Hyman and Mason 1995). Complex statutory arrangements, coupled with associated fiscal 
30 
and legal advisory costs, acted as further deterrents for employers. Concerns were also raised 
about the requirement that the majority of the trust membership be selected by employees, 
thereby leading to possible trade union domination of trust activities (see Allen et al 1991; 
Labour Research 1990) and an undermining of the managerial prerogative (Hyman and 
Mason 1995). Notwithstanding, ESOPs have remained attractive to managers because they 
generally allow for 'conventional' management hierarchies and patterns of control to be 
maintained, unlike in many co-operatives. In addition, employers who were first attracted by 
the tax advantages of ESOPs, or by their 'defensive potential' (Oakeshott 2000: 501), may 
have later come to appreciate the more 'human opportunities' of increased EP and 
subsequently the greater commitment of employees to their organisation. 
ESOPs also provided a model for the type of ESO that trade unions could actively support 
(Pendleton 2001). Historically, the trade union movement had expressed concerns that ESO 
undermined trade union strength and solidarity by encouraging employees to identify with 
capital rather than with labour (Bradley and Nejad 1989; Pendleton et al 1995b). Thus, the 
separation between employee and employer was at risk of becoming blurred, thereby 
compromising the union role and resulting in the union being drawn into representing 
'owners' as well as employees (Pendleton 2001). Moreover, during the 1970s, the TUC had 
argued that FIP schemes gave employees little real control over managerial decisions, 
exposed them to risks that they were not, on the whole, well placed to shoulder and 
precipitated inequalities of wealth in organisations. By the late 19805 and in line with the 
Labour Party, these concerns had been overtaken by the recognition that ESOPs offered a 
way of sustaining the traditional role of union representation in the aftermath of privatisation 
(Pendleton 2001). In addition, the collective nature of shareholding in ESOPs allowed for an 
expansion of employee control of management decision-making (Pendleton et al 1995a; 
Pendleton 1992). The (now former) TUC General Secretary, John Monks, said that FIP was 
'not an alternative to the other elements of involvement and commitment' but instead, could 
complement them and was 'a useful way of recognising the work that employees have done 
in creating a profitable and successful company' (1998: 178). Further discussion on ESOPs 
and the involvement of the UK trade union movement is presented in Chapter 5. 
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2.2.3 Direct employee share ownership 
The third and final form of ownership identified by Toscano (1983) is 'direct ownership', 
which the author describes as an arrangement 'in which employees own stock in a company 
personally and individually' (p. 590). Pendleton (200 I) said that in practice, it was not 
always possible to make a clear distinction between ESOP arrangements and the direct 
acquisition of shares by employees, since 'case law' ESOPs allow for shares to be distributed 
using direct purchase mechanisms. Some companies have used a combination of ESOPs and 
direct share purchases, while others converting to ESO through direct ownership have then 
created an EST to buy back shares from employees when they leave the company (see 
Trewhitt 2000). 
In the strictest sense, many companies around the world may be defined as 'employee­
owned', in that employees hold at least some shares in the enterprise. However, there may be 
no link between the 'employee-owned' shares and company strategy, employee behaviours or 
other potential outcomes. The company may adhere to the traditional corporate governance 
arrangement that links ultimate control of the company to the ownership of capital (Toscano 
1983). Shares may be bought and sold at any time, thereby making it easy for an outside 
investor to gain gradual control of the company. Concentrations of ownership and control 
then emerge, frequently reSUlting in inequalities of participation. Cotton (1993) concluded 
that in order for ESO to be an important factor in direct ownership enterprises two conditions 
had to be met. First, employees needed to have sufficient control over their compa.ny to 
significantly influence its strategy and decisions: if only one employee owns one of several 
million shares, ESO exists but it is trivial. During the period of large-scale UK privatisation 
flotations in the 1980s, typically up to 5 per cent of equity was available to employees (see 
Nichols and O'Connell Davidson 1992; Pendleton 2001). Second. individual employee 
owners must perceive a significant stake in the company and feel that they have some 
influence. Pierce et al (1991) referred to this state as 'psychological ownership' (p. 122), 
whereby the integration ofthe employee owner into the ownership experience can result in a 
number of social-psychological and behavioural outcomes. 
Advocates of direct ESO have argued that the approach provides a more immediate and 
tangible sense of ownership than provided by most ESOPs. In addition, employees have to 
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finance the share acquisitions themselves and so bear a much higher degree of risk, thereby 
engendering a more 'responsible' form of ownership. Employees become much more aware 
of the importance of corporate success and the relevance of their own work behaviour to 
achieving that success (Pendleton et al 1995a, b). Hence, direct ownership can be 
particularly important in smaller firms where the percentage of shares owned by current 
employees can be large enough to influence the direction of the company and make 
employees feel involved (Cotton 1993: 203). ESO may still be eroded over time, however, if 
the company becomes 'too' successful and the shares increase in value to such an extent that 
employees can no longer afford to buy them and external investors have to be found. This 
issue is addressed further in Chapter 6. 
Pendleton (200 I) described the clearest form of direct purchase as one 'where employees 
subscribe directly to shares without any use of an ESOP or EBT' (p. 71). One example is the 
buy-out of the N FC in 1981, acquired initially by its management team by means of a highly 
leveraged buy-out. Shortly after the formal transfer out of public ownership had occurred, 
existing employees, their families and retired employees were then invited to subscribe to a 
substantial part of the equity of the new company. Some 9,000 employees invested in the 
business - around 40 per cent of the entire workforce - although little is known about the 
distribution of shares (Bradley and Nejad 1989; Oakeshott 2000). It is the UK bus industry, 
however, which has provided some of the most significant examples of 'substantial' ESO 
resulting from direct share purchases. During the late 80s and early 90s, a number of bus 
companies, including Luton and District, People's Provincial Buses and Chesterfield 
Transport, selected the direct ownership route after privatisation. 
2.3 Broad-based employee share ownership 
Within the UK, a further category of ESO, taking in profit-sharing and more broad-based 
ESO schemes such as SA YE, CSOPs, Enterprise Management Incentives (EMls) and AESPs, 
also merits examination. Schemes under the 'broad-based employee share ownership' 
umbrella became particularly widespread in the 1980s, encouraged by a raft of legislative 
measures and a culture of wider share ownership espoused by successive Conservative 
governments (Pendleton 200 I). Commentators have described the extension of ESO as 'a 
central tenet of Conservative beliefs' (Pendleton 200 I: 43) and as one of the party's 
'outstanding achievements' (Taylor 1988: 6) after 1979. Profit sharing and ESO schemes 
were seen by Conservatives, and by some economists also, to have three main positive 
elements. First, they increased employee morale and productivity by offering incentives. 
Second, they introduced much needed flexibility into pay packages and moved away from the 
concept of the 'fixed wage'. Third, they had an effect on the overall economy by 
undercutting inflationary forces involved in wage push bargaining (Gold 1991). 
It was the year 1978, however, that marked the major turning point for broad-based ESO in 
the UK. For the first time, a UK Government introduced and passed through Parliament a set 
of tax reliefs designed to encourage broadly-based 'all-employee share schemes' by allowing 
companies to allocate free ordinary shares and pay for them out of pre-tax profits. Known as 
'approved profit sharing', shares were placed in a PST for a minimum of two years and if 
employees retained them in trust for a further three years (one year after 1995), they attracted 
no income tax liability as a benefit from employment. Instead, employees were liable to 
capital gains tax on their growth in value. The Labour Government of the day, in association 
with its then Liberal partners, introduced the measures as part of the Finance Act 1978 
(Hyman and Mason 1995). 
Commentators have noted that, in the one hundred years prior to 1978, the UK's employee 
ownership record had perhaps been best explained by the fact that neither of the main 
political parties, Conservative or Labour, had shown any real enthusiasm for the concept (see 
for example, Oakeshott 2000; Pendleton 2001). The Conservative Party had been 'the voice 
of special interests' - firstly, 'of the landed and aristocratic interest' and later, 'managerial 
and paternalist capitalism' (Oakeshott 2000: 51). For Labour, ESO was an ineffective means 
of bringing about capital redistribution, providing little scope for employee influence in 
corporate decision-making and potentially undermining trade union representation. The 
agenda of the Labour movement for much of the 20th Century had been dominated by two 
objectives. The first was 'to secure legal recognition for trade unions and strengthen their 
legal rights' and the second was 'to bring dominant sectors of the economy into Government 
ownership and State control' (Oakeshott 2000: 49). It was not until the 1980s that Labour 
policy warmed towards all-employee share schemes and vocal support was given to ESOPs 
in particular, reflecting the substantial change in Labour's economic and industrial 
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philosophies and policies during the decade (Pendleton 2001). The Liberal Party, in contrast, 
had been associated with various pronouncements in support of ESO stretching back as far as 
the late 19th Century. Moreover, in a 1928 report on Britain's industrial future, the party 
identified the 'master-servant' relationship as one of the key sources of Britain's industrial 
unrest and poor performance (Benn 1928). A second area of discontent examined in the 
report related to the division of society into two quite different classes - those who eamed 
their living by working and those whose income derived mainly from the profits of that work 
(Oakeshott 2000). It was these two sources of discontent with 'conventional capitalism' that 
some sixty years later, ESO came to address. 
The Conservatives' election victory in 1979 signalled the start of a proliferation of employee 
share scheme initiatives that sat alongside a new era in industrial relations and the 
introduction of new management techniques in the workplace (see Guest and Hoque 1996; 
Pendleton 2001). In part, the new techniques, often subsumed under the title of 'employee 
involvement' (EI), lay claim to fundamentally tra.nsforming the climate of labour­
management relations (see for example Metcalf 1989), signifying a move away from' labour­
driven' initiatives to programmes 'advanced and operated by practical managers' (Hyman 
and Mason 1995: 1). The reduction of trade union power was seen as 'central to Thatcherite 
ambitions' (Dunn and Metcalf 1996: 67) and was centred around the argument that a free 
market economy could only operate effectively if unhindered by the distorting effects of 
collective trade union behaviour. Based on the writings of the Austrian economist Friedrich 
Hayek, Dunn and Metcalf (1996: 68) described the Conservative argument thus: 
'Left to itself [a competItIve market] distributes rewards according to individual 
energy, talent, skill, risk and luck. Its manipulation, whether by the State, or by 
private monopolies and cartels (notably unions in pursuit of fairness, equality, security 
or a share of rents), invariably tends towards coercion. Individuals become subjugated 
to a collective will and additionally, in restricting enterprise, such manipulation 
restricts those entrepreneurs who thrive on risk. And in interfering with complex 
processes, it causes a misallocation of resources. The result is a poorer economy and a 
less free society than would exist if the market were left to its own devices.' 
Hayek's argument can also be used to explain Conservative hostility to nationalisation and 
public ownership, and why, by the end of the 1980s, the public enterprise sector had changed 
almost beyond recognition (Ferner 1989). During the period a large number of public 
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corporations were privatised and employment in the sector fell by 59 per cent from just over 
two million in 1979 to under 850,000 in 1989 (Beaumont 1992). The corporations that 
remained in public ownership had witnessed 'far-reaching changes in their industrial relations 
landscape' (Ferner 1989: 1). Pendleton and Winterton (1993: 8) described the Thatcherite 
critique of public enterprise as being 'formed of ideological, economic and industrial 
relations components which were substantially interrelated but which have had varying 
priority at particular times'. However, the underlying belief driving the Conservative 
privatisation programme was that the more extensive the functions of government, the greater 
the restrictions on the public's freedom of choice. Moreover, nationalised industries were 
viewed as inherently bureaucratic, which meant that, by definition, entrepreneurial initiative 
was largely absent. Businesses were also unable to respond fully to consumer preferences 
and were generally under little pressure to do so since most were monopolistic organisations. 
A further key element of Conservative policy during the Thatcher years, deregulation, led to 
the repeal or rescission of a number of statutory protections regulating labour and product 
markets. One such protection, Schedule 11, enabled unions to take to arbitration employers 
whose rates of pay were below the recognised industry norm. Schedule II had been used to 
protect the wages of bus company employees by limiting the extent to which private 
operators could undercut publicly-owned bus companies when tendering for contracted 
servIces. The 1980 Transport Act, which deregulated long-distance coach services and 
weakened the powers of Traffic Commissioners to exclude new entrants from stage carriage 
services, could be viewed as an attempt to weaken the privileged position of employees in 
publicly-owned companies (Pendleton and Winterton 1993). The 1985 Transport Act, which 
almost entirely deregulated bus services outside of London, was seen to accelerate the 
process. Deregulation in the UK bus industry during the 1980s is addressed more fully in 
Chapter 5. 
The emergence of EI in the early 1980s as a means by which to meet managerial objectives 
began to overtake many of the standard texts on ID and EP (see for example Cotton 1993; 
Hyman and Mason 1995; Poole 1986; Schuller 1985). EI was said to offer a 'less specific, 
milder and more general connotation' than ID and EP (Marchington et al 1992: 5). The latter 
were more closely oriented to an examination of how pluralistic concerns could best be 
promoted through representation and negotiation between collective entities such as trade 
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unions and employers (see Farnham and Pimlott 1995). Commenting on the differences, 
Marchington (1995) said that EI started from the assumption that 'managers might see the 
advantage of allowing employees to become involved', while the source of ID and EP lay' in 
the right ofthe governed to exercise some control over those in authority' (p. 282). 
Conceptually, EI tends to be an amalgam of US human relations management techniques that 
date back to the 1920s and are derived from the Japanese management methods of consensus 
management, compliant trade unions, total quality awareness and a seniority-based reward 
and promotion system (see Hyman and Mason 1995; Ouchi 1981). EI acquired greater 
prominence during the 1980s, however, within the rubric of 'human resource management' 
(l-IRM), which emerged as a possible solution to the challenge of an increasingly competitive 
national and international industrial environment (Guest and Hoque 1996). Storey (1995) 
defined HRM as 'a distinctive approach to employment management which seeks to achieve 
competitive advantage through the strategic deployment of a highly committed and capable 
workforce, using an integrated array of cultural, structural and personnel techniques' (p. 5). 
Perhaps more pertinently, Guest and Hoque (1996) observed that HRM 'generally conjures 
up an image of a high technology non-union environment' (p. 11). Essentially unitarist in 
nature, writings on the subject have often seen trade unions relegated to a very minor role 
(see for example, Miles and Snow 1984, Schuller 1989; Tichy et al 1984). 
Within the HRM rubric, EI has been associated with a 'softer' variant of the concept. The 
'soft' HRM model emphasises the 'human' aspect of the term and thus advocates investment 
in training and development, plus the adoption of commitment strategies to ensure that 
highly-skilled and loyal employees give the organisation a competitive advantage. In turn, 
definitions of EI have stressed the opportunities available for employees to influence and 
where appropriate, take part in decision-making on matters that affect them, thus going 
beyond simple performance of the contractual wage/work bargain (Hyman and Mason 1995; 
Marchington et al 1992). The 'hard' HRM model, in contrast, focuses on the 'resource' 
aspect and adopts a more rational approach to managing employees in aligning business and 
HR strategy while viewing people as a cost that must be controlled (Bratton 1999). 
Despite its association with the 'softer' HRM model EI remains an approach that has been 
described as 'redolent of employer initiatives' (Marchington 1995: 282). Employers are able 
37 
to define and limit the terms under which EI is introduced and gear their operations to 
strengthen the' individualisation' of employment relations (Sisson 1993). Broad-based share 
ownership schemes, for example, do not provide the rights or the basis for employees to take 
responsibility for the management of their company. Rather, such schemes can be viewed as 
an 'individualist' form of involvement and primarily as a form of remuneration 'rather than a 
means of fostering partnership and developing employee ownership' (Pendleton 200 I: 32; 
see also Creigh et al 1981; Heller et al 1998; McClean 1994; Rosen 1984). 
Possibly for these reasons, support for ESOPs during the 1990s was somewhat limited and 
conditional, or as described by Oakeshott (2000: 58), 'at a rather low level of intensity'. 
Conservatives regarded ESOPs primarily as a means for spreading wealth rather than as a 
route towards 10. Moreover, given that by 1990 several important battles had been won 
against the trade union movement (see Cox and Parkinson 1999; Dunn and Metcalf 1996), 
the Conservative Government of the time was wary of providing new mechanisms to give 
employees a collective voice. Similarly, preferential terms for employee buy-outs (EBOs) 
during some parts of the privatisation programme were very much conditioned by the 
specific objectives and context of particular initiatives. In the bus industry, the promotion of 
competition was a central element of government policy and further, there was a danger that 
open sales would lead to further market dominance by a small number of large companies. 
At the same time, given the 'open' and 'voluntaristic' approach advocated by successive 
Conservative governments of the 80s and 90s that UK employers knew best how to run their 
own businesses without interference from the State, enabling legislation for employees 
partaking in share programmes was itself significant (see Marcil ington 1995). 
Up until 1996, the only legal obligation upon employers to introduce some kind of EI to their 
workplace had been contained in Section One of the UK Employment Act 1982. Companies 
employing over 250 employees were required to state in their annual reports details of any 
initiatives they had implemented to promote E1 (Hyman and Mason 1995; see also 
Marchington 1995). The legal pressures on employers via this route were negligible, 
however, (Marchington 1992) and contrasted starkly with the more formal and legalised 
approach of the UK's European partners, which placed greater emphasis on 'processes' of EP 
such as consensus-building collective forums (Hyman and Mason 1995). Moreover, opt-out 
of the European Social Chapter meant that UK businesses were under no obligation to adhere 
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to some of the terms set down in the European Works Councils (EWC) Directive introduced 
on 22 September 1996. Under the terms of the Directive, companies in EU Member States 
with at least 1,000 employees and a minimum of 150 employees in each of two or more 
Member States, were required to establish an EWC or equivalent procedure for the purposes 
of informing and consulting with employees. Despite Britain's 'opt-out', many UK-owned 
multi-nationals were obliged to set up an EWC of their subsidiaries if operations met the 
Directive's workforce criteria in other European countries. In December 1997 the Directive 
was extended to cover the UK and subsequently implemented in the Transnational 
Information and Consultation of Employee Regulations 1999. Implementation of the second 
Directive meant that UK employers had to be included in present and future EWC 
agreements. The Regulations finally came into force on 15 January 2000 although the 
Government claimed that in many cases, UK employees in both UK-based and non-UK 
undertakings had already been voluntarily included in EWC arrangements concluded by 
undertakings subject to the original Directive (Department of Trade and Industry (DT!) 
2004). 
Broad-based share schemes have received more ringing political endorsements than any other 
form of EI as illustrated by a succession of Finance Acts providing statutory support for cash­
based profit sharing, deferred share-based profit sharing and various kinds of share option 
scheme. SA YE schemes and CSOPs brought in under the Finance Acts of 1980, 1984 and 
1995, for example, attracted tax concessions and more detailed discussions about the 
operation of these schemes can be found in Hyman and Mason (1995), McClean (1994), 
Oakeshott (2000), Pendleton (2001) and on the Inland Revenue website. 
Since 1997, New Labour's rationale for ESO has been expressed in terms virtually identical 
to those used by the Conservatives, except that 'the language of "partnership" has replaced 
that of "popular capitalism" in discussions of the broader context' (Pendleton 2001: 53). 
However, the argument that share schemes align the interests of employees with those of 
their firm and increase commitment to the organisation remains the same. While the New 
Labour focus has been on 'conventional' share schemes, 'no major innovations have been 
introduced to stimulate the growth of ESOPs' (Pendleton 2001: 54). However, the AESP, 
introduced in the Finance Act of 2000, can in principle operate in conjunction with an ESOP 
trust. Shares held in a statutory ESOP trust can be passed to a trust set up under the 2000 
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legislation without the loss of tax benefits granted earlier to the ESOP. Provision for rollover 
relief to owners selling shares to a statutory ESOP has also been incorporated into the 
legislation. Under the AESP, free shares are passed to employees who also have the 
opportunity to buy shares from pre-tax income, which can be a combination of 'matching'. 
'partnership' or 'dividend'. Shares purchased by employees are free of income tax and social 
security contributions if held for five years. Amendments to the AESP were brought in under 
the Employee Share Scheme Act 2002, including an early corporation tax deduction for 
companies on the money paid to an AESP, provided the AESP trustees used the money to 
acquire shares in the company (Inland Revenue 2004). EMI plans were a further New 
Labour share initiative introduced in the Finance Act 2000. The plan permitted a maximum 
£ 100,000 worth of options (later increased to £3 million in the 2001 Budget) to be made 
available to up to fifteen selected employees in small and medium-sized enterprises with 
gross assets below £15 million (Inland Revenue 2004). More recently, measures to simplify 
share schemes legislation and reduce the administrative and regulatory burden on companies 
with CSOPs, SA YE schemes and AESPs were introduced in the Finance Act 2003. 
Pendleton (2001) observed that perhaps the main difference between Conservative and New 
Labour approaches to ESO was the latter's recognition of the importance of mechanisms of 
EP used in conjunction with ESO to help realise productivity benefits. Labour's orientation 
to ESOPs, for example, was conditioned by its support for extensions of 10, its traditional 
relationship with the trade union movement, its suspicion of popular capitalism during the 
1980s and its evolving policy on public ownership. Nevertheless, current legislation still fails 
to define or stipulate those mechanisms of participation that should be conjoined with ESO 
schemes. In this sense, the legislation remains in the same tradition as that brought in by the 
Conservatives and in keeping with the traditional reluctance on the part of UK governments 
to introduce EP via statutory means. 
Some key changes are due in 2005. First, a new accounting standard, 'IFRS 2', will be 
introduced Europe-wide on I January 2005. The standard was issued in February 2004 and 
requires that a charge be made to the profit and loss account on all invested options granted 
after 1 November 2002. Previollsly, a charge had only been made in exceptional 
circumstances, reSUlting in understated expenses and overstated profits. The purpose of IFRS 
2 is to ensure that companies recognise the associated expenses of ESO schemes. Second, 
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the EU Employee Consultation Directive is set for implementation in March 2005, though it 
is open to debate whether UK employees and EP lobbyists have reason to be optimistic. 
Outlined in the Official Journal of the European Communities on 23 March 2002, the terms 
of the Directive establish 'a general framework setting out minimum requirements for the 
right to information and consultation of employees in undertakings or establishments within 
the European Union' (lPA 2002: 1). For the first time, UK employees will have a general 
legal framework for the sharing of information and consultation. The Directive applies to 
companies with fifty or more employees in a single Member State. However, the UK 
Government succeeded in negotiating some compromises to the Directive, thereby allowing 
for phased implementation. Thus, the terms will only apply to UK undertakings with 150 or 
more employees from March 2005, to those with one hundred or more employees from 
March 2007 and those with fifty or more from March 2008. Significantly, 'much about the 
text of the Directive leaves Member States and/or individual establishments or undertakings a 
high degree of discretion in implementing its key requirements' (lPA 2002: 3). Moreover, 
the UK Government has stated that information and consultation arrangements will not be 
imposed on workforces, but will give those who want it the right to information and 
consultation. Guidance from the DTI in relation to interpretative issues of the Directive was 
subject to a process of public consultation ending on 22 October 2004. Commenting on the 
amendments secured by the UK Government, the CBI's Deputy Director General, John 
Cridland, remarked: 
'The Government has done well to stop damaging European Parliament proposals that 
would have wrecked a finely balanced compromise. We oppose EU intervention in 
national rules on employee involvement as a matter of principle. But we recognise that 
ministers have negotiated the least damaging deal available. It is important that the 
Directive is now implemented in a way that helps rather than hinders genuine 
employee involvement' (DT! 2004). 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has outlined some of the key developments in ESO and suggested that at best, it 
has had a somewhat chequered history. Much has been written about the potential of ESO to 
'transform' the employment relationship and bring about productivity benefits by increasing 
the commitment of employees to their organisation. Researchers have also indicated, 
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however, that ESO can comprise a multitude of meanings and experiences which in turn, may 
affect both organisational and employee outcomes: Toscano's (1983) typology of ownership, 
which identified eight interlinking factors to be considered by employers seeking to 
implement a programme of ESO in their own organisations, remains one of the most 
significant pieces of research in this area. 
Early sections of the chapter discussed the main features of the systems of ESO identified by 
Toscano and the reasons why some models more than others tend to provide greater 
opportunities for employees to exercise influence in their place of work. Worker co­
operatives, for example, have been described in some quarters as representing the' ideal' 
form of ESO in that they satisfY a number of key principles: all employees are owners; only 
employees are owners; and every employee has an equal say in making major decisions 
connected with the business. In practice, few co-operative ventures have complied with the 
three principles although the Mondragon group of co-operatives is a significant exception. 
Whereas worker co-operatives have, at least in theory, taken the form of labour-managed 
businesses, ESOP organisations are seen to be labour-governed entities: managers are largely 
able to carry out their responsibilities without 'interference' from employee owners and often 
have disproportionate ownership rights. As discussed earlier in the chapter, aspects of 
Toscano's typology are developed further in Chapters 5 to 8 within the context of discussions 
of the different models ofESO presented in this thesis. 
The chapter concluded with an examination of a further category of ESO, which in recent 
years has been championed by UK Conservative and Labour governments alike. Broad­
based share ownership, including profit-sharing and SA YE, is essentially unitarist in nature 
and is not intended to provide any rights for employees in terms of greater influence in the 
workplace. Unlike other EU member states which have placed greater emphasis on EP and 
consensus-building collective forums, UK governments have remained wary of giving 
employees a collective voice, although New Labour has shown its support for extensions of 
10, albeit without the introduction of new assisting legislation. Further discussion on the 
'political context' of ESO can be found in Chapter 5, while Chapter 3 examines in more 
detail some of the main arguments surrounding ESO with a critical review of the key 
literature. 
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3.0 Employee share ownership: theoretical and empirical outcomes 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the last three decades empirical studies have examined I inkages between ESO and a 
number of different variables, including: organisational productivity and profitability: 
employment stability and job creation: organisational survival; EP; organisational 
commitment; and industrial relations. Emanating largely from the US and Canada, but 
also from Europe and more recently Asia and Africa (see for example Keef 1998; Wright 
et al 2000), studies have examined various forms of ownership structure. A variety of 
methodological approaches have also been used: some researchers have undertaken 
'snap-shot' cross-sectional qualitative and quantitative 'comparisons' between 
companies with and without ownership plans; others have taken a longitudinal approach, 
involving on-going investigations of employee-owned enterprises. There is also a 
considerable body of theoretical work on the subject, which focuses largely on the ways 
in which ESO operates in organisations and results in certain outcomes, particularly 
greater satisfaction among employees with both their work and the ESO scheme in place. 
The purpose of this chapter is to present some of the seminal theoretical and empirical 
ESO literature from the last twenty-five years, outlining the main themes to have 
emerged and identifying issues that have been raised, though not always addressed, in 
previous studies. Within the context of the current research the chapter provides an 
overview of the ESO literature to have addressed: EP in decisions within employee­
owned companies; workplace industrial relations outcomes; and ESO durability. The 
key themes addressed in the chapter are outlined briefly in section 3.2 below while issues 
relating to the methodological approaches of earlier studies are also highlighted. The 
chapter goes on to discuss the main research areas in more detail and concludes with an 
overview of the research questions to be addressed in Chapters 6 to 8. 
3.2 Overview of key themes 
Pendleton et al (1998) observed that most of those advocating ESO do so on the basis of 
a three-part argument involving changes in the attitudes of employees, their behaviours 
and ultimately, in the performance of the organisation. Firstly, it is suggested that ESO 
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will generate more 'favourable' attitudes among employees to their organisation and 
reduce any feelings of 'them and us' between employees and their managers (Kelly and 
Kelly 1991). Subsequently, a 'commonality' of goals (Wilson 1992: 27) between the two 
sides will emerge and lead to a greater level of organisational commitment, though 
perhaps at the expense of commitment to the employees' trade union (Poole and Jenkins 
1990). Specifically, ESO may 'signal and confirm' (Hyman and Mason 1995: 104) 
management assertions that they and their employees are on the same side (Copeman et 
al 1984), thereby helping to encourage co-operation and foster positive attitudes to work 
and management decision-making (see also French and Rosenstein 1984; Hammer et al 
1982; Long 1981, 1979, 1978a, b). 
Second, changes in employee behaviour including greater personal effort. increased 
scrutiny of colleagues' work behaviour and a reduced propensity to leave the 
organisation, will follow (Pendleton et al \998). A lower turnover rate may also lead to 
an increase in the average skill level present within a company over a period of time for a 
given investment in training (Wilson 1992). Companies, in turn, will be more likely to 
encourage additional investments in firm-specific skills or human capital. If businesses 
with some degree of ESO are better able to retain employees, then it may also be the case 
that these same businesses will be better placed to attract high-quality workforces. Third, 
positive changes in employees' behaviour will subsequently be reflected in 
improvements to company performance as measured, for example, by increased 
productivity and profitability (see Blasi and Kruse 2001; Conte and Tannenbaum 1978; 
Estrin and Jones 1992; Logue and Yates 2001). 
Pendleton et al (1998) concluded, however, that attempts to trace the three-stage' attitude­
behaviour-performance' linkage are often fraught with 'conceptual and methodological 
difficulties' (p. 101). Few researchers have attempted to trace all three stages in a single 
investigation, preferring instead to concentrate on investigating linkages between two of 
the stages and assuming that the third will follow more or less as predicted. In addition, 
many researchers have 'fought shy of the attitude-behaviour link since this is an 
especially complex and contested linkage' (ibid), although there are exceptions including 
Rhodes and Steers (1981) and more recently, Logue and Yates (2001) Pendleton et al 
(2001), Pierce et al (2001) and Rodgers (2003). 
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A tendency to consider all forms of ownership in the same way, while failing to take 
account of 'contextual' and 'ownership' differences in organisations, has also been a 
feature of some ESO studies (see Trewhitt 2000, 1999a, 199b for relevant discussion). In 
general, few researchers have attempted the conceptual or empirical work of comparing 
and contrasting employee attitudes and behaviours across different ownership systems, 
which would help to identify the conditions whereby ESO produced positive social­
psychological and behavioural effects (Klein 1987). Toscano (1983) observed that 
'different forms of employee ownership have different effects on companies and their 
workforces' and 'without this recognition, subsequent research and policy 
recommendations will suffer' (p. 581). 
Klein (1987) identified three approaches typically used by researchers in the US to study 
ESO and its effects: examining the relationship between employee attitudes and the 
number of shares owned by individuals (see French and Rosenstein 1984; Hammer and 
Stern 1980); comparing the attitudes of 'employee owners' and 'non-owners' (Long 
1978a; Tucker et al 1989) and comparing matched 'employee-owned' and 'non employee­
owned' businesses (Rhodes and Steers 1981; Russell et al 1979. Across the three 
approaches, research has often produced inconsistent and thus inconclusive results, while 
'generalisability' has also been limited. Studies have often been based on small single­
site samples of worker co-operatives, direct purchase EBOs, or employee share purchase 
plans involving the 'purchase' of stock by employees to save a failing firm. The three 
forms of employee-owned enterprise have relatively little in common with the vast 
majority of US employee-owned entities - ESOPs in profitable firms where employees 
'receive' stock as a benefit and who may, therefore, have very different expectations. 
Low response rates have also been a feature of ESO studies. Logue and Yates (2001) 
described low response rates as the 'Achilles heel of ESOP surveys': since firms that are 
enthusiastic about ESOPs respond at a much higher rate than firms that are not, the lower 
the survey response rate, 'the worse the data are skewed toward favourable reports' (p. 
22). Employee-owned companies are often identified through press reports and other 
types of publicity and these reports tend to focus more on successful than unsuccessful 
companies, since the latter are naturally less willing to be studied in any great detail (see 
Cotton 1993). Logue and Yates (2001) concluded that selection bias was a key reason 
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why ESOP studies in the US during the 70s and early 80s were 'so far off base in their 
results' (p. 23). 
Some researchers, moreover, have described ESO studies as being characterised by 
'methodological shortcomings' to the extent that 'it is difficult to quantify the effects of 
share ownership upon employee attitudes' (Wilson et al 1995: 3). A major problem has 
been the sole reliance upon univariate and bivariate methods of analysis, which have 
tended 'to preclude a precise assessment of the causal efficacy of share schemes in 
changing attitudes and of the influence of share ownership relative to other determinants 
of employee attitudes' (Pendleton et al 1998: 100; see also Klein and Rosen 1986). 
Moreover, the 'cross-sectional' approach adopted by many studies has been described as 
a 'dubious indicator of actual attitudinal change' and 'prone to respondent bias and 
misperceptions, not only in the assessment that there has been attitudinal change since 
employees became shareholders, but also in the claim that ownership is causally 
responsible' (Wilson et al 1995: 7). Moreover, 'the often fraught circumstances of 
conversion' (Wilson et al 1995: 9) have generally precluded the sllstained co-operation 
between organisations and academic researchers that is necessary to undertake 
longitudinal studies. Dunn et al (1991) is an exception for the UK, although the authors 
themselves acknowledged that an interval of one year between two surveys undertaken in 
a North Midlands manufacturing firm was 'perhaps far too short a time to gauge the 
effect' (p. 13) of ESO upon employee attitudes. 
Following a fertile period during the 1980s, ESO research 'tapered off (Orlitzky and 
Rynes 2001: 74) after the early 90s, partly as a result of complex methodological issues 
and partly because researchers became discouraged by the variable and often weak 
relationships between ESO, employee attitudes and organisational performance. More 
recently, it has been observed that ESO still provides a 'fertile ground for future 
research' (Orlitzky and Rynes 2001: 74). The purpose of the current study is to develop 
a greater understanding of the implications of different ownership systems, their origins 
and key characteristics for outcomes of 'feelings of ownership', EP, organisational 
commitment, industrial relations and employee ownership longevity and durability. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, few empirical investigations have examined at length the 
characteristics of dtfferent ownership models, the context in which different ownership 
conversions have occurred and the relationships of these variables with EP, employee 
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commitment to the organisation, organisational durability and industrial relations 
outcomes. The 'dynamics' of ESO may differ, for example, particularly in terms of 
'feelings of ownership', when employees purchase shares in their company directly 
(,direct ownership') as opposed to receiving them as a 'company gift' (through an ESOP) 
(see Klein 1987: 329). In turn, the extent to which employees experience 'a sense of 
ownership' may impact upon their desire for participation in the workplace, although 
research discussed in this chapter suggests that desire for participation among employee 
shareholders may not always be in the direction anticipated. 
In summary, it is necessary that future ESO studies take account of the 'empirical reality' 
of individual cases (Wilson 1992: 22), while 'certain contingent characteristics [of ESO) 
must be investigated in tandem with the fact of ownership per se' (Wilson et al 1995: 
11). Only through an understanding of the true 'diversity of ownership' can the 
inconsistencies of previous studies be addressed. 
3.3 	 Employee share ownership, company performance and employee 
participation 
There exists a substantial literature from industrial psychologists and researchers in 
organisational behaviour examining the causal flows describing the relationship between 
ESO and corporate performance. Between 1980 and 200 I, more than thirty-two studies 
exploring the ESO/company performance relationship and focusing on indicators 
including profitability, sales and job growth, were estimated to have been undertaken, 
(see Blasi and Kruse 2001). Performance outcomes have largely been divided between 
'neutral' (see GAO 1987; Sesil et a12002) and 'positive' (see Bradley et al 1990; Conte 
and Tannenbaum 1978; Estrin and Jones 1987; Long 1980; Rosen and Quarrey 1987; 
Wright et al 1989, 1992), although Blasi and Kruse (2001) noted that positive outcomes 
have not always established direct causality with ESO. Rather, good performance may 
be a 'cause' rather than an 'effect' of ownership, or it may depend on other factors in the 
organisation (see also Heller et al 1988; Tannenbaum 1983). As highlighted in the 
previous section, there may also be bias in terms of the organisations and the employee 
respondents featured in these studies. Comprehensive reviews of the ESO/company 
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performance literature can be found in Blasi and Kruse (2001), Cooper and Rousseau 
(2001), Cotton (1993) and on the NCEO website. 
One theme consistent to many 'ESO and organisational performance' studies, 
particularly those from the US, is that of 'participation'. Researchers have argued that 
organisations need to have in place appropriate schemes and policies of non-financial EP 
in order that ESO can spur on increased productivity, commitment and job satisfaction 
and give 'substance' to the employees' ownership stake (Oakeshott 2000; see also 
Robinson and Wilson 1992; Wagner and Gooding 1987; Wilpet1 1989). In addition, 
given a role in running their company, employees may respond by providing critical 
information on operational problems and co-operating in developing solutions to those 
problems (see Levine and Tyson 1990; Wilson 1992). Employee shareholders may, in 
turn, acquire more information from their employer about the financial position of the 
company (French and Rosenstein 1984). 
Oakeshott (2000) argued, however, that ESO needs to be 'significant' if the relationship 
between employer and employee is to be reciprocal: for the individual employee, the 
ownership stake needs to be 'worth a good deal more than the value of a few days' 
wages' (p. 406); for the workforce as a whole, the aggregate of ESO needs to be such that 
their voice is an important and even perhaps the dominant one in setting the long-term 
policies and objectives of the business (see also Long 1980). It is said that ESO creates 
perceptions among employees of the 'right' to participate in decision-making, although 
Tannenbaum (1983) posited that the extent to which these perceptions occur may depend 
on the authority and status of individuals in the organisation. 'White-collar' or 
managerial employees, for example, are more likely than other employees to have 
opportunities to participate in decision-making, are less prone to question their 
participation 'rights', usually enjoy greater access to financial information and are better 
equipped by training and experience to understand it (see also Heller 1992; HelIer et al 
1988; Marchington and Loveridge 1979) 
If perceptions of increased EP are realised in practice, benefiting employees are 
incentivised to work harder to protect their own investment (see French and Rosenstein 
1984; O'Toole 1979; Long; 1981; 1978; Pierce et al 1991; Rosen and Quarrey 1987) and 
improvements in company performance then follow. Among some of the more 
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significant ESO/participation/company performance studies, Quarrey (1986) reported a 
'strong and consistent relationship' between performance and employees' perception of 
influence in their company. Rosen and Quarrey (1987), moreover, found that ESOP 
companies with 'participation plans' grew at a rate three to four times faster than ESOP 
companies without such plans. In the 1987 GAO study, ESOP firms in which non­
managerial employees participated in company decisions had a 54 per cent more rapid 
rate of productivity growth than firms where participation was absent. 
Marchington (1995) commented that, while it was commonplace to link EP with high 
levels of commitment and company performance, the linkage was based upon two key 
assumptions: firstly, line managers were committed to participation and able to make it 
operate effectively in the workplace; secondly, participation had a positive effect on 
employee attitudes, leading to changes in work behaviour, which in turn fed through to 
higher levels of productivity and effectiveness. Tannenbaum (1983: 255) had noted 
some years earlier: 
'Research does not justify the simple assertion that companies with satisfied 
workers or companies that are relatively participative will be correspondingly 
productive and profitable. Employee ownership, however, implies conditions that, 
relatively speaking, are lacking in conventional companies and these conditions, in 
combination with participation, should have implications for the performance of a 
company.' 
3.3.1 A test ofthree employee share ownership models 
Katherine Klein (1987) addressed some of the key 'employee ownership conditions' in 
her study of three alternative ownership models suggested by some of the earlier 
literature. The models were identified by tracing the possible route from ESO to 
improved organisational performance, while underlying each model was the assumption 
that if employees were satisfied with their company's ESOP, they would, in turn, feel 
committed to the company and motivated to remain working there. Each model predicted 
that different ESO conditions were associated with high levels of employee satisfaction 
towards ownership, high organisational commitment and low turnover intentions. 
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The first model, termed the' intrinsic satisfaction' model, suggested that ownership on its 
own increased employees' commitment to and satisfaction with their organisation. 
Ownership is itself a reward for employees and the intrinsic feeling of reward influences 
subsequent employee attitudes and behaviours. Conversely, the 'extrinsic satisfaction' 
model suggests that ESO will have favourable consequences only when it is financially 
rewarding to employees (see Wilson 1992). If employees regard ESO as being 
financially rewarding, they will experIence greater feelings of satisfaction and 
commitment to their organisation (Buchko 1992). Klein identified two key ESOP 
characteristics for determining how lucrative an ESOP was for its participants: (i) the 
size ofthe company contribution to the ESOP~ and (ii) the return on company stock. The 
former (i) is calculated as a percentage of an employee's salary; hence, the larger a 
company's ESOP contribution the larger the percentage of salary each employee acquires 
through the ESOP. The latter (ii) also influences the value of employees' ESOP accounts 
and if the share price increases employees' accounts are more valuable. Thus, the 
extrinsic satisfaction model predicts that both the size of the company's contribution to 
the ESOP and the return on stock are positively related to satisfaction with ownership 
and organisational commitment. A study undertaken by Rosen et alone year prior to 
Klein's investigation reported that the amount of stock contributed to an ESOP was the 
most important predictor of positive employee attitudes. 
The third and final perspective, the 'instrumental satisfaction' model, establishes an 
intervening link whereby the positive consequences of ESO are deemed to occur only via 
the wider EP and influence in corporate governance and decision-making that results. In 
turn, employees' commitment to their organisation, job satisfaction and company 
performance all increase (Klein 1987). Klein set out to test the three models by 
examining the relationships between employee attitudes and ESOP characteristics, 
including: the percentage of company stock owned; the size of the annual company 
contribution; voting rights; reasons for introducing the ESOP; and methods used to 
communicate infonnation about the ESOP to employees. The measures of employee 
attitude dependent variables were: satisfaction with the plan; organisational 
commitment; and turnover intention. Data were collected from 2,804 ESOP participants 
in 37 ESOP companies between May 1982 and November 1984. Results indicated that 
employees were generally most satisfied with ESO and most committed to their 
companies when the company made a large contribution to the ESOP, when management 
50 
was highly committed to the concept of ESO and the company maintained an extensive 
ESOP communication programme. The results, therefore, supported the extrinsic and 
instrumental satisfaction models of ESO but offered no support for the intrinsic model. 
In 1993, Jones and Kato reported that, 'of the top 1,000 US ESOP finns, non-managerial 
employee influence via ESOPs was typically modest ... fewer than ten firms have non­
managerial employees representing employee shareholders by serving on the board' (p. 
359). Fewer than 5 per cent of employers, moreover, were actively finding ways to 
encourage EP in their companies and to train and empower employees to be involved in 
joint problem-solving teams. Studies by Klein and Rosen (1986), McElrath and Rowan 
(1992) and Rosen (1984) similarly reported that employees did not consider themselves 
to enjoy greater influence as a result of working in an ESOP company. More recently, a 
study of 270 Ohio-based ESOP firms undeliaken by Logue and Yates (2001: 45) 
concluded that 'the average ESOP is more participatory than previously' with close to 
two-thirds (63 per cent) of employers operating one or more formal channels of EP in the 
workplace. 
In general, however, US ESOPs have been regarded as an employee benefit provided by 
the employer who, in return, could expect closer allegiance alongside a possible increase 
in employee morale and motivation and by association, productivity and performance 
(Allen et al 1991). At the same time, US employers have had little to fear in terms of the 
loss of a managerial prerogative associated with ESOP provision (see Hyman and Mason 
1995; McElrath and Rowan 1992). Schuller (1985) observed that employers and even 
employees regard FIP and participation in decision making as unconnected (see also 
Ramsay 1991). Some early empirical studies (Greenberg 1981; Rhodes and Steers 1981) 
suggested that employees typically purchased stock for financial reasons and had few 
expectations of greater influence in decision-making. Thus, the lack of control by most 
employee shareholders under more 'conventional' forms of ESO may be less likely to 
weaken the relationships of shareholding with identification and satisfaction than is often 
supposed. Additionally, it is conceivable that these relations are more positive among 
employees with less control because their identification and satisfaction may be more 
dependent on ownership than that of individuals with greater authority, influence and 
status. Russell et ai's (1979) study of San Francisco refuse collection co-operatives 
found high rates of EP in several areas, including attendance at most or all of the 
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shareholders' meetings in the previous twelve months, or serving on the company board 
or on other workplace committees. The study also found, however, that the influence of 
managers and supervisors was greatest under a co-operative structure and so concluded 
that employee-owned organisations could be effectively democratised. Moreover, the 
authority of management need not necessarily be weakened, nor strengthened, to the 
disadvantage of lower levels. 
Within the UK, members of the trade union movement have claimed that in many cases, 
insufficient mechanisms of participation are being developed to allow shareholders a real 
say in how their company is run (see Pendleton 1997). In a 1992 Department of 
Employment study (see Marchington et al 1992) based on information from twenty-five 
cases, only a small minority of employees thought that FP had provided them with a 
greater understanding of management decisions. An earlier study by Fogarty and White 
(1988) similarly failed to find majority support among employees for FIP as a tool to 
provide them with influence and empowerment in the workplace. 
Where 'traditional' and perhaps 'undemocratic' power relations remain intact, this may 
frustrate employee owners who desire and 'expect' more participation and ultimately 
lead to a decline in their levels of satisfaction, motivation and commitment to the 
organisation (Conte and Svejnar 1990, 1988; French 1987; Rhodes and Steers 1981). 
O'Toole (1979: 188) referred to the 'failed expectations' of many non-managerial 
employees in relation to increased workplace democracy, when, for example, the voting 
rights of employee stock were restricted. Such conflicts were often at the heart of poor 
performance in employee-owned businesses. In his own empirical study, O'Toole (1979) 
found that 'rights of ownership' had no positive effects on employee behaviour, morale, 
or productivity where managers withheld voting responsibilities from employees (see 
also Tannenbaum 1983; Whyte et al 1983). Indeed, in such situations, employees 
generally displayed a degree of 'indifference' to ESO, manifested in several instances by 
voting to 'sell off their shares to the first attractive bidder. Thus the extent to which 
ESO reduces alienation and discontent depends on changes in the power relationships 
that meet employee owners' expectations of control (French 1987: 428). Bradley and 
Nejad (1989) observed that high expectations were most likely to be met in co-operative 
models of ESO. Conversely, profit-sharing or all-employee share schemes were unlikely 
to arouse hopes of greatly increased EP in decision-making (see Chapter 2), while 
52 
compames in which these mechanisms were present were unlikely to introduce 
participative structures independently. Essentially, therefore, the potential for 
disappointment is greatest in 'majority employee-owned firms'. However, if 
expectations of increased EP are not raised, then the transition to ESO need not be 
accompanied by new mechanisms of participation and conflict can be averted. 
3.3.2 Employees' expectations of employee share ownership 
One of the most significant theoretical studies to address employees' expectations of 
ESO was undertaken by J Lawrence French in 1987. French looked at ESO from two 
perspectives - as a 'financial investment' and as a 'mechanism of control'. From a 
'control' perspective, employees regard ESO as giving them the 'right' and providing 
them with opportunities to influence decision-making in the workplace. The control 
perspective assumes, moreover, that employee shareholders are an homogenous group 
and that their ownership status per se affects work attitudes and behaviours (see Hammer 
et al 1982). In contrast, the 'financial perspective' contends that employee shareholders 
do not have an increased desire for organisational influence and control and regard 
ownership merely as a 'financial investment'. Prior to French's study, Kruse (1981) had 
commented that employee shareholders often resembled most non-shareholders and 
moreover, defined ownership solely in terms of rights to the profits generated by the 
invested capital. In other words, employee owners perhaps view themselves simply as 
financial investors who, by coincidence, own shares where they work and limit their 
expectations to a satisfactory rate of return on their investment rather than greater control 
in company decisions (see also Hammer and Stern 1980). If financial returns are not 
adequate, however, dissatisfaction on the part of employee investors may increase their 
desire to participate in the decision-making process to ensure that appropriate solutions 
are sought for their company's financial, managerial and personnel problems (French 
1987). Alternatively, employee-owners may choose to adopt the 'exit' rather than 
'voice' strategy and sell their shares (Hirschman 1970). 
The 'financial investment' perspective further suggests that the number of shares 
employees own and the value of those shares are more impOliant than ownership per se 
(French 1987). Thus, if shares are viewed solely as 'investments', the work attitudes and 
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actions of employees who hold large numbers of shares will be expected to differ from 
individuals holding fewer shares. The 'economic significance' employee owners 
attribute to their individual shareholding, plus the share price and dividend level, may 
also affect their attitudes and actions in the workplace. More specifically, when share 
performance is perceived as favourable, employee shareholders are likely to have greater 
levels of satisfaction than employees without shares, since the former benefit more 
directly and immediately in the firm's success than the latter. By contrast, where the 
firm is perceived to have financial problems, employee owners are less likely to be 
satisfied than employees without shares since the latter have less to lose. FUliher, in 
organisations characterised by high levels of ESO and EP, the satisfaction of a relatively 
small number of employees with few or no shares could equal that of the more numerous 
employee shareholders, since all employees benefit from the 'democratisation of control 
relations' (French 1987: 429). Up until the time of French, research on a variety offonns 
of ESO had produced evidence of a 'financial' rather than a 'control' orientation. For 
example, in their study of an employee-owned library furniture factory in the North East 
of the US, Hammer and Stern (1980: 96) observed that, 'rather than having a collective 
consciousness of ownership, many employee owners saw themselves as traditional 
investors' (see also Rhodes and Steers 1981). 
Three years before the French study, French and Rosenstein (1984) had tested the 
'financial' ESO perspective within an ESOP organisation. The distribution of share 
ownership within the company was very unequal and at the end of 1980, managerial 
employees who made up 20 per cent of the workforce held about 76 per cent of the 
shares. Moreover, the ESOP made no provision for representation of employee owners 
on the company board. Along with a lack of union representation, non-managerial 
employee owners had limited influence in their workplace. Neveliheless, the substantial 
appreciation of the company's shares had left employees with few grounds to challenge 
management on the basis of poor leadership. The study was significant due to the fact 
that, until that time, little attention had been given to more common and weaker forms of 
ESO that were initiated by managers for financial and/or motivational reasons and 
operated through ESO trusts which held and managed the shares. Previous ESO studies, 
moreover, had focused largely on blue-collar employees occupying lower positions in 
both status and authority hierarchies. Thus, earlier studies provided little information on 
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the way in which control differences among different employee groups in organisations 
affected the relationships of ownership with attitudes and behaviours. 
In their conclusions, French and Rosenstein (1984) reported that over three-quarters of 
employees surveyed, both managerial and non-managerial, regarded shareholding as an 
investment rather than as an opportunity to become an 'owner' in their company. At the 
same time, non-managerial employee owners were reluctant to seek more influence, 
which the authors attributed to a lack of expertise preventing them from participating 
effectively (see also Fenwick and Olsen 1986; Heller et al 1998; Leitko et al 1985). 
Nevertheless, the relationship of shareholding with 'organisational identification' was 
more positive for non-managerial owners with lesser authority than for individuals 
accorded higher status in the organisation. French and Rosenstein (1984) observed that 
the strength of the relationship among the former perhaps stemmed in part from lower 
expectations of control compared with the more likely expectations of the latter. 
Nevertheless, the results also challenged the notion that desire for influence among 
employees with greater control was increased more by shareholding than that of 
employees at lower levels of status, authority and influence. The authors proposed that 
the 'financial orientation' of higher-status employee owners, alongside satisfaction with 
the share performance, had dampened interests of a more active role in decision making. 
Pierce et al (1991) argued that in order to understand the social-psychological and 
behavioural effects of an ESO system, it was first necessary to develop an understanding 
of the ownership construct. The authors saw ownership as being 'multi-dimensional' in 
nature, operating both as a formal and psychologically experienced phenomenon; 
moreover, each form (formal and psychological) had its own role in the ownership­
employee/attitude-behaviour relationship. Ownership was also unlikely to operate 
directly and/or independently on employee attitudes, motivations and behaviours. 
Rather, there appeared to be a number of intervening and moderating stages between 
formal ownersh ip and employee attitudes and behaviours. Pierce et al (1991) presented a 
theoretical model depicting an elaborate network of relationships articulating one set of 
conditions through which ownership could produce some of the social-psychological and 
behavioural outcomes linked to ESO. Like Klein (1987), Pierce et al (1991) sought to 
advance the notion that 'a number of intervening and moderating stages' (p. 124) were 
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more significant for attitudinal change among employees than the notion of simply 'being 
an owner'. 
Ownership expectations, perceptions of ownership 'legitimacy', management's 
philosophical orientation to ownership, employees' financial orientation, the type of 
ownership system and its context of origin all playa role in the operation of an ESO 
system. Pierce et al (1991) observed that many empirical studies had looked at a 
particular form of ownership and had tended to implicitly portray ESO as a singular 
concept, rather than addressing the social-psychological effects across different 
ownership systems. Few theorists, moreover, had identified the dimensions (i.e. 
structural design features) of ownership, as well as the saliency of those dimensions in 
ownership research. Finally, there was a 'near void' (p. 124) in the understanding of 
employee expectations and response differences across the different forms of ownership. 
ESO can cover a whole spectrum of possible cases (Wilson 1992), each comprising a 
different form of ownership (direct ownership, co-operative) and control (concentration 
of shares within the enterprise) (see Tannenbaum 1983). Cases often originate for 
different reasons, have different aims, and operate in very different ways (Cotton 1993). 
3.4 Employee share ownership and industrial relations outcomes 
A further section of the ESO literature has focused on the relationship between ESO and 
industrial relations outcomes. In particular, studies have examined whether attempts to 
strengthen ties between employees and employers via ESO will result in a 'loosening' of 
collective sentiments towards union membership and activity (see for example, Baddon 
et al 1989; Bradley and Nejad 1989; Kruse 1984; Pendleton et al 1995b and Poole and 
Jenkins 1990). Trade unions may also find their position weakened and the CB process 
subverted: for example, employees whose compensation is partly dependent on their 
company's success may be willing to accept lower wage increases or reduced benefits to 
help pay for necessary investments in plant and equipment to boost productivity (see 
McElrath and Rown 1982). Even broad-based share schemes have been described as 
representing a progressive diminution of influence in pay determination (see Saddon et al 
1989). Broad-based schemes generally provide few opportunities for large-scale ESO 
and influence in the workplace (see section 2.3 in Chapter 2) and so it may be assumed 
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that the union role as 'representative of employee interests' will remain unchallenged. 
However, such schemes are typically introduced and controlled unilaterally by managers 
and are not regarded as 'negotiable'. Thus, broad-based schemes comprise an element of 
the pay and conditions of employees located formally outside the boundaries of 
collective regulation (see Dunn et al 1991; Nichols and O'Connell-Davidson 1992). 
Arguments surrounding ESO and industrial relations are not clear-cut, however, and have 
been described as 'complex' (Pendleton 2001: 125) and paradoxical (see Kruse 1984). 
Hammer and Stern (1986), moreover, suggested that the dynamics of union involvement 
in employee-owned companies were likely to be inherently unstable and compared them 
to the movement of a yo-yo, alternating between co-operation and conflict with 
management. Based on their investigation of the employee-owned Rath Meat-Packing 
Company in Iowa, Hammer and Stern (1986) reported that unions often embarked on co­
operative strategies based on the fusion of employee and owner interests both during and 
in the immediate aftermath of ESO conversion. Subsequently, adverse economic 
circumstances resulted in the introduction of policies that were harmful to employee 
interests such as wage cuts, thereby leading to the withdrawal of union co-operation. 
Once the crisis had passed a return to co-operation was likely, though not to the same 
extent as before. Hammer and Stern (1986) concluded that over time, swings between 
co-operation and opposition moved the union back towards its traditional role, although 
it gradually became discredited among its members during the process. 
Trade u11l0ns may also 'find their employee representation role contaminated by 
ownership concerns, and hence their independence compromised' (Pendleton et al 
1995b: 580; see also Dilts and Paul 1990). Generally, it may be expected that new forms 
of participation emanating from an ESO conversion would be kept separate, at least in 
procedural terms, from existing union structures, but would be subject to scrutiny or 
control by union representatives. In some cases, employers that are ideologically 
committed to EP and believe that ESO entitles employees to board representation (see 
Hammer and Stern 1986; Rosen et al 1986) have appointed employee directors to the 
company board. However, as highlighted in Hammer et aI's (1991) study, there can be 
'widely divergent definitions' (p. 661) of the employee director role: in the study both 
employee directors and their workforce constituents regarded the protection of employee 
interests as the main purpose of the role. Managers, in contrast, stressed the 'downward 
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communication' function of employee directors to disseminate board decisions to 
employees 'after' those decisions had been made, thereby de-emphasising an active 
labour advocacy role. Pendleton et al (1995b) observed that, whatever the precise 
configuration of participation structures, a greater emphasis on ID would be expected 
where union representatives were a dominant influence on organisational design than in 
cases where they played a more subordinate role. 
3.4.1 Dual commitment 
The issue of dual commitment to trade unions and management is not unique to ESO, 
however, and was being addressed by researchers during the 1950s and 1960s (Gallagher 
1984). Dean (1954) and Purcell (1960) indicated that most employees showed allegiance 
to both their trade union and management, although findings were restricted in both cases 
due to the application of inconsistent 'dual allegiance' measures. Other scholars of the 
period, including Barkin (1950), England (1960) and Kornhauser et al (1956), argued 
against employees' ability to display simultaneous loyalties. Barkin, for example, 
asserted that the notion of employees maintaining loyalty to companies and unions 
concurrently 'does not stand up under even a cursory examination' (1950: 64). After 
1960, the issue of dual allegiance lay essentially unresolved for around a quarter of a 
century until a new generation of researchers raised it once again (see for example, 
Fukami and Larson 1982; 1984; Gallagher 1984; Martin 1981; Martin et al 1982). In the 
intervening period, a strong research theme developed around the concept of 
organisational commitment (Porters, Steers, Mowday and Boulian 1974), described as 
'having obvious relevance to dual allegiance' (Angle and Perry 1986: 32). 
One of the most significant studies to investigate dual commitment was undertaken by 
Angle and Perry (1986). Based around twenty-two municipal bus companies in the 
Western US, the study set out to examine whether unionised employees could develop 
simultaneous commitments to their unions and their employing organisations. The 
alternative hypothesis was that an inherent conflict of allegiance in dual-membership 
situations forced an 'either-or' choice. In the study, dual commitment was analysed in 
terms of two variables: the 'ambient labour-management relationship climate' and 'the 
extent of members' participation in union activities' (p. 31). The study was significant in 
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that it was the first to use independent sources to measure labour-management 
relationship climates and dual commitment. Describing the general approach of previous 
studies Angle and Perry (1986: 36) observed: 
'It has been the norm to assess dual commitment by counting the numbers of 
people whose attitudes were positive toward both union and management. 
Furthermore ... both the commitment measures and the judgement of the overall 
union-management relationship derived from the same self-reports. Thus. yea­
saving response bias could inflate both the extent of dual commitment per se and 
observed covariation in measures of relationship climate and commitment.' 
Results from the study confirmed that the extent of dual commitment expressed by rank­
and-file union members was related to the ambient labour-management relationship and 
that the likelihood of simultaneous commitment appeared to grow where relations 
between the sides were co-operative. Angle and Perry (1986) added, however, that 
people are often 'imperfectly rational' (p. 44) and can 'compartmentalise' their logic so 
as to hold simultaneously incompatible opinions (Cyert and March 1963; Simon 1976). 
The cross-sectional nature of research, moreover, could not establish whether ambient 
labour-management relationship climates actually resulted in varying levels of dual 
commitment. or whether other factors co-determined climates and commitments. The 
authors concluded: 
'We believe a logical case can be made that role dilemmas imposed by 
membership in conflicting systems must necessitate a loyalty choice between 
adversaries. However, it remains to more elaborate, perhaps longitudinal designs 
to have the final say' (p. 45). 
For the UK, Guest and Dewe (1991) were the first researchers to undertake an empirical 
investigation of dual commitment. The study, based around three electronics plants in 
the South-East of England, was part of a larger investigation of attitudes to work and 
trade unionism in ten countries sponsored by a Japanese trade union organisation 
operating in electronics and electrical consumer industries. Two of the plants produced 
electrical consumer products while the third was involved in telecommunications. Each 
plant was part of a larger company, two of which were British and one was Japanese. All 
three companies were characterised by a well-established relationship between 
management and the unions; in each case the industrial relations tradition was co­
operative and there was very little history of industrial conflict. Guest and Dewe (1991: 
80) observed: 
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'The combination of predominantly integrative bargaining and long-term 
acceptance by management of the legitimacy of the union role would seem to 
favour the development of dual commitment.' 
However, levels of dual commitment in the three plants were found to be low and indeed 
lower than reported in most of the countries featured in the comparative study. A clear 
majority of employees in the UK firms did not regard the unions as effective and since 
there were no compensating feelings of collective solidarity, there was no strong basis for 
union identity. The picture with respect to organisational commitment was 'slightly less 
clear' (Guest and Dewe 1991: 91) but satisfaction with many aspects of work was 
generally low. Figures on the propensity of employees to quit their organisation, for 
example, indicated a weak basis on which to build a strong organisational identity. 
Setting the results in a wider context, Guest and Dewe (1991) observed that forms of 
pluralism in countries like Sweden and Germany were characterised by a variety of built­
in participative mechanisms to take account of employees' interests, which helped in turn 
to generate greater shared identity through genuine integrative bargaining. In the UK, 
however, pluralism was rather more passive and based partly on apathy. Guest and Dewe 
(1991) added that, compared with other European countries, UK employees were less 
well educated, had a greater degree of cross-company work experience and were 
considerably more dissatisfied with their jobs. UK employees also thought more about 
quitting their present company than any other workforce in the ten-country study. 
Company disaffection, coupled with a lack of faith in the ability of unions to improve 
matters, was reflected in a high proportion of employees who failed to show identity of 
any kind. For employees displaying some degree of dual commitment, or organisational 
commitment on its own, the key variable was satisfaction with the scope for EI and EP in 
the workplace. Hence, Guest and Dewe (1991) suggested that there were 'potential pay­
offs' (p. 93) for companies in pursuing such policies more fervently, or perhaps in 
selecting more carefully those employees with a propensity to respond to opportunities 
for involvement and pat1icipation. 
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3.4.2 Relevance of trade unions in employee-owned companies 
Within the context of ESQ, research addressing industrial relations outcomes has tended 
to focus largely on the question of whether trade unions are still regarded by employee 
owners as relevant and necessary within employee-owned firms. Pendleton et ai's 
(1995b) UK study of thirteen employee-owned and twenty-six 'conventional' bus 
companies examined twin-related hypotheses: firstly, following conversion to ESO, 
employees' allegiance to their union will decline and may switch to new institutions of 
representation; secondly, new institutions will undermine the trade union role in CB by 
becoming involved themselves in these issues. Earlier evidence from the UK had 
indicated that the union role had become more restricted in a number of cases in the 
aftermath of ESQ conversion. In the John Lewis Partnership, structures of employee­
owner participation not only operated separately from union representation but also 
appeared to take precedence over the unions (Flanders et al 1968): 
'Alternatively, where new institutions of employee-shareholder representation 
have not been created, any pressures for increased industrial democracy may mean 
that unions themselves wi 11 function as representative of owners, thereby 
potentially compromising the independence and effectiveness of the union as 
defender of workers' interests' (Pendleton et al 1995b: 581). 
Using union membership as an indicator of employees' allegiance to their Union, 
Pendleton et al (1995b) found that results did not support the hypothesis that union 
membership would fall in employee-owned firms. In fact, union density was slightly 
higher and Pendleton et al (1995b) suggested that ESO had actually enabled firms to 
retain their public sector industrial relations characteristics when they moved out of 
public ownership. A strong sense of ownership, moreover, resulting from conversion to 
ESQ, did not appear to have led to a decline in the perceived utility of union 
representation. Employees who felt ownership strongest found trade unions the most 
useful, perhaps indicating that the unions were regarded as necessary to protect 
ownership rights and perhaps more importantly, that a new role was emerging for unions 
within employee-owned companies. 
An earlier study undertaken by Toscano (1984) involving an examination of workforce 
attitudes to trade unions in a New England textile ESOP company with 100 per cent 
employee ownership had reported similar findings. The study noted that employee 
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owners who are also union members 'do not abandon their support for the union and its 
role in protecting labour from potentially arbitrary management' (p. 86). However, 
although employees in the company viewed the union as it had traditionally functioned, 
'other workers in other types of employee-owned enterprises may perceive the union role 
differently' (ibid). In a co-operative, for example, employees are given more democratic 
control and consequently, may perceive a lesser or different role for the uniol1. In the 
company studied, shares had been allocated to employee accounts according to a formula 
based on wages and salaries and consequently, employees with the highest wages and 
greatest seniority had the largest blocks of stock in the company. Employees were able 
to vote on a 'one share one vote' basis, while unallocated shares (80 per cent of the total) 
were voted by a trustee. The distribution of voting power thus prevented employees from 
acquiring representation on the board of directors and this relative lack of control 
translated into support for the trade union as the one body to voice their concerns and act 
on their behalf. 
Sockell's (1985) study of three employee-owned companies also found that ESO did not 
significantly affect union functioning in an enterprise. Comparisons of companies' pre­
and post ESO-transfer annual grievance rates and pre-and post-collective agreements 
revealed no change in the scope of executed clauses, leading Sockel! (1985) to conclude 
that 'inertia preserves attitudes and behaviours' (p. 137). As one survey respondent (and 
management negotiator) from the study observed: 'Employee ownership doesn't make a 
difference because of the fact that people are indoctrinated as union people and it's hard 
for them to change'. Sockell also commented, however, that financial instability was a 
feature of each of the companies under investigation and may have drawn the parties' 
attentions away from ESO per se. Moreover, in line with Toscano's (1984) study, the 
absence of formal participation at each company may have helped to explain the kinds of 
attitudes and behaviours demonstrated by employees. 
Kruse's (1984) investigation of two ESOP companies found some evidence that the trade 
union had grown stronger in one case. Explanations were two-fold: first, financial 
benefits from ESO were too small in relation to the benefits from employment to 
transform employees' perceptions of themselves as employees first and foremost (see 
also Klein and Rosen 1986). Second, EP in decision-making was generally insufficient 
for employees to feel like 'true' owners (see also Conte and Svejnar 1990). Therefore, 
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the increased desire for participation resulting from ESO, coupled with limited 
opportunities to achieve it, may mean that the union's function as the main vehicle of 
representation may not only be maintained but actually enhanced (see also McElrath and 
Rowan 1992). Conversely, in Poole and Jenkins' (1990) study of twenty-two UK 
companies with some form of profit-sharing or employee share scheme, shareholders 
were more likely than non-shareholders to emphasise that channels other than the union 
were appropriate for obtaining greater decision-making influence in the workplace. As 
the authors acknowledged, however, the reality is perhaps somewhat more complex: 
whereas the introduction of profit-sharing or share schemes may well produce greater 
identification among employees with the goals of the company, it is unlikely that un ion 
activities will be completely undermined by these mechanisms. Nevertheless, the study 
concluded that it was necessary for unions to modify to some extent their traditional set 
of attitudes and assumptions if they were to continue to retain an appeal to both union 
members and non-members alike. 
Bradley and Nejad's (1989: 109) study of the NFC examined the propositions that 
industrial relations could either improve or deteriorate as a result of ESO. Taking the 
'improve' proposition, the authors reported that, following the transition to ESO, 
improved labour relations could be achieved in at least two ways. First, ESO could 
change the structure of financial incentives and the actual amount of an employee's 
financial rewards. Second, ESO could create or heighten a sense of identification with or 
commitment to the company and subsequently, a greater feeling of responsibil ity in the 
pursuit of joint wealth maximisation. Whether an employee takes shares to protect their 
job or to seek capital gains, the financial stake may reduce the perceived gap between 
individual rewards, both financial and non-financial, and the company's objectives. This 
change in perception may, in turn, engender more co-operative industrial relations. 
Several variables may distort these relationships, however, so that individual ESO in a 
buy-out may have little or no effect on a shareholder's attitudes and upon industrial 
relations outcomes. The size of an employee's shareholding may not be large enough to 
reduce perceptions of the differences between the individual reward and a company's 
objectives. Further, any income from ESO is likely to be small compared with salaries 
and wages and is, therefore, also unlikely to affect financial incentives. Consequently, an 
individual employee shareholder may retain allegiances to the traditional institutions of 
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labour-management relations in the firm (Bradley and Nejad \989). It may also be the 
case that a certain threshold proportion of a workforce must take shares in order to make 
employees feel they are part of an employee-owned firm and legitimise any additional 
horizontal or vertical monitoring that may result. 
Addressing the second proposition that industrial relations could deteriorate as a 
consequence of ESC), Bradley and Nejad identified two potential sources of tension: 
first, a division in the workforce between employee shareholders and non-shareholders; 
second, a gap between employees' expectations of ownership and actual outcomes. If 
ESO is not widely dispersed, a division in the workforce between shareholders and non­
shareholders may generate new tensions rather than harmonise labour relations. 
Following a conversion, there may be pressure to restrain wage increases in order to 
allow high dividend payments to shareholders, particularly in view of specific tax 
advantages. If, however, a significant proportion of the workforce has not invested, their 
resistance to this pressure could create tensions during CB. In addition, if the conversion 
to ESO has succeeded in creating large capital gains for shareholders, non-shareholders 
may become resentful. Conversely, an unsuccessful conversion may intensify horizontal 
and vertical monitoring and possibly worsen labour relations. Additional tensions could 
arise if the shareholders' rights of ownership are extended in practice at the workplace, 
particularly in relation to issues such as promotion, job security and redundancy 
priorities. If ESO was to create a 'two-tier' workforce, tensions between employees 
could increase. 
3.5 Employee share ownership and company durability 
The final part of this chapter looks at some of the key issues surrounding ESO and 
outcomes of company durability and longevity. There exists a considerable body of 
literature examining the durability, and more specifically the likely demise, of workers' 
co-operatives and studies can be traced back to the work of Sidney and Beatrice Webb in 
the early part of the 20th Century. Arguments concerning the apparent failure of co­
operatives to survive long-term (and already outlined to some degree in Chapter 2) are 
centred around a number of factors including: under-investment; a lack of commercial 
acumen among members (employees); difficulties in co-ordinating members; and 
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'perverse forms of firm behaviour' (Pendleton 2001: 193), such as the expansion of 
output during a recession. For co-operatives that manage to survive, it is said that they 
will eventually degenerate into 'conventional' organisations, since they come to 
recognise the need to hire professional managers and create organisational hierarchies 
(see Ben-Ner 1988; Pendleton 2001). 
There are studies, nevertheless, which contest the proposition that co-operatives are 
generally predisposed to eventual demise. Among them are Estrin and Jones' (1991) 
investigation of French worker co-operatives, where results did "not support the view that 
worker co-operatives are bound to fail' (p. 19). The authors refuted the prediction of 
rapid dem ise on the basis of the low mortal ity rate of French worker co-operatives during 
the 1970s and the ability of many to survive for more than thirty years. More recently. 
however, Oakeshott (2000) observed that very few French co-operatives could lay claim 
to being long-term survivors (also see section 2.2.1 in Chapter 2). 
Estrin and Jones (1991) further concluded that different life-cycle patterns could be 
expected to emerge according to the unique institutional arrangements present within 
individual co-operative organisations. [n particular, the authors noted that it was 
necessary to recognise the 'diversity' of co-operative ownership and that what was 
needed was 'a broad, multifaceted model that includes both economic and social 
variables and is not wedded to a single traditional disciplinal perspective' (p. 21). To 
date. no such model has been applied empirically, though this may be due, in part, to a 
lack of willing, suitable and available subjects for analysis. Life-cycle patterns in other 
kinds of employee-owned organisation, such as ESOP firms, have received considerably 
less empirical attention than co-operatives although as Pendleton (2001: 193) observes: 
'ESOPs are not likely to be subject to degeneration in the same way [as co-operatives] as 
there is less to degenerate from.' Moreover, unlike workers' co-operatives, management 
hierarchies are present in ESOPs from the outset, equity ownership is often unequal and 
as numerous studies have shown. there are generally few opportunities for employees to 
participate directly in running their company. Nevertheless, Pendleton (2001) added that 
life-cycle patterns in ESOP and other employee-owned enterprises merited examination 
in future studies of ESO. 
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3.5.1 Employee share ownership life-cycles 
One of the most significant theoretical investigations of employee ownership life cycles 
was undertaken by A vner Ben-N er (1998) and involved an examination of the birth, 
evolution and demise of both employee-owned and capitalist firms operating within 
market economies. The study put forward the proposition that the population of 
employee-owned businesses is likely to grow counter-cyclically: for example, many 
employee-owned tirms are born during recessions, frequently out of capitalist 
organisations, then transform once more into capitalist firms during economic booms. 
There exists an 'offsetting tendency' (Ben-Ner 1988: 287), however, as employee-ovmed 
firms are often formed during periods of sustained increase in the standard of living and 
subsequently dissolved in times of economic decline. Ben-Ner's study considered the 
birth and demise of employee-owned companies from two perspectives. First, a company 
may be formed by the assemblage of technologies and inputs not previously combined or 
by a radical change in the source of authority, objectives, or internal organisation of a 
previously existing firm. Demise similarly occurs via dissolution or radical change in the 
source of authority, objectives or internal organisation. The second perspective proposes 
that birth and demise represent transformation of one type of organisation into another. 
The study was underpinned by analysis in three key areas: obstacles to employee 
ownership formation; the efficiency attributes of such firms; environmental changes and 
the influence of these changes upon organisational life-cycles. Addressing the first area 
- obstacles to formation - Ben-Ner identified three main obstacles relating to problems 
of 'entrepreneurship', employees' aversion to risk and high set-up costs. Entrepreneurial 
problems stem from the premise that a 'self-interested entrepreneur will not choose to 
establish an employee-owned firm and share entrepreneurial profits with others if the 
establishment of a capitalist firm is a viable alternative' (p. 290). Specifically, when 
establishing a new firm, entrepreneurs must identify a niche for the firm, assemble 
inputs, organise and co-ordinate economic and technical functions and allocate risk 
bearing. Individuals undertaking these tasks are said to have combinations of abilities 
and skills that are not widely found in market economies and they may thus decide to 
appropriate a return to entrepreneurship in the organisations they established. 
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The second obstacle - employees' aversion to risk - addresses the potential losses to 
employees' income when an employee-owned organisation is formed. Ben-Ner argued 
that because of their relatively small wealth, many employees preferred a lower average 
of steadier income to a higher average of more variable income. Problems were 
exacerbated by what the author described as the 'inescapable bundling' (p. 290) of 
employees' human capital. equity capital and employment in an employee-owned firm 
and their subjection to the same risk. The study concluded, therefore. that employees 
were probably better off working for a capitalist firm, whereby less risk-averse capitalists 
acted as internal 'income insurers' and assumed the risk of running the firm. High set-up 
costs for such 'a rare form of organisation' (Ben-Ner 1988: 307), including the 
acquisition of relevant information, plus legal. organisational and financial expertise, 
were identified as a further obstacle. Capital may also be more costly to obtain since 
employee-owned firms may be regarded as riskier ventures compared with many 
capitalist start-ups. Moreover. the relatively limited wealth of employees limits the 
personal collateral available for obtaining loans, while use of the firm's shares is 
restricted because it dilutes employees' control. Support may be available, however, in 
the form of special lump-sum subsidies from ESO umbrella organisations. 
The magnitude of obstacles varies, however, according to technology. product 
characteristics. standards of living. market profitability. general economic. social and 
political conditions and significantly. the personal characteristics of employees. Ben-Ner 
(1988) argued that superior efficiency was partly dependent on the ability of employees, 
in terms of their skills and experience of decision-making derived from other 
organisations, to take advantage of the flexible decision-making and motivation 
structures that, theoretically at least, are present in employee-owned firms. A further 
body of literature has argued, however, that the delegation of decision-making by 
managers to employees may have negative effects upon company performance (Levine 
and Tyson 1990). Researchers working within the 'agency' framework (see for example, 
Jensen and Meckling 1979, 1976) observed that participation arrangements were 
inevitably inefficient since the costs of monitoring increased as the number of decision­
makers or agents increased (see also Marchington and Loveridge J979). Ben-Ner (1988) 
similarly described how inefficiency in employee-owned businesses could arise when 
managers attempted to try and democratically address the different preferences of 
employees in organisations. Termed 'preferences heterogeneity' (p. 298), increased 
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democracy in employee-owned firms could lead to disagreements and decision impasses, 
or could generate outcomes that were not desirable to all employees. More significantly, 
heterogeneity could contribute to the formation of interest-based coalitions and 
accompanying conflicts and erode any efficiency advantages. Notwithstanding, whatever 
the advantages and disadvantages of different management styles, employee-owned 
companies' domain of choice is unrestricted and businesses can select a governance 
structure at least as efficient as that of a capitalist firm, which faces far more restrictions. 
The final part of Ben-Ner's study involved an analysis of changes in the external 
environment and their influence upon employee ownership life-cycles. Organisations 
may respond to a changing external environment in one of three ways. First, 
transformation into a capitalist finn may occur in a profitable employee-owned company 
when members come to expect further gains from changing the organisation's principles 
of internal organisation, even at the cost of potential losses in efficiency. Transformation 
may also take place in an organisation that is unsuccessful because of the cumulative 
effect of its internal weaknesses and where a drastic change in the way it is run may 
prevent its dissolution. However, if neither reform nor transformation can assure 
members of at least as much as they could get by leaving the firm altogether, dissolution 
will occur. Ben-Ner (J988) added that, in some cases, members may rationally expect 
the demise of an employee-owned firm at the time of its formation, due to predictable 
environmental changes or internal weaknesses. Members may also expect a net gain 
from that finn's operation during its limited lifetime relative to other alternatives, such as 
job losses or a company take-over, as to warrant its formation. Ben-Ner suggested that 
employee-owned companies had a complicated life cycle exposed to many perils of 
demise, although the probability and timing of demise for individual firms depended on 
the mode of formation. Finally, the cumulative effect of organisational weaknesses 
became more crucial with time and increased the likelihood of demise in mature 
employee-owned firms. 
3.6 Summary 
This chapter has addressed some of the key studies and arguments in relation to ESO that 
have emerged during the past quarter of a century, while setting the context for the 
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current programme of research. The study sets out to explore outcomes of 'feelings of 
ownership', organisational commitment, EP, industrial relations and ESO durability and 
address some of the questions that have been raised but not always resolved in previous 
studies. As highlighted in this chapter and also in Chapter 1, few empirical 
investigations have examined in detail the characteristics and contexts of different 
ownership models and the implications for particular outcomes within a single 
investigation. The main aim of the current research is to address the varying 
circumstances and diversity of ownership which is vital if ESO is to become a viable 
strategy for increasing the incidence of workplace EP and in turn. motivation. 
commitment and organisational productivity. 
The results of this research programme are set out in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6 
examines employees' 'feelings of ownership' and organisational commitment within 
three employee-owned companies. Following some of the issues raised in this chapter 
and also in Chapter 2, the analysis is guided by two propositions: first employee 
shareholders working under 'direct' ownership arrangements derive greater satisfaction 
from ownership than employee shareholders working in firms with more 'indirect' 
ownership (ESOP) systems in place. Second, where employees' feelings of ownership 
are more profound, greater levels of commitment to the organisation are duly anticipated. 
As well as the 'model" of ownership, a further key theme raised in Chapter Six is the 
'differing circumstances of ownership'. There are marked differences between the three 
compal1les in terms of their route into ESO and this is addressed more fully in the 
chapter. 
In Chapter 7, all six organisations are examined in relation to outcomes of EP and 
industrial relations to establish whether opportunities for EP in decision-making are 
greater in employee-owned companies than in enterprises where ESO is absent. It may 
be anticipated that opportunities and employees' desire for EP will be greater in 
employee-owned firms, although this is not always the case as results from some of the 
studies in this chapter have testified. In turn, it is expected that employees' attitudes to 
EP will impact on their attitudes to their trade union and also their managers and these 
areas are also considered in Chapter 7. To date, the dual commitment/ESO relationship 
has received rather limited attention within the empirical literature. Finally Chapter 8 
examines ESO durability and examines whether the reasons and methods by which 
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compames convert to ESO are important for their durability as employee-owned 
businesses. Three of the six cases that transferred from public into private (employee) 
ownership and were subsequently 'sold on' provide the basis for analysis in the chapter. 
Aside from worker co-operatives, little empirical work has been undertaken in relation to 
employee ownership life-cycles and the factors that may be important for establishing the 
durability of employee-owned firms. Research in Chapter 8 sets out to address the 
omission with an examination of potentially key influences, including: the model of 
ESO adopted at the outset; the initial ESO objectives and motives for the conversion in 
each case; the role of key actors involved in the conversions; and the ways in which each 
system of ownership was operated and managed. 
First, Chapter 4 sets out the research methodology framework with a discussion of the 
quantitative, qualitative and observational methods used. The approach undertaken aims 
to address some of the methodological criticisms levelled at previous ESO studies and 
these are discussed in the following and subsequent chapters. 
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4.0 Research methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Results presented in the thesis are based on primary quantitative and qualitative data 
drawn from a case study investigation of six UK bus companies. Ethnographic 
techniques including non-participant observation, plus secondary sources of information 
collected from all six cases, supplemented the primary data methods. Data were 
collected over an eighteen-month period between July 1997 and December 1998. This 
chapter discusses the methods used to conduct the programme of research, the main aim 
of which was to examine 'diversity in employee share ownership' and the potential 
importance of diversity for outcomes of ESO satisfaction, EP, organisational 
commitment, industrial relations and ESO durability. A case study approach was 
considered the most appropriate to meet the research objectives, since case studies 
provide scope for application of a variety of research tools. The chapter begins with an 
overview of case study research and general design issues, followed by an outline of the 
methodology in the current investigation, including case study selection and survey and 
interview work undertaken. 
4.2 Case study research and triangulation 
Use of the case study method in research has been well documented. Yin (1994: I) 
referred to the case study as an 'empirical inquiry' and the preferred strategy when 'how' 
or 'why' questions were being posed. The method also facilitates an assessment of 
existing hypotheses as well as the generation of new ones, allowing for investigation of a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Glaser and Strauss 1970). One of 
the major strengths of the case study method, however, is the opportunity it gives the 
researcher to draw upon many different sources of evidence in an investigation (see 
Gummesson 2000). Moreover, the scope to acquire multiple sources of evidence by 
using case studies is said to far exceed that of other research methods, including 
experiments, surveys and histories (Gillham 2000; Yin 1994). Data drawn from a range 
of different sources also allows the researcher to address a broader range of historical, 
attitudinal and observational issues. However, the most important advantage is the 
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development of converging lines of inquiry, otherwise known as 'triangulation' (Yin 
1994). 
Triangulation has been defined as 'looking at the same phenomenon, or research question 
from more than one source of data' (Decrop 1999: 158). Specifically, information drawn 
from different sources can be used to 'corroborate', 'elaborate' or 'illuminate' the 
research problem (see for example GiIlham 2000: Nachmias and Nachmias 1996; Yin 
1994). Triangulation is based on the 'triangle' analogy and implies that a single point is 
considered from three different and independent sources (Decrop 1999). Derived from 
topography and first used in the military and navigation sciences, the concept has been 
adapted for social science inquiry. Authors including Webb et al (1966) and Jick (1979) 
refined triangulation by combining quantitative and qual itative methods and advocated 
that the two should be viewed as complementary, rather than as symbolising rival camps. 
Some years later, triangulation received further attention in qualitative research as a way 
to 'ground' the acceptance of qualitative approaches (Denzin 1978; Rossman and Wilson 
1985). 
4.2.1 Forms of triangulation 
Denzin (1978) identified four basic forms of triangulation: data triangulation; method 
triangulation; investigator triangulation; and theoretical triangulation. The four forms 
may be viewed as running along a continuum, beginning with 'data triangulation', which 
involves the use of a variety of data sources within a study. including quantitative, 
qualitative and observational data. An additional way to triangulate data is to transcribe 
field notes during and immediately after an interview or observational session (Decrop 
1999). Field notes may be particularly useful as they can shed additional light on the 
textual content, or indicate specific questions that did not directly appear within an 
interview transcript. Next on the continuum is 'method triangulation', which entails the 
use of multiple methods to study a single problem. Method triangulation can include 
different qualitative methods or a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques. 
Since each research method used in an investigation will have its own limitations and 
biases, and single methodologies result in personal biases, mUltiple methods pave the 
way for more credible and dependable information (Decrop 1999). Examples of method 
triangulation in the management field have been found in the work of, among others, 
Marchington et al (1992), Poole and Jenkins (1990) and in the 1998 Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS). In a change to earlier research in the WERS 
series, methods used in 1998 included an employee survey. Previous WERS research 
had been based on interviews with managers and employee representatives, which were 
not intended to provide an employee perspective (Cully et al 1998). 
Third on the triangulation continuum is 'investigator triangulation', which is concerned 
with using several different researchers to interpret the same body of data. Next to the 
investigator's subjective understanding, gender, race and culture can also bias the 
analysis of data (Oecrop 1999). Independent investigators may examine a section of the 
data collected and confirm or invalidate prior interpretations. Investigators may also be 
invited to read transcripts or a summary of the analysis provided by the researcher and 
comment on it, with any remarks or disagreement with interpretation reintroduced into 
the analytical process to enhance the credibility of the analysis. The final form of 
triangulation is 'theoretical triangulation' and involves the application of perspectives 
drawn from different disciplines to interpret a single set of data (Oecrop 1999). 
Confronting emerging hypotheses with existing theories and searching for alternative 
explanations help to make conclusions more sound. Applied to the inductive research 
process of theory building, multiple sources of evidence can be brought together to 
define a construct or causal relation. 
Oecrop (1999) concluded that a combination of data sources, methods, investigators and 
theories could reduce personal and methodological biases and open the way for richer 
and potentially more valid interpretations. Since multiple sources of evidence essentially 
provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin 1994), case studies adopting a 
triangulation approach may be rated more highly in terms of their overall quality than 
those relying on only single methods (see for example, Oenzin 1989; Yin et al 1983). 
Todd (1979) concluded that triangulation was not an end in itself, but an imaginative way 
of maximising the amount of data collected. 
71. 
II 
4.2.2 Choices in research design 
Easterby-Smith et al (1991) defined 'research design' as the 'overall configuration of a 
piece of research' (p. 21). In designing the programme of research, the researcher is 
faced with a number of choices, including the kind of evidence to be gathered, the 
sources from which the evidence is to be drawn and how it is to be interpreted to provide 
answers to research questions. The researcher also faces a series of philosophical 
choices to establish the perspective from which a given phenomenon is to be explored 
(May 1997). Awareness of research philosophy assists the researcher in recognising 
which designs will work for their research programme and which will not. Two 
traditional schools of thought to have emerged from the social science arena are 
positivism and phenomenology. Easterby-Smith et al (1991) concluded that both 
positions had, to some extent, been elevated to a stereotype by advocates of the opposing 
side, though Lehaney and Vinten (1994) argued that individuals did not necessarily fit 
into either category directly. 
The positivist paradigm considers reality to be objective and tangible. Interest is focused 
on what is general, average and representative 'so that statistical generalisations and 
prediction are possible' (Oecrop 1999: 157). In adopting the positivist perspective, the 
researcher studies social phenomena" in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist 
or physiologist when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain' 
(Ourkheim 1964: xiv). Results derived from the positivist method of investigation are 
said to produce a set of 'true, precise and wide-ranging laws of human behaviour' (May 
1997: 10). The researcher is then able to generalise from their observations on social 
phenomena to make statements about the behaviour of the population as a whole. Within 
the process, positivism explains human behaviour in terms of cause and effect. Positivist 
methods can provide wide coverage of a range of situations and produce statistics which, 
when aggregated from large samples, may be of considerable relevance to policy 
decisions (Easterby-Smith et al 1991). At the same time, however, methods from the 
positivist paradigm may be inflexible, artificial and ultimately ineffective in helping the 
researcher understand the processes or significance that people attach to actions. 
Moreover, methods may not be helpful in generating theories and since they foclls on 
what is or what has recently occurred, it is difficult for policy-makers to infer what 
changes and actions should take place in the future. Legge (1984) concluded that 
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positivist methods only provided illusions of the 'true' impact of social policies. Most of 
the data gathered would not be relevant to real decisions, although they could be used to 
support the covert goals of decision-makers. 
Often regarded as the 'polar opposite' of positivism (Silverman 1993: 22), 
phenomenology or 'interpretive social science' appears to be the prevailing approach to 
qualitative research in the social sciences literature (Gummesson 2000), being primarily 
oriented towards 'the immediate phenomena of human experience such as thinking and 
feeling' (Odman 1985: 2162). Phenomenology attacks the positivist stance on several 
fronts: firstly, that the only knowledge of any significance is that derived from the use of 
objective measures; second, that science should be based only on data that can be 
observed and measured directly; finally, that science is value-free (Easterby-Smith et al 
1991). Habermas (1970), for example, argued that positivist methods, while claiming to 
be independent of values and interests, generally supported the interests of the more 
powerful members of society in practice. 
Essentially, the task of the phenomenologist is not to gather facts and measure how often 
certain patterns occur, but rather, to appreciate the different constructions and meanings 
that individuals place upon their experiences (Easterby-Smith et al 1991). Taylor and 
Bogdan (1984: 2) concluded that 'the important reality is what people perceive it to be'. 
In addition, the researcher is a part of what is being researched and will ultimately affect 
the behaviour of those being 'researched' (Lehaney and Vinten 1994). The 
phenomenological paradigm is not without its weaknesses, though these are said to be 
fairly complementary to the strengths of the overall approach (Easterby-Smith et al 
1991). For example, data collection can take up a great deal of time and resources, the 
analysis and interpretation of the data may be very difficult and policy-makers may 
afford low credibility to studies based on a phenomenological approach. However, the 
time taken to conduct a study within the phenomenological paradigm allows the 
researcher to look at change processes over time, to understand people' s meanings, to 
adjust to new issues and ideas as they emerge and to contribute to the evolution of new 
theories. Moreover, phenomenological methods provide a way of gathering data that are 
seen as 'natural' rather than 'artificial'. 
I 
While a clear dichotomy exists between the positivist and phenomenological paradigms 
at the philosophical level, differences in practice are by no means so distinct and clear 
cut (Burrell and Morgan 1979). The reality of research inevitably involves some 
compromise between the two paradigms. Increasingly, management researchers have 
developed methodological approaches, combining both quantitative and qual itative 
techniques, which provide a middle ground and ultimately, some bridging between the 
two perspectives (Easterby-Smith et al 1991). Moreover, where findings yielded by the 
different data collection methods are consistent, the validity of those findings is said to 
increase (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). Moreover, Gummesson (2000: 142) noted that 
'if the results are contradictory, we realise that the use of a single method could have 
misled us'. Easterby-Smith et al (199\) concluded that the best way to tackle 
contradictory results was to raise the discrepancy with research participants and establish 
whether they had any explanations. 
The remainder ofthis chapter discusses the application of different techniques employed 
in the current research programme. Quantitative and qualitative methods formed the 
basis of the research design, while observation and secondary data sources provided 
valuable supplementary information in relation to the issues being investigated. The 
precise mix and application of research instruments used in the present study varied 
between the different companies, however. Time spent conducting the fieldwork at each 
establishment also varied, depending primarily on the number of sites to be visited, the 
number of employees willing to be interviewed and ultimately, the level of accessibility 
permitted in each case. 
Easterby-Smith et al (1991: 100) described the approach undertaken in the current 
research as one of 'interrupted involvement'. Over a period of time the researcher is 
present sporadically within the company, moving in and out of the enterprise to deal with 
other work, or to conduct interviews with or undertake observations of different 
individuals across a number of different cases. The process is not one of continuous 
longitudinal involvement, whereby the researcher gathers 'time-series data' over periods 
of time significantly longer than the immediate focus (Pettigrew 1985), and does not 
involve actual participation in the work. Rather, it provides a model for what is often 
viewed as a 'participant observation' method in that the researcher spends a period of 
time in a particular setting, combining observation with interviews. 
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4.3 Research design in the current investigation 
A multiple case study design was used for the current investigation. Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) concluded that the actual number of cases needed in a specific study would be 
determined by 'saturation', that is, the diminishing marginal contribution of each 
additional case. When the marginal utility of an additional case approached zero the 
researcher had no need to continue with further cases (Gummesson 2000). Given the 
context of the investigation, it was necessary to select a 'sufficient' number of cases to 
accommodate a detailed examination of the most prominent and diverse forms of ESO to 
have characterised the UK bus industry from the late 1980s through to the mid-1990s. 
Further details of the number and types of cases used are given in section 4.3.1. 
In his discussion of case study design, Yin (1994) placed single and multiple case 
designs within the same methodological framework, but noted that mUltiple-case designs 
offered distinct advantages over single-case designs. For example, evidence from 
multiple cases is often considered "more compelling' and the overall study subsequently 
'more robust' (Yin 1994: 45). However, the rationale for single-case designs cannot 
usually be satisfied by multiple cases: the unusual or rare case, the critical case and the 
revelatory case are all, by definition, likely to involve only single cases. In addition, 
multiple-case designs often require extensive resources and time, which may be beyond 
the means of a single researcher. Every case within a mUltiple design should, therefore, 
serve a specific purpose within the overall scope of inquiry, rather than be used simply to 
assess the incidence of the phenomena under investigation. Gummesson (2000) observed 
that general ising from statistical samples was rarely applicable to case study research and 
concluded that generalising from case studies should be approached differently. 
Similarly, Normann (1970: 53) observed that: 
' ... the possibilities to generalise from one single case are founded in the 
comprehensiveness of measurements which makes it possible to reach a 
fundamental understanding of the structure, process and driving forces rather 
than a superficial establishment of correlation or cause-effect relationships.' 
Normann's observation focused on the use of in-depth studies based on exhaustive 
investigations and analyses to identifY certain phenomena and lay bare mechanisms that 
also existed within other companies. More specifically, Yin (1994: 48) concluded that 
the researcher should follow a 'replication logic' rather than a 'sampling logic' when 
embarking upon a multiple-case design. Following a replication rationale, each case is 
carefully selected so that it either predicts similar results (a literal replication), or 
produces contrary results but for predictable reasons (a theoretical replication). 
Moreover, half of the cases within a multiple design may be designed for literal 
replication while the remaining cases are designed to pursue different patterns of 
theoretical replication. Where results from all of the cases turn out as predicted. 
compelling support is provided for an initial set of propositions. If cases are in some way 
contradictory, however, the initial propositions need to be revised and re-tested with 
another set of cases. 
Yin (1994) argued that the development of a rich theoretical framework was an important 
step within these replication procedures. For example, the framework needs to state the 
conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal 
replication) as well as conditions where it is unlikely to be found (a theoretical 
replication). The theoretical framework later becomes the vehicle for general ising to 
new cases. In their discussion ofthe replication approach to multiple case studies, Yin et 
al (1983) concluded that each individual case study consisted of a 'whole' study, in 
which convergent evidence is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case. 
The conclusions of each case are then considered to be the information needing 
replication by other individual cases. For each individual case, the researcher should 
indicate how and why a particular proposition was demonstrated, or not demonstrated. 
Across the cases, the extent of the replication logic, plus reasons why certain cases were 
predicted to have certain results and others were predicted to have contrary results, 
should be noted. In summary, multiple cases should serve in a manner similar to 
multiple experiments, with similar results or contrary results predicted explicitly at the 
outset ofthe investigation. 
Gummesson (2000) extended the issue of generalisation further still, asking whether it 
was at all meaningful to generalise in a social context. The opposite of generalisation is 
'particularisation' (Patton 1980: 280), whereby social phenomena are part of a specific 
situation and are far too liable to change to allow meaningful generalisation. The 
contingency theory of organisations claims that there is no 'right' organisational structure 
for a company; it all depends on the circumstances. Gustavsen and Sorensen (1982), for 
example, placed considerable emphasis on the importance of' local theory', arguing that 
it was perhaps the only type of theory that could be created in social situations. In a 
social context there remains a substantial risk that generalisations act as a prejudice that 
effectively blocks understanding rather than constituting supportive pre-understanding. 
Gummessol1 (2000: 97) concluded: 
'As long as you keep searching for new knowledge and do not believe you have 
found the ultimate truth but, rather, the best available for the moment, the 
traditional demand for generalisation becomes less urgent.' 
4.3.1 Case study selection 
Six bus companies were selected for the main investigation while one other was chosen 
for a preliminary pilot study. For reasons of confidentiality the six main cases are 
referred to hereafter as Company One. Company Two, Company Three, COlnpany Four, 
Company Five and Company Six and are located in the North West, Soutb Yorkshire, 
West London, the North East, the South East and South West London respectively. 
Applying definitions from the CTC (2001) previously highlighted in section 1.3 in 
Chapter I, cases used in the study were defined as 'employee-owned' where employees 
owned a 'significant' proportion of the equity (25 per cent or more) either directly or 
through a trust. Conversely, companies with more broad-based systems involving only a 
small amount of equity passed to employees were defined as having 'employee share 
ownership arrangements'. 
Among the six cases, one 'employee-owned' company (Company One) was operating a 
system of direct share ownership during the period of fieldwork involving 100 per cent 
employee ownership of equity. At the time of writing, the employee ownership structure 
remains in place and the company represents the only example of a wholly employee­
owned enterprise still operating in the UK bus industry. Two other employee-owned 
companies in the study had ESOP structures in place at the time of the fieldwork and 
employee ownership of equity in the two cases was 80 per cent (Company Two) and 25.1 
per cent (Company Three). In the remaining three cases, companies were operating in a 
'post-ESO' environment during the period of data collection, having been 'sold on' to 
other major transport groups some years earlier. One former employee-owned company 
(Company Four) had operated under an ESOP structure for five years, with employees 
owning a 49 per cent share of the equity and senior managers and directors the remaining 
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51 per cent. A further former employee-owned enterprise (Company Five) operated 
under a direct share ownership system for almost four years with 100 per cent employee 
ownership of equity. The remaining company (Company Six) had 'employee ownership 
arrangements' for three years, during which time employees owned 9.5 per cent of the 
equity. All six cases are profiled more fully in Chapter 5. 
In the first instance, business directories and professional associations, including the 
ESOP Centre, the IPA, CEOP and lCOM were contacted for up-to-date lists of 'relevant' 
UK bus companies. 'Target' companies included: (1) current 'employee-owned' 
companies/those with 'employee share ownership' arrangements; and (2) former 
'employee-owned' companies /those which formerly had 'employee share ownership' 
arrangements. 
On completion of the initial stage, a list of around ten companies meeting the criteria was 
drawn up. Companies on the list were generally contacted by phone in the first instance 
to establish the name of the individual most likely to be able to assist in the initial stages 
of the research. The contact was generally the managing director, the finance or 
personnel director, a trade union representative or an employee director. An introductory 
letter requesting a meeting and outlining the purpose of the research was then sent to the 
contact. In Rosen et ai's (1986) study, the authors found that if the recipient of an 
introductory letter agreed to a meeting, chances were good that the company would go on 
to participate in the study. The experience of Rosen et al (1986) was mirrored in the 
present study with only one exception. One of the companies contacted underwent a 
change to its employee ownership status three months after an initial meeting and 
subsequently felt unable to participate in the research during a period of transition. In all 
other cases, companies agreeing to an introductory meeting in turn agreed to participate 
in the investigation. Klein (1987: 322) pointed to the possibility of bias in multiple-case 
designs, insofar as participating companies are those whose management is sufticiently 
interested to want to become involved in the research. The potentially valuable 
contributions of companies that do not become involved are excluded from the 
investigation. In the present study, companies refusing the request for an introductory 
meeting did so either because it was 'policy' not to participate in research of this nature, 
or because the timing of the request was inappropriate. Having undertaken extensive 
secondary research to produce a 'pool' of 'employee-owned' bus companies, the 
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researcher was confident that those included within the sample were 'representative' of 
the most prominent forms of ESO within the UK bus industry, in line with the aims of 
the research. However, during the period of data collection, the ownership status of 
some of the participating bus companies changed. These changes, generally involving 
'employee-owned' companies being sold on to other major transport groups, are 
discussed more fully in Chapter 5. 
Where a company agreed to an introductory meeting, a fairly structured interview 
approach was adopted for the purposes of gathering background information on, among 
other issues, the company's history and its system of ESO. The meeting typically 
concluded with a discussion of how the research would be carried out, including the 
length of time the researcher would need to spend at the company and convenient dates 
for commencing the fieldwork. Additionally, a contact from the employee/union side 
was requested by the researcher in each case to assist with 'introductions' to other 
employees. It was considered necessary to 'win' the confidence of the workforce and to 
reassure employees that the research was independent of managers at the company and 
more importantly, that the participation of employees in the research would not lead to 
recriminations from managers at a later date. Gummesson (2000: 32) identified two key 
figures essential for helping the researcher to gain access to the company and its 
employees - the 'gatekeeper' and the 'informant': 
'Gatekeepers are those 'who can open or close the gate for the 
researcher/consultants, while informants can provide valuable information and 
smooth the way to others.' 
Without gatekeepers, gaining access to individuals may become a difficult and lengthy 
process (see for example, Barnes 1977). while informants are needed to help the 
researcher locate individuals suitable for interview and observation. Gummesson (2000: 
33) added that the researcher would become lost in an unfamiliar setting without 'at least 
one efficient and benevolent informant'. 
At the introductory meeting, personnel were informed that the research process would 
involve two main stages - 'Stage One' and 'Stage Two'. Stage One consisted of a 
quantitative employee attitude survey in the form of a questionnaire while Stage Two 
involved qualitative semi-structured interviews, typically with managerial and trade 
union personnel. In addition, the quantitative and qualitative data were to be 
supplemented by non-participant observation at meetings and the collation of secondary 
information. Pennission to attend relevant meetings was requested, though granted only 
at Company Two where the researcher was able to attend one EBT meeting and one CNC 
meeting. The remaining companies were reluctant to grant permission to attend meetings 
due to the sensitive nature of the issues being discussed. Other opportunities to 'observe' 
respondents generally occurred 'on site' when the two main stages of the data collection 
were being undertaken. Scott (1994: 36) concluded that observation can aid an effective 
understanding of workplace culture, while time spent observing within the workplace can 
help to correct any erroneous first impressions and prejudices associated with being a 
newcomer to the industry. Observations were further supplemented by extensive tours of 
some of the companies, which in turn provided the opportunity to engage with employees 
at all levels. 
Finally, an extensive catalogue of secondary data gathered from company reports, in­
house journals and national newspapers was produced. Yin (1994) concluded that 
documentary evidence could be used to corroborate and augment findings from other, 
perhaps less tangible sources, including observation. Collation of the data, covering 
general labour force and commercial information, occurred during successive visits to 
research sites and formed an on-going part of the research process. In addition, a 
questionnaire designed by the researcher was used to collate general information on, 
among other issues, mechanisms used by each company to disseminate information to 
employees, for example notice boards, meetings, road shows and so on (see Chapter 7 
and Appendix 1 for more details). The questionnaire was sent to all six companies and 
specifically, to a member of the management team likely to have direct access to this 
information. Three companies - Company One, Company Five and Company Six ­
completed and retumed the questionnaire (Appendix 2(i) and Appendix 2(ii). Despite 
numerous requests the questionnaire was never returned by any of the remaining 
companies. 
4.4 Stage One employee attitude survey 
In line with the aims of the research and following the methodologies of Marchington et 
al (1992) and Poole and Jenkins (1990), it was considered necessary to explore the 
'attitudes' and 'reactions' of employees in relation to outcomes of 'ESO satisfaction', 
organisational commitment, EP, employee-manager and employee-trade uDlon 
relationships. Employee attitudinal data provided a valuable dimension on each case 
study organisation and allowed for possible relationships between the different variables 
under investigation to be explored. An anonymous and confidential 'self-completion' 
questionnaire was distributed to employees across all six companies for the purpose. 
Techniques for conducting surveys are not restricted solely to questionnaires and may 
include in-depth interviews, observation and content analysis (see for example, Marsh 
1982). However, a questionnaire was regarded as the most appropriate way for a single 
researcher to survey a large cross-section of employees across the six cases within the 
time-scale of the project. 
Surveys have their ongm In the positivist tradition, though to describe surveys as 
'positivist' may be an oversimplification. While nearly all surveys aim to describe or 
explain the characteristics or opinions of a population through the use of a representative 
sample (May 1987), a number of different forms can be identified. Ackroyd and Hughes 
(1983) classified surveys under four main headings: factual; attitudinal; social 
psychological; and explanatory. Attitudinal surveys are said to constitute a shift away 
from the hard data basis that characterises factual surveys, which in turn 'aim to gain 
information from individuals concerning their material situation rather than attitudes or 
opinions' (May 1997: 82). Moreover, by using attitude surveys 'it is believed possible to 
explain a person's behaviour' (May 1997: 83). 
Since surveys measure facts, attitudes or behaviour through questions, it is important that 
hypotheses can be operationalised into measures. Specifically, hypotheses 'must be 
turned into questions that respondents can understand and are able to answer' (May 
1997: 84). ). The answers must then be capable of categorisation and quantification. 
When the data have been collected and analysed, the researcher is then in a position to 
decide whether the hypotheses have been confirmed or falsified and what this means for 
the theory. It is possible, though unlikely, that a single survey may wholly 'confirm' or 
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'falsify' a theory. More likely is that the theory will be supported in certain respects, 
\vhile some results will be unanticipated and confusing. de Vaus (1996: 55) said: 
'This is good since it makes us think and modify or develop the initial theory and 
is what leads to progress.' 
Surveys are also predicated on a rigorous approach that aims to remove as much bias 
from the research process as possible and 'produce results that are replicable by 
following the same methods' (May 1997: 84). This can be achieved in a number of 
ways. The first is through 'standardisation', which refers to the conditions under which a 
survey is conducted, and specifically, how a questionnaire is designed, administered and 
analysed. McMiller and Wilson (1984: 84) observed that standardisation: 
' ... covers the whole process of exactly specifying the questions to be asked, 
the manner of asking them, how the replies are to be scored etc. A standardised 
interview is one that has been constructed in this way, has been tried out, and is 
ready for use in the population to be studied.' 
Specifically, if all respondents are asked the same questions in the same manner and they 
express differences of opinion in reply to those questions, these variations result from 
'true' differences of opinion rather than as a result of how the question was asked or the 
context of the interview. Thus, questionnaires concentrate upon the replies of 
respondents within a structured interviewing situation and the responses and 
characteristics are then quantified and aggregated with others in the survey sample 'to 
examine patterns or relationships between them by employing the techniques of 
statistical analysis' (May 1997: 85). 
The second method is via 'replicability', which attests that other researchers can replicate 
a survey by adopting the same approach to sampling and questionnaire design. Regarded 
as 'one of the key safeguards against falsification' (de Vaus 1996: 340), replication ofa 
survey producing the same results with different groups at different times will increase 
confidence in the original findings (May 1997). From replicability emerge the issues of 
'reliability' and 'validity'. Specifically, a survey is aiming to be both 'reliable', whereby 
a researcher will obtain the same result from the same measure used on different 
occasions, and 'valid', whereby it measures what it is intended to measure and 'is free 
from both systematic and random error' (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 1997: 33). 
There are a number of ways in which to assess the validity of a measure, including 
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construct, intemal and external validity. In recent years, each of the above have been 
given due consideration by a number of authors, and extensive discussions can be found 
in de Vaus (1996), Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1997), Judd et al (1991) and 
Oppenheim (1992). The final method, 'representativeness', focuses not only upon 
finding a sample that is representative of the population being investigated, but also that 
the findings are 'statistically significant'. that is, whether they are larger or smaller than 
would be expected by chance alone (May 1997: 85). 
4.4.1 Administration of Stage One survey 
Initially, a decision was taken to administer questionnaires to a random sample of 
employees across the six companies by means of a postal survey. The intemal mail 
system in each company was to be used for the purpose. Payroll information giving 
details of name, site location and length of service was requested and provided by two 
companies in the first instance. In line with the aims of the research, questionnaires were 
to be distributed to both shareholding and non-shareholding employees in each case. 
Visits to all six companies, some of which had up to five different sites, would inevitably 
involve large investments of time by a single researcher. Hence, a postal questionnaire 
allowed for potentially wider coverage and additionally, from the employees' point of 
view, greater anonymity. However, following discussions with personnel on both the 
union and management sides at a number of the companies, the idea of a postal 
questionnaire was eventually abandoned. Those companies advising against the method 
had previously been involved with postal surveys from other researchers and response 
rates had generally been very low. Discussions regarding low response rates from postal 
questionnaires have been well documented in research methods texts, while problems of 
being unable to control who actually completes the questionnaire in the event of a postal 
survey have also been highlighted (see for example, Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). 
Therefore, the researcher took the decision to administer questionnaires personally at 
each site, usually in the staff rest rooms and canteens. The number of sites across the six 
companies came to twenty-one in total (see Chapter 5), although time taken to visit each 
of the sites personally was offset by the potential for far higher response rates than would 
have occurred from a postal questionnaire. 
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The decision to administer questionnaires personally on site was further supported from 
experience of two pilot studies undertaken in the month prior to the start of the main 
fieldwork in July 1997. Yin (1994: 75) described work at pilot sites as providing 
'information about relevant field questions and about the logistics of the field inquiry'. 
The pilot case study helps the researcher to refine their data collection plans with respect 
to the type of data to be collected and procedures to be followed. Being on site also 
makes it easier to ensure that employees who have been asked to complete the 
questionnaire actually do so on their own. Oppenheim (1992) observed that self­
administration of questionnaires by the researcher helped to ensure a minimum of 
interviewer bias while permitting interviewer assessments, providing necessary 
explanations although not the interpretation of questions, and offering the benefit of a 
degree of personal contact. Additionally, the technique adopted for the present 
investigation provided scope for observation and for holding 'informal interviews' with 
respondents within their own environment. Moreover, employees unwilling to complete 
a questionnaire were, nevertheless, often prepared to partake in an informal exchange, 
which, in some instances, provided a valuable contextual overlay to data collected via 
other methods. 
The first pilot study was undertaken in June 1997 in a bus company located in the 
Eastern region of the UK and which did not feature subsequently as part of the main 
investigation. As a former 'employee-owned' company with 100 per cent 'employee 
ownership', the firm was significant for two main reasons: firstly, it had pioneered the 
direct share ownership route to ESO (Pendleton et al 1995b); and secondly, was one of 
only two privatisations out of seventy from the National Bus Company (NBC) stable to 
move into employee ownership (Oakeshott 2000). Further details of the background to 
ESO in the UK bus industry are presented in Chapter 5. The company operated as an 
employee-owned enterprise from 1987 until 1994 when shareholders voted to sell to a 
major UK transport group on the basis that the sale was in the best interests of the firm. 
Yin (1994) observed that convenience, access and geographic proximity can be the main 
criteria for selecting pilot cases, allowing for a less structured and more prolonged 
relationship to develop between the interviewees and the researcher than might occur at 
the 'real' case study sites. The pilot site may then assume the role of a 'laboratory' for 
the researcher, allowing them to investigate different phenomena from many different 
angles or to try different approaches on a trial basis. Work at the first pilot site, which 
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was located close to and had links with the researcher's university, began with an 
informal exploratory meeting with the engineering director during the summer of 1996. 
Meetings with the operations manager and general manager subsequently followed in the 
spring of 1997. The purpose of these meetings was to obtain insights into the UK bus 
industry in general, as well as highlighting practical issues in relation to research 
methodology. For example, shift work is a key feature of the bus industry, which in turn 
has implications for the way in which research instruments can be administered most 
effectively. 
The main purpose of the first pilot study was not to 'test' the scales that were to appear 
in the Stage One questionnaire but rather, to obtain a 'feel' for how best to conduct the 
main fieldwork. One whole day was spent in the staff canteen at the company's main 
site, where the researcher not only administered questionnaires but also talked to 
employees about their own experiences ofESO. Employees were also asked to comment 
on the design and wording of the questionnaires and their opinions were duly noted. 
Among the researcher's main concerns at this stage were the length of the questionnaire 
and the ease with which employees were able to follow the written instructions about 
how to complete it. Perhaps most important, however, was a need to assess the 
willingness of employees to complete the questionnaire during their work breaks and to 
establish whether they had sufficient time to do so before returning to their shift. To 
administer the questionnaire, the researcher approached employees individually in the 
canteen and rest room and asked them if they would be willing to participate in the pilot 
study. The exercise did not come as a complete surprise to them, since the garage 
manager had forewarned them of the researcher's activities on the previous day via a 
notice posted on the canteen's notice board. Moreover, each questionnaire was 
accompanied by a covering letter outlining the purpose of the research, providing 
guidance on how to mark responses and ensuring anonymity to respondents. In addition, 
the letter set out to reassure respondents that the investigation was not merely a 
'management exercise'. However, the researcher was on hand to explain the aims of the 
research and reassure employees that their responses would remain anonymous and 
confidential. Over the course of the pilot exercise thirty-six questionnaires were 
completed, with only around ten employees refusing to participate. 
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Having 'refined' the approach to be taken for administering the questionnaires, the 
purpose of the second pilot study was to test the scales to be used for measuring 
employee attitudes in relation to ESO satisfaction, organisational commitment, EP and 
employee-manager and employee-trade union relationships. The second study was 
undertaken at a site attached to one of the companies featured in the main investigation in 
early July 1997. The company chosen had five sites located across South Yorkshire, 
which meant that the researcher still had scope to survey a large number of staff at the 
remaining four sites for the main fieldwork. Moreover, the firm, otherwise known as 
Company Two (see Chapter 5) had been the focus of previous investigations by other 
researchers, leaving employees and other personnel well-placed to comment on the 
attitude scales and overall wording of the questionnaire. On the day of the pilot study, 
the researcher was taken to the staff canteen and introduced to employees by a trade 
union officer who outlined the purpose of the exercise to help put employees 'at ease' 
and to increase their willingness to participate. Feedback from the second pilot study 
indicated that the questionnaire required only minor amendments for the main 
investigation. The main changes were made to the British Organisational Commitment 
Scale (BOCS), which was used to measure employees' commitment to their organisation. 
Origins and development of the scale are discussed in more detail in section 4.4.4. A 
total of twenty-six questionnaires were completed on the day of the second pilot exercise, 
while around fifteen employees refused to participate. 
4.4.2 Survey response rates 
Completion of the main Stage One survey took approximately twelve months, from July 
1997 through to July 1998. Having to conduct the research at times to suit all six 
companies meant that work ran concurrently across the cases. The researcher spent a day 
at each of the sites and respondents were selected at random. May (1997) commented 
that while many probability samples are described as 'simple random samples', it is often 
not possible to select a sample from a sampling frame. Among the reasons put forward, 
adequate lists on which to base the sample may not always be available (see for example, 
de Vaus \996). Thus, the researcher needs to modify the 'simple' design to ensure that 
the sample is as accurate as possible. A 'multistage cluster sample', for example, may be 
used. Using this method, the initial sampling frame might be districts or electoral wards, 
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or as in the present study, different company sites. Moreover, the sampling may be in 
several stages but in each, the random procedure remains the same (May 1997). The 
general principle of multistage clustering is to maximise the number of initial clusters 
chosen and consequently, to select relatively few individuals or units within each cluster. 
de Vaus (1996: 69) noted the importance of including as many different clusters as 
possible as against obtaining as large a sample as possible: 'by maximising the chance 
for variety initially, we increase the chance of maintaining representativeness at later 
stages.' Conversely, selecting a limited number of clusters could leave the researcher 
with a large but very unrepresentative sample. In the end, however, a compromIse 
between cost and sampling error has to be made (de Vaus 1996). 
For the current investigation, the aim was to administer questionnaires to employees 
within a one-day time frame allocated for each site. Given the method used to distribute 
the questionnaires and the promise of anonymity, it would have been impractical to 
spend any longer than one day at a single site. There were two main reasons for this: 
firstly, there was a likelihood that employees who had already completed the 
questionnaire on a previous occasion could be approached again; secondly, trying to 
identify remaining employees at the site who had not already completed the 
questionnaire would be difficult. The majority of completed questionnaires were 
returned to the researcher on the day of the survey, although in some cases respondents 
who were unable to complete their questionnaire on the day of the researcher's visit 
posted them back at a later date. 
To determine what constitutes an 'adequate' sample size, attention must be given to the 
degree of variability in the population; the more heterogeneous the population the larger 
the sample size needed to capture the diversity of the population (Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch 1997). Consideration also needs to be given to the degree of error, or the 
'sampling error', that the researcher is prepared to tolerate. de Vaus (1996: 71) noted, 
for example, that the sample size has to be quadrupled to halve the 'sampling error': a 
sample size of 400 will result in a 5 per cent sampling error, while a sample size of 1,600 
results in a sampling error of 2.5 per cent. A further consideration for determining 
sample size is the extent to which the intended analysis involves the use of sub-samples 
for cross-classification purposes and the use of statistical techniques that assume a 
b' 
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minimum sample size sufficient to produce meaningful results (Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch 1997). 
Details of response rates from the survey are presented in Table 2. The table shows that, 
from a total of 1,295 questionnaires distributed personally to employees across the six 
companies, 821 were completed and returned to the researcher, giving an overall 
response rate of 64 per cent. 
Table 2: Questionnaires distributed and response rates 
Response rates (as 
Total employees Total a proportion of 
in company Sites Completed questionnaires questionnaires 
1997/8 Visited questionnaires distributed distributed) 
(n) (n) (n) (n) 
83.3Cc!f1}PCil!xQ'!~ .... 300.0......... ...2.0 .f .. ?Q.Q .................................I..9?:.0 
··1 ........ . 

c;pf1}PCif}yT'.1!f!. .......2,700:9............ 4.0 ...... )O?':Q. . ...!55.:9 67.6 

c;c?f1}PCl:f}xT~r.~e },I.??:O ... ?:O...... ..................I?I:Q. 387.0 ............................ 49.4 

9.c?f1}PCiY/XC?l!r. ....}??~O:O... 4.0 .2)'!:Q. .....}?O.:O .1 62.0 
....,.. ". 

c;l?f1}Pc/'f}XEi~~.... 752.0 ........ .... ~.:g............... 122.0. ............................ 184.0 66.3 
...... 

Company Six 1,639.0 2.0 96.0 111.0 86.5 
Total (n) 8,128.0 20.0 821.0 1,295.0 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
Response rates ranged from 49.4 per cent at Company Three up to 86.5 per cent at 
Company Six. The number of completed questionnaires as a proportion of the total 
number of employees in the company was lower in some cases than the researcher would 
have wished, most notably at Company Two (3.8 per cent) and Company Six (5.9 per 
cent). As shown in the table, however, these companies were among the largest in terms 
of total employees and a level of questionnaire distribution by a single researcher higher 
than that achieved would have been unlikely. 
In addition, other 'questionnaire distribution' methods 'piloted' by the researcher gave 
further support for the method actually used. Following completion of the Stage One 
pilot studies, Company Two was the first company to be visited by the researcher for the 
main survey. Employees who had not participated when the researcher was first 'on-site' 
were given an additional opportunity to do so by collecting a questionnaire from the 
company's main trade union office. Around fifty extra questionnaires were left with a 
trade union officer for employees to collect and complete, place in a sealed envelope and 
return to the trade union office to be collected by the researcher at a later date. A notice 
90 

was posted on the door of the office, requesting that employees participate in the survey 
and explaining how they could do so. The approach proved unsuccessful, however, with 
no questionnaires being completed after three months and was therefore abandoned at 
subsequent companies. 
4.4.3 Survey measures 
The questionnaire used for the Stage One survey (Appendix 3) consisted of core sections 
for all companies, plus variable supplementary sections appropriate to the situation of 
individual cases. For all companies, the first section consisted of a series of standard 
questions covering age, gender, job category, length of service and trade union 
affiliation. Table 3 shows that across all six companies the majority of respondents 
identified themselves as 'drivers'. Respondents classed as 'supervisory' or 'managerial' 
represented junior and middle management grades and were not distinct from 'other' 
employees, for example drivers, in terms of the basis for share allocations. In all cases, 
including the 'post-ESO companies', differences in 'share allocation policy' were only 
apparent at senior management level and above, where individuals had generally invested 
more money or were perhaps allocated additional controlling shares (see Chapter 5). For 
results presented in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, 'employees' of the company include drivers, 
supervisors, those in administrative and clerical positions and all other staff categories as 
shown in the table. 
Table 3: Respondents b job category 
Company Company Company Company Company Company 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Job category % % % % % % 

Driver 91.0 85.7 80.7 96.3 83.5 66.3 

, ............._ .... '" ....M ....• ................ , ............. ..
.................... ....,.."...... ..··........v···_ .........._. 

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1
.... §.l1gil1e~E. 0.0 ..........................." .._..........".................""............... .........................,......., .. 
Conductor l 0.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0.~flteTil1g(~!.~fll1il1g ........ . 0.0 ................" ....-.. ,............ .. 
Clerical/administrative 5.6 5.6 3.2 2.8 9.5 
...............~""............ . ...................,~... ~.,,," ........'" ..................... ,' ..~.................-.. " ...'''.. 

2.9 2.7 0.9 11.6 0.0?l!.P.~EY..i.~?lY,............ .., , ...,..,........? 4 

4.8 3.2 0.0 1.6 10.5.!Y.13:l1flg~r.ifll, '" "',..... ,.,m,." ,., 0.0 .".. ,............., .............................. 

Other 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 11.6 

Valid cases (n) 89.0 105.0 187.0 217.0 121.0 95.0 

,.. """"~, ........"...." .....""...... 

Missing observations (n) 1.0 0.0 4.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 

lCornpany Three only 

Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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Additional details on gender, age, length of service, employment status and trade union 
membership are given in Tables 4-6. Table 4 shows that the typical respondent profile 
was male, aged between 30 and 49 with between one and ten years' service. Almost all 
respondents were employed on full-time contracts, while trade union membership, in line 
with the general pattern of membership in the industry (see Pendleton et al 1995b), was 
around 80 per cent in three cases and 	over 90 per cent in the remaining three. The 
TGWU was the main union in each case, though GMB members represented around one­
fifth of respondents at both Company Four and Company Five. The majority of 
respondents did not hold a specific position in their union. although union roles that did 
emerge from the Stage One survey were represented in each of the companies. 
Table 4: Respondents' seneral details 
Company Company Company Company Company Company 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Gender % 	 % % 0/0 0/0 % 
Male 	 90.0 90.5 94.2 91.8 93.8 
.............m... ............... .. ................._......... _... , .. 95.9 .................. 

Female 10.0 	 9.5 5.8 4.1 8.2 6.2 
Valid cases (n) 90.0 105.0 191.0 217.01.........·......····· ....···· ..··... · .. ·......·,..·...<. ....·...... ·· ....·....·......· ........... , ................................. . ..................." ............. .. .. •••••• •• ....................H ..... . 	 122.0 ....................... 96.0 ............. 

Missing observations (n) 0.0 	 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
% 	 0/0 0/0 (Yo
... Ag'!..E~~g'!. ............................... ............................... .............................................. 
Under 20 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 
..... 
20-29 	 12.2 11.4 26.2 8.8 14.8 19.8 
........ " ..................... . 

30-39 	 27.8 20.0 29.8 34.1 27.9 25.0 
.-.................................. .............................- ......................... 	 ............. 

40-49 	 40.0 20.9 35.9 35.2 24.0 
................
................................................2......4.....4: 1 ............................ 

50+ 35.6 28.6 22.6 21.2 22.1 30.2 

Valid cases (n) 90.0 10.5 191.0 217.0 122.0 96.0 

. . .... ................................. ................................................................... . .1- ....................................... . 

Missing observations (n) 0.0 	 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 

'Yo 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0
.I:~I1.g!.~?.f... ~~ryi':~ ..... ................ . 

39.0 22.5 8.8 15.6 19.8!:~s~!~~!:I.). )'~~~ ......... ...... ...+ 16.0 	 .. 1
 
30.5 62.8 	 54.9 60.61-10 years ......."'............ ...1.........5;....2...2 	 ......................................... ........................... .. 51.3 ............. 

............. •••M .......................
. } ..}:?9.y~~~?... ............................?.!..:..?. 22.9 4.7 24.2 18.9 13.0 ...... 
.}1:3Oy~~r? 7 . 0 2.8 7.9 13.4 10.6 5.3 
.....................,,,....... 

31+ years 3.3 4.8 2.1 2.3 0.0 1.3 

Val!.~..E~~~s (n)..... "'.............. 88.0 105.0 	
....." .................. 

187.0 195.0 122.0 94.0 

Missing observations (n) 2.0 0.0 4.0 22.0 0.0 2.0 

.. ~[JlP~()y[Jl'!.l1tstllt~~....... % % 0/0 % 

FuJI-time 98.9 97.1 100.0 96.8 99.2 97.9 

........... " ......... .. 

Part-time 1.1 	 1.8 0.0 1.8 0.8 2.1 
................ ,....",,"'...._............ . ........................... ,..... 	 .......................................................... 
 I 

Temporary 0.0 1.1 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 

104.0 191.0 217.0 122.0 96.0
.....Y..~.I.!~..~~~~.~ .. (~X.'" ................. 8.2..:9 	 .....+........ . ... 

Missing observations (n) 1.0 	 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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Table 5: Trade union membership 
Company Company Company Company Company Company 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
% % % % %Name of union % 

TGWU 100.0 92.9 99.4 76.0 73.5 83.6 

ACTS 0.0 1.0 0.6 0.0 6.1 0.0 

UNISON 0.0 6.1 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 

GMB 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.1 20.4 0.0 

....................................... 

TSSA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.4 
Valid cases (n) 81.0 99.0 154.0 208.0 98.0 73.0 
................." ...... ..................".................. .............." .............................................................................. . 

. ~?!~ppE~(;l~I~.(':l). .... 3 .0 6.0 31.0 8.0 18.0 17.0 
Missing observations (n) 6.0 0.0 6.0 1.0 5.0 6.0 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
Table 6: Profile of trade union members 
Company Company Company Company Company Company 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Position held (n) (n) (n) Cn) (n) (n) 

Chairman 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 

.......................................... ........................." .. 

Vice chairman 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
. .................................. . ......................................................................... 

§~~EE:!~I),' ..... . 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 

Steward 2.0 3.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.0 

.........................................................." ...... , . ........... .. ....... .................................................................... .......................... ........ 

0.0 5.0 
~ 
0.0 0.0 0.0
.13:~p~E:§E:rl!<lt!y.~ 0 . 0 
................................. 

Pension trustee 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
............................... , . 

Other 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 

Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 

The second section of the questionnaire set out to test commitment to the company 
among both shareholding and non-shareholding respondents in Company One, Company 
Two and Company Three. The six-item version of the BOCS, described as a 
'psychometrically adequate, stable and reliable' (Cook and Wall 1980: 45) measure of 
commitment, was used for the purpose. Section three consisted of a nine-item scale, 
originally developed by Angle and Perry (1986), for completion by shareholding and 
non-shareholding respondents to test attitudes to the trade unions at all six companies. 
However, only respondents belonging to a trade union were asked to complete section 
three, since the items in the scale had no relevance for non-trade union members. In 
contrast, the following two sections of the questionnaire were designed for completion by 
all respondents in all of the companies. Section four featured two eleven-item scales 
which set out to measure desired and perceived levels of EP in decision-making at the 
job, departmental and organisational levels across each company. Section five consisted 
of a three-item scale designed to measure the attitudes of employees to their managers. 
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The remainder of the questionnaire varied according to the circumstances of the 
individual company. For the three employee-owned cases, respondents were asked to 
indicate whether they currently owned shares within their company, when they had 
acquired their shares and in the event that they did not own shares, to indicate the reason 
for their 'non-shareholder' status. Of Stage One respondents confirming that they owned 
shares, shareholders at Company One, Company Two and Company Three represented 65 
per cent (n = 56), 95 per cent (n = 100) and 60 per cent (n = 114) respectively of the 
Stage One sample. Prior to the survey, the researcher had been informed by personnel in 
each employee-owned company that overall ESO participation rates at that time were 
fairly high: around 70 per cent in Company One; around 98 per cent in Company Two: 
and over 90 per cent in Company Three. 
The responses of 'non-shareholders' - those working in employee-owned companies but 
who did not own shares - were a sub-group incorporated into some parts of the analysis. 
To an extent, non-shareholders are excluded from participating in the activities of an 
employee-owned company - for example, voting at the AGM and having access to 
certain financial information. However, it is proposed that as employees they will still 
benefit from working in a democratic, consultative and co-operative environment thought 
to be characteristic of an employee-owned enterprise. In their longitudinal study of ESO 
and employee attitudes, Dunn et al (1991) identified a number of different non­
shareholder groups, including: those dissatisfied with their company's ESO scheme; 
those who considered the investment period to be too long; those not interested in the 
scheme; those without sufficient spare cash; those critical of their company; and those 
who were unsettled in their job and perhaps planning to move to another company in the 
near future. A sufficiently large sample of non-shareholding employees, thereby 
allowing for analysis of different non-shareholder sub-groups, would have been useful in 
the present investigation. At Company One and Company Three non-shareholding 
respondents represented around 38 per cent (n = 30) and 37 per cent (n = 70) of their 
Stage One survey samples respectively. These samples were too small to generate 
meaningful results of different non-shareholder sub-groups as identified by Dunn et al 
(1991), but were, nevertheless, suffic iently large enough to permit some degree of 
statistical analysis of 'total' non-shareholders within the two companies. Further details 
of non-shareholder analysis based on data from Company One and Company Three are 
given in section 4.4.8. At Company Two, given that the proportion of employees not 
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owning shares represented less than 5 per cent of the company's Stage One sample, no 
meaningful analysis of non-shareholders as a separate group could be generated. 
In the three post-ESO companies, respondents were asked to confirm: whether they had 
owned shares during the time their company was 'employee-owned'/had 'employee 
ownership arrangements'; whether they believed their company should have remained in 
'employee ownership'; and whether they were satisfied with the price they received for 
their shares when the company was sold. 
The final three sections of the questionnaire were designed for completion by employee 
shareholders in the three employee-owned companies. Respondents were asked to 
indicate the number of shares they held currently; how they viewed their company's 
ownership system; whether owning shares had made a difference to the way they thought 
about their company; and what they thought about a possible future sale of the company. 
In the penultimate section, respondents were asked to rank what they considered to be the 
five main benefits of ESO at their company from a list of ten options. The final section 
consisted of a six-item scale developed by Rosen et al (1986) to measure levels of 
satisfaction among employee shareholders towards their company's ownership system. 
Five-point interval scales were used throughout the questionnaire where the researcher 
set out to measure the attitudes of respondents. Adjectives were chosen to represent the 
two extremes of a continuum - for example 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree' - and 
respondents were required to mark a point located on or between the two extremes. The 
points located between the two extremes of the scale were numbered so as to 
communicate to the respondent that distances between the scale points were intended to 
be equal (see Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 1997). Interval scales contrast with 
ordinal scales, which set out to establish an ordered relationship between subjects being 
measured and to determine whether a subject has more or less of a given characteristic 
than another subject (Hussey and Hussey 1997). Ordinal scaling permits calculation of 
the median and mode in statistical analysis but excludes calculation of the arithmetic 
mean. In contrast, the interval scale permits calculation of the median, mode and mean, 
which in turn allows for more powerful analytical techniques, known as 'parametric 
statistics', to be applied to the data. Parametric techniques are discussed in more detail 
in section 4.4.8. 
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In the present research, a score of '1' on the interval scale generally indicated a 
'favourable' attitude while a score of '5' indicated an 'unfavourable' attitude. 
Oppenheim (1992) concluded that it did not matter which way round the two extremes 
were positioned on the scale, although once decided, consistency was necessary. A 
further consideration highlighted by Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch (1997) was the 
number of points on the scale. Conventionally, five or seven-point scales are the most 
widely used in social science research. Judd et al (1991: 155) concluded that 'providing 
fewer than five to seven categories seems to limit reliability, although increasing the 
number of categories over this number helps little if at all'. The researcher chose five­
point over seven-point interval scales on the basis that use of the former would minimise 
possible confusion among respondents and make it easier for them to complete the 
questionnaires. 
Besides interval scales, 'ranking' was the other main scale format used for the 
questionnaire. Ranking provides the researcher with information about the degree of 
'importance' or 'priority' that respondents attach to a set of judgements or objects (see 
Nachmias and Nachmias 1996) and is particularly important as many properties cannot 
be given a precise numerical value. The technique does not, however, provide any 
information about the distance between ranks. Techniques used to analyse the 
questionnaire data are discussed in section 4.4.8 while sections 4.4.4 to 4.4.7 below 
briefly outline the origins of the attitude scales used in the Stage One questionnaire. 
4.4.4 Organisational commitment 
Developed by Cook and Wall (1980), the BOCS was used to measure organisational 
commitment within the three employee-owned companies featured in the present 
investigation. The scale had originally been developed for use with UK blue-collar 
employees across two stages of interview, with items kept fairly brief and written in 
language that could easily be understood by the respondents. In Cook and Wall's (1980: 
40) definition, organisational commitment was seen as being concerned with 'feelings of 
attachment to the goals and values of the organisation, one's role in relation to this, and 
attachment to the organisation for its own sake rather than for its instrumental value'. In 
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an earlier study, Buchanan (1974) had identified three components of organisational 
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commitment: 
(i) 	 identification - seen as pride in the organisation and the internalisation of the 
organisation's goals and values; 
(ii) 	 involvement - seen as psychological absorption in the activities of one's role; 
(iii) loyalty 	- seen as affection for and attachment to the organisation; a sense of 
belongingness manifesting as a 'wish to stay'. 
While the items for the BaCS were 'generated afresh by the authors' (Cook and Wall 
1980: 42), the components identified by Buchanan (1974) - 'identification', 
'involvement' and 'loyalty' - served as a conceptual guide for Cook and WaJl's scale. 
The original version of the BOCS consisted of nine items, three of which were negatively 
phrased. Response alternatives were situated on a seven-point scale ranging from 'no, I 
strongly disagree' (point 1) through to 'yes, I strongly agree' (point 7) (see Appendix 4) 
and respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
each statement. The use of negatively phrased items within the Bacs was the subject of 
a later study examining the dimensionality of the scale (see Peccei and Guest 1993). 
Comparing the standard nine-item scale with a shorter six-item version consisting only of 
the positively worded items (see Table (i) in Appendix 5), Peccei and Guest (1993: 3-4) 
observed: 
'Because of the low validity and reliability often exhibited by negatively worded 
response items ... we expect the positive version to perform better than the 
standard one.' 
In their conclusions, Peccei and Guest (1993: 30) said that 'the positive six-item version 
of the Bacs was, as expected, found to be psychometrically superior to the standard 
nine-item scale', and that 'there is nothing to be gained by using the nine, rather than the 
six-item version of the scale'. The authors said it was advisable to discard the negatively 
worded items and use the shorter positive version of the instrument in future research, or 
to use the full scale but with the negatively worded items reworded in a positive 
direction. Peccei and Guest (1993) also found strong empirical support for the existence 
of three distinct, but related, factors within the BOCS corresponding to the 
'identification', 'involvement' and 'loyalty' sub-scales. Following the work of Peccei 
and Guest (1993), the six-item version of the BaCS was used for the current 
investigation, although the nine-item version was used for the pilot studies and both 
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versions were tested for reliability using the 'alpha coefficient' statistic. The alpha 
coefficients were 0.85 and 0.71 for the six-item and nine-item scales respectively. As a 
rule of thumb, the alpha coefficient should be at least 0.7 before the scale can be 
considered reliable (see de Vaus 1996) and the higher the result the more reliable the 
scale. On the basis of the alpha scores, either version of the scale would have been 
considered a 'reliable' measure, though tests of each sub-component of the scale, as 
shown in Table 7, provide stronger support for the six-item scale. 
Table 7: Alpha coefficient scores for the BOCS sub-components 
BOCS sub-components Six-item scale Nine-item scale 
Identification 0.87 0.78 
............................._...'.........................................".......... .., ... 0>0........................... ..........................._................... .. 

Involvement 0.85 0.60 
'L~y~jiY'" ..................... -.. 0.70 ................ ·····0·:65······ 
Source: Stage One survey and pilot study 1997/8 
4.4.5 Employee-trade union relations 
The state of relations between employees and their trade union was measured using a 
nine-item scale drawn from the work of Angle and Perry (1986). Respondents in all six 
companies were asked to complete this section of the questionnaire only if they were a 
member of a trade union, since the scale was not relevant for non-union members. In 
their own study of dual commitment and labour-management relationship climates, 
Angle and Perry (1986) looked at four main areas: labour-management relationship 
climate - managers' form; labour-management relationship climate - union form; union 
commitment; and dual commitment (also see section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3). Both 'Iabour­
management relationship climate' scales included twenty-five items examining the 
relationship between managers and trade unions in general, as well as during negotiations 
and grievances. Parallel forms of the scale were developed so that each side responded 
to questions regarding their perceptions of their opposite number. The union 
commitment scale was made up of four items and examined members' commitment to 
their union or employee association, while the dual commitment scale consisted of six 
items and measured commitment to the employing organisation and to the union or 
employee association. In the original study, scale items were presented in a seven-point 
interval scale agree/disagree format and were administered to transit managers, labour 
leaders and rank-and-file employees across twenty-two companies. 
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The Angle and Perry (1986) study was particularly significant for a number of reasons. 
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Firstly, previous studies of 'organisational climate' had been criticised on the basis that 
survey methods 'simply combined disparate perceptions into fallacious averages' (Angle 
and Perry 1986: 45). In their own investigation, Angle and Perry (1986: 45) found that 
the scale they developed to measure labour-management relationship climates 
represented a 'meaningful attribute of each organisation, not a spurious consensus'. 
Results from a series of statistical tests, including alpha coefficients and One-way 
analysis of variance (ANOV A), gave support to their conclusions. Secondly, Angle and 
Perry's study was the first to use independent sources to measure dual commitment. 
Earlier studies (see Fukami and Larson 1982; Gallagher 1984; Martin 1981) had tended 
to measure commitment to the employing organisation and to the trade unions separately, 
and then 'combined' the scales to show the extent of dual commitment. For the Stage 
One survey, items were drawn from the scales developed for the Angle and Perry (1986) 
study to produce a new nine-item scale (see Table (ii) in Appendix 5) with an alpha 
coefficient of 0.71. 
4.4.6 Employee participation and employee-manager relations 
Two parallel eleven-item interval scales designed to measure employees' desire for and 
perceptions of actual participation in decisions in eleven work-related areas were adapted 
from scales used in earlier studies by Pendleton et al (1 995a, b), Poole and Jenkins 
(1990) and Walley and Wilson (1992). The studies by Pendleton et al (1995a, b) drew 
on data collected from thirteen bus companies and twenty-six matched companies during 
the early 1990s, thereby allowing the authors to address the issue of the impact of ESO 
through the use of cross-sectional comparisons of 'employee-owned' and 'conventional' 
companies. Included in the findings were employees' views about the involvement of 
various 'actors' in decision-making. The Poole and Jenkins (1990) study was based on 
twenty-two case studies drawn from an initial sample of 303 companies UK-wide and 
had three main objectives: to examine the relationship of share schemes with the 
financial and industrial relations perfonnance of companies; to assess the role of share 
schemes in relation to other EP practices; and to identify and explore any obstacles to the 
development of profit-sharing and share ownership. The study had a number of stages, 
including interviews with key managerial and trade union personnel and the gathering of 
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data on company performance. In addition, an employee attitude survey was designed to 
elicit employees' views on a range of areas including: profit-sharing and share­
ownership schemes generally; preferences for particular types of scheme; and methods of 
profit distribution. Finally, Walley and Wilson's (1992) study was based on data from an 
employee attitude survey administered to employees in eight private company ESOPs 
during 1991 and 1992. The survey was designed to measure employee commitment to 
the organisation and involvement, integration, job satisfaction, influence over decision­
making and general attitudes towards ESO and formed part of a longitudinal study of 
ESO and changing attitudes. Measures used by Walley and Wilson (1992) had 
themselves been adapted from previous studies by Hammer and Stern (1980), Long 
(1978a, 1981), Klein (1987) and Poole and Jenkins (1988). 
In the current study, all respondents including non-shareholders across the six 
companies, were required to indicate how much influence they wished to have in 
decisions relating to eleven workplace issues including their own job, how their own 
depot was run, staffing levels, wage and bonus payments and so on. Respondents were 
then asked to indicate how much influence they actually had in decisions for the same 
eleven areas. Items were presented in a five-point interval scale format with points on 
the continuum ranging from 'a great deal of say' (1) to 'no say at all' (5) (see Table (iii) 
and Table (iv) in Appendix 5). The alpha coefficients for the 'desired' and 'perceived' 
participation' scales came to 0.93 and 0.95 respectively. 
A three-item scale measunng employees' attitudes to their managers was similarly 
adapted from Pendleton et al (l995a, b), Poole and Jenkins (1990) and Walley and 
Wilson (1992). To explore the employee-manager relationship, the scale set out to 
examine three main areas: the extent to which employees perceived a social division 
between themselves and their managers; the extent to which managers took notice of 
employees' ideas and experiences; and the extent to which employees perceived that 
managers were efficient in running the company (see Table (v) in Appendix 5). The 
alpha coefficient for the scale was 0.71. 
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4.4.7 General satisfaction with employee share ownership 
The final attitude scale featured on the Stage One questionnaire set out to measure 
general levels of satisfaction among employee shareholders towards their company's 
share plan. Originally developed by Rosen et al (1986), the scale featured in their study 
of thirty-seven ESOP companies - often regarded as one of the most significant ESO 
studies undeliaken in the US. Underpinning the study was the assumption that if 
ownership was to improve corporate performance, including productivity, profits and 
company longevity, it must first work at the 'employee-attitude' level. The authors used 
several different measures to quantify the attitudes of employees to their work, and 
strong positive scores on these measures were considered to be indicative of ESO 
success. While pre-existing measures of employee outcomes, including organisational 
commitment, job satisfaction and turnover intention were used wherever possible, no 
such scale existed at that time for measuring 'employee satisfaction with share 
ownership'. The scale developed by Rosen et al (1986) originally consisted of fifteen 
items to assess the views of employees to ESO, though the authors reduced the number to 
eight on the basis of statistical and analytical techniques, including factor analysis and 
reliability tests. For the current investigation, a six-item version of the scale was used, 
with items featured considered to be those of 'most relevance' to respondents (see Table 
(vi) in Appendix 5). In addition, a negatively phrased item appearing in the original scale 
- 'I do not care about owning shares in this company' - was reworded in a positive 
direction for the questionnaire. The alpha coefficient for the six-item scale was 0.76. 
To some extent, parallels can be drawn between the methodological approach of the 
Rosen et al (1986) study and that adopted for the current investigation. Both studies set 
out to investigate different approaches to ESO and implications for employee outcomes. 
For these reasons, it was necessary for both studies to include companies displaying a 
range of ESO characteristics. The Rosen et al (1986) study sample included companies 
with majority employee ownership alongside companies where employee ownership was 
minimal. Average employee ownership across the thirty-seven firms was 42.33 per cent, 
although one company had I per cent employee ownership and five others had 100 per 
cent employee ownership. Similarly, some companies appeared to have a 'culture of 
ownership' in place while in others, ESO constituted little more than a benefit plan. 
Companies were also of varying size and represented different industries and regions, 
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while the circumstances in which ESO occurred were similarly varied. Share plans were 
initiated by retiring owners in some cases, by existing managers in others and in some 
cases in response to plant closures. The six companies featured in this investigation were 
similarly varied in terms of ownership characteristics, including the type of scheme and 
level of employee shareholding (see Chapter 5). 
4.4.8 Analysis of Stage One data 
Quantitative data collected from the six companies were transferred to coding booklets 
(Appendix 6) in preparation for entry into the computer package 'Statistical Procedures 
for the Social Sciences' (SPSS). SPSS is designed especially for the analysis of social 
science data and contains most of the statistical techniques employed by social scientists 
(Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). As well as exploratory statistics, techniques used to 
analyse the Stage One data included One-way ANOYA, Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) ANOVA, 
independent, matched-pairs and Wilcoxon t-tests and multiple regression. Results of the 
quantitative analysis are presented primarily in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
As part of the investigation, the researcher set out to test whether data collected from the 
six companies had equal means. The One-way ANOYA test was applied to data 
covering five main areas: organisational commitment (three companies); general 
satisfaction with ESO (three companies); employees' relations with the trade unions (six 
companies); desired and perceived EP (six companies); and employees' relations with 
managers (six companies). Where One-way ANOYA is used, the null hypothesis tested 
is that n companies have equal means in the population. Thus, if there are no differences 
found between the companies all sets of data have the same mean and the same variance; 
the alternative hypothesis is that at least one mean is different from the others. The One­
Way ANOYA test does not indicate, however, which companies may differ, only that 
they are not all the same. To overcome this omission, the Scheffe and Tukey-b tests, 
otherwise known as post hoc or multiple comparison tests (Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch 1997), are used to identify where differences exist. One-Way ANOVA is 
a parametric technique, the application of which rests upon the assumption that the data 
being analysed have certain characteristics: that observations are drawn from a 
population with a normal distribution; that the data being compared have approximately 
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equal variances; and that the data are measured on an interval or ratio scale (Foster 
2001). A 'homogeneity of variances' test should be performed on the data to see if the 
normal distribution and equal variance assumptions apply. If the assumptions are not 
met, the non-parametric equivalent of the ANOVA - 'K-W ANOVA' - should be used. 
Homogeneity of variances tests were performed on data from all six companies and 
results are presented and discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
The t-test is similarly a parametric technique that can be applied to either independent 
(unrelated) or matched-pairs (related) samples (Hussey and Hussey 1997) and is used 
when one wishes to compare two samples on a variable measured at the interval or ratio 
level (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 1997). As with the ANOV A test, the null 
hypothesis tested by the two-sample t-test is that the population means are equal, while 
the alternative hypothesis is that the means are not equal. The result of the t-test 
indicates the extent to which the two samples need to differ for the null hypothesis to be 
rejected. If, for example, the result given exceeds the value at the selected probability 
level (usually 5 per cent or less), the null hypothesis can be rejected. In other words, 
there is a difference between the two samples that is not due to chance. To perform 
either the independent or matched-pairs t-test, the normal distribution and equal variance 
assumptions apply. Where the assumptions are violated the non-parametric equivalent of 
the t-test should be used. Results of independent-samples t-tests used to compare levels 
of organisational commitment among shareholders and non-shareholders in two of the 
companies are presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 presents the results of a Wilcoxon test, 
the non-parametric equivalent of the paired-samples t-test, which was applied to 'desired 
and perceived participation in decisions' data collected from the six companies. 
Multiple regression techniques were also applied to the data. Such techniques are used 
to analyse several variables simultaneously, that is, one dependent variable and a number 
of independent variables and not only enable the prediction of the dependent variable but 
also provide an assessment of the relative impact of each of the independent variables. 
Multiple regression can also help to indicate the combined ability of independent 
variables in explaining the variation in the dependent variable (Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch 1997). 
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In Chapter 6, stepwise mUltiple regression has been used to examine the impact of 'ESO 
characteristics' (independent variables) upon 'ESO satisfaction' (dependent variable). 
Stepwise is one of five regression methods that can be applied to statistical data (the 
others are 'enter', 'forward', 'backward' and 'remove') and it is generally the most 
frequently used: it allows the researcher to examine each variable for entry or removal 
from the regression model (see Foster 2001 for further discussion). Three independent 
variables - 'company type', 'total company shares' and 'relative employee shares' - were 
entered into a regression model to establish which, if any, impacted upon levels of ESO 
satisfaction. A 'company type' dummy was used to distinguish between 'direct 
ownership' and 'ESOP' companies, while 'total company shares' represented the 'total' 
proportion of shares held by employees collectively within each firm (100 per cent at 
Company One; 80 per cent at Company Two; 25 per cent at Company Three). Following 
the work of Pendleton et al (1998), the third variable, 'relative employee shares', 
measured the 'relative' number of shares held by individuals in each company - that is, 
the actual individual shareholding as a proportion of mean shareholding. Mean or 
'relative' shareholdings came to 957 (Company One) 1,565 (Company Two) and 914 
(Company Three). 
The same independent variables, with the addition of one other - 'ESO satisfaction' ­
were used in a second stepwise regression model also featured in Chapter 6, which 
examined the impact of 'ESO characteristics' upon organisational commitment. The 
'ESO satisfaction variable' was derived from the average score for the six ESO 
satisfaction scale items, while 'organisational commitment' was divided into three sub­
components (dependent variables) of commitment as identified by the BOCS: 'identify', 
'involve' and 'loyalty' (see section 4.4.4). 
Three further stepwise regression models are presented in Chapter 7. The first examines 
possible determinants of 'dual loyalty' (dependent variable) including 'perceived union 
effectiveness', the 'employee-manager relationship', 'employee shareholder status' and 
'company ownership status'. 'Union effectiveness' was derived from the average of five 
items drawn from the Angle and Perry (1986) scale. The five items tapped into a number 
of areas of 'union effectiveness' including the extent to which the union(s) played an 
important role in their company, made concessions to avoid problems and co-operated 
with managers to reach a resolution. The 'employee-manager relationship' variable was 
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concerned with 'social divisions' between the two parties (see section 4.4.6), while 
dummies were used to distinguish between employees who owned shares and those who 
did not and between companies which were 'employee-owned' (Company One, Company 
Two and Company Three) and those which were not. Finally, a number of independent 
variables were entered into two further regression models to investigate possible 
determinants of desired and actual EP. For each model ('desired' and 'actual'), the 
predictors were 'union effectiveness' (see above), 'employee-shareholder status', 
'ownership status of the company', 'trade union membership' and 'management 
efficiency'. Further details of all of the variables used can be found in Appendix 7. 
In addition, some of the exploratory quantitative data analysis undertaken for Company 
Five was broken down into different sUb-components. The company had been formed in 
May 1997 following the merger of two other firms - one 'employee-owned' company 
and a management buy-out (MBO) (see Chapter 5). At the time of the Stage One data 
collection phase in November and December 1997, employees at the 'new' company 
were still working at the locations where they had been based prior to the merger. 
Moreover, employees at the former 'employee-owned' site were still represented by the 
GMB, while employees at the former MBO site were represented by the TGWU. It was, 
therefore, considered useful to analyse results for the two sites separately, (referred to as 
Company Five (A) and Company Five (B) respectively for purposes of clarification in the 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in Chapters 7 and 8), as well as in aggregate. The 
number of employees in the survey representing the former 'employee-owned' site 
(Company Five (A)) alone was too small (>30) to result in meaningful analysis. In 
addition, exploratory results for the former 'MBO' site (Company Five (B): n = 76) 
were found to be virtually identical to those for the two sites combined and were 
therefore subsequently excluded from further analysis. Exploratory findings for the 
former MBO company are presented in Appendix 8. 
4.5 Stage Two 
Stage Two of the investigation consisted of forty-two semi-structured interviews 
conducted on a one-to-one basis with key personnel from each company. Trade union 
representatives, including branch chairmen, secretaries and convenors, plus senior and 
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middle managers representing the key operating, financial and personnel functions, 
provided the focus for the interviews. Specifically, the aim of Stage Two was to 
document the observations of key actors directly involved in their company's conversion 
to ownership and/or subsequent sale to another firm. Through the interviews, the 
researcher set out to collect from each company the following information: 
• 	 the form and structure of ESO adopted in the first instance; 
• reasons for, and events leading up to, the introduction of ESO; 
• 	 current employee influence as perceived by managers and trade union personnel; 
• 	 views on the current industrial relations climate; 
• 	 details on the operation of the company's share ownership scheme and 'joining' and 
'exit' arrangements for employees; 
• 	 individual assessments of the overall effects of ESO upon employee attitudes and 
behaviours. 
Completion of the Stage Two interviews took approximately five months from August to 
December 1998. Following the method for Stage One, collection of the Stage Two data 
ran concurrently across the six cases. The number of respondents interviewed within 
each company varied according to the size and structure of the enterprise, the 
accessibility of the individuals themselves and ultimately, their willingness to participate 
(see Appendix 9 for details of Stage Two respondents). Interviews lasted approximately 
one-and-a-half hours each and were recorded to allow for a full and detailed transcription 
at a later date. Across the six companies, only one respondent at Company Six preferred 
not to have the interview recorded. Silverman (1993: 10) described audio-recordings as 
an increasingly important part of qualitative research, being able to offer a highly reliable 
record to which researchers could return as they developed new hypotheses. In addition, 
May (1997) observed that audio recordings could assist in the interpretation of interviews 
in two ways. Firstly, the interviewer could concentrate on the conversation and record 
the non-verbal gestures of the respondent during the interview, rather than spending time 
referring to the interview notes and writing down what was being said. Secondly, 
recordings could be edited according to the theoretical categories in which the researcher 
was interested; this in turn could assist in the comparative analysis of interview 
responses. 
• 
106 

• 	
, 
Audio recordings may also assist in ensuring a 'reliable interpretation' of what has been 
said during the interview (Silverman 1993), since they allow both the researcher and the 
respondent to return to the extract and review its content in detail. Heritage (1984: 238) 
observed: 
'In enabling repeated and detailed examination of the events of interaction, the 
use of recordings extends the range of precision of the observations that can be 
made. It permits other researchers to have direct access to the data about which 
claims are being made, thus making analysis subject to detailed public scrutiny 
and helping to minimise the influence of personal preconceptions or analytical 
biases.' 
In quantitative research, reliability and validity of the survey, plus the representativeness 
of the sample, are among the central methodological issues. Conversely, 'authenticity' is 
often the main goal in qualitative research, with the aim being to acquire an 'authentic' 
understanding of people's experiences (Silverman 1993). Notwithstanding, issues of 
reliability and validity in qualitative research have been raised by authors including 
Silverman (1993) and Winter (2000). On the issue of reliability, Silverman (1993) 
observed that when dealing with texts drawn from interviews, issues of reliability arose 
through the categories assigned to analyse each piece of text. The author emphasised the 
importance of using categories in a standardised way so that any researcher could 
categorise in the same way. 
In his discussion of validity in qualitative research, Winter (2000) observed that validity 
'resides with the representation of the actors, the purposes of the research and 
appropriateness of the processes involved'. The author added that the only similarity 
between quantitative and qualitative research methods was that, 'at some point, questions 
will be asked and data will be collected' (Winter 2000: 7). Quantitative research limits 
itself to what can be measured or quantified while qualitative research attempts to 'pick 
up the pieces' (Winter 2000: 7) of the unquantifiable, personal, in-depth, descriptive and 
social aspects of the world. The aim for the qualitative researcher, therefore, is to 
attempt to understand behaviour and institutions by getting to know the actors involved 
as well as their values, symbols, beliefs and emotions (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). 
Definitions from Bryman (1988), Hammersley (1990) and Miles and Huberman (1994) 
similarly emphasised the importance of the social setting, the perceptions of 'local 
actors' and the lack of standardised instrumentation, at least at the outset, in qualitative 
research. Winter (2000: 8) concluded that qualitative research may 'set itself up for 
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failure when it attempts to follow the established procedures of quantitative research 
such as experimentation, efforts of replication, use of control groups and LIse of 
standardised formulas'. 
4.5.1 Choice of Stage Two methods 
Interviews were chosen as the main qualitative method for the current study on the basis 
that they allowed the researcher to capture the different perspectives of respondents and 
to follow-up interesting comments raised by the respondents during interview. Focus 
groups and observation (the latter was used as a supplementary method of data collection 
in the current research) are among other common qualitative techniques and detailed 
discussions can be found in Gummesson (2000), May (1997), Nachmias and Nachmias 
(1996) and Silverman (1993). In their discussion of different qualitative approaches, 
Marshall and Rossman (1989: 10-11) made the following observation: 
'The approaches vary, depending on how intrusive the researcher is required to 
be in the gathering of data, whether these data document non-verbal or verbal 
behaviour or both, whether it is appropriate to question the participants as to how 
they view their worlds, and how the data can be fruitfully analysed'. 
More so than many other qualitative methods, interviews allow for rich insights into 
people's experiences, opinions, aspirations, attitudes and feelings (May 1997) and can be 
categorised under four main headings: structured interviews; semi-structured interviews; 
unstructured or focused interviews; and group interviews. The semi-structured interview 
format was selected as the most appropriate in that it allowed the researcher to explore 
specific areas according to the aims of the research, while allowing freedom to probe 
further and accommodate elaboration from respondents. Semi-structured interviews also 
give respondents the opportunity to answer more 'on their own terms' than a standardised 
interview would permit, but still provide a greater structure for comparability over that of 
focused interviews (May 1997). Discussions of the other main interview formats can be 
found in Dey (1998), Easterby-Smith et al (1991) Judd et al (1991), May (1997) and 
Nachmias and Nachmias (1996). 
Having established the mam method for the qualitative data collection, a 'selective 
sampling' approach was adopted for the Stage Two investigation. Miles and Huberman 
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(1994) stated that sampling in qualitative research essentially involves two actions that 
may sometimes pull the researcher in opposing directions. Firstly, there is a need to set 
boundaries - to define aspects of the case that can be studied within the limits of time and 
means while connecting directly to the research questions and including examples of that 
which is to be studied. Secondly, the researcher needs to create a frame to help uncover, 
confirm, or qualify the basic processes or constructs underpinning the study. For the 
present investigation, the aim was to select respondents for Stage Two according to 
certain criteria (i.e. their involvement in share ownership activities). Selective sampling 
is a frequently used method in qualitative analysis and involves choosing sites and/or 
respondents purposefully to maximise or minimise differences (Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Strauss (1987: 39) defined the approach as: 
, ... the calculated decision to sample a specific locale or type of interviewee 
according to a preconceived but reasonable initial set of dimensions (such as 
time, space, identity) which are worked out in advance for a study.' 
The method is not to be confused with theoretical sampling, which has its roots in 
grounded theory. In theoretical sampling the researcher decides on 'analytic grounds' 
what data to collect next and where to find them (Strauss 1987). Essentially, the process 
of data collection is 'controlled' by the emerging theory. Where qualitative studies are 
not based on a grounded theory approach, samples may still 'evolve' during the course of 
the research. Miles and Huberman (1994: 27) observed: 
'Samples in qualitative studies are usually not wholly pre-specified, but can 
evolve once fieldwork begins. Initial choices of informants lead you to similar 
and different ones, observing one class of events invites comparison with 
another: and understanding one key relationship in the setting reveals facets to be 
studied in others.' 
In practice, the choice of respondents did evolve to some extent during the current 
research, with suggestions put forward by 'gatekeepers' and other informants for 
additional respondents with knowledge of and 'something interesting to say' about ESO 
within their company. The participation of individuals known to hold strong or opposing 
views to other interview respondents was actively sought. Sekaran (1992: 34), for 
example, stated that where frequent occurrences of contradictions within interviews 
occurred, these could, in themselves, offer valuable insights, indicating for example, 
problems of poor communication or misperceptions of a company's philosophy, goals, 
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values and so on. Miles and Huberman (1994: 275) similarly emphasised the importance 
and value of contradictions or 'rival explanations' in qualitative research: 
' ... the trick is not to explain them away in light of your favourite explanations 
... but rather to run with them, to ask yourself what kind of alternative case these 
bits of information could build, and then check them out further.' 
4.5.2 Qualitative research sources 
Questions used for the Stage Two interviews were drawn primarily from the studies of 
Poole and Jenkins (1990) and Rimm and Mannheim (1964). As discussed in section 
4.4.6, the Poole and Jenkins (1990) study consisted of three main stages including 
interviews with key managerial and trade union personnel directly involved in the 
establishment and/or administration of profit-sharing or ESO schemes. Interview 
questions used in the Poole and Jenkins (1990) study explored 'share scheme 
administration', reasons behind the introduction of the share scheme in each case, 
opportunities for EP, plus the perceived effects of ESO upon the behaviour of employees 
including absenteeism, labour turnover and general attitudes to work. 
In addition to Poole and Jenkins (1990), Stage Two also drew from the work of Rim and 
Mannheim (1964). In their investigation, Rim and Mannheim (1964) examined industrial 
relations in three different sectors of ownership control by comparing the attitudes of 
executives and trade union representatives to each other. The authors used the Mutual 
Attitudes Scale developed by Stagner et al (1958), which consisted of two parallel scales 
of attitudes designed to measure separately the attitudes of managers to the union and the 
attitudes of union representatives to managers. The scales were made up of eleven and 
nine items respectively and in the Rim and Mannheim (1964) study, were used as survey 
as opposed to qualitative interview questions. Adapting the scales for the present 
investigation allowed for a more 'complete probing' of the relevant issues, enabling 
respondents to provide examples in support of their responses. Full details of the Stage 
Two interview questions, plus those featured in the Poole and Jenkins (1990) and Rim 
and Mannheim (1964) studies can be found in Appendix 10. 
Following the aims of the current research, Stage Two respondents, and particularly 
those from the three 'post-ESO companies', were asked to recall past events and 
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situations. The use of 'historical data' in research has been the focus of previous 
criticism. Rose and Sullivan (1996) argued that the ways in which individuals 
interpreted past events and behaviours were coloured by subsequent events. Moreover, 
the further back in time respondents were asked to recollect, the less sound the quality of 
the retrospective data. However, without some retrospective elements in the research, 
cross-sectional data may produce little of help to the researcher in terms of analysing 
social change. Kjellen and Soderman (1980: 27) argued strongly in favour of an 
historical approach to case study research: 
'It is not possible to understand the actual state of an organisation without an 
insight into the company's history, i.e. the processes that have led up to the 
company's present condition. Moreover, it is inherent to the nature of 
organisations and other social systems that some of the principal characteristics 
cannot be readily observed at a surface level. It is difficult to arrive at any 
conclusions without studying their behaviour over a fairly long period of time.' 
Kjellen and Sodennan (1980) proposed that a mi lestone classification be used for major 
changes that have occurred within a company's environment, ownership structure, 
production process, product/market mix, organisation and management. In addition, the 
authors proposed an analysis of 'critical events', their background and consequences. 
Gummesson (2000: 101), moreover, observed that a company consisted of individuals 
who in the past had been more or less successful in creating a common identity of shared 
values, a history, and a corporate culture: 
'If we lack understanding of the company history - founding fathers, traditions, 
symbols, systems, processes - we may feel deprived. The same is true if we lack 
understanding of the present and future.' 
Gummesson (2000: 101-2) put the case in support of history as follows: 
• 	 History is a diagnostic instrument that helps us to put a problem in its context and 
environment. It supplies a thread and helps us to create order among a mass of data; 
it provides patterns. No two sets of circumstances are ever identical, although 
certain patterns may recur frequently. 
• 	 History helps us both to create analogies and to select the pertinent analogies. It 
provides a fixed point for triangulation between the past and the present position of a 
company and the position of competitors; it provides opportunities for comparison. 
• 	 History helps us to place facts and events within a shared memory, it presents the 
heritage and roots, the tradition that helps to create company spirit and pride. 
• 
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• 	 We can learn from history what we cannot learn from it - that there are no simple 
formulas, that history does not provide solutions but a thought process, and that we 
have to realise and accept ambiguity and complexity. 
For the present investigation, the collection of historical data assisted in an understanding 
of a company's present events and in some cases, possible future events. Gummesson 
(2000) termed this 'pre-understanding', while remaining mindful of 'sediment' which he 
described as layers of behaviour that no longer fulfilled any useful purpose but 
nevertheless remained part of the corporate culture. At the same time, adopting an 
historical stance could help to uncover the process of sedimentation. 
4.5.3 Stage Two analysis 
Reference was made to a number of research methods texts for analysis of the Stage Two 
interviews including Coffey and Atkinson (1996), Gummesson (2000), May (1997), 
Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1998). However, the work of Miles and 
Hubern1an (1994) in particular was used as a major source. Methods used by Miles and 
Huberman (1994) to analyse qualitative data are based on three main elements: data 
reduction; data display; and conclusion drawing/verification. Detailed definitions can be 
found elsewhere (see Miles and Huberman 1994: 10-12). To outline the process briefly, 
however, the coding of data (data reduction) leads to new ideas on what should go into a 
matrix (data display). Transferring data to a matrix then requires fUliher data reduction. 
As the matrix grows preliminary conclusions are drawn, which may lead to the decision, 
for example, to add another column to the matrix to test the conclusions. Miles and 
Huberman (1994: 12) described the three elements, along with a fourth element, data 
collection, as forming part of an interactive and cyclical process: 
'The researcher steadily moves among these four "nodes" during data collection 
and then shuttles among reduction, display, and conclusion drawing/verification 
for the remainder of the study.' 
Qualitative data analysis may, therefore, be regarded as a 'continuous iterative 
enterprise' (Miles and Huberman 1994: 12), in that issues of data reduction, display and 
conclusion drawing/verification come into figure successively as analytical episodes 
follow each other. Parallels can also be drawn with quantitative data analysis, which is 
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similarly concerned with data reduction (computing means, standard deviations and 
indexes), data display (statistical tables) and with conclusion drawing/verification 
(significance levels). However, quantitative researchers work with well-defined familiar 
methods that are usually more 'sequential' than 'iterative' or 'cyclical', while qualitative 
researchers are in a more fluid and pioneering position. Miles and Huberman (1994: 12) 
concluded: 
' ... we need to understand more clearly just what is going on when we analyse 
data, to reflect, refine our methods, and make them more generally usable by 
others.' 
The main methods used to analyse the qualitative data were 'contact summary sheets' 
and 'within-case displays', which included 'role-ordered matrices' and 'event-listing' 
charts. 'Cross-case displays' were produced using partially-ordered meta matrices. All 
methods used are discussed in the following section. 
4.5.4 Application of analytical techniques 
The first stage of the qualitative analysis involved creating a coding scheme for the data. 
Contact summary sheets, defined as 'a single sheet with some focusing or summarising 
questions about a particular field contact' (Miles and Huberman 1994: 51) were used to 
create the codes. A number of methods for coding qualitative data are available to the 
researcher. Following the work of Strauss (1987), for example, the researcher can code 
for 'conditions', 'interactions among actors', 'strategies and tactics' and 'consequences'. 
For the current analysis, contact summary sheets were used to document the main themes 
raised by each respondent during interview. Among the main themes raised by Stage 
Two respondents in line with the aims of the thesis are those listed below: 
• current management-union relations; 
• current management-employee relations; 
• current union-employee relations; 
• the current general industrial relations climate; 
• employee involvement/participation; 
• views on different forms of ESO; 

• objectives of ESO for each company; 

• whether the objectives were met; 
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• 	 the impact of ESO on employee efficiency; 
• 	 the impact of ESO on the relationship between employees and their union; 
• 	 the impact ofESO on employees' attitudes to work; 
• 	 the main advantages of ESO; 
• 	 the main disadvantages of ESO; 
• 	 the extent to which employees cared about ESO in their company; 
• 	 the extent to which employees felt like owners; 
and where applicable: 
• 	 the likely survival of the company as an 'employee-owned' entity; 
• 	 the attitudes of employees when the period of ESO ended; 
• 	 the ways in which certain issues could have been handled differently, for example, 
the circumstances which led to the 'selling-on' of the company. 
The themes were then reproduced on forty-two contact summary forms, representing one 
form for each respondent interviewed. Direct quotations or 'salient points' (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: 54) given by respondents during the interviews in relation to each 
theme were also added to the forms. The number of the page on which the quotation 
appeared in the interview transcript was similarly included to assist with easier 
referencing at a later stage of the analysis. Various other details including the type of 
contact - whether on the management or trade union side - and the date on which the 
interview was conducted were also entered. This infonnation assisted the researcher in 
keeping an organised record of interviews undertaken. Examples of contact summary 
forms used to assist in the analysis are featured in Appendix 11. 
Compilation of the contact summary forms resulted in a full record of the main themes, 
along with supporting evidence for all Stage Two respondents from the six companies. 
Data were then extracted from the contact summary forms to create 'within-case' data 
displays, or an analysis of the 'single case'. Miles and Huberman (1994: 172) concluded 
that the first task ofthe researcher was to understand each case 'on its own terms' and to 
emerge with 'a well-grounded sense of local reality'. A number of methods for 
compiling 'within-case' displays. including context charts, checklist matrices and time­
ordered displays, are available to the qualitative researcher. Two main methods - event­
listing charts and role-ordered displays - were used. Event-listing matrices allow the 
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researcher to obtain an initial grasp of events in a summarised form, suggesting 
subsequent lines of deeper description, analysis and interpretation that will follow (Miles 
and Huberman 1994). They chronicle a flow of events and processes and are valuable 
where the researcher wishes to identifY the 'different domains of events' (Miles and 
Huberman 1994: Ill) and preserve their sequence, while showing the salience or 
significance of preceding events for following events. Event-listing matrices were 
created from qualitative data collected from the three post-ESO companies. In an 
attempt to study employee ownership durability in these companies, matrices created and 
presented in Chapter 8 highlight key events in the history of the companies during their 
time as 'employee-owned' enterprises. 
The second method used in the study, the role-ordered display, orders information 
according to people's roles in a formal or informal setting (Miles and Huberman 1994: 
122). A role is defined as a complex of expectations and behaviours that make up what 
an individual does and should do; a role-ordered matrix sOlis data in its rows and 
columns that have been gathered from, or about, a certain set of 'role occupants' - that is, 
i J 
Idata reflecting their views. The attitudes and perspectives of different actors - those in 
managerial and trade union roles within the company - were key aspects of the research 
and role-ordered matrices permitted close attention to the interaction of individuals 
within their roles. To create the role-ordered matrices, contact summary forms were 
scanned for relevant quotations, which were then entered into each matrix cell. Each 
matrix produced resulted in a 'snap-shot' summary of what respondents said about a 
particular issue. All role-ordered matrices compiled for the qualitative data analysis are 
presented in Appendix 12 (i-xxxiv), while the main themes explored through the matrices 
are summarised as follows: 
• the model ofESO and its method of operation; 
• likely survival of the firm as an employee-owned entity; 
• objectives of ESO and associated outcomes; 
• advantages and disadvantages of ESO; 
• employee attitudes to ownership; 
• ESO and employee behaviours. 
Once a matrix has been created, the researcher is able to scan its columns, both within 
and across roles, to establish what is happening. The method allows conclusions to be 
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drawn in a number of ways, including: counting and making comparisons; noting 
relations between variables; and following-up any surprises that may have occurred 
(Miles and Huberman 1994: 125). Having established an understanding of the dynamics 
of each individual case, the next stage is to proceed to an analysis across all cases ­
termed a 'cross-case' analysis. The aim of cross-case displays is to see processes and 
outcomes across many cases, to understand how they are qualified by local conditions 
and thus to develop more sophisticated descriptions and more powerful explanations 
(Miles and Huberman 1994). Multiple cases, adequately sampled and carefully analysed, 
help to establish whether findings make sense beyond the specific case. A further, more 
fundamental reason for cross-case analysis is to deepen understanding and explanation. 
Glaser and Strauss (1967, 1970) argued for using multiple cases to establish under what 
sets of structural conditions hypotheses were minimised and maximised. The researcher 
can then identify where a given order of events or incidents is most likely to occur or not 
occur. Multiple cases not only pin down the specific conditions under which a finding 
will occur, but also help the researcher form the more general categories of how those 
conditions may be related (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
The researcher may face a number of issues, however, when undertaking cross-case 
analysis. Silverstein (1988) highlighted the tension between reconciling the 'uniqueness' 
of an individual case with the need for a more general understanding of generic processes 
that occur across cases. More specifically, Ragin (1987) discussed the relative merits 
and shortcomings of adopting a 'case-oriented' as opposed to a 'variable-oriented' 
approach to cross-case analysis. A case-oriented approach considers the case as a whole 
entity, looking at configurations, associations, causes and effects within the case - and 
only then turns to comparative analysis of a (usually limited) number of cases. 
Typically, the researcher would look for underlying similarities and constant 
associations, compare cases with different outcomes and begin to form more general 
explanations. 
In contrast, the variable-oriented approach is conceptual and theory-centred from the 
start, casting a wide net over a usually large number of cases. The 'building blocks' are 
the variables and their intercorrelations, rather than individual cases. As a result, the 
details of any specific case recede behind the broad patterns found across a wide variety 
of cases and little explicit case-to-case comparison is done (Miles and Huberman 1994). 
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Ragin (1987) concluded that variable-oriented analysis is valuable for finding 
probabilistic relationships among variables in a large population. The approach is poor, 
however, at handling the real complexities of causation, or in dealing with multiple sub­
samples: findings may often be very general and even 'vacuous' (Miles and Huberman 
1994: 174). Case-oriented analysis, on the other hand, is good at finding specific, 
concrete, historically grounded patterns common to small sets of cases, but its findings 
may remain particular to the case. Miles and Huberman (1994) concluded that neither 
approach is more preferable than the other for qualitative data analysis. Rather, the issue 
is one of making deliberate choices, alternating, or perhaps combining and integrating 
methods as a study proceeds. The authors added that it is possible and usually desirable 
to combine or integrate case-oriented and variable-oriented approaches in an 
investigation. 
Remaining mindful of the dilemmas of cross-case qualitative research, partially-ordered 
meta-matrices were used to analyse qualitative data across the six companies. The basic 
principle of the meta-matrix is the inclusion of all relevant and condensed data and in its 
simplest form, involves 'stacking-up' all of the within-case displays for a particular 
theme on a single sheet. Moving from the initial within-case display to a meta-matrix 
allows for data to be partitioned further so that contrasts made not only between 
individual cases, but also between different variables, can be clarified. Pmiitioned and 
clustered meta-matrices become progressively more refined, usually requiring further 
transformations of case-level data into short quotes, summarising phrases, ratings and 
symbols (Miles and Huberman 1994). All meta-matrices created from the qualitative 
data are presented in Appendix 13 (i-xx). 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the main quantitative, qualitative and ethnographic techniques 
used as part of an extensive case study investigation to explore diversity in ESO. Case 
studies have been identified by proponents of the approach as a valuable method for 
conducting in-depth investigations of particular phenomena: they allow the researcher to 
draw on multiple data sources, both primary and secondary, that can assist in creating a 
rich picture of the area being studied. For the current research, a multiple case study 
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design has been used. Multiple-case designs require extensive resources and may make 
considerable demands on the researcher's time, but offer distinct advantages over single­
cases, particularly in terms of providing more 'robust' and compelling arguments of the 
area being studied. Given the focus of the investigation, the research methodology 
chosen accommodates the undertaking of a detailed examination of the most significant 
and diverse forms of ESO to have been found in the UK bus industry towards the end of 
the 20th Century. In summary, the approach undertaken is considered to be the most 
appropriate for meeting the research objectives. 
Before presenting the results of the research in Chapters 6 to 8, Chapter 5 provides a 
more detailed overview of all six companies. The chapter addresses the 'varying 
circumstances of ownership' in each case as well as other issues that may be important 
for outcomes of ESO satisfaction, EP, organisational commitment, industrial relations 
and employee ownership durability. A recognition of the historical 'ESO context' of 
each organisation and the different elements that may impinge on a particular case, such 
as those identified in Toscano's (1983) ownership typology, are essential to ensure that 
accurate analysis and interpretation of ESO outcomes occur. 
118 

• t 
5.0 UK bus industry overview 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of ESO in the UK bus industry and profiles the six 
cases providing the basis for the research. The cases epitomise the diversity that 
characterised ESO within the UK bus industry in the late 1980s and through the next 
decade. 'Diversity' in the context of the thesis is defined in terms of the 'model' of 
ownership system adopted by each of the companies, the percentage of 'employee 
ownership' and overall 'insider ownership' in each case and the circumstances in which 
the conversions to ESO occurred. The companies are outlined in individual sections, 
beginning with a discussion of the reasons for the introduction of ESO and for the 
particular ownership system chosen in each case. Details of share offers and allocations 
to employees, ESO negotiating structures, the number of employees participating in each 
scheme, plus a discussion of the current situation at each company are also featured. The 
chapter concludes with detailed comparisons of the main characteristics of ESO in each 
of the 'employee owned' companies and additionally, at the three 'post-ESO' firms as a 
pretext to results in the following three chapters examining more fully the theme of 
'diversity in employee ownership'. 
5.1.1 Impetus for employee share ownership 
Deregulation in the wake of the 1985 Transport Act provided the initial impetus for 
employee ownership conversions in the UK bus industry. Prior to 1985, public sector 
operators, protected by a strict regulatory regime, had provided the majority of scheduled 
bus services in the UK (Pendleton 2001). In an attempt by the Conservative Government 
of the day to increase competition and expose the industry to market forces, the 1985 
Transport Act made it easier for new entrants to obtain a route licence in competition with 
existing operators (Forrester 1993). Changes brought about by deregulation were to have 
a huge impact upon existing public sector operators, not least in the industrial relations 
arena. Describing the impact of deregulation, the TGWU (1991: 223) spoke of the move 
from 'a highly regulated framework with tightly centralised national bargaining, to the 
loose, uncoordinated and often chaotic experience that the industry now is'. Prior to 
deregulation, bus industry employees had been covered by nationally-agreed terms and 
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conditions of employment. After 1985, however, a widespread drive to reduce wage 
levels within the industry became paramount. Given that pay determination in the private 
sector was not regulated by CB due to the virtual non-existence of recognised unions, 
employment costs were usually considerably lower than among public sector operators 
(Pendleton 2001). Redundancies also became a notable feature of the bus industry post­
1985, with staffing levels cut by as much as 57 per cent in some areas (Heseltine and 
Si\cock 1990). 
Given the tight constraints imposed by central government, public sector owners were 
unable to sustain losses in their market share and were therefore faced with the prospect of 
continued cutbacks to services and employment levels, or sales to other firms. The latter 
option would have taken services out of public control, leading to asset sales and 
employment reductions and was therefore regarded as 'unpalatable' (Pendleton 2001: 90). 
Employee ownership was viewed as a more acceptable solution, given that the presence of 
employees as owners offered the possibility that service levels would be protected because 
of the desire to maintain levels of employment. In addition, management/employee bids 
appeared to offer the best possibility of meeting government privatisation objectives of 
increasing efficiency and promoting the spread of ESO (Mulley and Wright 1986). It is 
perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that the primary motives for employee ownership within 
the bus industry have been described as defensive rather than ideological (Pendleton 
2001). In some of the initial bus buy-outs, ESOPs were generally the preferred model of 
ownership for all parties concerned (see for example, Pendleton et al 1996). For 
employees, ESOPs posed little direct financial risk and were favoured by managers 
because they permitted the continuation of conventional management structures. Finally, 
on the union side, ESOPs were seen as a way to sustain the traditional role of union 
representation (Pendleton 2001). Oakeshott (2000: 273) observed: 
'That a union should ever promote majority employee ownership flies in the face 
of the traditional hostility to employee ownership of almost all unions in the 
Western world: a hostility based on the fear that employees who are also owners 
will become co-opted on the side of capital in the class struggle. On the other 
hand, a preference for majority over minority employee ownership as the "least 
worst" outcome of privatisation makes excellent sense ... ' 
In a number of cases, the initial attitude from the unions had been one of suspicion of 
employee ownership and an underlying preference for the status quo. Oakeshott (2000: 
274) added: 
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'Only when it became apparent that a continuation of the status quo was simply not 
an option did the attitude of unions to employee ownership start to become more 
pragmatic. ' 
In their 1989 conference policy statement, the TGWU described ESOPs as 'a last resort in 
defence of negotiated wages and conditions against the threat of take-over, break-up and 
asset stripping' (TGWU 1990: 120). The statement added that while the formation of an 
employee-owned company provided no respite from competition with other low cost 
operators, ESOPs were seen as a possible option available to the unions in offsetting 'the 
more extreme ravages of deregulation' (ibid). Additionally, union involvement in ESO 
conversions was higher in the bus industry than in any other sector, and in some cases, 
unions were responsible for starting the conversion process. Research by Pendleton 
(2001) found that the more unions were involved in ESO conversions, the greater the level 
of share ownership for employees. Moreover, the greater the extent of union involvement, 
the more important the prevention of take-overs as a reason for converting to employee 
ownership. 
5.2 Case study profile 
In the aftermath of the 1985 TranspOli Act, employee-owned bus companies, or those 
with some degree of ESO, emerged from one of five main stables. The first group of 
companies to become 'employee-owned' resulted from the break-up and privatisation of 
the NBC in 1985. A majority of buy-outs (n = 26) from among this first group involved 
only small teams of the most senior managers, although up to 40 per cent of equity was 
set aside for employees in twelve companies. In around a further twelve cases, share 
option and/or profit-share schemes were introduced while eight further buy-outs involved 
middle as well as senior managers as initial equity holders (Wright et al 1992). A second 
group of employee-owned firms emerged from the privatisation of local authority and 
Passenger Transport Executive (PTE) firms (Pendleton 2001). Prior to 1985, local 
authorities and PTEs had run bus services that were not generally in competition with 
NBC services. At that time. the structure of the industry was one of area-wide 
domination by single companies, with structural concentration by municipally or 
nationally-owned operators (Wright et al 1992). Under the provisions of the 1985 
Transport Act, however, local authority or PTE bus companies were to be formed into 
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separate passenger companies limited by shares and operating at arm's length from local 
authorities (Oakeshott 2000). 
The years 1990-92 saw the third wave of employee ownership conversions from among 
subsidiaries of the Scottish Bus Group (SBG). Five out of eleven SBG subsidiaries were 
privati sed to MEBOs, which were generally characterised by high levels of employee 
ownership (Pendleton et al \996). Following the SBG conversions, a further wave of 
local authority and PTE privatisations occurred, which saw employees generally acquire 
the controlling stake in their firms. The defeat of the Labour Party in the 1992 General 
r-:kction was said to have created a further impetus among trade unions for employee 
ownership. Some local authorities, for example, delayed agreement 011 ownership on the 
basis that Labour might win the 1992 election and halt the privatisation programme. 
When Labolll" lost the election, however, these authorities came to the conclusion that 
employee ownership buy-outs were the hest option (Pendleton 200 I ). Direct share 
ownership schemes also began to grow in popularity around the same time. although there 
had heen some examples of this form of ESO arrangement in some of the earliest bus buy­
outs after 1985 (see for example, Pendleton et al 1995b). The privatisation of London 
Buses in 199-+ resulted in the tinal set of employee ownership conversions. Four out of 
ten London Buses companies became MEBOs, with employees typically holding the 
minority stake. In all cases, employee ownership in the London firms was characterised 
by a mueh higher equity involvement of institutional investors than virtually all of the 
precl:!ding buy-outs (Pendleton 200 I). 
Two of the employee ownership conversions featured in the present study originated from 
PTE operations, one in the first wave of privatisations in the late 80s (Company Four) and 
the other ill the second \\ave in the early 90s (Company Two). Two other conversions 
( 'ompull)" ()11(, and ('ompany Five (AJ) resulted from local authority privatisations during 
the early 90s, while the final two conversions (Company Three and Company Six) came 
from London Buses privatisations. It is generally reflective of ESO in the UK bus 
industry that four ol"the six firms in the present study represented municipal privatisations. 
Of all UK bus firms known to have been 'employee-owned' from 1987 onwards (n ::;:: 29), 
eighteen had n:sulted from lucal authority or PTE privatisations. (see Pendleton 2001). 
Dates fc)r conversion to employee ownership for the six case studies extended over a five­
year period from 19R9 through to 1994. 
... 
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5.3. Background to Company One 
Company One is located in the N0I1h West of England and employs approximately 300 
staff and managers across two sites - the main bus depot in the centre of town and the 
company's head office on the outskirts of the town. Drivers are based at the main bus 
depot while managerial, administrative and engineering personnel are located at the head 
office site. The company was first established in 1986 in the aftermath of deregulation 
following the transferral of the local borough counci I 's transport department to the status 
of a private limited company. Subsequent to its status as an employee-owned enterprise, 
Company One remained in the ownership of the local council until 1993, being operated 
at 'arms length' by a board of directors comprising local councillors and members of 
Company One's own management team. 
5.3.1 Impetus for the buy-out 
The impetus for the conversion to employee ownership in 1993 had been prompted 
initially by a government announcement some two years' earlier that all future sales from 
local authorities would be via open tender, with anyone allowed to make a bid. According 
to Company One's traffic manager, employees at that time faced a stark choice - 'buy or 
be bought '. As far as the company was concerned, a buy-out was the only way to avoid 
the uncertainty of a third party assuming control of the business and additionally, to 
ensure continuing membership of the Local Government Superannuation Scheme (LGSS). 
The Conservative Government of the time had stipulated that in future transfers to the 
private sector, availability of the LGSS would be on the sole basis that buy-outs were 
completed by 30 June 1993. Thus, a buy-out team of managerial and trade union 
representatives from within the company, plus external business consultants, put forward a 
series of proposals for a direct share ownership scheme. The consensus among the team 
was that direct ownership would have a strong positive effect on staff motivation and 
efficiency, whereas the distribution of 'free' shares through an ESOP would weaken the 
motivational effects of a buy-out. The idea of an EBT holding a significant proportion of 
the shares until they were eventually distributed to employees was also viewed as 
potentially problematic. Specifically, the accumulation of a large amount of shares in a 
trust would invest responsibility and influence in a small group of elected trustees at the 
expense of individual shareholders. Despite these concerns, the company created an EBT 
-

123 

• 

to act solely as a warehouse for shares, purchasing them from employees who had left the 
company and subsequently selling them on to new employees. 
5.3.2 Share allocation 
Given the company's decision that the majority of shares should not remain in the hands 
of a minority of individuals, the buy-out team agreed that all staff participating in the 
scheme should be able to buy the same number of shares. Thus, no distinction was to be 
made between managers and employees and there was no obligation upon any individual 
to purchase shares. The arrangement was also viewed as a safeguard to ensure that the 
management team would not resell the company after only a short period of time. In 
some of the earlier UK bus buy-outs, companies had been sold to MBOs and 
subsequently re-sold to secure quick profits for managers. The arrangement created at 
Company One was intended to remove this temptation, with a clause added to the Articles 
of Association that no employer or employee of the company could own more than 2 per 
cent of the total shares. 
5.3.3 Take-up of share offer 
Approximately 91 per cent of the total workforce participated in the initial buyout in 
1993 i . All participants purchased one thousand shares at a value of £1 per share while the 
remaining equity was raised via bank loans. After 1993 shares were valued in March and 
September each year by independent auditors, with the valuation on each occasion based 
on a 'fair value', rather than the 'market price'. Up to the time the fieldwork was 
completed in 1998, the share price had either risen or sustained the previous valuation, 
but had never fallen during the period. Moreover, after 1993, the company gave 
employees two further opportunities to purchase up to a maximum of 150 shares; new 
employees became eligible to participate in subsequent share offers after one year's 
service. Thus, by 1998, the individual maximum allocation of shares was 1,150 and over 
two-thirds of the original shareholders still worked for the company. After the fieldwork 
for the thesis had been completed, Company One sanctioned an additional 'free share' 
issue with allocation based on the number of shares already held by individuals. Those 
holding 1,150 shares received most of the free shares up to a maximum of thirteen shares. 
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Thereafter the company had a downwards 'sliding scale' with those holding the least 
number of 'purchased' shares subsequently receiving the fewest 'free' shares. Although 
requested, no figures were made available for the total number of employees in the 
company holding the 'new maximum' of 1,163 shares. However, during the Stage One 
investigation respondents were asked to specify the number of shares owned and from a 
total of 56 shareholding respondents, two indicated that they held 1,163 shares. Further 
details of share distribution among respondents are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Com allY Olle: 
Shares owned (n 
1-500 
501-550 
551-1,000 
1.001+ 
(n ~ 56) 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
5.3.4 Shareholder participation 
Shares held by employees carried voting rights at the AGM, while the company's Articles 
of Association allowed for employee shareholder input into decisions constituting 'major 
business'. Typically, these would include decisions to relocate or sell the business, or 
change its status to that of a public limited company. A decision relating to any such 
issue required a resolution to be passed by a majority (75 per cent) of employee 
shareholders. However, members of the senior management team were allocated a 
special category of shares, known as 'A' shares, thereby giving them a controlling interest 
in the management of the company. Similarly, the composition of the company board 
ensured that senior managers effectively had control for day-to-day decision-making. 
The board consisted of five executive directors from the senior management team, 
including the managing director and financial director, plus four employee directors 
representing the four main workforce groups: platform; inspector and office worker; 
craft; and non-craft functions. Employee directors were each elected for a two-year term 
of office by the workforce and an external non-executive representative also sat on the 
board. Routine board decisions required only a simple majority to be passed; therefore, 
the built-in management majority on the board enabled managers to have control. The 
management directors were not subject to re-election although the employee shareholders 
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could remove them from their positions if an ordinary resolution signed by the four 
employee directors was passed by 80 per cent of the shareholders. 
5.3.5 Current situation 
Company One remains the only wholly employee-owned bus firm currently operating within 
the UK. The company has now managed to sustain its position of employee ownership for 
over ten years, which is considerably longer than any other UK bus operator. Reasons for the 
company's longevity as an employee-owned entity were put forward by Company One 
respondents during the Stage Two interviews and responses are discussed more fully in 
Chapter 6. 
5.4 Background to Company Two 
Company Two is located in South Yorkshire and employs approximately 2,700 
employees across five main sites. The company converted to employee ownership via a 
PTE privatisation in November 1993 following agreement by the local authority some 
eight months earlier that it would support such a strategy. Promoting itself as a company 
that aimed to 'invest in our shareholders as employees, who are recognised as our most 
valuable asset,ii, Company Two regarded an ESOP as the most viable route to becoming 
an employee-owned company. A direct share ownership arrangement was rejected on the 
grounds that it would discriminate against those employees without the personal funds 
necessary to buy shares. The arrangement thus created apportioned 80 per cent of the 
company's allocated share capital to employees and the remaining 20 per cent to a major 
trade investor. Broken down further, 54 per cent of the total 80 per cent 'employee 
allocation' was lodged with the employees themselves, while the remaining 26 per cent of 
shares were retained by one of two EBTs created within the company. 
5.4.1 Operation of the ESOP 
Two trusts - 'EBT I' and 'EBT 2' - were created to hold shares on behalf of employees, 

partly as a safety mechanism and partly as a store from which the company's APS 
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scheme could draw shares. The shares were then distributed to eligible employees ­
those with two years' service. EBT 1 held 26 per cent of ordinary shares in perpetuity on 
behalf of all employees in the company. Votes on major decisions required a 75 per cent 
majority vote of shareholders, thus making the 26 per cent shareholding held by EBT 1 
vital for any vote to be carried. EBT 2 in contrast was created to act solely as a 
warehouse by purchasing shares from employees who were leaving the company and 
acting as a temporary home for the shares until they could be redistributed through the 
APS scheme. When an employee left the company, their shares had to be sold back to 
EBT 2. The APS scheme was simply an Inland Revenue scheme, thereby allowing the 
company to make tax-deductible contributions each year to the trust. The APS scheme 
then used the money to acquire new shares and distribute them through EBT 2 to all 
qualifYing employees. These shares could be held in trust for employees for up to a 
maximum of five years and be used for voting at the company's AGM. 
5.4.2 Share allocation 
All employees with a minimum of two years' service received 114 free shares at a value 
of £0.01 per share for each year they had worked at the company up to 1993. A two-year 
minimum service period was regarded as appropriate in view of a high turnover of staff, 
generally common \vithin the first two years of employment in the UK bus industryii,. 
Following the buy-out in 1993, there were three subsequent share issues between 1994 
and 1996 as shown in Table 9 below. 
Table 9: Share issues at Company Two 1994-6 
Year of issue Number of shares issued per employee ValueJ:l.er share (£) 
199411995 
... ·m.,·"",,' •.• 
................. 1 105.092.0 0.85 1.50 
. " ...........""....__...._........ . 
1996 74.0 2.10 
Additionally in 1996 and also at a value of £2.10 per share, the company introduced a 
'Buy One Get One Free' scheme, whereby employees who purchased fifty shares 
received an extra fifty at no additional cost. This offer was also made available to 
employees with less than two years' service with the company. Although the company 
provided no figures regarding take-up, around 90 respondents from Stage One said that 
they had bought shares through the offer. An example of how share allocation was 
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determined at Company Typo is presented in Figure 1, while Table 10 gives details of the 
number of shares held by respondents from the Stage One survey. 
Figure 1: Criteria for share allocation at Company Two 
An employee who began working for the company in 1977 would, by 1993, have achieved 
sixteen years of service, thus: 
• 114 (shares) x 16 (years of service) = 1,824 'free' shares 
• 	 Employee would have received a further 271 shares (105 + 92 + 74) in the three 
subsequent share issues at no additional cost. 
• 	 If the employee had taken part in the BOGOF scheme, they would have received a further 
100 shares (fifty purcbased and fifty free shares). 
Therefore, the employee's total share allocation would be calculated as follows: 
1,824 + 271 + 100 = 2,195 sharesiv (2,145 free shares and 50 purchased shares) 
Table 10: Com aI/V Two: 

Shares owned (n) 

1-500 

50 \-550 

ondents 
551-1,000 	 14.0 
I,OOl~l,?OO 	 8.0 
1,501-?,OOO 	 18.0 
2.001-2,500 
2,501-3,000 
...................................................................1:...0:.:..0.:•.......................................................... 

3,001-3,500 6.0 
3,501+ 3.0 
(n= 1(0) 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
The basis for the number of shares distributed to individuals was determined by length of 
service rather than seniority. Therefore. a driver who had worked at the company for 
twenty years would have received a greater number of shares than a chief executive with 
eight years' service. However the chief executive and financial, operations and 
engineering directors each held twenty-five special voting shares, or 'golden shares', at a 
value of £0.01 each. Golden shares carried majority-voting rights for a period of five 
years (except for specified matters requiring a 75 per cent majority of ordinary 
shareholders or the agreement of two employee directors). The golden shares were 
viewed as a 'safeguard' for the directors, given that three of the directors together were 
required to vote with their shares in order to dismiss the fourth. 
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5.4.3 Composition of the company board 
At the time of the Stage One investigation, the company was managed by its board of 
directors, whose appointment and removal were governed by the Articles of Association. 
The Articles made provision for twelve directors and the board comprised four employee 
directorsY (for which the consent of at least two was required for key decisions) four 
executive directorsvi and four non-executive directors vii. The composition of the board 
was particularly significant in that Company Two was the first UK enterprise to have 
equal numbers of employee directors and executive directors on the company board. 
Company Two also had a CNC in place, made up of TGWU representatives and which 
met to discuss central company issues, wages and scheduling. In addition, each depot 
had a unit manager to oversee its employees and bus routes. From 1993 up until the end 
ofthe fieldwork in September 1998, the company had no industrial stoppages. 
5.4.4 Current situation 
After the Stage One investigation in 1997, Company Two went through a number of 
significant changes to its ownership structure. In June 1998, the company was sold to the 
trade investor who had held the 20 per cent stake in the original buy-out. For the sale in 
1998 to go ahead, the trade investor required 92 per cent of the shareholder vote. 
Employees who owned shares each had one vote, while EBT 1 had a 26 per cent share of 
the total vote. The trade investor had to convince EBT 1 to sell its share so that it could 
acquire 46 per cent of the vote (20 + 26); this left 54 per cent of the shareholding 
remaining. In the event, 98 per cent of the workforce voted in favour of the sale and the 
company was sold for £67 million. The proposed offer date was 1 June 1998 while the 
actual take-over occurred on 13 July 1998. Approximately 2,300 employees became, on 
average, £ 10,000 richer following the sale when shares were valued at £6.40 each. 
5.5 Background to Company Three 
Company Three serves the west London area and employs approximately 1,200 staff 
across five main sites. In 1994, against the backdrop of the privatisation of London 
Buses, the company decided to embark upon a MEBO strategy via an ESOP arrangement. 
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On 7 October 1994, the day of privatisation, employees of Company Three, including 
non-directors and non-senior managers, attained 25.1 per cent of the shares. Venture 
capitalists acquired 45 per cent of the share capital, while the remaining 29.9 per cent 
went to the company's directors and senior managers. At that time, shares were valued at 
36 pence each and over a three-year period around 700 employees (58 per cent) took up 
the share offer. The primary objective of the ESOP was 'to enable as many staff as 
possible to share in the benefit of the company's performance as [it] develops in private 
ownership"'''. Employees wishing to participate were asked to complete a 'form of 
acceptance and contract of participation' and submit it to the company's head office. The 
form was distributed to all employees along with a booklet outlining the details of the 
ESOP. A key issue faced by employees at the time of privatisation was a drop in wages 
and the loss of one week's holiday, although both were recouped at a later date. Cuts to 
terms and conditions had occurred generally throughout London Transport during 1993, 
and in the following year, managers, trade union representatives and employees at 
Company Three were all faced with confronting this issue directly. The implications for 
all parties and for the ESOP are addressed in Chapter 6. 
5.5.1 Operation of the ESOP 
A buy-out steering group made up of trade union representatives, unit chairs and elected 
by the trade union membership was set up to co-ordinate ESOP activities. In this regard. 
and to ensure that stan eligible to participate in the scheme actually obtained a proportion 
of the 25.1 per cent share allocation, two trusts were created: an EBT and a PST. At 
privatisation, the company set aside funds for the EBT to enable the trust to purchase the 
whole of the employee share allocation. The company was then able to make a cash 
payment from its profits to the PST, which the PST then used to purchase the shares frol11 
the EBT. Like Company Two, the PST was an Inland Revenue APS scheme, while the 
function of the EST was to provide an internal market for trading the shares. The 
creation of the internal market was achieved by: 
• 	 selling the shares that were held by the EBT to employees who applied for additional 
shares in the company. The ability of the EBT to sell shares in sllch cases was 
dependent upon how many shares it had available at the relevant time; 
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• 	 matching the requirements of employees wishing to sell shares with those of 
employees wishing to purchase them; and 
• 	 buying shares from employees wishing to sell their shares in the company in 
circumstances where the trustee could find no 'matched' buyer for those shares on the 
seller's behalf. Shares were also purchased from departing employees who were 
required to dispose of their shareholdings according to certain specified procedures. 
The ability of the EBT to purchase shares in these circumstances was determined by 
the availability of cash to the trust at the relevant time. 
For tax purposes, it was a condition of applying for the shares that the trustee of the PST 
would retain the shares on behalf of employees for at least two years. Thus, while the 
shares belonged to employees at Company Three, they were not permitted to have their 
own names on the share register until October 1997. Until that date, employees were 
unable to sell their shares or use them as security for a loan, but provided that employees 
remained with the company their shares could not be allocated to anyone else. The 
shares, which were classed as ordinary shares, were valued at least once per calendar year 
by independent external auditors. After two years, employees could transfer the shares in 
to their name although they would incur income tax liability as a result. The tax liability 
could be avoided however by leaving the shares in the care of the PST. 
Moreover, for each financial year from 1997 onwards, and following receipt of the 
auditors' valuation, it was intended that the company board would specify two dealing 
days, the second occurring six months after the first. When the dealing days had been 
established, the trustee of the EBT would inform employees at least twenty-one days in 
advance: 
• 	 how and when they had to give notice to the trustee of whether they wished to buy or 
sell shares on the internal market; and 
• 	 the dealing price for each class of shares on the relevant dealing day. 
Those eligible to participate in the scheme had to be employed by the company on or 
before 7 October 1994 and still be in employment when the trustee of the PST made the 
allocation of shares under the scheme. If an employee left the company after this date, 
they did not qualify for any shares. From the Stage One investigation, 40 per cent (n = 
74) of respondents said they had acquired shares through the company's ESOP. 
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-5.5.2 Share allocation 
All employees eligible to join the scheme received a flat amount of lIS ordinary shares, 
plus 25 additional shares for each completed year of continuous service up to 7 October 
1994. Thus, an employee with five years' service received a total of 240 shares (115 
basic plus 5 x 25). In terms of voting rights, the shares gave employees the opportunity 
to exercise a vote in the event of a take-over offer being made for the company. 
Company Three also appointed four employee directors from the main workforce groups 
to represent the interests of employees. In addition to the employee directors, four 
executive and two non-executive directors" sat on the company board. 
5.5.3 Flotation of the company 
July 1997 marked a significant turning point in the history of Company Three, in that the 
organisation reverted from private back into public ownership via a London Stock 
Exchange flotation. During its time as an employee-owned enterprise, the company more 
than doubled its pre-tax profits, from £104 million in 1994 to £3 million in 1996. 
Revenues over the same period rose from £28.5 million to £37.1 million, while shares 
originally valued at 36 pence in 1994 had reached £4.80 by July 1996. At the time of the 
flotation in 1997 Company Three was valued at £40 million. 
The flotation had a number of consequences for the company - not least an increase in 
the value of the collective investment of the company's directors and senior management 
team from an initial £100,000 to an aggregate value of £ 12 millionx• The chief executive, 
who invested £40,000 in the MEBO, emerged with a holding worth £3.3 million. As the 
buy-out was nearly all funded by debt and included just £360,000 of equity, the chief 
executive's initial investment gave him an II per cent stake. Windfalls for employees 
were more modest. Around 700 employees received an average £9,000. The minimum 
stake for an employee was worth £3,000, while those with 30 years' service at the 
company received shares worth £29,000. Collectively, the value of the employees' 
investment was around £ I million and the initial 25.1 per cent share allocation was 
retained. At the time of the flotation, the shares were placed at a value of £ 1.73 ­
capitalising the company at £37.2 million. Share dealing began on 29 July 1997. 
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With the assistance of an interest-free loan of up to £500, employees were given the 
opportunity to buy around 1.2 million shares overall when the company floated. 
Approximately 1 million of the shares were purchased, with 735 (61 per cent) from a total 
of just over 1,200 employees electing to take up the offerxi • Table 11 below gives details 
of the number of shares purchased by respondents following the flotation. 
TabIll :e Company Tl,ree: Sh ares owned by respondents after flotation 

Shares owned (n) Employees (n) 

1-500 42.0 

·50i~550· 0.0 
551-1,000 11.0 
1,001-1,500 3.0 
.ji~2:000··· 3.0 
'2,001-2,500 1.0 
3.0
.?~?91.-3,999. .... •......................... 

~,99I~~~?OO 1.0 
3,501+ 3.0 
(n = 67) 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
Additionally, on 3 October 1997, shares that had been allocated to the EBT some three 
years earlier were released from the trust, allowing employees the opportunity to sell 
them if they so wished. At the time of the flotation, all employees in the company would 
have owned shares in some capacity, having either acquired them at privatisation or 
during the flotation. The only likely non-shareholders in 1997 would have been those 
who joined the company between August and October of that year, although no details of 
the exact number were available. At that time, employee turnover was approximately 30 
per cent. 
5.5.4 Current situation 
Subsequent to the flotation, events in the company's history included the acquisition of a 
rival London bus operator in August 1998. The acquisition cost the company £41.9 
million but doubled its size in the process. Just over half of the deal- £21.5 million - was 
financed by a '2 for 5' rights issue in September 1998 and 8.6 million shares were issued 
to employees at a cost of 250 pence per share. A further interest-free loan of £ I ,000 was 
made available to enable employees to purchase the shares. In total, £33.1 million was 
paid in cash and £8.8 million was taken on in debt. The share issue, which was expected 
to reduce the directors' shareholding to 22 per cent, was underwritten by the same 
133 

venture capitalists that had held a 45 per cent share in the original 1994 buy-out. The 
acquisition took Company Three's share of the London bus market from 7 up to 13 per 
cent and the money raised from the share issue was used to purchase additional fleets. 
More recently, in 2000, the company was acquired by a Singapore-based multi-modal 
transport service provider. On 18 February 2000, the boards of the two companies 
announced an agreed cash offer of £2.40 for each Company Three share, thereby valuing 
the issued share capital at approximately £73.8 million. Company Three's shareholders 
accepted the otTer and on 21 March 2000 the purchase of the company was formally 
approved. 
5.6 Background to Company Four 
Company Four is located in the NOl1h East of England and employs approximately 1,500 
staff across four main sites. The company moved to its current ownership structure in 
July 1994 after a five-year period as a MEBO. Following deregulation, the company, 
which had formerly run bus services under the local PTE. transferred to local authority 
ownership in 1986 The arrangement continued until 1989 \vhen Company Four elected 
to move away from local authority control and into a MEBO arrangement. Initially after 
deregulation, the government had been content to achieve privatisation by encouraging 
local authorities to sell bus companies on a voluntary basis. In 1989, however, the 
government decided to introduce legislation that would force the sale of these companies. 
Additionally. Company f"'our was restricted in how it could operate commercially while 
under the ownership of its local authority. A number of options, including a MBO, an 
EBO and a MEBO were all considered as possible options. However. the local authority 
refused to sell to a MBO. while the trade unions, keen to secure an EBO for their 
members. failed to persuade the banks to lend them the capital for such a venture. In the 
end a MEBO was seen as the best option for all parties. 
The form of buy-out selected by the company was an ESOP. During initial buy-out 
negotiations the company's trade unions had been against the idea of individuals. both 
employees and managers. acquiring shares based on their ability to pay for them. 
Fundamental to the scheme was the principle that everyone had the same opportunity to 
own shares. Management acquired the majority stake of the share allocation, receiving 
5 I per cent of the shares. while employees acquired the remaining 49 per cent. 
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-Management took the majority stake to satisfy external investors that the company was 
committed to seeing the buy-out succeed, given that the company's assets were 
mortgaged to fund the purchase. Larger stakes for managers had not been uncommon in 
a number of the UK bus buy-outs. Generally, managers acquired the majority share to 
reassure financing institutions that there were groups of owners within the organisation 
with an incentive to ensure that targets for servicing finance were met (Wright et al 
1990). 
Company Four's buy-out was completed at a cost of £12.5 million. Managers invested 
around £306,000 of personal equity to fund the purchase and the company's three 
executive directors assumed ownership of around 30 per cent of the shares, thereby 
giving them additional control. For the employees' side, two employee directors sat on 
the company board, both of whom had a right of veto on certain strategic decisions as 
outlined in the company's Articles and Memorandum of Association. 
5.6.1 Share allocation 
Collectively, the total number of shares available to employees was 6,000,000, at an 
initial value of 5 pence for each share. Individuals eligible to participate in the scheme 
were permanent employees of the company as at 31 March 1989 and working for more 
than 16 hours a week. In subsequent years, participants were required to have a minimum 
of 12 months' continuous service with the company, effective at 31 March of the year in 
question; additionally, they had to be actively employed by the company at the date of 
share allocation. Initially, share issues were weighted according to length of service 
although each subsequent share offer was evenly distributed. Almost all individuals 
eligible to participate in the ESOP did soxii. Eligible employees received 200 shares for 
less than one year's continuous service up to 31 March 1989. For more than one but less 
than two years' service, the allocation was 375 shares; those with more than two years' 
continuous service received 600 shares. In addition, employees with more than two 
years' service became eligible for a service-related allocation of 25 shares for each 
additional completed year at 31 March 1989. Provided employees were eligible in 1990 
and subsequent years, they received at least 100 shares, while part-time employees 
received a pro-rata allocation calculated as a proportion of the hours they would have 
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been contracted to work if on a full-time contract. Details of share allocations are given 
in Table 12. 
Table 12: Com an Four: Share allocation accordin to len th of service 
Completed years of Share allocation Completed years of Share allocation 
service n service n 
< than I 200 
...................... ?!I~~.~l~)'~!lT~~':I!~I.? ........... ...... ... ........... .I~9QQ .. 

> than I but < 2 375 > than 19 but < 20 I 

... ?t.h2.':!1?y~2.':t~~1J.t.~~ .. .......... ....6.,.0 ..,................................. .....> ...:.a:;;:.:n ...0.:...." ..::::.:.. :::....b::..u::::.t: ...< + .........................:..:.:..::::..:................
:0 + ........t.,.:h ..:...::::2 ...= ......... ::::2:...:1............. 
. ?th2.':!1}y~Cl~~~1J.t<:A .. 625 > than 21 but < 22 
> thCl!1~y~Clrs~1J.t<:? 650 
....... ........?t~Cl~2.?)'~!lr~~l:l~<: 23 
... ?t.h.I:1~?y~I:1~~~1J.t.::~ . 675 
> than 6 but < 7 700 

?thl:1!1!years but < 8 725 

> than~)'<!ars but< 9 750 

>tha~?y<!ars but < I0 775 
?t.h.Cl!119Y~Clrs~1J.t < I I 800.....................................
 
> than 23 but < 24 
> than 24 
1 ........................................<.................. :....................................... 
I 125 
1 1 
1 175 
> than ) lyearsbut < 12 825 .?t~Cl~~?)'~!lr.~.~l:l!<:}Q .!~275 
> than 12.. years but < 13 850 ................................ ?t~~~}Q)'e!lr~~':It.<:}.1 .I,3QO 
> than 13 but <: 14 875 > than I but < 32 
> than 14 but < 15 900 but < 33 
... ?t~I:1!1I?y~Cl~~~llt<:16. 925 > than 33 but < 34 .......... +........... 
I 
.. ?:t.~l'lI1I()yt!Cl~~.~llt<:IT . 950 .... ........... ...............?:t}~!l~}~)'.~!lr.~bl:lt.<:}5 I,~QQ 

> than 17 ears but < 18 975 >35 1,425 
Source: Your Guide to the /Company FourJ ESOP (1989) 
5.6.2 Operation of the ESOP 
Money annually set aside by the company board for the ESOP was transferred to a PST 
established at the time of the buy-out. The money from the PST was then used to acquire 
shares held by the company's EBT and the shares were distributed to those participating 
in the scheme. However, there was a minimum period where participants had to retain 
the shares allocated to them, while the amount of tax for which participants were liable on 
the disposal of their shares was affected by the length of time they held on to them. It 
was anticipated that five years after their initial allocation, the shares would automatically 
be released from these restrictions and transferred to participants. The company produced 
a series of booklets outlining the aims and objectives of the ESOP, which were sent out to 
all employees. Within one of these bookletsX1ii the stated objectives of the ESOP were 
outlined as being: 
' ... to enable all eligible employees to participate directly in the company's success 
through their efforts at work, their contribution to the new consultation procedures, 
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and their receipt of the company's shares - the value of which will increase if the 
company prospers.' 
5.6.3 ESOP negotiating structures 
During the period of ownership, the company had a Joint Advisory Committee (JAC) 
made lip of three executive directors. the personnel, traffic and other senior managers, 
plus five employee representatives. The purpose of the .lAC was to consider and discllss 
overall progress and company strategy; it met every three months and also prior to 
company hoard meetings. 
Additionally. each of the company's main garages set lip a divisional ESOP Consultative 
Committee (lTC). the purpose of vihich was to consider and discuss divisional progress 
and pluns. plus reports submitted from divisional seminars. Meetings occurred every 
three monlhs and gave employees the oPPOIillnity to discuss relevant topics with senior 
managers. Di\isional ECCs \\ere made up of local garage managers. two additional 
management representatives and lip to five employee representatives from across all statT 
categories. plus a representative of the .lAC'. Additionally, during the period of 
ownership, employees recei\'\:d linaneial information, including copies of the annllal 
a<':C(lunts and were additionally invited to attend company AGMs where they had the 
upportunity to put qlll!stiol1s to the board. 
5.6.4 Current ownership structure 
('umptll/I' Fuur operated as an emplL)Y'ce-o\\ned enterprise for five years. During that 
time. the shares \"en; \ allied on an annual basis. with the share value rising from 5 pence 
lip tn 63 pence mer the period. In July 1994, the company became the focus for a major 
takc-\,)ver by om: llf the UK's leading transport groups. Employees were offered £4.58 
pCI' share and subsequent support for the take-over was virtually unanimousx,v • On the 
day of till' "ale all emploYl'es received three-year job guarantees from the new owners 
plus cash windfhlls avcraglll)!, hct\\iccn £9J)()O and £10.000. At the time of the fieldwork 
there had hccll 150 voluntary hut 110 compUlsory redundancies. although employee 
turnover WIIS initially high following the take-overn . 
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5.7 Background to Company Five 
('ompallY Five is located in the South West of England and transferred to its employee 
ownersh ip status in December 1993 at a cost of £ 1.15 mill ion. At that time. the company 
employed around 250 employees across four divisions including a budget rent-a-car 
franchise and a coach service. Steered through the conversion by a small working party 
of managerial and employee representatives. the purchase of the company had been the 
suhje<.;t of negotiations for some considerable time prior to 1993. eventually receiving 
'single-hidder' status that allowed the company to proceed with the buy-out without any 
wmpditinn. The timing of events for the buy-ouI was crucial. If the sale of the company 
was compkted before the end of 1993 the local council could keep the entire proceeds of 
the sale. Selling at a latcr date vvould have led to the local authority sharing the revenue 
from the sale \~ itll central government. The council laid down a three-year condition for 
('ompony Fh'{', whereby if the company was sold within the first year of the buy-out it 
had tn pay the council 90 per cent of any profit made during that time. If sold after two 
years, the company had to pay back 60 per cent of the profit, or 30 per cent after three 
\cars. At the end nfthe third year ('ompany Five was able to sell as and when it wished. 
5.7.1 Operation of the share scheme 
To fund the buy-out in 1993, Company Fil'L' needed to raise approximately £300.000. 
Employees eligible to participate in the scheme had to he employed by the company at 
the time of the huy-out. As \\lth ('oll1pany One. the minimum individual investment for 
lin employee was £ LOOO, although senior managers were required to invest £ I5.000 each 
if' they \\ ished tn participate in the scheme. A special personal loan arrangement was 
agreet! \\ ith a local huilding society to provide funds for those wanting to be a part of the 
ouy-out hut \\110 did not have the necessary finances. Around 70 per cent of all 
employt.:t:!) (n 2(4) took. lip the share offer: only around 5 per cent did not want to 
become involved and the remainder could not afford to participate (IRS 1995). At the 
time (\1' the Stage One investigation just over 16 per cent of respondents said they had 
owned sharl..~s in the company when it was employee-owned. Reasons given for not 
\\\\ning shares induded failing to meet the length of service criteria (88 per eent) and 
simply not wbhin~ to own shares in the company when the buy-out occurred (8 per cent). 
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When the shares were apportioned in December 1993, directors received 8 per cent, 
managers received 3 per cent and employees - collectively - were allocated 49 per cent, 
although no individual employee held more than 7 per cent of the shares. The company 
also set up an EBT that held 40 per cent of the share capital. Shares were originally 
valued at 10 pence each and had to be sold back to the company when employees left. 
Participation in the scheme also gave employees the opportunity to exercise their voting 
rights at the company's AGM, the first of which took place on 11 June 1995. Over the 
four-years of the buy-out employees had the option to buy additional shares up to a 
maximum value of£3,436. 
Company Five's board was originally made up entirely of company employees, including 
managers. Later on the board acquired two executive directors. two managers. three 
employee directors who were elected by the workforce and an independent chairman. 
The employee directors came from each of the three main staff groups - engineering, 
platform and administrative - and had a four-year term of office, although this was 
staggered to provide continuity. Union representatives were not pennitted to sit on the 
board although regular meetings between the two groups did occur. The company had 
one further board responsible for running the EBT: it was managed by three employee 
representatives - a driver, plus two employees from the workshop and administrative 
departments, together with an independent chairman. Bi-monthly meetings. otherwise 
known as 'sharp end' meetings, also took place, providing a forum for employees to ask 
questions of directors and departmental managers, raise issues and make suggestions 
regarding the general running of the company. 
Six months after the start of the buy-out new staff received an increased hourly rate of 
pay but less holiday entitlement than established employees. Following one year's 
service with the company. the basic rate of pay rose and employees were entitled to 
purchase shares in the company. In subsequent years both the basic rate and holiday 
entitlement increased. 
5.7.2 Current ownership structure 
Company Five, as a single entity, ceased operations in May 1997 and merged with a one 
time competitor and former MBO to become part of one of the UK's largest transport 
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groups. Spurred into action by the belief that the long-term future of Company Five best 
lay in ownership by one of the larger transport groups, all of the company's employees 
eligible to vote for the sale did so. The company was sold for approximately £8 million 
and employees received on average around £ 18,000 each from an initial investment of 
£ 1,000. Managers from the MBO company took over most of the management roles of 
the new business, including the role of managing director, while Company Five's 
managing director left the company immediately following the sale. The positions held 
by Company Five's employee directors were also dissolved and at the time of the 
fieldwork there were no plans to resurrect these roles. Figures provided by the new 
managing director revealed that Company Five held about 28 per cent of the local 
transport market during its period of ownership. The company now employs around 752 
personnel across three main sites and since the merger has managed to secure around 95 
per ccnt of the local market and win a number of awards including 'Bus Company of the 
Year' in 1998. 
5.8 Background to Company Six 
COlnpany Six was established in 1989. Currently paIi of an overseas pic subsidiary 
operating bus, light rail and metro systems throughout France, COl11pan,V Six is located in 
South West London and employs a total of 1,639 personnel across two main sites. Sold 
in the first instance to a management-led consortium on 5 November 1994 following the 
privatisation of London Buses, the company was sold on again in August 1997 at a cost 
of £41 million, to its present owners. The sale followed a unanimous workforce vote in 
support of the offer, with shares valued at £0.74 eachxvi. 
In 1994, directors and managers had acquired 54.5 per cent of the company's equity, the 
company's 1,544 employees were allocated a 9.5 per cent total share and the remainder 
went to external institutions. /\ MEBO was originally established for the purposes of 
acquiring the issued share capital of the company from London Transport, with the 
acquisition completed for an aggregate cash sum of approximately £23.000,000. To fund 
the acquisition, management shareholders invested £284.000 in the company by way of a 
subscription of management convertible ordinary shares at £0.01 each. Financial 
institutions invested around £8.7 million, divided as follows: 
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(i) 	 £ 155,742 for 15,574,194 institutional cumulative paliicipating ordinary shares valued 
at £0.01 each; 
(ii) 	£3,428 for 34283,584 institutional convertible deferred shares valued at £0.01 each, 
with no dividend rights; 
(iii) £3,412,000 for 3,412,000 institutional cumulative redeemable preference shares 
valued at £0.0 I each, purchased at a premium price of £0.99 each; and 
(iv) 	£5,144,830 for loan stock issued by the company carrying gross interest at 7.5 per 
cent per annum until 31 October 1995 and 10 per cent thereafterxvii • 
5.8.1 Employee offer 
'The offer to employees consisted of 'ordinary shares' at a value of £0.0 I each and 
'employee preference shares' at £0.10 each: 
(i) 	 Ordinary shares ('free shares') constituting 4 per cent of the ordinary share capital of 
the company, which were allocated to employees of the company employed on 
May 1994 and continuously employed up until 9 am on II February 1995. An EBT 
~ 'EBTI' - was established for this purpose, funded by the company to enable it to 
subscribe for the ordinary shares. The number of shares allocated to each employee 
was dependent upon the length of continuous service at II February 1995 as shown 
in Table 13. No management shareholders received ordinary free shares. 
(ii) 	 Ordinary shares (,further ordinary shares') constituting up to an additional 17 per 
cent of the ordinary share capital and up to 15,927, III employee preference shares. 
These were offered for sale to employees of the company employed on 31 December 
1994 and who were continuously employed until 9 am on II February 1995. This 
component was referred to as ·the further employee offer'. 
The 'further employee offer' gave employees as a collective group the right to invest up 
to £ 1,700,000 in the company. This was on the basis that f()r each additional £100,000 
invested by employees, ordinary shares constituting a further 1 per cent of the company's 
ordinary share capital \vould be issued to them. Each employee investing funds in the 
company received a proportion of the total number of ordinary shares and employee 
preference shares available for purchase, equal to the proportion of the total employee 
investment that their individual investment constituted. The minimum investment was 
ISO and loans were available to employees wishing to take up the additional offer"lli. 
I 
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The company had two dealing periods each year, when all 'ordinary' shareholders were 
able to notify the company that they wished to offer their shares for sale. Shares offered 
to the EBT 1 could either be purchased by the trust and kept for future offers to be made 
to employee shareholders, or be offered directly to existing employee shareholders 
immediately they became available for sale. On leaving the company, for whatever 
reason, employees had to sell their shares back to the EBT. In terms of voting rights, 
holders of the institutional ordinary shares, management ordinary shares and ordinary 
shares were entitled to attend and vote at general meetings and on a poll, were entitled to 
receive one vote for every sLlch share they held. Moreover, ownership of shares gave 
employees the opportunity to appoint two non-executive (employee) directors who were 
given a two-year term of office. 
Table 13: Criteria for share allocation at Com an Six 
Number of ears continuous service at 11th Februar 1995 Shares allocated (0) 
At least from the I st of M~yl??4tg!~~.II~~()rF~~TllarYl??5 O.5x 
At least I 1.0x 
At least 2 1.2x 
At least 3 
...................." ...... ······..·__ ·· .... ·.. ·····H"..'..·.······ ".,,,.. ,, .................,,, .. 1.3x 
At least 4 lAx 
At least 5 1.5x 
At least 6 1.6x 
..........••..•••••.•.......................•.•...........•. ." .•......................................... 
At least 7 1.7x 
At least 8 1.8x 
At least 9 1.9x 
At least 10 2.0x 
.......................................................•..................................................... . " ........." ......................................." ... "." 
At least II 2.1x 
At least 12 2.2x 
At least 13 2.3x 
At least 14 2Ax 
At least 15 2.5x 
............................. j ............................ . 
At least 16 
.......................................... ..................................j 2.6x 
At least 17 2.7x 
At least 18 2.8x 
At least 19 2.9x 
20 or more 3.0x 
Source: Offer ofShares to Employees (circular to Company Six employees - 1994) 
5.8.2 Current ownership structure 
Unlike the situation at Company Five. employee directors still held a role, post buy-out, 
in Company Six and retained their positions on the company board. Also on the board 
were a non-executive chairman, six executive directors, two employee directors and three 
non-executive directors. The company also had a joint consultative committee (JeC) 
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made up of management and trade union representatives that met once every three 
months. Meetings held did not focus so much on key issues; rather, they reviewed how 
all of the garages were performing while considering scope for improvement and issues to 
work on over the following three months. The lCC meetings essentially provided each 
side with the opportunity to air their grievances and the minutes of the meetings were 
then posted on notice boards around the different sites. Health and safety meetings were 
also held every six weeks. In terms of the management structure, a number of 
management tiers were removed following privatisation in J994. From a total of seven 
assistant (lpcrating managers in the early 90s, there were two such positions at each 
garage by the time of the 1998 investigation. The individual holding the position of 
managing director at thl.: tinll: or the study had held the same role before privatisation. 
5.9. Summary 
5.9.1 Employee-owned companies 
Tah/e J..I (pages 149-50) outlines the key features of ESO at the three employee-owned 
hus companies featured in the study - Company One, Company Two and Company Three 
- pills the nackgroulld and context against which each ESO scheme was launched. One of 
the key aspects of the current research is to compare employee attitudes and behaviours 
across three diffcn:nt models or ESO (see Chapter 1) and TaMe 14 provides a useful 
overview of some or the most signi ticant features of the three schemes. 
From the table the main differences between the three companies and the three ESO 
sd1i..:mcs Clln lit.: identilied as follows: the proportion of collective ESO within each 
company; the system of ownership adopted; the context in which each scheme was 
launched: and the number of employees participating in the scheme. Similarities are also 
noted, lHwfever. Company One and Company 1\1'0 both moved to ESO from similar 
stables and both allowed employees to have voting rights on issues constituting 'major 
husiness'. I~mpl()yecs at Cumpony Three were also allocated voting rights, although this 
W,lS limited to a "ptc in the event of a take-over offer. Additionally, share allocation at 
('wllpallY ()ne and ('ompul/)' Two \vas based on either willingness to invest (Company 
()flt') or kl1tJ.th of scniec {( 'O/llpallY nV()) , rather than being dependent upon one's 
positioll in the \H"gallisational hierarchy (Company Three). Specifically, in Company One 
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and Company Two, it was possible for drivers to own more shares than those in senior 
management positions. Similarly, in both cases, senior managers were allocated 'priority 
shares', thereby giving them controlling interest in the running of their companies and 
day-to-day decision-making. The arrangement for allocation of shares among directors at 
CO/llpany Three differed slightly. At the time of the initial buy-out, the directors and 
senior management team invested a total of £ 100,000 into the company and received 29.9 
per cent of tht: share capital. At Company Three it was not the intention to place 
employces and directors on an equal footing through the allocation of shares. The 
arrangt:!l1cnt adoptt:d at ( 'o/JIpilny Tim.'1.! was in line with general M ESC) strategies at that 
t iIlle. however, given that Clutsidt: investors were generally ul1wi 11 ing to invest in majority 
I-:BOs. 
Tht: IHlmbcr of employees across the three companies taking up the initial share ofTer at 
tlH: time of the huy-out also merits consideration. Over 90 per cent of employees at 
('ompany ()II(, invested £ 1.000 in their firm to buy shares, while at Company Two, almost 
all employees participated in the share offer. In the latter case however, employees were 
11I)t required tn invest their own money. Similarly. at Company Three. employees were 
llot required to make a direct financial investment, though the initial take-up rate of 58 
per cent was considerably lower than for Company Two. The reasons for converting to 
mmcrship in each case have already hcen highlighted, though it is worth considering that 
the hackground 'lgainst which each of the schemes was launched was probably significant 
in terms of takt.:-up rates. Employees at Company One, for example, wanted to take 
cOlltn)\ of their own company -- 'buy or bl! bough! '. The company had also rejected an 
ESOP arrangement on the basis that employees investing a sum of their own money in the 
cI.Hnpan,Y \"{Hlld be Illore motivated to see it succeed than if they had received their shares 
at no dire!..:t cost. 
In contrast, \..,bile ('olllpallr Two had faced a similar situation to Company One in terms 
llf being forced to move ,may from local authority ownership, a direct share purchase 
arrangement was rejected on tht: basis that it would discriminate against those employees 
without the funds to iIlH:St. Thlls, through the ESOP, employees at Company Two were 
L'ffectivcly offered ·snmething. for nothing" which probably goes some way to explaining 
thL' hig.h take-up rate. Similarly, the COIllJlOI1.V Three ESOP required no direct financial 
investnHmt by employees. However, the share offer was inextricably linked to 
privatis,lthm and a reduction in terms and conditions Df employment, thereby creating a 
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negative view of ESO among employees and perhaps prompting large numbers of them to 
reject the share offer. This particular theme is developed further in an analysis of the 
Stage Two interviews presented in Chapter 6. 
5.9.2 Post employee buy-out companies 
Table 15 (pages 151-2) summarises the key points to emerge from the three post buy-out 
companies - Company Four, Company Five and Company Six - including: events leading 
to ownership conversion at each firm; the system of ownership chosen, the percentage of 
equity held by employees; and criteria for participation in the scheme. The table also 
reinforces the theme that UK bus buy-outs took a variety of forms, with the cases shown 
providing diverse examples of the systems and degrees of employee ownership that 
characterised the industry for over a decade. At Company Six, employees were allocated 
9.5 per cent of the share capital, though an additional allocation was available for 
employees willing to invest their own money in the firm. In contrast, directors and senior 
managers at the company were allocated over half of the equity. At Company Four, 
directors and senior managers were similarly apportioned a majority shareholding, though 
employees were allocated 49 per cent of the share capital. The situation at Company Five 
was different again, with 89 per cent of the share capital divided between employees and 
the company's EBT. Company Five's directors held a further 8 per cent of the shares 
while senior managers held the remaining 3 per cent. Additionally, Company Five 
employees were required to purchase their shares to paliicipate in the scheme. The 
situation at Company Four and Company Six, with directors and senior managers holding 
a majority of the equity, was probably more typical of some of the earlier buy-outs, 
however. A 1989 survey conducted by the Centre for Management Buy-out Research 
found that managers held a majority stake of the equity in more than 75 per cent of cases 
(Wright et al 1989). 
There was an indication by 1990, however, that management-led buy-outs with only 
minority participation for employees were meeting with some resistance (Wright et al 
1990). Competing trade union-led employee bids were occurring in some situations. 
This was indeed the case at Company Four in 1989, though the TGWU failed in its bid to 
form a total EBO in that instance. Notwithstanding, where employee bids were 
successful, the intention was to allow managers to take operating decisions but to be 
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subject to control by employee shareholders. At least In part, the involvement of 
employees as equity investors appeared to be motivated by the belief that direct EP 
improved performance, or at least created goodwill towards managers at a time when 
radical changes were occurring. 
Aside from the differences in the model of ESO adopted and the criteria for allocation of 
shares, the length of time spent by the three companies as employee-owned entities is also 
worthy of mention. In each case, the period of time spent in ownership exceeded the 
average for all buy-outs of 3.42 years (Wright et al 1992). Moreover, employee 
ownership at Company Four and Company Five exceeded the average for bus buy-outs of 
3.7 years (Pendleton 2001). The length of time spent by Company Six as an employee­
owned company was slightly below the average for bus buy-outs. The theme of 'ESO 
durability' is examined more closely in Chapter 8. 
It is also worth noting that in the 'post buy-out' era, Company Four and Company Five 
still operate share option schemes, even though for the present thesis they are defined as 
'post-ESO firms'. As highlighted previously in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, an 'employee­
owned company' provides employees with some degree of control as manifested, for 
example, through the exercising of voting rights. Broad-based share option schemes in 
contrast may be viewed as an individualist form of involvement because participation 
rates tend to be very low, thereby leading to fragmentation of ESO (see Chapter 2). In 
addition, many employees in share-based profit-sharing schemes prefer to take their 
rewards in cash, thus losing any rights of ownership. 
5.9.3 Summary 
Chapter 5 has presented detailed profiles of each of the six cases, addressing a wide range 
of issues relevant to the current study and setting the context for results that follow in 
Chapters 6 to 8. Selection of these particular cases was based on the premise that they 
represented some of the most significant forms of ESO to have been found within the UK 
bus industry in the aftermath of deregulation and privatisation. Information in Table 14 
and Table 15 has identified the extent of ESO diversity present within the study sample 
and issues highlighted in the tables, including ESO concentration within the firm, 
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methods for acquiring shares and the basis for share allocation, are addressed further in 

the following three chapters. 

Results are hased on primary quantitative and qualitative data, as discussed in Chapter 4. 

Firstly. Chapter 6 looks at 'feelings of ownership' and 'employee commitment' at 

('ompany One, COII/pany Two and COll1pan.-v Three, while the focus of Chapter 7 is an 

examination across all six companies of EP and industrial relations outcomes. Finally, 

Chapter 8 looks at whether di fferent models of ESO and the varying circumstances of 

ownership an: important for its durability. Stage Two data from Company FOllr, 

('Oll1jlClf/V Fivl! and ('olllllfmy Six provide the basis for results presented in Chapter 8. 

Of respulllknts partlClpatll1g in the Stage One survey, just over 71 per cent said they had 
purchased shares in 1993. 7 per cent, :) per cent and 17 per cent of Stage One respondents 
n:spectively purchased shares in the years 1994, 1995 and 1997. No Stage One respondents 
purchased shares in 1996. 
Featured in the tompany's 'Mission Statement'. 
111 	 66 per cent of Stage (lne respondents at ('nmpany Two became shareholders in 1993. For 1994. 
1995 and 1996, the take-up of shares among Stage One respondents came to 12 per cent, 14 per 
cent and 8 per cent respectively. 
Based on a share value (If .£2.10 per share in 1996, these shares would have been worth 
approximatcly £4,609. At the time of the Stage One survey in 1997. the average shareholding 
in ('ompaIlY FIfO was approximately 1.200 shares at a total value of £2,400. 
Two cmployee directors were selected fl'oIl1 platform staff one from office staff and one from 
engineering staff and were elected for a two-year term of office. For the first term. two of the 
directors were elected for three years, giving a rotation of directors annually. 
" 	 Lach of thL~ executive din:ctnrs was responsible fiJr a specific field of operation. 
'" 	 Non-executive' directors were appointed by the executive and employee directors and included 
two communit) -appointed directors, plus one business appointment. 
""1 	 Statement ft:atured in ('(JIII/IiIllY {llret' 's share scheme booklet distributed to employees prior to 
the I 99·l hll~ out. 
" 	 One of the employee directors represented the company's venture capitalists while the other 
was a rl'pn.:'<;cntative from the City. 
Featured in the flotation prospectus published on 16 Jul) 1997 (Financial Times - 17 July 
1997: 26). 
" 	 From Stage ()nl'. 53 per cellt of respondcnts said they had purchased additional shares 
following thl' t1ol<\tion of the company. The result is based on a total of 185 respondents 
providing un answer to the que:'li~m. 
'" 	 Although requested during the curn:nt investigation. no accurate figures were available t()r the 
total numhcr of cmpl\lyt~es participating in the ESOP in 1989. Rcsults from Stage One 
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however reveal that 55 per cent (n = 119) of all survey respondents (n = 217) participated in 
the ESOP. 
xiii 	 Your Guide to the [Company Four] ESOP - 1989. 
xiv 	 Around 53 per cent of Stage One respondents said they were satisfied with the price they 
received for their shares when the company was sold. 
xv 	 In an interview in November 1996, the Manager Director said that a large redundancy 
programme at the end of the three years was unlikely. 
xv. 	 63 per cent of Stage One respondents said they were satisfied with the price they received for 
their shares. 
xvi. 	 Extract from 'Offer of Shares to Employees' booklet produced by Company Six and circulated 
to all staff in the company. 
"lll No exact figures were available for the number of employees taking up the 'employee offer' or 
the' further employee offer' at the time of the buy-out in 1994. However, results from Stage 
One reveal that 43 per cent of respondents owned shares in the company when it was 
employee-owned. This figure does not distinguish between the two share offers. 
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.Table 14: S f 
------ -'----d kev --- ESO--- - ch---- teristics ( d com pames,) 
CompallY Olle 	 CompallY Two Company Three 
_~..omp.l!~y.l()_{:!lf:i0 n 
-_...... -...... 
North West 	 South Yorkshire West London 
\,266-­_!()taL!1l1~~!E...~~pl()Yf!d ____ 300 ?,?9Q...._....... ...-..._..__._._....-....._.__ ..... 
Number of sites Two Five Fiver-" .-. .---------.. .....-......- ............_._. ...--....-.-.... ........ ..............._............... .._._.__... _......._._...._.... . · __......_.H............._··..····· 
Year ESO was established 1993 1993 1994 
.-. --_ ..- ._--- -_.._..... _... __.. -.._...... ........- ...._...... 	 ..................... 
••______ ···'_U,."H·_____ • _._._._._._._....__•••••• ............._._.__._..._.... _. 

ModelofESO ~:p~:e~t.s.h~r~p~-~~~...~~~... _..._ ESOP 	 ESOP 
.. _," ~.---.--.~.-- .......-.. ,.--...-.." ..-.. --.~..-.---..--.-.........-.- ...••..... ••••••••• ~.d ••••••• • _ •••• u ............................._ •••••• 	 n ..................................... 

I~..t.!!!....~!!~E..es. h.e.I~.....~y.e.!'!1!~?ye.e..~ .}QQE~Ecent ?QE~E~~'1.! . .... ~?IEeE~~'1.t. .... 

External shareholders None 20 per cent of the share capital held by 45 per cent of the share capital held by 

an external trade investor 

.. --.-~-.•....•..-.. ...- ...........--........~.-....-.-....-.... 	 ... VE!'1.ttl~.~ ...~.~pi!lll.i.sts ..... 
~ ...--~-.-
Directors' shareholdillgs 	 Members of the senior management four company dircctors held 25 'golden 29.9 per cent of the share capital was 
team held 'A' shares, giving them a shares', which calTied voting rights for allocated to the company's directors and 
controlling interest in the management five years except on cel1ain specified senior management team. 
.... -
... ()Lt.h~ ..~.()I!'pal1y:. matters . 

Background to ESO Company had become local-authority As for Company One Privatisation 

owned following deregulation. 

Introduction of government legislation 

in 199 I regarding future sales from 

local authorities prompted move to 

_.... 	
ESO. 
. ........................... _....................._...... .............._....... 	 .................._.................................._.... . ........................... _..... ........... ....- ...................................... - - ............................. ......................-............................
~ 
ESO philosophy 	 In buying shares employees would 'To invest in our shareholders as 'To enable as many staff as possible to 

'become bonded to a level of employees, who are recognised as our share in the benefit of the company's 

perfonnance required for the buy-out to most valuable asset.' performance as it develops in private 

succeed',

.._..............- .......-._. ......._...................._._..._.................._........ 	
.."".... " ............ ..................._....._._._.._-_ .._....... .......... 
g~l1~l'ship: ' 

Eligibility for joining the scheme 	 Employees could elect to purchase Employees with a minimum of two Employees had to be employed by the 

sharcs after one year's service with the years' service received shares at no company on or before 7 Octobcr 1994. 

..................................._........................._...... ....... .....(;()l!'P.lll1y· direct cost to themselves . 

Number of employees participating in 91 per cent 99 per cent (see Chapter 5). 58 per cent 

~...~':: .. i~.~!..i!ll ...~.~.y.~.().~.~......... . ............... . ................ ,"' ..............................................._......................................... ..................... ...............................-	
......................................- ................................. 

Share value 	 1993: £1 per share 1993: £0.0 I per share 1994: 36 pence per share 
September 1998: £9.25 per share 	 1994: £0.85 per share 1996: £4.80 per share 
1995: £1.50 per share 1997: 173 pence per share 
1996: £2.10 per share 1998: 250 pence per sharc ('2 for 5' 
rights issue) 
Table 14 continued: 
Basis for allocation of shares 
.....__._...- . ............._--- ... .__ .. - ---.--.- ... __... -....._._._..... ......................- .... -......_....-. 

Role of share trusts 
• ___ ••••••••••" ••_ •••••• ·_•••••• w« . .............................................................._...... 

Voting rights for employees 
...__...__._._.. _._......_.._._.__., ... 	
........... 

Employee directors 
..... _.'.......-.-._ .._. _.._..._._....._. 

Composition of the company board 
! 
-_._-_.__....-
..._...- -,--. ....-.... ......._....
-~ 
Current status of company 
CompallV Olle 
Eligible employees purchased 1,000 
shares on the day of the buy-out. Up to 
1998, employees had the 0ppOIiunity to 
purchase a further 150 shares. After 
1998 the company authorised an 
additional 'free share' issue up to a 
maximum of 13 shares for individuals. 
1'J<:"'I!I.~)o;il!l.1l!1! .. ~h~.~~~()t~l..':".~.~....I,.I6!...... 
Company established an EBT to act as a 
warehouse for shares. When employees 
left the company the trust 'purchased' 
their shares to sell on to new 
employees. 
Decisions constituting' major business' 
required a 75 per cent majority vote of 
~1~ployee.~h~~~~!1()lder~:......_. .......... 
Four employee directors from each of 
the main workforce groups. 
- ..-................... 	 .. ............ 

Five senior managers and four 
employee directors. Senior managers 
had effective control for the day-to-day 
running of the company through their 
'A' shares . 
Remains a wholly employee-owned 
enterprise. 
Company Two 	 Company Three 
Eligible employees received 114 shares Eligible employees received 115 
for each year of service up to 1993, ordinary shares with twenty-five 
followed by three annual free share additional shares for each year of 
distributions thereafter and a 'BOGOF' service. 
scheme in 1996. 
, 
................_.. .... .... ........ .........-.........
~ 
ERTI and EBT 2 were created to hold Company set up an EBT and a PST. On 
shares on behalf of employees. EBT I the day of privati sat ion, funds were set 
held 26 per cent of the shares. EBT 2 aside for the EBT for purchasing the 
acted as a 'warehouse' by purchasing whole of the employee share allocation. 
sharesfi:om employees that had left the Company then made payments from its 
company and subsequently profits to the PST. The PST then used 
redistributing them through the APSS. these payments to purchase shares from 
the EBT. 
...................................................... 

As for Company One 	 In the event of a take-over offer being 
made, employees were able to vote to 
. .......... _........_._..... ... 
~~<::eptorr~j~<::~the off~~~. ... ... __ ... 
Four employee directors: two platform Four employee directors representing 
staff, one engineer and one member of the main workforce groups. 
the office staff. 
.............................................................- ....... ... _.....__....._... 	 ....-----,_._.._.­
four employee directors, four executive Four employee directors, four executive 
directors and four non-executive directors, two non-executive directors 
directors. The consent of at least two (one representing venture capitalists and 
employee directors was required for key one from the City). 
decisions. 
.. - .........._.­ .......__ ..... ........._.._._...... 
Company sold to trade investor from Acquircd by a Singapore transpOli 
initial buy-out in 1998. company in 2000. I 
i 
Table 15: Summary of cases and key ESO characteristics ~ost employee buy-out companies) 
Variable I Company Four 
Employee share ownership: 
Year scheme was 
established
--- .... ,........._.,-, .._. ,. 
 -~ 
Model of ESO 
I 1989 
--+--_ ..•......... _........._..........._._._.............. ..-....._..._... ..........._._._......... .............._.. . 

MEBO - 51149 per cent management! 
employee split through an ESOP mechanism. 
No direct financial investment required by 
employees. Managers collectively invested 
approximately £306,000 of personal equity. 
6,000,000 shares were made available to 
employees at a value of£0.05 per share. 
Amount of shares available included a 
service-related allocation of25 shares for each 
year of service at 31 March 1989. 
I Company Five 
1993 (Company Five (AJ - see Chapter 4) 
+_ ......... -_ .......................................... 
Direct purchase MEBO. Allocation of shares: 
directors - 8 per cent; managers 3 per cent; 
employees 49 per cent. EST held remaining 
40 per cent of the share capital. Employees 
invested £ I ,000 each in the company to buy 
shares; managers invested £ 15,000 each. 
Shares were originally valued at £0.10 per 
share. 
f··············_···_······_··-·_·__·················_·-............- .. -.........•.._....,._..._.............................................._.._......................._........_...._............................•.._._........................•.......................... ···_·_···r·····_···········_·····················_·_··........................_...._..............._....................._........_.........................._.... 

Events leading to 
ESO 
How the scheme 
worked 
f··· 
Criteria for 

participation 

Moved into local authority control following 
deregulation in 1986. Local authority 
relinquished control three years later 
···_f_follo~!!l.g_c;~~!1ges .. i!1J~gislat.!g~~ ...................__.... _ .... 
Money annually set aside by the company 
board for the ESOP was transferred to a PST. 
Money from the PST was used to acquire 
shares for ESOP participants from the EBT. 
Working as a permanent employee for more 
than 16 hours a week at 31 March 1989. 
Thereafter, [2 months' continuous service at 
31 March. 
As for Company Four. Company Five (AJ 
moved out of local authority control in 1993. 
. ......._...... 

Shares were held by the company's ERT. 
Over the four-year period, individuals were 
able to buy additional shares up to a maximum 
value of £3,436 through dealing days held 
once a year. 
.................. . ... __ ~ ........._ ... .........._ 
AI! permanent employees working at the 
company at the time of the buy-out were 
eligible to paI1icipate. 
Company Six 
1994 
MEBO - 54.5 per cent of the shares held by 
directors and senior managers, 9.5 per cent 
held by employees and the remainder held by 
external institutions. Managers invested 
£284,000 to fund the acquisition, buying 
shares valued at 1 pence per share. Other 
financial institutions invested approx. £8.7 
million. Offer to employees was in two parts: 
(l) 	4 per cent of the share capital in ordinary 
shares valued at £0.0 I per share; 
(2) 	17 per cent of the share capital. Minimum 
investment was £50 (optional to 
.... ~E!?:p'-()y~_~~.L .. 
Following privatisation, Company Six was 
sold by London Transport in 1994. 
.......... 

An EBT was set up for the 'ordinary share 
offer'. Two dealing periods each year when 
'ordinary' shareholders could sell their shares. 
Shares offered to the EBT could be retained 
for future offers to shareholders, or offered 
di~~~_tlyto~~i~!ingsl1.~E~~()I~~E~: __ 
For first part of the offer: allocation based on 
length of service. 
For second paI1 of the offer: shares were 
offered for sale to employees of the company 
employed on 3 1 December 1994 and who 
were continuously employed until 11 February 
1995. 
I 
Table 15 continued: 
COnlDall1' Four 	 COI1lD(JIIV Five 
Employee directors 	 Two employee directors during the buy-out. Three employee directors during the buy-out. 
Both had rights of veto 011 ceI1ain strategic 
decisions. 
N~zotia!j_rlg~tructu res 
, ... .. 	
EBT Board lAC, ESOP Consultative Committee 
-~....... 

Year scheme ended 	 1994 
_ 
1997 
Reasons 	 Take-over by a major transport operator. Merged with Company B (see Chapter 4) with 
Employees were offered £4.58 per share and the view that it \vas best for the long-term 
the vote for the sale \vas virtually unanimous. future of both companies. Virtually 
Employees received average windfalls of unanimous support for the sale_ Average 
between £9,gOO_?I!~~_lQ,9QO. windfalls of £ I 
Additional An EBO and a MBO had also been considered Union representatives were not permitted to 
information in 1989. sit on the company board 
In 1994 on the day of the sale, all employees 
!,:_(;;,:ive d __ t~_~,:(!::xcarj()~g~IClJ:Cll)-_~e.~s- _ 
Current pay lNC agrees rates of pay for 95 per cent of lNC agrees rates of pay for employees across 
negotiating staff. Directors' pay set by head office in all sites. Made up of trade union 
arrangements Scotland. representatives. the managing director and 
members of the senior management team. 

'Other' negotiating JA C DC C ----- -[B;=;~;;~thly~~~tiJ~g~-;ithth~;;p~;·at;;;;ls 

structures 	 director, garage staff managers and union 

representatives. 

Monthly meetings between union 

representatives and managing 

director/operations director. 

l:lealth and safetyrn~(!tings . 
Employee directors Employee directors retained positions after F~fio-~j;~gth~me;ger,tller;;je~-were 
1994 sale_ dissolved, with no plans to resurrect them in 
the future . 
.. .. .-..............-.-....
~..... 
............ .-."..._..... 	 .-.................................. . 

Additional Flatter management structure compared with Merger of the two companies resulted in 
f __ i!.1..f~_~r.!l_~!!~_I.! _ _______________J!~~=~~X=()~t.P~~!()cl· common terms and conditions across all sites. 
......................_...................................-....... 

Total number 1,540 752 

ed 

COfflDam'Six 
Two employee directors during the buy-out. 
lCC 
1997 

Take-over by an overseas subsidiary_ 

Unanimous vote in favour of the sale with 

shares valued at £0.74 each. 

Employee shareholders were able to appoint 

employee directors. 

JNC agrees rates of pay for all staff. Made up 

of four directors, paid union officers and 

company convenor. 

Three-monthly lCC meetings_ 

Six-weekly health and safety meetings_ 

Two employee directors currently in place. 

Flatter management structure compared 

PJ:~...~.~y~_<?!:'! ..peri()d .._._ 

1,639 

6.0 	 Employee share ownership, feelings of ownership and organisational 
commitment 
6.1 	 Introduction 
Chapter 6 examines different models of ESO and 'feelings of ownership' and 'employee 
commitment' outcomes. Specifically, the chapter sets out to investigate the extent to 
which the attitudes of employee shareholders to ESO and to their organisation differ 
across the three 'employee-owned' cases featured in the study - Company One, Company 
Two and Company Three. Based on quantitative data from the Stage One employee 
attitude survey and on qualitative data from Stage Two, the main aim is to establish 
whether the 'model' of ESO and the context of its formation are important for outcomes 
of ownership and organisational commitment. 
Section 6.2 presents findings concerning employees' 'feelings of ownership'. Data 
analysis for this first section is divided into three main areas: level of satisfaction with 
ESO; how the main benefits of ESO are perceived; and whether ESO has made a 
difference to the way employee shareholders regard their company. Guiding the first part 
of the analysis is the hypothesis that employee shareholders working under a 'direct' 
system of ESO (Company One) derive greater satisfaction from being owners compared 
with employee shareholders in firms with more indirect ownership, such as an 'ESOP' 
(Company Two and Company Three). It is further hypothesised that employee 
shareholders in companies with a 'direct' ownership programme exhibit a greater 'sense' 
of ownership towards their company than shareholders in firms with more 'indirect' 
arrangements. Investigation of the second hypothesis draws on results from two areas of 
'ownership' analysis - the perceived main benefits of ESO at each company and the 
attitudes of employee shareholders to their company following an ESO conversion. 
Where employees experience greater feelings of ownership it is hypothesised that a 
stronger sense of commitment to the organisation will also ensue. Section 6.3 examines 
organisational commitment across the three companies and the extent to which 
'characteristics of ESO', such as the model of ownership and the number of shares held 
by employees, impact upon the commitment of employees. Further analysis presented in 
section 6.3. I looks at the commitment levels of shareholders and non-shareholders at 
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Company One and Company Three to establish whether ownmg shares is actually 
important for commitment outcomes. Company Two data were excluded due to the small 
size of the company's 'non-shareholder' group (see section 4.4.3 in Chapter 4). 
Previolls ESO studies (see Chapter 3) have often included comparisons of 'shareholder 
and non-shareholder attitudes', although the approach has sometimes been criticised (see 
French 1987; Pendleton 2001). Variables other than 'ownership' per se - for example, 
the number of shares held by individual employees, the model of ownership in place and 
the context in which the conversion to ownership occurred - have not always been 
considered in tandem. In an attempt to address these issues, section 6.3.1 also compares 
the attitudes of non-shareholders only at Company One and Company Three to establish 
whether the model of ownership is important for attitudinal outcomes among employees 
who do not own shares. As discussed in Chapter 3, non-shareholders may still benefit to 
some degree from working in an environment of employee ownership, although like 
shareholders, attitudinal outcomes may similarly be determined by variables other than 
ownership alone. The chapter also includes an examination of observations drawn from 
the Stage Two interviews regarding the model of ESO adopted by each company and 
reasons for the choice of model. The aim of the qualitative analysis is to gain richer 
insights into results from the quantitative stage. Views from Company One respondents 
on the likelihood of a third-party buy-out in the future are also examined, though such an 
investigation was inappropriate at Company Two and Company Three given the situation 
in each case at the time of the Stage Two interviews (see Chapter 5). Role-ordered 
matrices used to assist in the analysis of qualitative material (see section 4.5.4 in Chapter 
4) presented in this chapter can be found in Appendix 12 (i-xxxiv). 
6.2 Employee share ownership satisfaction 
Results in this section are based on quantitative data examining employee shareholders' 
responses to Rosen et ai's (1986) six-item 'general satisfaction with employee share 
ownership' scale. The aim of the analysis is to examine the attitudes of employee 
shareholders in relation to ESO satisfaction and to establish whether there are differences 
in employee attitudes across three different models of ESO. Tables 16 to 18 present 
exploratory results based on responses to the 'ESO satisfaction' scale. Questions 
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featured on the Stage One questionnaire were originally presented in a five-point interval 
scale format, with responses ranging from 'strongly agree' (1) through to 'strongly 
disagree' (5). For ease and clarity of presentation, the 'strongly agree' and 'agree' 
categories and 'disagree' and 'strongly disagree' categories were merged into single 
'agree' and 'disagree' categories respectively (see Pendleton 2001). Details of 
respondent numbers and further information on the scale can be found in sections 4.4.2 
and 4.4.7 in Chapter 4. Table (vi) in Appendix 5 lists all six scale items and their 
corresponding variable labels, which are shown in the tables below. 
Table 16: Satisfaction with ESO at Company One: employee shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable Mean 
.. ~atisfyiflg .... 32.7 40.8 26.5 2.88 
• •• " ........................ H ....,.·••• ' ••••H ••••••• 

52.1 35.4 12.5 2.46~tClY ............................................................ " ..... . 

Own 40.0 18.0 42.0 3.0 
• .....................m .....................""...... ,

................. 

29.8 6.4 2.02 
••••• " •••••••''' .......H •••~•••"., ............M •••• ,
Care .. ....................... . .............?~.:.8 

34.0 8.0 2.02
.1I11P()rt<lflt 58.0 , ....................""............,........ 
 t····················· 
Proud to own 48.0 44.0 8.0 2.32 
Table 17: Satisfaction with ESO at Company Two: employee shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
MeanVariable % 
41.1 3.16Satisfyil1g .... 34.7 24.2 ..M......................·.....··· ..···.. 

Stay 41.1 26.3 32.6 2.88 

Own 27.4 23.2 49.4 3.45 

......... 

Care 59.6 19.1 21.3 .......... 2.32 
t····························I· 
44.2 30.5 25.3 2.69Important .......... . 

28.4 2.69Proud to own 45.2 26.3 
Table 18: Satisfaction with ESO at Company Three: employee shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 
SClti~fyiflK,. ...... ........ 13.5 . . ......~,~~}. . ................................. ~~'; J~.~~ 

Stay ........,.................... ,:2~,.1~...:..:3~.. ....,.,.,....._......... 1, ......... ,...........:"';. v,;': ..,..~.....................,., ........... +...... :~~..):; ......................... 1 ...................,,',..'..v,."'°·,······,·1 

Own 18.3 16.4.??:.?_.... ,...,.,_ 3.89 

Care ...................•... ,....• ~?: I. 22.1~.Q:~ .._...... . 2.69 

~:l;~;r:;~~ll .", .. ,,~}j ~~:~ !~:~.' ....-.' ... -_..j:~~ 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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Two mam patterns emerge from exploratory results presented in the tables above, 
revealing both differences and similarities across the three cases in relation to ESO 
satisfaction. Generally, employee shareholders at Company One were the most satisfied 
with their company's ESO scheme overall, Company Three employee shareholders were 
the least satisfied and those at Company Two lay between the two extremes in their 
attitudes to ESO. At the same time, similarities were evident across the three cases in 
terms of how respondents 'ranked' the six scale items. Results taken from the tables 
above and summarised in Table 19 reveal that respondents in all three cases were most 
likely to care about owning shares in their company (63.8 per cent at Company One: 59.6 
per cent at ('ompany Two: 47.1 per cent at Company Three), while the presence of ESO 
in the organisation was also fairly important to respondents (58 per cent at Company 
One: 44.2 per cent at Company TH'O; 41.3 per cent at Company Three). At the other 
extreme, respondents at all three companies were far less likely to feel like owners (40 
per cent at ('ompany One: 27.4 per cent at Company T-"vo: 18.3 per cent at Company 
Three), or to find their work more satisfying because they owned shares (32.7 per cent at 
Company One: 34.7 per cent at Company Two; 13.5 per cent at Company Three). 
Table 19: 
anp Three 
Most likely to agree Care 
1 .....I.111portant ................................ IlTlP()rt~I1!.. .... §t<l:t .. Proud to own Proud to own StaY..§!::l;,Y .. Own ..... S~tj~fyiI1g Own 
Least likely.t::::o....::a~g!.:..re:::e=-------.-L....::S:::·a:::ti~sf:,;.v-.::in.:..;;:!...___-L-20~w~n~_____L.::S.::.at:..:;is:..::fyLi:.:.:nQO"___-.-J 
Differences between the three cases are examined more fully using a parametric One-way 
ANOY A test (see section 4.4.8 in Chapter 4). The null hypothesis tested by One-way 
ANOY A is that n groups being tested have equal means in the population, whereas the 
alternative hypothesis is that at least one of the means is different. In the present context, 
if there are no differences between the companies all three sets of data will have the same 
mean and the same variance and so the nulI hypothesis will be accepted. To perform 
ANOYA, the variances of the groups being tested must be equal, which can be confirmed 
by a 'homogeneity of variances' test as shown in Table 20. 
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Table 20: Test of homogeneity of variances - ESO satisfaction 
Levene 

Statistic df1 df2 Siq. 

Satisfying 2.229 2 245 .110 

Stay 2.324 2 243 .100 

Own 
.335 2 246 .716 

Care 7.014 2 242 .001 *** 

Important 5.579 2 246 .004** 

Proud to own 2.272 2 246 .105 

••• Significant at 0.001 •• Significant at 0.01 
Where the equality of variances assumption is met the output of the fifth column (Sig.) in 
the table is not signi1~cant, though output for two of the scale items in Tahle 20 - 'care' (p 
= 0.001) and 'important' (p = 0.01) - is significant. Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 
(1997) concluded that while the One-way ANOVA gives reasonably good results in the 
case of minor violations, the non-parametric K-W One-way ANOVA is recommended 
where violations are more substantial (see section 4.4.8 in Chapter 4). The K-W 
ANOV A, which is based on an approximation of the chi-square distribution, was, 
therefore, also performed on the ESO satisfaction data (see Appendix 14) and confirmed 
the results of the parametric ANOV A test which are shown in Table 21 below. 
Table 21: ANOV A - ESO satisfaction 
Sum of Mean 
Squares df Square F Sig. 
Satisfying Between Groups 42.406 2 21.203 12.273 .000*-* 
Within Groups 423.272 245 1.728 
Total 465.677 247 
Stay Between Groups 58.503 2 29.252 15.586 .000*** 
Within Groups 456.070 243 1.877 
Total 514.573 245 
Own Between Groups 28.345 2 14.173 7.365 .001 *-* 
Within Groups 473.373 246 1.924 
Total 501.719 248 
Care Between Groups 16.140 2 8.070 3.957 .020* 
Within Groups 493.558 242 2.039 
Total 509.698 244 
Important Between Groups 27.254 2 13.627 6.480 .002** 
Within Groups 517.349 246 2.103 
Total 544.602 248 
Proud to own Between Groups 24.883 2 12.442 6.432 .002** 
Within Groups 475.864 246 1.934 
Total 500.747 248 
... Significant at 0.001 •• Significant at 0.01 • Significant at 0.05 
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The overall variability in the data presented on the previous page is partitioned into two 
sources: variability of the observations within each group ('within groups') and 
variability between the group means (,between groups'). Total within-group variability 
is represented by the 'within-groups' sum of squares, while a measure of average 
variability within the groups is represented by the 'within-groups' mean square. The 
within-groups mean square is calculated by dividing the 'sum of squares' by the number 
of 'degrees of freedom' (total sample size minus number of groups). Similarly, the 
'between-groups' mean square is calculated by dividing the total sum of squares by the 
number of degrees of freedom. If the null hypothesis is true and there are no differences 
between the means in the three companies, the variability within each case should be 
about the same as the variability between the three groups. Thus, the ratio of the 
'between groups' mean square and the' within groups' mean square should be close to I. 
This ratio is known as the F-ratio and its significance can be established by comparing it 
to the critical values of the F-distribution. In Table 21, none of the F-ratios for the six 
variables are close to' 1'. Furthermore, the associated significant p-values for each of the 
six variables indicate that the null hypothesis is unlikely to be true. If the p-value is 0.05 
(significant at the 5 per cent level) or less, this indicates a significant difference between 
the companies being compared. Thus, in the present context, the null hypothesis that 
respondents at the three companies shared similar attitudes to their ESO scheme is not 
accepted. 
Results in Table 21, however, only indicate that attitudes among the three respondent 
groups are not all the same - they do not establish which of the cases may differ. The 
next stage of the analysis, therefore, is to identify where the differences lie using 'post 
hoc' or 'multiple comparisons' tests including the Scheffe and Tukey-b tests (Foster 
200 I) (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 1997). Results of the Scheffe test are shown 
in Table 22. 
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Table 22: Multiple comparisons test - ESO satisfaction 
95% Confidence 
Mean Interval 
(I) (J) Difference Lower Upper 
Dependent Variable Company Company (I-J) Std. Error Siq. Bound Bound 
Satisfying Scheffe 1.00 2.00 
-.28 .23 .480 -.85 .29 
3.00 
-1.00' .23 .000 -1.56 -.44 
2.00 1.00 .28 .23 .480 -.29 .a5 
3.00 
-.72' .19 .001 -1.18 -.:~6 
3.00 1.00 1.00' .23 .000 .44 Ui6 
2.00 .72' .19 .001 .26 1."8 
Stay Scheffe 1.00 2.00 
-.43 .24 .216 -1.02 :17 
3.00 
-1.22' .24 .000 -1.81 -.El3 
2.00 1.00 
.43 .24 .216 -.17 1.C12 
3.00 -.80' .19 .000 -1.28 -.:32 
3.00 1.00 1.22' .24 .000 .63 UI1 
1--::---. 2.00 .80' .19 .000 .32 1.28 
Own Scheffe 1.00 2.00 
-.45 .24 .177 -1.05 :14 
3.00 -.89' .24 .001 -1.48 -':31 
2.00 1.00 .45 .24 .177 -.14 HIS 
3.00 
-.44 .20 .083 -.93 .04 
3.00 1.00 .89' .24 .001 .31 1.48 
1-::,­
Care Scheffe 1.00 
2.00 
2.00 
.44 
-.30 
.20 
.26 
.083 
.507 
-.04 
-.93 
.B3 
.:13 
3.00 
-.6r .25 .030 -1.29 -.05 
2.00 1.00 .30 .26 .507 -.33 .,l3 
3.00 
-.37 .20 .188 -.87 :13 
3.00 1.00 .6r .25 .030 .05 1.29 
2.00 .37 .20 .188 -.13 .a7 
Important Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.67' .25 .030 -1.30 -.05 
3.00 
-.89' .25 .002 -1.51 -.:~8 
2.00 1.00 .6r .25 .030 .05 UIO 
3.00 
-.22 .21 .569 -.73 .29 
3.00 1.00 .89' .25 .002 .28 1.S1 
2.00 .22 .21 .569 -.29 .'?3 
Proud to own Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.37 .24 .306 -.97 .n 
3.00 -.82' .24 .003 -1.41 -.23 
2.00 1.00 .37 .24 .306 -.22 .B7 
3.00 
-.45 .20 .077 -.94 .04 
3.00 1.00 .82' .24 .003 .23 1.41 
2.00 .45 .20 .077 -.04 .04 
• Significant at 0.05 
Output presented in the 'mean difference' column of the table indicates where 
differences between the three companies are located. For the 'satisfaction' item - 'my 
work is more satisfying because I own shares in this organisation' - the output shows a 
significant difference between Company One and Company Three (p = 0.000) and 
additionally, between Company Two and Company Three (p = 0.001). No significant 
differences are found between Company One and Company Two on this item, howeveL 
The 'homogenous subsets' output shown in Figure 2 similarly helps to identify where 
any differences between the three companies may lie - the 'subset of means' that do not 
differ from each other are listed in the same column. Thus, output presented for the 
'satisfying' scale item confirms that there are no significant differences in attitude 
between Company One and Company Typo respondents, though views at both companies 
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differ significantly from views put forward by respondents at Company Three. The main 
findings of the post hoc tests are summarised in Table 23 followed by a discussion of the 
analysis in the chapter so far. 
Figure 2: Homogeneous subsets - ESO satisfaction 
Satisfying Stay 
Tukey B 
Scheffe 
Company 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Sig. 
N 
49 
95 
104 
49 
95 
104 
Subset for 
alpha =.05 
1 2 
2.88 
3.16 
3.88 
2.88 
3.16 
3.88 
.432 1.000 
Tukey B 
Scheffe 
Company 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Sig. 
N 
48 
95 
103 
48 
95 
103 
Subset for 
alpha =.05 
1 2 
2.46 
2.88 
3.68 
2.46 
2.88 
3.68 
.173 1.000 
Own Care 
Tukey B 
Scheffe 
CompaQl' 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Sig. 
N 
50 
95 
104 
50 
95 
104 
Subset for 
aloha =.05 
1 2 
3.00 
3.45 3.45 
3.89 
3.00 
3.45 3.45 
3.89 
.139 .153 
Tukey B 
Scheffe 
Company 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Sig. 
N 
47 
94 
104 
47 
94 
104 
Subset for 
alpha = .05 
1 2 
2.02 
2.32 2.32 
2.69 
2.02 
2.32 2.32 
2.69 
.457 .293 
Important Proud to own 
Tukey B 
Scheffe 
Company 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Sig. 
N 
50 
95 
104 
50 
95 
104 
Subsetfor 
alpha =.05 
1 2 
2.02 
2.69 
2.91 
2.02 
2.69 
2.91 
1.000 . 654 
Tukey B 
Scheffe 
Company 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
1.00 
2.00 
3.00 
Sig . 
N 
50 
95 
104 
50 
95 
104 
Subset for 
alpha =.05 
1 2 
2.32 
2.69 2.69 
3.14 
2.32 
2.69 2.69 
3.14 
.260 .144 
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Table 23: Summary of 'post hoc' test results - ESO satisfaction 
'Between-groups' differences 
Comp(tny Olle and Company One and Company Two and 
CompallV Two Companv Three Compan v Three 
....Y..ll.~.i.ll.~.I.~... .............. ..Q~t~0.'.'.:l..~....................P:Yll!~~.... Outcome ... P:Y~~\J_~"..Q~!s..9..'.'.:l-:.. ......p:Ylll\J~ 
Satisfying No significant 0.480 Significant 0.000'" Significant 0.00 I *" 
difference difference difference 

Stay No significant 0.216 Significant 0.000·" Significant . ·····0:000·** 

difference difference difference 

...................." 

.,,',n ..............................................................._ ........................... 

Own 	 No significant 0.177 Significant 0.00 ('. No significant 0.083 

difference difference difference 

"........... ......"'.............. " ...................." .................. ................................................."...."' .... 	 .......... 

Care 	 No significant 0.507 Significant 0:030* No significant 0.188 

difference difference difference
I 	 ......... +......................... 

Important 	 Significant 0.G30* Significant o No significant 0.569 Idifference difference 	 difference 
............... +......................................................... 

Proud to own No significa~t 0.306 Significant 0.003* No significant 0.077 
difference difference difference 
*** Significant at 0.001 '* Significant at 0.01 • Significant at 0.05 
Results reveal that the most significant differences in respondent attitudes to ESO were 
found at Company One and Company Three: Company One respondents were generally 
the most satisfied with ESO and Company Three respondents were the least satisfied. 
Moreover, significant differences between the attitudes of respondents in these two 
companies were found for all six 'ESO satisfaction' scale items. For the remaining 
·between groups' combinations - 'Company One and Company Two' and 'Company Two 
and Company Three' - some significant differences in attitudes between respondents 
were also found, though to a far lesser extent as illustrated by results in Table 23. 
On one level, it is perhaps not unexpected that the attitudes of respondents at Company 
One and Company Three lie at the two extremes of positive and negative assessments 
respectively for 'between-groups' differences. By the time of the Stage One survey, 
Company One employee shareholders had succeeded in safeguarding their jobs for four 
years and had also witnessed the share price rise steadily during that period. Moreover, 
employees were aware of the importance of preventing a potentially hostile take-over 
bid; the company was relatively small and in the view of some, potentially vulnerable to 
a take-over. Company One employees had also invested their own money to buy a 
'stake' in the firm. Direct investment made the idea of 'being an owner' more tangible to 
employees and in addition, meant they were far more likely to remain working for the 
company to reap the rewards of their initial investment. 
] 61 

... 

Significant differences were also found between Company Two and Company Three for 
two scale items, 'satisfying' and 'stay', despite the fact that both were ESOP companies. 
However, Company Two employees collectively owned an 80 per cent stake in their 
organisation and individually, were able to own more shares than senior managers and 
executives depending on length of service. Such differences may lead one to conclude 
that employees at Company Two were more satisfied with ESO than Company Three 
employees, though results in Table 24 suggest that the proportion of company stock 
owned may not always affect ESO satisfaction as anticipated. 
Table 24: The impact of employee ownership characteristics on ESO satisfaction 
(multiple regression - stepwise method) 
Variable Beta Coefficients t-values 
Company type 0.OS5 1.077 
Total company shares -0.324 -5.27S·" 
Relative employee shares -0.204 -3.324"· 
Constant 22.784'" 
Significant at 0.001 
The table shows significant interactions between 'ESO satisfaction' and the number of 
shares held, both collectively and individually, (p < 0.00 I), though not in the directions 
that may have been expected (see section 4.4.8 in Chapter 4 for a rationale of the 
variables used and Appendix 7 for variable definitions). Results indicate lower levels of 
employee satisfaction with ESO where individual and collective ownership are greater. 
One possible reason is that higher levels of 'ownership' equate with greater expectations 
of ESO satisfaction and these expectations may not have been met for all respondents. 
Conversely, where employees held fewer shares, expectations were perhaps not as great 
and may have resulted in, if not greater satisfaction, then at least lower levels of 
dissatisfaction with ESO. The 'company type' variable was a dummy used to distinguish 
between 'direct ownership' and 'ESOP' companies. 
On the basis of these findings, it may be anticipated that ESO satisfaction at Company 
Three would be greater than indicated by results from the Stage One survey. Perhaps a 
more important factor than the number of shares owned by employees is that, in contrast 
to Company One and Company Two, the Company Three ESOP coincided with very 
direct and tangible losses for employees, certainly at the outset. Although participation 
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in the ESOP did not require a direct financial investment, there was a general consensus 
among Company Three respondents that employees did pay directly for their shares 
through cuts to wages and holiday entitlement (see section 5.5 in Chapter 5). 
Nevertheless, employees who participated in the ESOP were expected to reap the 
financial benefits in the longer-term because they would have their names put on the 
share register and be able to sell their shares. Indeed, prior to the fieldwork for the Stage 
One survey in 1997, employees had already realised some of the benefits of ESO 
following the company's flotation earlier that year. The share price had risen 
substantially from its initial value in 1994, employees had received average windfalls of 
around £9,000 each and were given the opportunity to buy further shares at the flotation 
(see section 5.5.3 in Chapter 5). During the course of the investigation, however, it 
became apparent that feelings still ran high in relation to events in 1994 and the losses 
experienced by employees at that particular time. Overwhelmingly, employees regarded 
ESO as being inextricably linked to hardship. 
There was also considerable resentment at the size of the stake owned by the company's 
directors and the subsequent windfalls they received in 1997. Directors received returns 
worth over £ 1 million each on their initial collective investment of £ 100,000, while the 
chief executive received a return of £3.3 million. Observations from Stage Two 
respondents, both managers and trade union representatives, highlighted clearly the 
strength of feeling. A garage staff manager said: 
"{ think when we went through privatisation the supervisors and managers were 
let down very badly. The senior managers and directors were looked after - they 
had some part of the company and had a lot of money to purchase shares. We 
were always led to believe that the supervisors and managers were part of the 
company and would be looked after. When the time came we were let down - we 
were thrown in with the rest of the staff and had to negotiate for a chunk of the 
shares. ' 
Other employees should also have had an opportunity to buy shares at the outset, 
according to some of the trade union respondents, though one - a TGWU health and 
safety representative - admitted that at the time 'the vast majority [of employees} 
wouldn't have invested anything '. Following extensive discussions between the TGWU 
and the company's directors, the decision had been reached that a MEBO was the most 
likely way to safeguard jobs after privatisation. Employees regarded the resulting buy­
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out as a betrayal by their union, however, and the firm's convenor provided a graphic 
description of the views of employees towards the TGWU at the time: 
'The general reaction was that gallows corner was still operating. They [the 
employees] would have hung us from the gallows. So it took a very strong will 
from the reps to be able to go about their daily work and smile, take the insults 
from the staff and then stand for re-election to go through it again and get 
continued abuse from staff. It was emotionally draining and very hard to 
swallow - "we've done this for you, we've given away a week of your holidays to 
keep the company".' 
Given the attitudes of employees, it is hardly surprising that they would have shown little 
interest in buying shares, though the company's human resources manager said it was the 
TGWU who didn't support a scheme requiring employees to purchase shares directly. 
The respondent added, however, that the company should have 'tested the waters' to see 
if employees were interested in buying shares, given that they had been willing to invest 
their own money at the time of the 1997 flotation (see section 5.5.3 in Chapter 5): 
'We should have perhaps tried to see if we could get employees to put a stake in­
they did it for the flotation. It would have meant that less money was needed from 
the venture capitalists.' 
Despite some of the problems at Company Three, employees at Company One potentially 
had far more to lose from share ownership, risking the loss of their initial investment as 
well as their job. Nevertheless, 'direct ownership' had been regarded as the most 
appropriate ESO strategy for Company One, given the aims of the company in 1993 (see 
section 5.3.1 in Chapter 5). In choosing an ESO model, 'equality', 'employee 
commitment' and avoiding a 'them and us situation' were regarded as key considerations 
to ESO success and a direct ownership arrangement was seen as the most likely way to 
achieve these aims. Having to purchase shares gave employees more of a stake in their 
company and signalled to external financial backers that employees and managers alike 
were committed to ensuring the success of ESO. One respondent, an inspector and 
employee director, described how other alternatives, including an ESOP, had been 
considered in 1993, but none would have provided the broad base or necessary security 
for the workforce: 
'We bought the company to stop other people from buying us out and to 
safeguard our jobs - that was the 'utopian' idea at the time. The idea is still the 
same - lots of shareholders owning the company so it is owned by the majority, 
not the minority,' 
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An ESOP would also have failed to raise the capital required for the buy-out, whereas a 
direct share purchase arrangement meant that everybody took the risk. The company's 
finance director said: 
'We had to put our case across to the banks that the workforce was committed. 
This was the best way of obtaining the money internally.' 
That attitudes towards ESO were fairly positive among Company One respondents is 
perhaps more a reflection of the scheme's success, in terms of the rising share price and 
the longevity of employee ownership. If ESO had proved unsuccessful, the attitudes of 
respondents at the company may have been rather different. Notwithstanding, a high 
share price was seen as a major problem by Stage Two respondents at both Company 
One and Company Two. Both companies faced financial difficulties when employees 
left because they were having to 'buy back' shares from departing employees. The 
inspector and employee director at Company One highlighted the problems of trying to 
encourage new recruits to buy shares in the firm: 
'I still feel that the idea [of direct ownership] was correct, but the share value has 
risen so much that people can't afford to buy shares and obviously there is a 
drain on the company when shareholders leave. If people could buy a share each 
month, they could slowly become bigger and bigger shareholders and something 
in that respect should be done. This subject has been broached many times but 
you can't force people to become shareholders. It should be a choice - it should 
not be a condition of employment.' 
At the time of the Company One buy-out it had been the intention that no individual, 
regardless of their position, should own a larger number of shares relative to others in the 
company. To ensure that all employees had an equal opportunity to buy shares the 
company set up a deferred purchase scheme with low-interest loan arrangements. The 
company's stores manager said: 'lvlost people who want them [shares] have bought 
them. ' 
At Company Two the advent of ESO had been delayed so that the firm could learn from 
the mistakes of other bus companies and put in safeguards to avoid the same pitfalls. A 
high share price, plus the 'selling on' of companies after only a short period of ESO, had 
been fairly common in some of the earlier bus buy-outs. Among the safeguards 
implemented by Company Two, employees were given opportunities to buy shares during 
the latter period of ownership, while the company board consisted of an equal number of 
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executive directors and employee directors (see section 5.4.3 in Chapter 5). One of two 
managing directors at the company said that the later share issues had come too late, 
further adding that they should have occurred shortly after the initial buy-out to try to 
halt the constant erosion of the firm's profits. The respondent admitted, however, that 
few employees would have been able to afford to buy more shares: 
'You would have to have the ability to pay and people would have said "I can't 
afford it" and so they would have got no shares.' 
Company Two's TGWU branch secretary argued that the intentions of the ESOP had 
been misplaced from the outset: the most important factor was not the number of shares 
owned by employees but rather, the fact that all employees had the right to exercise a 
vote, thus providing a true democratic platform. The respondent argued firstly, for a 
common ownership project on the basis that it was a much more positive way of 
achieving EP in the company, and secondly, for a larger share allocation for the firm's 
EBT I: 
'If we'd had a compromise and had an EBT 1 of 51 per cent with the rest of the 
shares distributed to individuals, that would have made a difference to the 
financial performance ofthe company straight away. The fewer shares that were 
in individual hands meant that fewer shares had to be bought back as people left. 
That did become quite a burden for the company that was going to get bigger and 
bigger as the shares increased in value. We were getting to the point where half 
a million pounds at least was being paid out to buy shares back from the people 
who left. As the shares increased in value it would have got worse and there was 
no way we could sustain that.' 
In effect, Company One and Company Two could be described as victims of their own 
success, though ultimately, outcomes for the two companies have been very different. 
By 1998, Company Two had reached a situation where it could no longer sustain having 
to payout large sums to buy back shares from employees who had left the company. 
Company One however managed to maintain its employee ownership status and at the 
time of writing is the only employee-owned company that remains of the UK bus buy­
outs, having now operated under an employee ownership structure for the past eleven 
years. In 1998, most Stage Two respondents at Company One regarded the prospect of a 
sale in the short term as unlikely, though some recognised that it would probably happen 
at a future date. The set-up of the original buy-out scheme and the method by which 
shares were distributed among senior managers and directors was seen as a significant 
factor to the company's longevity as an employee ownership entity. Unlike the situation 
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in some of the earlier bus buy-outs, Company One's directors and senior managers had 
not acquired a majority shareholding at the outset, which therefore reduced their 
motivation to sell on some two to three years later. Company One's inspector and 
employee director said: 
'Management does not want to sell. Managers are equal shareholders with the 
rest of the workforce. They would not end up with a large sum of money that 
would support them for the rest of their lives. If they did decide to sell, who 
would be the first ones to go? It would be the managers. It is therefore unlikely 
that the managers would support a buy-out.' 
The respondent added that the buy-out took a long time to organise because a 'broad 
hase . was seen as important: 'It is used as a hurdle, a deterrent in case there is a buy-out 
hid. fla huyer came along they would have to convince 200 shareholders.' The finance 
director similarly considered a sale to be unlikely; the company had only 300 employees 
and was therefore not big enough to create real problems for other transport groups, even 
though some in the company thought that its size perhaps made it more of a target for 
take-over. Moreover, in the event of a take-over bid, a potential buyer would have to 
convince a company of majority employee shareholders to accept the offer of a sale. The 
finance director added that the strategy at Company One would not necessarily work in 
other companies: There is no setformula - each situation will d[ffer. ' 
6.2.1 Summary 
It is the 'differing circumstances of ownership' and their impact upon ESO satisfaction 
that this first section has set out to examine. Results suggest that a combination of the 
employee ownership model, the method by which employees have acquired their shares, 
the circumstances surrounding ownership conversion and the perceived success of the 
scheme, are all important for 'ESO satisfaction' outcomes. It is clear that employees will 
be more satisfied with ESO ifthey regard it as having been successful. At the same time, 
employees who have endured losses following conversion will be rather less satisfied 
with ESO. The size of the employee shareholding is also important for ESO satisfaction 
outcomes, insofar as higher levels of 'employee ownership' may raise expectations that 
are subsequently not met. It is worth remembering that Company One had 100 per cent 
collective employee ownership, but individual share allocations were relatively small 
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(see sections 5.3.2-5.3.3 in Chapter 5). Conversely, employees at Company Two and 
Company Three had opportunities to own shares in far greater numbers and may 
therefore have been expected to view ESO more favourably. That employees at the two 
companies did not hold more favourable views highlights not only the complex nature of 
employee ownership, but also the need to consider such complexity when undertaking 
future empirical studies in this area. 
6.2.2 Benefits of employee share ownership 
The second stage of the 'feelings of ownership' analysis involves an examination of ESO 
benefits. Based on data from the Stage One survey, respondents were asked to select and 
rank from a list of ten options (see section 7 in Appendix 3) what they considered to be 
the five main benefits of ESO in their organisation. A ranking score of' l' indicated the 
respondent's first choice of benefit and a ranking of '5' their fifth choice. Responses 
from each company were then aggregated and results are presented in Figures 3 to 12 
and summarised in Table 25. 
Figure 3: 
More involvement for employees in company decisions (%) 
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Figure 4: 
The prospect of getting some extra money (%) 
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Figure 5: 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice 
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Figure 6: 
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Figure 7: 
The opportunity to own a part of the company (%) 
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Figure 8: 
More interest in the success of the company (%) 
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Figure 9: 
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Figure 10: 
Increasing co-operation between management and the rest of the workforce (%) 
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Figure 11: 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice 
11 Company One II Company Two 0 Company Three 
Providing an incentive for employees to stay at the company (%) 
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Figure 12: 
Encouraging employees to put more effort in to their work (%) 
First choice Second choice Third choice Fourth choice Fifth choice 
.. EJ Company Olle IICompany Two 0 Company Three 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
Table 25: Main benefits of ESO - summarised ranks 
........ (f!l11Pl!:'!lQl!~l... (q,!,p{JJ1Y.T~q2 .... . (f!.1!Ip,lllly,!J1tf!l 

Overall °/0 Overall % Overall °/0 
Benefit ranking .. ranking i ranking! 
More involvement for employees in 1 56.5 1 50.0 3 27.9 
company decisions 
The prospect of getting some extra 4 41.4 2 48.4 1 50.0 
money 
.......... 

More information about day-to-day 2 46.7 10 13.2 8 12.1 

matters at the C,UIIlI-'<lI 

The opportunity to own a part of the '" .) 45.2 3 34.5 5 23.5 
....c(?f!1panymm.... ................................ ........ ......mm .............. .......... 
To be able to exercise voting rights 7 23.8 
~ 
8 19.4 7 19.5 
........ ...,.......... 
More interest in the success of the 10 19.4 7 20.0 9 10.6 
company 
. - .., ........... ...... 

Feeling a part of the company 8 20.6 5 
~ 
23.6 2 33.3 
................... 

Increasing co-operation between 5 33.3 9 15.1 4 23.8 
management and the rest of the 
workforce 
..............

........................... 

Providing an incentive for employees 9 20.0 6 22.4 6 20.0 
to stay at the C,UlIIl-'<1ll. 
Encouraging employees to put more 5 33.3 4 23.8 10 9.2 
I effort into their work 
In = 54 
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Results from Figures 3 to 12 and Table 25 reveal both differences and similarities across 
the three cases in relation to the way respondents ranked the main benefits of ESO. 
Overall, opportunities for greater involvement in company decisions and access to more 
information were regarded as most important at Company One. Given that respondents 
had invested directly in their company, it is not unexpected that they would want more of 
a say in the way the company was run and more information on its performance. 
Company Two respondents similarly recognised the benefits of having more involvement 
in the decisions of their firm, but regarded the opportunity for more information about 
day-to-day matters as far less of a benefit than respondents at Company One. At the 
same time, it is perhaps to be expected that Company Three respondents would rank the 
prospect of financial gain as the main benefit, since they had experienced losses at the 
onset of ESO. Given the background to ESO at Company Three, results relating to the 
benefit 'feeling a part of the company' are all the more surprising: this benefit was 
ranked second highest at Company Three, but only eighth at Company One. 'Feelings of 
ownership' may have been expected to be less apparent among Company Three 
respondents, given the resentment surrounding the circumstances of the MEBO. 
Among the conclusions to be drawn, the 'tangible' benefits of ESO - including 'more 
money' and 'more information' - were most likely to be selected by respondents from all 
three cases, though there were exceptions. Moreover, some support is given for the 
hypothesis that employees participating in a 'direct' ownership scheme are more inclined 
to exhibit a greater sense of ownership than employees involved in an ESOP scheme. 
For example, Company One respondents specified a preference for 'being involved' and 
having more information about their firm; financial gain was less of a priority. 
Conversely, money was seen as the main benefit at Company Three, with opportunities 
for involvement and access to information regarded as lesser benefits. Responses from 
Company Two employee shareholders in relation to financial gain and more involvement 
in decisions lay between these extremes, which may in turn be explained by the 
combination of 'direct' and 'indirect' ownership arrangements at the company. 
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shares has made no difference 
6.2.3 Employee shareholder views on employee share ownership 
For the final stage of the 'feelings of ownership' analysis, respondents at the three 
companies were asked to respond to the statement: 'in what ways has ESO made a 
difference to the way you think about your company?' The statement featured on the 
Stage One questionnaire and set out to establish whether ESO had resulted in changes to 
the way respondents thought about their company and the nature of the change where it 
had occurred. Respondents were given the opportunity to express their own views on 
ESO rather than select from a series of options, which could have' led' them to think 
about ESO in a particular way. Answers given by respondents were collated, sorted into 
numerically coded categories and analysed using SPSS (see Chapter 4). Summaries of 
the main findings are presented in Tables 26 to 28. 
Res n) 
..•..•.....••..•..c....................................................................................................................................................... .•....••.••..••••. + 

a cash windfall when I leave/when the firm taken overI·····'····················",..········:··········:·····.... :.... 
.. I.. ~nl11<:l.~.~~.~llEi~g~Yj()~ ...<l:0d... tbefutllr~()rtb~c()~p.~I1Y...... ....... 4.0 

I am .I11.()r~ ... il1t~.~~.~!.~.4.....il1....~().~!s, .. pr()fit<l:~.i.lity .. al1d .. effi.~i~l1~y.... 4.0 

It is our 3.0
:..:....:.::....::..:::.:......::..:::..:.::.:c.:::.•.,;.................................................................... .............................................................................................._............................................................... I ... ·· ...................... 

2.0I now 
•....•................. ,:........................ : .. : 

You are now made to feel that it is management against the workforce 1.0 
Table 27: Company Two respondents2 
Statement Respondents (n) 
Owning shares has made no difference 35.0 
... Q"."I1.!.I1.g ..~h<l:rE:s ...h~.? .. rl·la~.~... ~..~... ~()!!.:~~!.9.}.<l:.I.ly ..<l:".".<l:~~........ ... . .......................................1...................1....6:.....0:......................... 

... y().ll....fE:..~I..li..~e .. <l:I1... ().".".I1.~.r!y(?ll....<l:!..~..."."<:l!.~!.I1.s..f<:l~X().1l.~...9."."I1.c().~.p.<:1.r:ly..... .........................................._. .......... ......................!..~....O 
I think more about relations with management 3.0 
"n '" 67 
Table 28: Com~any Three respondents3 
Statement Respondents (n) 
Owning shares has made no dift,e~~r..:e~.~n..:.~ce~.. ......................................................................................................................................... t 3?Q ....._.. . 
You put more effort into your work 9.0 
lIt makes you think more about financII·"all ...rl.,e:vw."..aa.,r..~d::...................................................................................................... 1 .......................;;7.. ::0;............. ..j 

.....y()ll.:.r.~...<l:... P~~ ..().f.!b~...~<:lII1P.~y .................................................................................... _..............................h............................. . ................ 3·9..................... . 

You feel discriminated against .. b~~~llseth~l'l1~I1~g~~~g<:l!~g~~~.. ~E~~.. ......... i.·········· ....... ·.. ........ .... .................. j
4 O

Th~~~;;:;pany.·j~~~;~~sta~dprofit-orien.~.ecl...................... ..._........................... 1.0 

··yo~n·~~h~~·~~esp~nsibii'itYtoa~e~group of people (shareholders) 1.0 

3n = 60 

Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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The tables show that proportionately, Company One respondents were the most likely 
group to indicate that ESO had made a difference to the way they thought about their 
company. Though fourteen respondents (40 per cent) said that owning shares had made 
no difference, the remaining twenty-one (60 per cent) highlighted some shift in attitude. 
At Company Two and Company Three, however, over half of the total in each case 
indicated that owning shares had made no difference to their view of the company. 
Where changes had occurred across the three cases, views typically included 'feeling a 
part of the company'. 'working harder' and 'being more commercially aware '. 
'Financial gain' was also reported, though not by Company Two respondents. 
Moreover, not all changes were viewed positively. Respondents at Company One and 
Company Three highlighted rifts between employees and managers in their companies, 
though the number reporting such as rift was minimal in both cases. 
6.2.4 Summary 
Results presented in the first part of the chapter suggest some support for the hypothesis 
that employees in a 'direct ownership' company (Company One) are more satisfied with 
ESO than those working in ESOP companies (Company Two and Company Three). 
'Direct ownership' employees are also more likely to exhibit a greater 'sense of 
ownership' than employees working under ESOP arrangements, in terms of wanting 
more involvement in day-to-day matters and having greater access to information. 
Notwithstanding, across the three cases generally, the 'indirect' and 'psychological' 
outcomes often attributed to ESO, including increased work satisfaction, were seen as 
less important than some of the more 'direct' consequences of ownership, including more 
information and being able to help secure the future of the company. Company or 
ownership 'type' was found to be far less significant for ESO satisfaction when 
combined with other 'employee ownership' characteristics, such as the number of shares 
held by employees both collectively and individually, which were highly significant. 
Moreover, despite the findings that direct ownership arrangements made ESO 
satisfaction and a greater' sense of ownership' more likely in the present research, it is 
suggested that the 'success' of an ESO scheme as perceived by employees is also 
important for ESO outcomes. If Company One's scheme had been considered less 
successful, outcomes would have been quite different. 
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6.3 Organisational commitment 
The aim of this section is to examine whether employees who experience greater feelings 
of ownership in turn demonstrate greater levels of commitment to their organisation. 
Exploratory findings for the six-item BOCS (Cook and Wall 1980) measuring 
commitment to the organisation are shown in Tables 29 to 31 (see Table (i) in Appendix 
5 for a listing of all six scale items and their corresponding variable labels as presented 
below). Statements were originally presented to Stage One respondents using five-point 
interval scales with responses ranging from 'strongly agree' (1) to 'strongly disagree' (5). 
When the survey was completed, categories were merged to create single 'agree' and 
'disagree' categories for purposes of clarity (see also section 6.2). 
Table 29: Organisational commitment at Company One: employee shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 

Proud 53.6 26.S 19.6 2.46 

I····················································· ......... . 

Feel 60.7 16.1 23.2 2.36 

Contribution 69.6 19.7 10.7 2.13 

.........._ ............................................................... ·_ .......N ........" ............................" .......... 

Effort 64.3 21.4 14.3 2.IS 
.........................,...." ........"...-................................................................................._...... 

Financial 59.0 17.S 23.2 2.36 

Money 44.6 19.6 35.8 2.75 

Table 30: Organisational commitment at Company Two: employee shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 

Proud 37.0 42.0 ...................?}.:.9 .. .................2:75........ 

Feel 30.0 40.0 ............................. 39:9... ............~.:..~.?....... . 

.. ¢.2~.tEib~;iE?~::·········· f· ···....·.·..·..·.·.·.·..·.··.·.·.·....·.·.··..·.::5...7:...:..0..:...................................... 1 ..:.·.·..: ..•.·.·.·.·.·..·.·.·............. j 17:.9 ........................~.:.??..............
.. .................................................2.·~·.··.6 
 .·10.·:··.·· 

Effort 56.0 21... 0.............. 23.0 ... 2.4:3 ..._... 

... --......................". 

Financial .?'.~.:9..... .. .._.. .... 19.0.___.. 28.0 2.58
..................................." ....... 

Money 38.0 25.0 37.0 2.95 
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Table 31: Organisational commitment at Company Three: employee shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 

Proud 28.8 30.6 40.6 3.23 

...................................." ..........................-..........-
.............................." ... 

Feel 
.................,.... ......... }~:? .............. 26.1 j .......................3~...9cc...:...7.:...... . ................................ ~:}} .. 

Contribution 54.9 ···········]'8:9.. · 26.2 2.50
,,,,,,,.._...,,,.......................... 

Effort 55.4 12.5 32. 1 ········....:2":66 

Financial 37.8 19.8 42.4 3.14 

........................................ -.- ........ " ...........­
Money 31.5 13.6 54 .. 9 3.48 

Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 

Exploratory findings indicate that Company One respondents were most likely to be 
committed to their company, those at Company Three were the least likely to be 
committed and Company Two respondents lay in-between. Findings in Table 32, 
however, also point to 'within-groups' similarities in that, across all three cases, 
commitment was most likely to be demonstrated through 'involvement' (IN). An average 
of 67 per cent of respondents at Company One, 56.5 per cent at Company Two and 55.2 
per cent at Company Three said they were prepared to contribute more and make more 
effort for their company. A majority of Company One respondents (average 57.2 per 
cent) also showed commitment in terms of identifying with their firm, though around 
only one-third of respondents at both Company Two (average 33.5 per cent) and 
Company Three (average 31.5 per cent) did so. Approximately one-third (average 34.7 
per cent) of Company Three respondents similarly agreed that they would be loyal to 
their firm, compared with over two-fifths (average 45.5 per cent) at Company Two and 
just over half (average 51.8 per cent) at Company One. 
1 

Most likely Contributionto agree 

J?:ff°rt.. (Ij\)) ........... .I::ff<?~.. Q"]\!) ................. ........~.()11tri~llti()r:(Ij\) 

f.~el(II?1 ... .Xi~~r:~!~l(I.::QY).Yir:~l1~i~I(~QX} .. . 

Y!~~l!~i~l(~()X) ....... .. .r:1g~~y(I.::QY1 .....j .....:F....e:..e:.:l.....\.:..=.. c~ ................................... . 

f'E(?U~(II?) .... .Y~().1l~.(!..J:?2 ... .. .. .t"v1()r:~X(~()Y) 
Money (LOY) Feel (10) Proud (10) 
Differences between the three companies are examined more closely using the parametric 
ANOVA test. Following minor violations from the 'homogeneity of variances test' 
(Table 33), the non-parametric K-W ANOVA test (Appendix 15) was also applied to the 
data and confirms results shown in Table 34. 
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Table 33: Test of homogeneity of variances: organisational commitment 
Levene 

Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 

Proud 
.923 2 264 .399 

Feel 2.480 2 264 .086 

Contribution 5.112 2 264 .007** 

Effort 4.318 2 265 .014* 

Financial 
.852 2 263 I .428 

Money .727 2 264 .484 

•• Significant at 0.01 Significant at 0.05 
Table 34: ANOV A: organisational commitment 
Sum of Mean 

Squares df Square F Sia. 

Proud Between Groups 24.581 2 12.291 7.242 .001**" 

Within Groups 448.048 264 1.697 

Total 472.629 266 

Feel Between Groups 21.062 2 10.531 5.705 .004*' 

Within Groups 487.350 264 1.846 

Total 508.412 266 

Contribution Between Groups 5.522 2 2.761 1.576 .209 

Within Groups 462.463 264 1.752 

Total 467985 266 

Effort Between Groups 8.986 2 4.493 2.282 .104 

Within Groups 521.831 265 1.969 

Total 530.817 267 

Financial Between Groups 28.067 2 14.034 6.363 .002" 

Within Groups 580.012 263 2.205 

Total 608.079 265 , 

Money Between Groups 24.727 2 12.363 5.223 .006" 

Within Groups 624.944 264 2.367 

Total 649.670 266 I 

••• Significant at 0.001 ** Significant at 0.01 
With the exception of the involvement sub-scale items - 'contribution' (F = 1.576; P = 
0.209) and 'effort' (F = 2.282; P = 0.104) - Table 34 shows significant differences 
between the three cases in relation to respondents identifYing with and showing loyalty to 
their company. A more detailed examination of company differences (see Tables 35 and 
36 and Figure 13) reveals significantly different attitudes between Company One and 
Company Three respondents in terms of identifYing with and showing loyalty to their 
company. 
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Table 35: Multiple comparisons test: organisational commitment 
95% Confidence 
Mean Interval 
(I) (J) Difference Lower Upper 
Dependent Variable Company Company (I-J) Std. Error Sig Bound Bound 
Proud Scheffe 1.00 2.00 
-.29 .22 .423 -.82 .25 
3.00 
-.76' .21 .002 -1.29 -.24 
2.00 1.00 
.29 .22 .423 -.25 .tl2 
3.00 -.48" .18 .032 -.92 -.03 
3.00 1.00 
.76" .21 .002 .24 1.29 
2.00 ,48' .18 .032 .03 .92 
Feel Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.53 .23 .065 -1.09 .03 
3.00 
-.75' .22 .004 -1.30 -20 
2.00 1.00 .53 .23 .065 -.03 1.09 
3.00 -.22 .19 .509 -.68 .24 
3.00 1.00 .75' .22 .004 .20 1.:lD 
2.00 .22 .19 .509 -.24 .68 
Contribution Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.17 .22 .757 -.71 .:18 
3.00 -.37 .22 .234 -.90 .-16 
2.00 1.00 .17 .22 .757 -.38 .71 
3.00 -.21 .18 .531 -.65 .24 
3.00 1.00 .37 .22 234 -.16 .90 
2.00 
.21 .18 .531 -.24 .65 
Effort Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.25 .23 .563 -.83 .33 
3.00 -,48 .23 .112 -1.05 .08 
2.00 1.00 .25 .23 .563 -.33 .El3 
3.00 -.23 .19 .491 -.71 .24 
3.00 1.00 ,48 I .23 .112 -.08 105 
2.00 .23 .19 ,491 -.24 .71 
Financial Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.22 .25 .679 -.83 .39 
3.00 -.78" .24 .007 -1.38 -.-18 
2.00 1.00 .22 .25 .679 -.39 .83 
3.00 -.56' .21 .026 -1.06 -.05 
3.00 1.00 .7e- .24 .007 .18 1:18 
2.00 .56' .21 .026 .05 1.06 
Money Scheffe 1.00 2.00 -.20 .26 .739 -.83 .43 
3.00 -.73' .25 .017 -1.35 -:11 
2.00 1.00 .20 .26 .739 -,43 .83 
3.00 -.53' .21 .047 -1.05 -.01 
3.00 1.00 .73' .25 .017 .11 1.:15 
2.00 .53' .21 .047 .01 1.05 
". Significant at 0.05 
Figure 13: Homogeneous subsets: organisational commitment 
FeelProud 
Subset forSubset for 
alpha = .05alpha =.05 
2 Company N 1 2Company N 1 
Tukey B 1.00 56 2.36Tukey B 1.00 56 2.46 
2.00 100 2.892.00 100 2.75 
3.00 111 3.113.00 111 3.23 
Scheffe 1.00 56 2.36Scheffe 1.00 56 2.46 
2.00 100 2.892.00 100 2.75 2.75 
3.00 111 3.113.00 111 3.23 
Sig . 1.000 .593
.377 . 069 Si9· 
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Contribution 	 Effort 
Subset for Subset for 
alpha = .05 ajQha = .05 
Company N 1 Company N 1 

Tukey B 1.00 56 2.13 Tukey B 1.00 
 56 2.18 
2.00 100 2.29 	 2.00 100 2.43 
3.00 111 2.50 3.00 112 2.66 

Scheffe 1.00 56 2.13 Scheffe 1.00 56 
 2.18 
2.00 100 2.29 	 2.00 100 2.43 
3.00 111 2.50 	 3.00 112 2.66 
Sig. .205 	 Sig . .092 
Financial 	 Money 
Subset for Subset for 
alpha = .05 alpha =.05 
Company N 1 2 Company N 1 2 

Tukey B 1.00 Tukey B 1.00 56 2.75
56 2.36 
2.00 99 2.58 	 2.00 100 2.95 
3.00 	 111 3.14 3.00 111 3.48 
ScheffeScheffe 1.00 56 2.36 	 1.00 56 2.75 
2.00 1002.00 99 2.58 2.58 	 2.95 2.95 
3.00 111 3.14 3.00 111 3.48 
Sig. .645 .058 Sig. .709 .094 
Table 36: Summary of post hoc test results - organisational commitment 
Between groups differences 
Company One and Company One and Company Two and 
Companv Two CompallV Three Company Three 
Variable 	 Outcome 
. p:Y::tlll~ Outcome Outcome 
.................... 	 .P:Y.::t.!~;. ....".... ............" .................................".............. ....... . P:.Yll '.ll e.......... 

Proud (IO) No significant 0.423 Significant 0.002 Significant 0.032* 

difference difference difference 

Feel (IO) No significant 0.065 Significant 6.()()4" No significant 0.509 

difference difference difference 

......" ...... ., ...... 
.. ... m .....,...." ....... . ......................._...." ...... . ..................... ............................................. " ......." ........
·" ... 
Contribution (INV) 	 No significant 0.757 No significant 0.234 No significant 0.53 I 

difference difference difference 

....................... .. " ................... .................... ••• .........«.« " ........................ .............. ........................... ..................... ................................................................... 
Effort (IN V) No significant 0.563 No significant 0.112 No significant 0.491 
difference difference difference 
.... 
.................................. 

Financial (LOY) No significant 0.679 Significant 0.007*' Significant 0.026' 

difference difference difference 

Money (LOY) No significant 0.739 Significant 0.01'7' Significant 0.047' 

difference difference difference

.. 
SIgnificant at 0.0 I SIgnIficant at 0.05 
No significant differences emerged between Company One and Company Three on the 
involvement sub-scale, however, and as shown by results in Table 36, this pattern is 
repeated for the Company One and Company Two and Company Two and Company 
Three 'between-groups' combinations. Company Two respondents were, however, 
significantly more likely than those at Company Three to be loyal to their company and 
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In addition, to tell people they were proud to work for their company. Finally, no 
significant differences were found between respondents at Company One and Company 
Two. 
Given results in section 6.2, it may come as little surprise that respondents at Company 
One and Company Two were, at least in part, significantly more committed to their 
companies than Company Three respondents. Underpinning the work of Klein (1987) 
was the assumption that employees were more committed to their company when they 
were satisfied with its ownership plan - an argument reinforced by results in Table 37 
below. The table shows strong positive associations between ESO satisfaction and each 
facet of organisational commitment as identified by the SOCS. Other employee 
ownership characteristics, however, (see Appendix 7 for variable definitions), are shown 
to have no significant effect upon commitment. 
Table 37: The impact of employee ownership characteristics on identification, involvement 
and loyalty (multiple regression - stepwise method) 
Variable Identify Involve Loyalty 
Beta coefficients 
(t-values) 
Company type (dummy) 0.080 -0.003 0.002 
(1.469) (-0.055) (0.031 ) 
Relative employee shares -0.012 -0.072 -0.106 
(-0.219) ( -1.233) (-1.851) 
Total company shares -0.056 0.044 -0.072 
(-1.010) (0.739) (-1.211) 
ESO satisfaction 0.594 0.495 0.517 
(11.191)... (8.649)'" (9.160),,· 
Constant (4.109)'·· (3.430)'" (4.507)*,' 
r 0.594 0.495 0.517 
r 
2 0.353 0.245 0.267 
Adjusted / 0.350 0.241 0.264 
Significant at 0.001 
Support is therefore given to the hypothesis that employee shareholders are committed to 
their company when they are satisfied with its ESO scheme, though 'between-groups' 
differences in Table 36 suggest that commitment is not inevitable. The 'circumstances of 
ESO' may, for example, be equally important for organisational commitment. Given the 
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circumstances surrounding the introduction of Company Three's ESOP, it is perhaps to 
be expected that ESO satisfaction would be lower compared with Company One and 
Company Two and this would explain some of the 'between-groups' commitment 
differences shown in Table 36. Perhaps a more notable finding is the apparent level of 
agreement among the three sets of respondents in relation to the BOCS 'involvement' 
sub-scale. Despite the apparent significance of 'ESO satisfaction' for 'involvement', it is 
suggested that employees are more inclined to contribute to and make extra effort for 
their company in order to safeguard their job, rather than for the fact of employee 
ownership. Conversely, identifying with and showing loyalty to the company are 
perhaps 'less tangible' aspects of commitment and therefore perhaps more likely where 
employees have a more developed sense of ownership towards that company. 
6.3.1 Analysis of attitudes among shareholders and non-shareholders 
The final part of the organisational commitment analysis consists of two stages. Using 
Stage One data from Company One and Company Three, the first stage involves a 
comparison of employee shareholder and non-shareholder attitudes at the level of the 
individual company. The second stage involves a comparative analysis of non­
shareholder attitudes across the two companies. In line with the main themes raised in 
the thesis, the aim of the comparative analyses is to establish whether the model of 
ownership is important for attitudinal outcomes among non-shareholders. It is argued 
that non-shareholders, though excluded from participating in some activities, will still 
benefit from working in a democratic, consultative and co-operative environment thought 
to be characteristic of an employee-owned enterprise. Working in such an environment, 
may, in turn, lead to higher levels of organisational commitment. Exploratory statistics 
and the results of independent samples t-tests are presented in Tables 38 to 41. The 
Levene test for homogeneity of variances is included in the t-test output in Table 39 and 
Table 41. Provided the F value is not significant (p > 0.05), the variances can be 
assumed to be homogenous and the 'equal variances assumed' line of significance values 
can be used. 
I 

I 

183 

.. 
Table 38: Organisational commitment: Company One shareholders (S) and non-shareholders (NS) 
Agree Neither agree/disagree Disagree 
• 
% 
Variable S NS S NS S NS 

Proud 53.6 

....." ........................................................ . 
46.7 26.8 36.7 19.6 I 
Feel 60.7 53.3 16.1 26.7 23.2 20.0
................ ,................... 

Contribution 69.6 60.0 19.7 30.0 10.7 10.0 

Effort 64.3 
 60.0 21.4 30.0
.....c.'c..........................................• , •............... 14.3 10.0 

)~ ~Financial 58.9 56.7 17.9 20.0 23.2 -j.j 

Money 44.6 43.3 19.6 13.4 35.8 43.3 

Table 39: Independent samples t-test: Company One shareholders and non-shareholders 
Std. Std. Errol-

Shareholder status N Mean Deviation Mean 

Proud Shareholder 56 2.46 1.26 .F, 

Non-shareholder 30 2.53 1.07 .20 

Feel Shareholder 56 2.36 1.38 .18 

Non-shareholder 30 2.43 1.07 .20 

Contribution Shareholder 56 2.13 1.21 .1€> 

Non-shareholder 30 2.27 1.05 .1 B 

Effort Shareholder 56 2.18 1.32 .1 B 

Non-shareholder 30 2.23 1.07 .20 

Financial Shareholder 56 2.36 1.43 .1 B 

Non-shareholder 30 2.37 1.47 .2", 

Money Shareholder 56 2.75 1.53 .20 

Non-shareholder 30 3.00 1.53 .2B 

Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances Hest for ~uali!rof Means 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Proud Equal variances 1.445 .233 -.254 84 .BOO -.07 .27 -.61 .47
assumed 

Equal variances 

-.267 68.208 .790 -.07 .26 -.59 .45 
not assumed 

Feel Equal variances 
 3.144 .080 -.263 84 .794 -.08 .29 -.65 .50 
assumed 

Equal variances 

-.283 73.005 .778 -.08 .27 -.61 .46 
not assumed 

Contribution Equal variances 

.194 .661 -.542 84 .589 -.14 .26 -.66 .38 
assumed 

Equal variances 

-.566 67.001 .573 -.14 .25 -.64 .36 
not assumed 
Effort Equal variances 84 .846 -.05 .28 -.61 .50 
assumed 
Equal variances 
1.744 .190 -.195 
-.20B 70.737 .836 -.05 .26 -.58 .47 
not assumed 
Financial Equal variances 
.065 .799 -.029 84 .977 -.01 .33 -.66 .64 
assumed 
Equal variances 
.33 .65
-.029 57.963 .977 -.01 -.67 
not assumed 
Equal variances Money 
.009 .926 -.722 84 .472 -.25 .35 -.94 .44 
assumed 
Equal variances 
.35 -.94 .44
-.722 59.312 .473 -.25 
not assumed 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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Table 40: Organisational commitment: Company Three shareholders (S) and non-shareholders (s) 
Neither agree/disagree Disagree 
Variable S NS s NS 
40.5 36.5 ......... 
43.9 
Table 41: Independent samples t-test: Company Three shareholders and non-shareholders 
Std. Std. Errol-

Shareholder status N Mean Deviation Mean 

Proud Shareholder 111 3.23 1.36 .1:1 

Non-shareholder 
 70 3.19 1.28 .1 ti 

Feel Shareholder 111 3.11 1.43 .14 

Non-shareholder 70 3.41 1.32 .1 Ei 

Contribution Shareholder 111 2.50 1.45 .14 

Non-shareholder 69 2.59 1.53 .HI 

Effort Shareholder 112 2.66 1.53 .14 

Non-shareholder 68 2.59 1.44 .1-'I 

Financial Shareholder 111 3.14 1.56 .1 ~i 

Non-shareholder 69 3.35 1.50 .HI 

Money 	 Shareholder 111 3.48 1.55 .15 

Non-shareholder 69 3.57 1.53 .HI 

Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% 
ConMencn 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower UDDer 
Proud Equal variances 
.692 .407 .195 179 .846 .04 .20 -.36 .44
assumed 

Equal variances 

.198 153.633 .844 .04 .20 -.36 .43
not assumed 

Feel Equal variances 
 172 .679 -1.444 179 .151 -.31 21 -.72 .11 
assumed 

Equal variances 

-1.469 155.113 .144 -.31 .21 -.72 .11 
not assumed 

Contribution Equal variances 

.393 .532 -.436 178 .663 -.10 23 -.55 .35 
assumed 

Equal variances 

-.430 138.274 .668 -.10 23 -.55 .35 
not assumed 

Effort Equal variances 
 1.167 .281 .315 	 178 .753 .07 23 -.38 .53 
assumed 

Equal variances 

.320 148.302 .749 .07 23 -.37 .52 
not assumed 

Financial Equal variances 

.291 .590 -.903 178 .368 -.21 .24 -.68 .25 
assumed 

Equal variances 

-.910 148.261 .364 -.21 .23 -.67 .25 
not assumed 

Money Equal variances 

.202 .654 -.371 178 .711 -.09 .24 -.56 .38 
assumed 

Equal variances 

-.372 146.138 .710 i -.09 .24 -.55 .38 
not assumed 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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At the level of the individual firm, there were no significant differences between the 
attitudes of shareholders and non-shareholders at either company for any of the BOCS 
statements. 
At Company One, both sets of respondents were most likely to show commitment to their 
company through 'involvement': over two-thirds (69.6 per cent) and over three-fifths 
(64.3 per cent) of shareholders respectively said they were happy to make a contribution 
for the good of their company and expend extra effort for the company. Among the non­
shareholding group, three-fifths (60 per cent) of respondents said they were happy to 
make a contribution while a further three-fifths (60 per cent) said they were willing to put 
in additional effort for the company. At the other end of the spectrum, just over half 
(53.6 per cent) of shareholders said they were proud to tell people they worked for 
Company One, while over two-fifths (44.6 per cent) said that the offer of a bit more 
money would not seriously make them think of leaving. For non-shareholders, responses 
to these two statements came to 46.7 per cent and 43.3 per cent respectively. 
At Company Three, both groups were also most likely to show commitment to their 
company via 'involvement'. More than half of shareholders (S4.9 per cent) and non­
shareholders (52.8 per cent) said they were happy to make a contribution for the good of 
their company, while similar numbers (SS.4 per cent of shareholders; 50.7 per cent of 
non-shareholders) said they were prepared to put in extra effort. However, far fewer 
respondents than at Company One, both shareholders and non-shareholders, were likely 
to identify and show loyalty to their company. Fewer than 30 per cent of Company Three 
shareholders and just over 30 per cent of non-shareholders were proud to tell people they 
worked for their company. In addition, just over one-third (34.2 per cent) and just over 
one-quarter (26 per cent) of shareholders and non-shareholders respectively said they felt 
a part of their company. 
Table 42 presents results for the second stage of the analysis, which compares non­
shareholder attitudes across the two companies. In the table the 'equal variances not 
assumed' values are used for the 'contribution' and 'effort' scale items since p < O.OS. 
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Table 42: Independent samples t-test: Company One and Company Three non-shareholders 
Std. Std. Errol' 
Company N Mean Deviation Mean 
Proud Company One 30 2.53 1.07 .20 
Company Three 70 3.19 1.28 .1 E, 
Feel Company One 30 2.43 1.07 .20 
Company Three 70 3.41 1.32 .1 E, 
Contribution Company One 30 2.27 1.05 .1 SI 
Company Three 69 2.59 1.53 .1 E 
Effort Company One 30 2.23 1.07 .20 
Company Three 68 2.59 1.44 .17 
Financial Company One 30 2.37 1.47 .27 
Company Three 69 3.35 1.50 .1e, 
Money Company One 30 3.00 1.53 .2e. 
Company Three 69 3.57 1.53 .1e. 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equalitv of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig. Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df (2-tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Proud Equal variances 
883 .350 -2.449 98 .016" -.65 .27 -1.18 -.12assumed 
Equal variances 
-2.625 64.795 .011 -.65 .25 -1.15 -.16
not assumed 

Feel Equal variances 

2.704 .103 -3.582 98 .001 'It** -.98 .27 -1.52 -.44assumed 
Equal variances 
-3.896 67.203 .000 -.98 .25 -1.48 -.48not assumed 

Contribution Equal variances 

10.125 .002 -1.069 97 .288 -.33 .31 -.94 .28assumed 
Equal variances 
-1.234 78.663 .221 -.33 .27 -.86 .20
not assumed 

Effort Equal variances 
 5.906 .017 -1.210 96 .229 -.35 .29 -.94 .23assumed 
Equal variances 
-1.354 73.261 .180 -.35 .26 -.88 .17
not assumed 

Financial Equal variances 

.015 .901 -3.002 97 .003" -.98 .33 -1.63 -.33
assumed 
Equal variances 
-3026 56.268 .004 -.98 .32 -1.63 -.33
not assumed 

Money Equal variances 

.025 .875 -1.690 97 .094 -.57 .33 -1.23 .10
assumed 
Equal variances 
-1.689 55.168 .097 -.57 .33 -1.24 .11
not assumed 
'** Significant at 0.001 ** Significant at 0.0 I * Significant at 0.05 
I Differences between Company One and Company Three non-shareholders are 
I 
 highlighted by results in Table 42: Company One non-shareholders were significantly 
more likely to be proud to work for their company (p = 0.016), to feel a part of the I company (p = 0.001) and to stay with the company even if it was not doing too well 
financially (p = 0.004). In contrast, there were no significant differences between 
Company One and Company Three non-shareholders in terms of being happy to 
contribute to the good of the company (p = 0.221), make additional effort (p =0.180), or 
stay with their employer if they were offered more money elsewhere (p = 0.094). It is 
-
... 
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suggested that some of the 'less tangible' aspects of organisational commitment, such as 
identifying with one's company, are more likely to be found where ESO is 'more 
tangible' to employees, including non-shareholders, in that company. As highlighted in 
section 6.1, non-shareholders may still benefit to some degree from working in an 
employee owned enterprise, though like shareholders, attitudinal outcomes may be 
determined by variables other than ESO alone. However, the fact that no significant 
differences were found in the attitudes of shareholders and non-shareholders at the 
individual company level (Tables 39 and 41) supports the argument that the 'climate' of 
ESO in the company is important for commitment outcomes. 
6.4 Summary 
Chapter 6 set out to examine the attitudes of employee shareholders in relation to 
'feelings of ownership' and 'organisational commitment' across three companies, each 
with different models and degrees of employee ownership. The 'feelings of ownership' 
analysis (section 6.2) was divided into three stages: satisfaction with ESO among 
employee shareholders; perceived benefits of ESO; and ways in which employee 
shareholders viewed their company under an employee ownership structure. Guiding the 
'feelings of ownership' analysis were two main hypotheses. Firstly, employee 
shareholders working under a system of 'direct' ownership would derive greater 
satisfaction from being owners compared with employee shareholders in companies with 
more indirect arrangements. Secondly, employee shareholders in companies with 
'direct' ownership arrangements would exhibit a greater' sense' of ownership towards 
their company than shareholders in firms with' indirect' arrangements. 
Following the 'feelings of ownership' analysis, some support is given for the two 
hypotheses. For example, results of the 'ESO satisfaction' analysis revealed that 
Company One respondents were the group most likely to be satisfied with their ESO 
scheme and Company Three respondents were least likely to be satisfied. Moreover, 
Company One respondents were proportionately the most likely of the three groups to 
acknowledge that ESO had made a difference to the way they thought about their 
company and attitude shifts on the whole were positive. Notwithstanding, a 'within­
groups' analysis established a level of agreement among the companies in relation to 
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ESO satisfaction: respondents at all three companies were most likely to care about 
owning shares and least likely to feel I ike an owner of their company or find work more 
satisfying because they owned shares. It is thus concluded that some of the direct 
outcomes of ownership, including being able to participate in securing the future of the 
company, were perhaps more important to respondents than more indirect outcomes, 
including 'increased work satisfaction' and a greater 'sense of ownership'. A similar 
conclusion emerged in relation to 'direct' and 'indirect' outcomes of ownership for the 
'benefits of ESO' analysis. Though exceptions were noted, respondents at all three 
companies tended to give a higher preference to the more tangible benefits of ESO, 
including more money, more information and the opportunity to become more involved 
in company decisions. 
The second part of the chapter (section 6.3) investigated the hypothesis that 
organisational commitment would be stronger where employees had a more developed 
sense of ownership. Underpinning this hypothesis was the work of Klein (1987) which 
concluded that employees would be more committed to their company where they were 
satisfied with its ESO scheme. Given results from the 'ESO satisfaction' analysis it is no 
surprise that respondents at Company One and Company Two were, to some extent, 
significantly more committed to their companies than Company Three respondents. 
Company One and Company Two respondents had invested not only time but also their 
own money into their firm, though the amount at Company One was collectively nearly 
ten-times that invested at Company Two. In contrast, Company Three respondents had 
invested no money directly and did not have the same level of satisfaction towards their 
firm's ESO scheme. What emerged as perhaps a more interesting finding from the 
commitment analysis was that there were no significant differences between the three 
cases in terms of respondents being willing to contribute to and make an effort for the 
good of their company. As discussed in section 6.3, employees may be more inclined to 
become 'involved' in order to safeguard their job, regardless of the characteristics and 
circumstances of employee ownership. 
Findings from the qualitative analysis offered additional insights into the Stage One 
results. At Company One, employees and managers alike had set out to prevent a hostile 
take-over bid and a direct ownership arrangement was regarded as the best way to 
achieve this aim. Moreover, Company One had managed to sustain its longevity as an 
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employee-owned enterprise, which may also explain why its non-shareholders were 
significantly more likely to show commitment to the company than non-shareholders at 
Company Three. Like its shareholders, Company One's non-shareholders had also 
benefited from ESO insofar as the company had not been sold on to a third party and 
employees had kept their jobs. This may also account for there being no significant 
differences in attitudes among shareholders and non-shareholders at Company One. The 
same rationale can be applied at Company Three, in that employees had witnessed their 
directors earn huge windfalls as a result of ESO. This had subsequently led to a general 
feeling of resentment among all sections of the workforce and may explain why there 
were no significant differences in attitude between shareholders and non-shareholders. 
In conclusion, some support is given for the hypotheses that ESO satisfaction, feelings of 
ownership and commitment to the organisation are more likely under 'direct' ownership. 
However, a direct ownership model does not make positive attitudinal outcomes 
inevitable. It is suggested, for example, that outcomes may equally be a reflection of the 
success of the ownership scheme, in terms of the longevity of ownership and the share 
price. At the time of the survey, the share price at Company One had risen by nearly 
nine-times the original value. If the share price had fallen when the survey was 
conducted findings may have been rather different. A longitudinal approach can help to 
overcome such problems and this issue is addressed further in Chapter 9. 
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7.0 Employee share ownership, employee participation and industrial relations 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 7 sets out to examine whether opportunities for EP in decision-making are 
greater in employee-owned organisations than in firms without ESO. EP may occur in a 
number of ways within both types of enterprise, both directly and indirectly, via task 
participation or through consultative and representative forums, including trade unions, 
works councils and employee directors. However, within employee-owned enterprises, 
employees who share in the equity of their organisation may also regard it as their 
'legitimate right' (Pierce et al 1991: 128) to have greater access to information and to 
exercise some direct influence over matters relating to their workplace (see Long 1981). 
Voting rights for employees who own shares, plus a general 'culture' of participation 
instilled by managers and resulting from the introduction of ESO, may further contribute 
to a level of EP greater than that found in 'more 'conventional' firms. 
Opportunities for EP in employee-owned enterprises may also be extended to nOI1­
shareholding staff. Though excluded to some extent from participating in the activities 
of their company, such as voting at the AGM, employees who do not own shares may 
still benefit from working in a more 'democratic' and 'involving' arena. Studies 
detecting either no or only minor differences in attitudes between shareholders and non­
shareholders in employee-owned organisations and previously discussed in Chapter 3 
suggest some support for this argument. 
It may also be assumed that employees would naturally embrace the idea of having more 
say in the way their organisation is run, particularly if they own shares and thus have a 
direct interest in its success. However, previous studies discussed in Chapter 3 (see for 
example, French 1987; Rosen and Quarrey 1987) suggest this may not always be the 
case. Employees' perceptions of management capability, for example, may be an 
important predictor of their desire for more participation and influence (Rhodes and 
Steers 1981). Where managers are perceived to be efficient in running the organisation, 
employees may be perfectly satisfied for them to continue to manage and thus show little 
or no desire to have more influence themselves and assume a more active role. 
Conversely, employees may actively seek more participation and influence where they 
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are dissatisfied with the methods of their managers and regard their investment in the 
employee-owned firm as being at risk. 
ESO and EP may additionally have implications for the role and function of trade unions. 
It has been posited (see Pendleton et al 1995b; Poole and Jenkins 1990) that ESO aligns 
the aims and goals of employees with their managers, thereby reducing the need for 
employees to be represented by a trade union. However, where employees are 
dissatisfied with the degree of influence they have in their organisation, or are unhappy 
with their managers, they may regard the union as the most appropriate vehicle for 
representing their interests and giving them a voice. Alternatively, employees may find 
themselves able to develop simultaneous commitments, or 'dual commitment', to both 
their union and employer, though this would depend on the attitudes of employees to 
both parties. Studies addressing the concept of dual commitment (Angle and Perry 1986; 
Guest and Dewe 1991) were discussed in Chapter 3. 
This chapter seeks to investigative a number of key questions. First, is actual 
participation in decision-making greater for employees in employee owned companies 
than in post-ESO enterprises and if so, are there likely to be differences between the 
different forms of employee-owned company? Second, is desire for greater participation 
less where employees are satisfied with the way their managers run the company? Third, 
do employees still seek participation via trade union channels, even if their company is 
an employee-owned company? Finally, to what extent do employee-manager relations 
and employee-trade union relations influence employees' ability to demonstrate 
simultaneous commitment to both factions? 
To address these issues the chapter is divided into a number of sections. The first stage 
of the analysis (section 7.2) examines EP across all six organisations and specifically, the 
degree to which employees seek participation in decisions relating to their job, their 
depot or department and the organisation overall, plus the level of participation they 
actually have at each level. The second stage (section 7.3) focuses on EP and relations 
between employees and their managers, while the third (section 7.4) examines EP and 
relations between employees and their trade union. Results presented in the chapter are 
based on quantitative and qualitative data drawn from the Stage One survey of employee 
shareholders and non-shareholders and from the Stage Two interviews respectively. For 
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I used to aid in the qualitative analysis can be found in Appendices 12 and 13. 
7.2 Desired employee participation 
This first section examines quantitative data from the Stage One survey in relation to 
employees' (shareholders and non-shareholders combined) desire for greater influence in 
eleven work-related areas (Tables 43 to 48). Five-point scales used to measure responses 
were adapted from studies by Pendleton et al (I 995a, b) and Poole and Jenkins (1990), 
while responses along the scale ranged from 'a great deal of say' (I) through to 'no say at 
all' (5). Following methods in Chapter 6, points' l' and '2' ('a great deal of say'/'some 
say') and '4' and '5' ('little say'I'no say at all') were merged in each case to assist in the 
clearer presentation of results. Full details of respondent samples for each case can be 
found in section 4.4.2 in Chapter 4. 
Table 43: Desired participation at Company One: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
Decisions % Mean 
.... c:()~p('l~yp91 i.c:jes 
.. ....... 
55.5 
....................... 
26.7 17.8 2.46 
..()\\,Tl~~p()t 63.7 25.0 II) ...................................~23 
Ownjob 68.5 20.2 11.3 2.00 
............""'...,,....................................,,"" 

....yy.~..g~~... ('lTl.~... ~()t.1.~~~s ... ..................... " ..... 61.8 23.6 . ....... ,.......... ., ............................. .. 14.6 2.21 

..................................

Health andsafety 65.1 20.3 14.6 2.12 
45.0 29.2 25.8 2.64 
~ ~ .......?!~f.:0t.1.g ...............m .............".~....~~._., .... ........................• •... M.............M........ ..............."._M.M~....."_..._... ....................._._•.•_"·...m 
.. .. 
52.8 25.8 21.4 2.55 
.....~.~~pr.()9.!:1.~ts...... ....... ,." ..... -................"" ..... 

41.1 25.6 33.3 2.79 
........................_ ......... ,....... ••• • ...".."",,............... .. ..... "no..• •••••P ..·,..... •••••••
.... ~.~.~~.('l~N.~~ry 
Investment 36.7 32.2 31.1 2.91 
......• •••• • ....." ...........M .............. " .. ••• 
 24.4 ·················· ...... ·.... ···41:2·...."....·.... "3':12""'"
Recruitment 34.4 
....~.M............~_."..... .. ...................""........, ....................... _...........""................. . 

Training 37.8 34.4 27.8 2.89 
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all six companies, Stage Two data were analysed across three main areas: EP and 
communication, including practices and institutions for giving employees a 'voice' at 
each of the firms; trade union issues; and industrial relations. Further details of Stage 
Two categories, plus quantitative and qualitative data sources and methods used to 
analyse the data were previously discussed in Chapter 4. Examples of matrix displays 
-
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Table 44: Desired participation at Company Two: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
Decisions % Mean 
51.0 30.8 18.2 2.49~gl?P::lI1Xpg}i<:.i~s. 
...... " ...............................................................................'" 
.Q~I1.~~P2~ ... 
Own job 
~':l:g~S.':l:I1~?211~S.~.S....... . .... 6..~..:.?....... ...................................}~} ............................... 1..7..:}................?:Q? 
74.3 13.3 12.4 1.851:I.~<l!t.b.<lI1~.s.':l:.f~t.x ...... 
56.7 20.2 23.1 2.45§t.':l:ffil1g ................ 

59.0 21.0 20.0 2.39.1.'l~~p~g~1J~~s. . 
53.4 23.8 22.8 2.52.1.'l.~~.I11.<l<:.hil1.~EY ..... 
Investment 38.1 36.2 25.7 2.78 
..,..,Recruitment 34.3 .,., ..,.., 32.4 2.95 
............................................ 

Training 43.8 31.4 24.8 2.62 
Table 45: Desired participation at Company Three: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
~ 
0/0 MeanDecisions 
47.8 31.7 20.5 2.59.~9EI1P<lI1Xp()}i<:.i~.s......... 

66.1 17.7 16.2 2.24··6~·~···1;~2t ......... 
 71.7 14.4 13.9 2.01 
26.6 2.30~<lg~s.<lI1~?gl11Js.~.s.. 65.4 8.0 ................................. 

64.4 13.8 21.8 2.24 
. . tI~<l!t.~<lI1~s.<lf~t.y. .... 
46.5 29.1 24.4 2.59§t.<lffil1g 
49.4 31.2 19.4 2.48.1.'l~~p~()~1J<:.ts .. 
20.2 32.3 2.73 
.... !'J.~.~.EI1<lchil1~ry ............ .. j .. 47.5 

Investment . .......................................... ..... ......................."..........
34.0 29.2 36.8 3.05 
2.91Recruitment 42.0 21.7 36.3 
Training 52.7 20.5 26.8 2.55 
Table 46: Desired participation at Company Four: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
MeanDecisions 
25.9 24.1 
......................................... ,
~()l?p<lI1Xpgli<:.i~s................. 50.0 2.68 

16.5 24.0g~119~P()t................ 59.5 2.45 

11.9 20.0 2.16 
......................................
Own iob 68.1 
............" ...... " .................... 

2.1910.0 21.5~<lg~S.<l119?9111Js~s. ............. m ••••••••••• 68.5 2.21
13.8 20.0H~<l!t.~<lI1~s.<lf~ty .... 66.2 28.5 2.6619.5 
.......................................
§t.<lffil1g. 52.0 
26.2 2.5619.5 
.................................
.tJ~~PE9~1J<:.tS. 54.3 2.6821.8 28.51.'l~~l?':l:<:.hin~ry.. .............. .. 49.7 3.24
26.1 42.1 .......................................
Investment 31.8 ...................................... .......... ..... 

32.7 28.4 }~:? ..wm· .............? .I ..~. . .. ..
Recruitment 
31.2 2.75Training 47.6 21.2 
• 
-Table 47: Desired participation at Company Five: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
Decisions Mean 
47.1 35.5 17.4 2.55
.....~OIT1p<1~yps>li<:i~.~............. 

..... Q~l!...~~p()t 67.8 20.6 11.6 2.13 
Own job }0.2.....................................................I.~.2 ............ II.:?........... 2.05 
\\iages and bonuses 67.7 16.6 f................I....5,......7.:..............................1..............=2:.......1.:..0.,....................... i-!~;jth;~d~af~i:v 73.6 17.4 9.0 1.93 
...................... 

~!':l:f~l1g ... ... ........ ... 55:4... ..... 24..7...........................I.. ?:?....................?:~.I.. 

~~YI'...PE()~~l~t~....... ... ...... .....?3 . 7 22.3 24.0 2.52 

·l\revvl"J1<1~~il1ery.... ........... I.... 57.5 20.8 
....... f.. .....7.:.. ..................... ..................=2..:.4 ...:..
..........=2...1 : 1 .....4 ............. 

Investment 25.0 
.............. 31.7...+ 43.313.....2......8.....................1 
Recruitment 28.9 
............................... 
........ ...}~2 38.9 3.17 
Training 42.2 28.9 28.9 2.76 
Table 48: Desired participation at Company Six: shareholders and non-shareholders I A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
Decisions % Mean 
.~S>l11P<1I1YPs>li~ies .. 41.5 ....... 38.3 ...............~.9...:.~.... 2.64 

Qvvl!A~p()! ..........~.~:.? ........................ 17.1 13.0 2.13 

Qvv~js>~.............. ..... 7?}.. . .......!}:8...... ........ ..... I?:?....... ................... 1:?? 

~.,,!:g~~<1I1~~().I1.~~.~s.. .... ... ..... .. 73.1 .............................................!..?..2 9 . 7 .L:~~ 

.... I:-1{;!<1Itb(ll1~?<1fety............. 69.1 ....... }?~............ 11.7 L.U'> 

.?t(lffll1g 53.2 29.8 17.0 2.43 

...t!.~vvp~()~':1~!.?. ...... ... ??:}.... 25.5...... ....... 19.?............................ 2.47 

..~{;!YI'.l!lClC~il1{;!r.Y. .. .... ...... ... ... ........... 5 5 .4 .. . ....... ??}.......?2}........ 2.49 

25.6 2.85I Il1yes!l"J1ent 37.2 37.2 .......................,""......................., ............-.....-..~,.... ,."".. . ..............,........"" .. . 
,Recruitment 1 37.2 30.9 31.9 2.87 
Training 51.6!4. 7 23.7 2.51 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
Findings show respondents generally in agreement in relation to those areas where they 
wanted a greater say in decisions and areas where a greater say was less of a priority. In 
four of the six organisations (One, Two, Three and Six), a majority were most likely to 
want more say in relation to their job, while in the remaining two organisations, wages 
and bonuses (Company Four) and health and safety (Company Five) were seen as the key 
areas. At the other extreme and across all six organisations, recruitment and investment 
were seen as Jess important areas for decision-making among employees. The main 
findings from all six cases are summarised in Table 49. 
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T bl 49a e : D' deSIre parf'ICIpaf Ion ­ ,WI'thOIn groups rank'mgs 
Company I Company Company Company Company Company 
One Two Three Four Five Si'( 
Desires Own job Own job Own job Wages and Health and Ownjob 
most say bonuses safety 
Health and Health and Wages and Own job Own job Wages and 
.. ?(l.f.~!)'. ..,....."........ ...... safe!y............ bonuses/ .............. ........................,................... ........" ...............".................. bonuses 
Own depot Own depot Own depot Health and Own depot Own depot/ 
.--_ ........................................... 
... saf~1:y Health and 

............................ 

Wages and Wages and Health and Own depot Wages and safety 
bonuses bonuses 
..... 
safety bonuses
............... I· ............ 
Company New Training Products New New 
p?li~!~~ 
....... ..... 
..... pr()cll:'~!:>. 
..........." .. ..'.!!.(l~~j~~I)' l!.l~~~i.~~ry .. 

New 
"" 
Staffing Products Staffing Staffing New 
... PToducts 
.......", .. I . ...... E()ducts .......... Staffing New Company Company New Staffing 
policies/ policies/
n··.·'.·.....·.·. .....!!.l.(l.~h.i.l1ery ..... . pr()cll:'~~~ ........... ... ................ ........ 
New Company Machinery Machinery Company Training 
.... '.!!(l~~i~~ry p?I}~i~~ ........ 
. ................ ... p()li~.!.~~ ...... 
Training Training Staffing Training Training Company 
................. 
p()Iicies 

~, Investment Investment Recruitment Recruitment Recruitment Investment/
...................... ....... • •.•••...••.••••••.••••••••••••.•••••••••••••... L ••.•.••••••••.••.•.•.... 

Desires Recruitment Recruitment Investment Investment Investment RecruitmentI 
least say 
Results in Table 49 are perhaps not all that surprising. It may be expected, for example, 
that employees would generally express a desire for more say in decisions relating to 
their own job, irrespective of whether they owned shares in the organisation. Nearly 84 
per cent of Company Two respondents wanted more influence in their job, followed by 
75.3 per cent at Company Six and 71.7 per cent at Company Three. Results for the 
remaining cases in relation to job decisions were clustered around or just below the 70 
per cent mark. A majority of respondents across the six organisations similarly wanted 
more say in relation to pay issues and health and safety arrangements. Like job 
decisions, these findings are perhaps not unexpected, given that pay and health and safety 
impact upon employees directly in their day-to-day working lives. At 73.1 per cent, 
Company Six respondents were most likely to want more influence over pay 
arrangements, while those least likely, but still representing 61.8 per cent of the Stage 
One sample for their firm, were found at Company One, The proportion of respondents 
wanting more say over health and safety decisions were similarly clustered in the 60 and 
70 per cent bands and ranged from 64.4 per cent at Company Four up to 74.3 per cent at 
Company Two. 
As highlighted earlier in the chapter, an increased desire among employees for greater 
say in workplace decisions may be a direct reflection of the current state of employee­
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manager relations in the organisation. French (1987) posited that employees often 
wanted more influence where they were unhappy or dissatisfied with their current work 
situation. Bartkus (1997) and Heller et al (1998), however, concluded that employees 
will often express a desire for more say than they have at the present time, but may then 
become disinterested upon realising that having a greater say may, in turn, mean greater 
responsibility. Applying French's (1987) argument, the results suggest that respondents 
at all six organisations were unhappy with their pay and additionally, with health and 
safety arrangements and job methods but in turn, satisfied with the decisions of their 
managers in relation to investment and recruitment. An alternative interpretation and 
probably the more likely is that respondents in all cases were less interested in 
recruitment and investment, since neither area has a direct impact upon employees in the 
same way as the more immediate issues of job methods, pay and health and safety. 
Moreover, with only one exception (investment decision: p<O.05), the results ofa K-W 
test (see Chapter 4) presented in Table 50 reinforce the finding that there were no 
significant differences between the six cases in relation to employees' desire for 
participation in their workplace. 
Table 50: Desired participation: K-W test 
I 
Desired Desired Desired Desired Desired 
Desired own Desired wages and health Desired new new Desired Desired Desired 
policies depot own job bonuses and safety staffing products machinery investment recruitment training 
Chi-Square 2.238 5.071 4.600 2.751 7.170 334~ I .804 5.631 14.630 df 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6.403 5 6.884 5 
Asymp.Si9· .815 .407 .467 .738 .208 .647 .977 .344 .012' .269 .229 
Significant at 0.05 
Mean rank scores (see Appendix 16 for full details) from the K-W test indicate that 
respondents at Company Two (mean rank: 356.96) and Company Six (mean rank: 
367.0 I) were most likely to want a greater say in investment decisions (mean rank: 
381.44) and Company Five respondents least likely (mean rank: 440.48). Perhaps 
surprisingly, only a minority from each employee-owned firm wanted more influence in 
investment decisions. In each employee-owned case, a majority of Stage One 
respondents, plus employees across the firm generally, had owned shares in one form or 
another at the time of the survey. It was perhaps to be expected, therefore, that 
employees would express an interest in how managers were investing and spending 
money, though three possible reasons for the apparent lack of interest are suggested. 
First, in each case, employees may have been satisfied with current management 
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decisions and happy to let managers manage. Second, employees, regardless of whether 
they owned shares, still saw day-to-day issues such as pay as being more important (see 
Pendleton 200 I). Third, employees had relatively few aspirations for greater direct 
participation, preferring to use more indirect channels such as their trade union. 
Relationships between employees, their managers and trade unions are examined more 
fully in sections 7.3 and 7.4. 
7.2.1 Actual employee participation 
The second stage of the EP analysis looks at actual levels of EP (shareholders and non­
shareholders combined) for the same eleven areas examined in section 7.2. Following 
exploratory results (Tables 51 to 56) and an 'actual participation' rankings summary 
(Table 57), the findings of a K-W test are presented (Table 58) to establish significant 
differences, if any, between the six organisations. The final part of the quantitative 
analysis in this section examines the extent to which employees' desires for participation 
in decisions have been met. Termed the 'participation gap', results are calculated by 
subtracting the mean score for desired participation from that of actual participation (see 
Pendleton 2001) for each of the eleven 'workplace decision' areas (Table 59). In 
addition, a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used to establish the level of significance of 
the 'participation gap' for each area. 
Table 51: Actual participation at Company One: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
Decisions % Mean 
....~C?~P~~y..p9.Ii~.\.~.~...... .. ........................?..:.!........ .... ..........! ..~.:.9..... 75.3 4.28 
..Q~.~....9.~pC?t . .............................. 11.2 14.6 74.2 ......~..:..1..?................  

.. Q~~j?.~.............. .... .... ... .....~.7.:.9....... . . ............}..?:.!...................................................?.!.:.?.............. 3.49 

..~.~g..!?~ ..~!!9.!?9.~~~.~~ ........................... ....... !.4.:.?. .............!.4..:.?............................ ......... .... .?g.:~. 3.96 

..... !i.~~.!~h... ~p.~...~~f~!Y................................................... .1}.:.!..... . .........................~~.} .......................................................?.?...:.?............ .......................?:.~.?. ....... 

Staffing 7 8 ......}...!.:.~............................................~}.:.Q............................................4..:.~.~....................

................................. ....... ............................................... .................................. . 

••• 1i.~~.• ~~t8~~iY····· ...·••••·•••...•.•••••.•. ·· .:.......... ...~.~:~........................................:i.~;i:••• ••··...:·.:::................. :.:..:....j.~~§. ...........:~..............:••••~...:...*:.~~ .................... 

Investment 7.9 13.5 78.6 4.37 
"R~c~~'it~~~t"""'" .. ..................... ........ ..... .. 9.0 ···· .. ·jT:2..·······...····..... ·····.. ··..·.....····..· ...;i9-:-ij ....--· ...·....·.... r·· ..........4·:is ...·...·..·······..  

·..·T;:~j~·j~g········ .. ····1·)..:2···..······ .. ··········12':4·····...·········..······ ...····....············76·A ...... ·..·..·.........·...r..........--4·:·2S·.......... ·......  

-
Table 52: Actual participation at Company Two: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
Decisions 	 % Mean 
8.7 11.5 	 4.27<::(,l~p~r:typ(,l.I!~i~? 
72.1 4.02 
.....Q\\'r:t9..~p()t ..... 15.4 ................ ..... 12.5 	 ..........,- ..._........ 

22.1 17.3 60.6 3.64g\\,!1j()~. . 	 ............................. 

10.6 3.8
.	~(lge~an~bonuses 1 ...........8~:.~5...:..6.::...................... 1............ 4,.37 
Health an~safety 19.2 22.1 58.7
...................... ·f··········:.··:··:··:·· ..······..·····..····+····~· ..:·:::·.::....... I 

§t(lml1g 	 11.5..... .."., 6.7 81.8 4.33 
8.6 12.6 78.8 4.30 
.....~eV/prodll~ts 
5.8 7.7 86.5 4.48.~.~.VI machin~ry .. 	 .- ... -- .......... --.... _- ... 

Investment 	 7.6 6.7 8,5,....:.7.:.......... ....... .1."... 4.49 

Recruitment 	 10.5 6.7 82.8 4.37 
Trainin 1 	 15.4 3.8 80.8 4.29 
..........,.".......... . .................. 

Table 53: Actual participation at Company Three: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
.... 	
~ 
% 	 MeanDecisions 
4.2011.2 11.8 77.0.<::()l11p~r:typ()licies 	 ............... "., ......"" .... 

13.4 18.7 67.9 3.99O\~r:t9.ep()t 
31.4 17.0 51.6 3.409v;r:tjob 	 .................................. 

9.1 10.6 80.3 4.31~.l:l:ge~(;lJ'\d .. \)?nuses 	 ...................... ...... 

20.7 66.0 3.91 
... ...........
Health and safety 13.3 	 -.......­
76.9 4.249.7 1§~8:ftil1g 
77.0 4.20NeVI products 	 10.2 12.8 
12.3 78.1New machinery 9.6 	 ... 4.27 
9.1 11.3 79.6 4.34Investment 
8.6 77.4 4.2314.0 	 .............................
Recruitment 
4.0517.1 10.7 72.2Trainin' 
Table 54: Actual participation at Company Four: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
.... 
Mean%Decisions 4.486.57.0<::()mpClny p()l ici es 
8.3 82.8 4.34 Own depot 	 8.9 68.4 3.9219.0g>.¥r:tj()~ 4.4586.06.17.9W8:ges and bonuses 4.1473.211.3Healtband safety 4.5687.96.55.6
.?tafnl1g 	 4.497.4 5.6...........".,....... .... ........ .,.,~.7.:.9........ 
NeVI. products 4.506.1Newl1.1achincry 	 7.S ........" .....,."".."","' ... "................. " ..... ,......... . 
 4.565.1 88.4 ., ..........._._................
6.SInvestment 4.606.0Recruitment ... ?:J..." ...... ................  	 87.9 4.46
85.65.19.3Traillin' 
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Table 55: Actual participation at Company Five: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
~ 
Decisions 	 % Mean 
g()~P.~~YP9}i~i~~.. .. 9. 1 9.0 81.9 4.35 
Q~!!~~P9t 9.0 17.2 73.8 4.11 
Ownjob 31.1 18.0 50.9 3.36I····:::::···:··:··:··:··~··:::···:::························...............................................1 .....................c.....:...:...:................ I····· ............................................................... 

~~g~~<:Lfl~~()I1~~~~ 9. 1 13.1 77.8 4.30 
!j~~!t~<:Lfl~s.<:Lf.e!Y 19.6 23.0 57.4 3.72 
.~~llff"il1g.. . 9.9 15.6 74.5 4.24 
.~~"Y.p.~()~~cts . . 4.9 16.4 78.7 4.30 
13.3 84.1 4.49~~"Y~<:L~~il1~TY.... 2.6 
Investment 4.9 9.0 86.1 4.56 
IR~~ruitment 9.9 7.3 82.8 4.39 
79.5 ················1 4.21Training 	 9.9 10.6 
Table 56: Actual participation at Company Six: shareholders and non-shareholders 
A great deal Neither a lot No say at all 
of say nor a little say 
liliiii 	 ~ 
Decisions 	 0/0 Mean 
.. g?~p.~~yp()licies . 10.8 17.2 72.0 4.17 
22.8 13.0 64.2 3.82
.. Q~fl~~P?t 	 ....................................................................................................................................................... 

Ownjob 44.1 15.1 40.8 3.08 
.. . 
14.0 26.8 59.2 3.78~<:Lg~s.(lI1~~()I1~~~s. 
23.7 24.7 51.6 3.59H~~lt9::t11~S.(lf.~ty .. l·································:··················· I····················································· .......................................... ,..".. ,,' .......,.,.. ,."',....,',. " ... ,. 

12.9 16.1 71.0 4.13.~tllff]l1g 
14.0 14.0 72.0 4.04~~"YP.~9~~<;tS. 
15.1 70.9 4.12 
..	~~"Y ...~.::t.~.~..i.I1~TY........ ..,.,",.,.....,.... ,1:.. 4...::.. ,0:,....,.... ", .... ,.,...,....1 
Investment 11.8 14.0 74.2 4.24 
.............. , ..... 

Recruitment 12.9 10.8 76.3 4.24 
Training 18.5 13.0 68.5 4.02 
Source: Stage One survey 1997/8 
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Table 57: Actua partIcIpatIOn - 'within aroups' rankings 
Company Company Company Company Company Company 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Has most Own job Own job Own job Ownjob Own job Own job 
say 
............" ......"." .. 
........... f· ........············..·······..·········· + ..................... 
Wages and Health and Training Health and Health and Health and 
bonuses safety ....·.... ............. I.......a...e ..,...................................f . ... s.::i.fe.t.Y.
·· .......... ·t.....................................................· s......f.....ty s.::ife.ry........... ....... 
Health and Own depot! Recruitment Own depot/ Staffing! Own depot 
.. s::ife.ty. Training.................... Training Recruitment/ 

..................,.,..................... ..... . 
Own depot! Own depot! 
' 
Training .....Ir.::i.i.r.1..i.r.1.K..... 
Training Wages and Health and Wages and Wages and 
bonuses/ §::ife.t.Y.. bonuses/ bonuses/ 
New Staffing Company New Company New 
PT()~lI~tS. ............................................... ........ polices/M::i~hil1e.I)'. policies/ products/ 
Recruitment Recruitment New Company Own depot/ New 
Products policies/ Wages and 
I................................................. I 

1····.. ··············· .. ···························+···.................................................... + .......................... I l11..::ichiIle.rx .. 

Staffing/ Company Staffing/ New bonuses Staffing/ 
New policies/ New Products/ New Recruitment 
machinery/ New Machinery Investment products/ 
I n vestmentp~()dll~~~ .... Investment 
•• m ............................... . 

Investment Wages and Staffing/ Investment 
Has least Company New bonuses/ Recruitment New Company 
say policies machinery Investment machinery policies 
At the exploratory level, the greatest degree of perceived actual participation in decisions 
was in relation to the respondent's own job (Table 57). Respondents specifying some 
degree of influence over their job ranged from 44.1 per cent at Company Six down to 19 
per cent at Company Four (see Tables 5J-56). It is worth noting, however, that the job 
undertaken by the majority of Stage One respondents, bus driving, is generally semi­
autonomous in nature. Thus, compared with other roles in the firm, perceptions of 
greater job involvement (albeit still relatively small) are more likely, but this is probably 
more attributable to the nature of the job than to an 'involving' organisation culture. 
Health and safety was a further area where respondents had some degree of influence, 
though perceptions of actual influence were still relatively low across the cases and 
ranged from 23.7 per cent at Company Six down to 11.3 per cent at Company Four. 
Unlike respondents' own jobs, however, opportunities for greater influence over health 
and safety issues were more likely to be indirect: all firms had appointed health and 
safety representatives and held regular meetings, thereby giving employees a channel 
through which they could raise any concerns. At the other extreme, work areas where 
actual involvement was perceived to be low included: policy making; the purchase of 
new equipment; wages and bonuses; investment; staffing; and recruitment. Moreover, 
results from a K-W test presented in Table 58 show that, with the exception of 'company 
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policies' and 'investment', differences across the SIX firms for actual say over the 
remaining nine workplace decisions were significant at the 5 per cent level or below. 
Table 58: Actual participation: K-W test 
Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived Perceived 
Perceived own Perceived wages and health Perceived new new Perceived Perceived Percei',ed 
pOlicies de ot own job bonuses and safety staffing products machinery investment recruitment training 
Chi·Square 10.506 15.765 28.032 39.059 18.967 17.372 14.430 12.109 7.932 12.488 13.Ei83 
df 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Asyrnp. Sig. 
.062 .008'* .000'" .000'" .002" .004" .013' .033' .160 .029' .01S' 
*'* Significant at 0.00 I Significant at 0.01 * Significant at 0.05 
In addition, mean rank scores from the K-W test (full details of mean rank scores are 
presented in Appendix 17) reveal that Company Six respondents were most likely to 
participate in decisions for eight of the nine 'significant' workplace issues shown in 
Table 58. The exception was recruitment, where actual participation in decisions was 
found to be higher at Company Three. At the other extreme, and across all nine 
'significant' areas, Company Four respondents were least likely to participate in 
workplace decisions. Perhaps most notably, respondents at all three employee-owned 
companies had relatively low perceptions of participation in decision-making, which 
suggests that factors other than 'share ownership' may be important for actual EP 
opportunities in organisations. In addition, results in Table 59 reveal highly significant 
'participation gaps' across the six firms overall between desired participation and 
respondents' perceptions of actual participation for each workplace decision. Details of 
'participation gaps' for each individual organisation (p = 0.001) can be found in 
Appendix 18. 
Table 59: Actual and desired participation (means) - all cases 

(Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test - two-tailed) 

Gap 

~gr.:r.:'p~0>'P()Ii~i~~ 4.31 2.58 ................L?~........... .....9:Q9L~.~~_....  

Owndepot 4.10 2.24 1.86 0.001*** 
Own job 3.54 2.02 1.52 0.001 *** 
l.w.. ,.,.I.~,a£ge::s...:a=n•.d~....b:..o~.n::u:::s..e:.5:........... + ...........4..•.:.:2::5............. +....................~2::....1: ..6: +............... ..::2.,.0::=9...... 1............. 0; ..0;:.0~::1:*:::*:::*:l 

Healthandsafety 3.87 2.10 1.77 0.001*** 
.§~'.l.ffl!lg. ................................ .. 4.34.................................. }.55.. .... ....... ......!:7?... . ........... Q:.Qg,}.~_~~ 

New products 4.30 2.50 1.80 0.001 *** 
New machinery 4.39 2.63 1.76 0.001*** 

Investment 4.44 3.06 1.38 0.001*** 

......." .. , ........ , ................. 

Recruitment 4.38 3.04 '1:34 0.001*** 
Training 4.23 2.67 1.56 0.001 *** 
*** Significant (two-tailed) at 0.00 I 
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Stage Two respondents from all six organisations further reinforced the argument that 
employees generally had only limited opportunities for a 'direct say' in the activities of 
their enterprise. Opportunities for involvement and participation were primarily indirect 
and came via representation from trade unions and employee directors on the boards of 
firms. Four of the six cases - Company One, Company Two, Company Four and 
Company Six - had employee directors at the time of the Stage Two interviews. 
Company Five (A) also had employee directors from the time of the EBO in 1993 until 
the merger with Company B in 1997, though at the time of the Stage Two interviews in 
1998, the newly-created Company Five had no plans to resurrect these roles. Most 
organisations also had JCCs, works councils, or some kind of open forum where 
employees could put their points directly to managers. Methods used to circulate 
information to employees generally included notice boards, posters, 'in-house' 
newspapers and the more informal approaches of 'gossip' and the 'grapevine '. Further 
information on methods used to 'involve' employees and disseminate information is 
presented in Appendix 20i) and Appendices 12 and 13. 
Asked whether changes to their organisation's ownership structure - involving either a 
move to or away from ESO - had brought about changes in relation to EP in decision­
making, respondents indicated that ESO had generally provided more participation 
opportunities, albeit through indirect means. At Company Two, interviews were 
conducted shortly after the firm had moved on from employee ownership in June 1998. 
Although the organisation was still undergoing a period of transition at the time of the 
interviews, respondents commented that opportunities for EP had already diminished just 
two months after the sale. The TGWl chairman for the engineering staff summarised 
the views of other Stage Two respondents at the company: 
'We used to have four employee directors - we've now only got one and his 
influence isn't like it used to be. Certainly he's been kept a lot more in the dark 
in the last few weeks since the company has been bought out than he ever was 
before. He used to be kept up-to-date on a daily or weekly basis - now he seems 
to have very little information about what the company is going to do, what its 
strategy is, what its plans are. All those things in my opinion will make relations 
worse.' 
At Company Four, an employee director similarly described how employees had been 
given more opportunities for participation during the period of employee ownership: 
• .1.2 
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'When the employees owned the company there were regular briefings and 
seminars for all to attend. All aspects of the company would be open for 
discussion. This has now finished and there is resentment at the fragmentation of 
the workforce with differing wage rates and conditions. This resentment 
obviously spills over into lower morale.' 
Company Four's TGWU branch chairman said there was 'stacks of scope' to involve 
employees, but added that the firm just plays around the edges '. The respondent 
described how the managers just H'ant to do their own thing' but would be better off 
'getting people involved on the shop floor ': 
'Someone sitting at head office determines what changes are going to happen 
without consulting the people who actually drive the buses. A guy who is driving 
a bus up and down every day on a certain route - he knows where the problems 
are, they should be asking him, but it doesn't happen.' 
Similarly, the TGWU branch secretary said: 
'There's no communication. They've got consultative committees which are 
supposed to be forums for involving the employees on the shop floor and they 
rarely happen now, so there's no feedback. The only feedback you get is bad 
news - "this is what's happening, that's happening". There's no "right - let's sit 
down and have a local forum here, what's your problem - we'll sit back and 
listen". That just doesn't happen.' 
At Company Five, the move to ESO in a post-deregulation environment had acted as a 
'trigger' for managers giving employees more influence and providing them with more 
information. A garage manager, previously at employee-owned Company Five (AJ 
referred to a 'climate of secrecy' inherent within the NBC prior to deregulation when 
'information was a closely guarded secret '. The respondent added: 
'You didn't let the serfs know what was going on, so it's come on in leaps and 
bounds. I suppose really it took its first foothold in 1986 when deregulation came 
about and we then had to stand up and basically state our case to the troops about 
what was going on. They'd all heard about deregulation and privatisation - how 
was it going to affect them? That's what they wanted to know. And that's when 
the first glimpse of information being released happened.' 
Company Five's engineering director, who had also previously worked at the former 
employee-owned company, added that moving to ESO focused everyone on what had to 
be done for their organisation to succeed: 
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'There was more focus on where we needed to be and what we needed to achieve, 

because there was no guardian angel at [the council] to look after us. It was all 

down to us. The bank manager came to see us directly when things weren't going 

to plan. So we did need to focus everybody's attention on that. But we also 

wanted to know whether we were doing the right thing. We encouraged a lot 

more feedback. There were surveys flying around left, right and centre during the 

time we were owners. We wanted to get the feedback, we wanted people who did 

own a stake in the company to comment, not just leave it to us.' 

Prior to privatisation, opportunities for EP at the two London bus firms, Company Three 
and Company Six, had been restricted largely to representation by the trade unions. 
though this was regarded as a powerful medium for employee influence at that time. A 
TG WU branch representative from Company Six commented: 
'In years gone by, when the local rep said they [employees] were coming off the 
road over a dispute because someone had been sacked for a fairly obscure reason, 
then they [the union] had the power to just say "right, we're taking these buses off 
the road". Now that sort of ability has been taken away and therefore, for that 
reason alone, people do not feel they have their destiny in their own hands like 
they once had. Once they had a voice that could be expressed, albeit through 
their union. Now they don't feel they have that voice, because they're not 
allowed to have it.' 
No Stage Two respondents at Company Six thought that the move to employee ownership 
had provided more opportunities for EP in their organisation. The size of the employees' 
collective shareholding was very small and respondents witnessed no real changes in 
participation opportunities either during or 'post' employee ownership. In addition, the 
firm's TGWU secretary stated that the nature of bus driving and shift patterns made it 
difficult to get employees together in one location at the same time: 
'Sometimes drivers will go three or four weeks, if not more, and never meet. It's 
not like working on a shop floor, where you call everybody into a room for an 
hour's meeting. We'll never ever be able to get all the people together.' 
All six organisations were faced with a similar problem, though some were evidently able 
to overcome it more successfully than others. At Company Three, for example, 
opportunities for participation were said to have increased following privatisation and the 
move to employee ownership. One respondent, a TGWU representative and EBT trustee 
said: 
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'There was no involvement previously. I would say since 1994 when we moved 
towards a MEBO, changes took place and I think that has progressed. We've 
moved away from the "them and us".' 
A convenor, garage manager and human resources manager from the same company all 
said that employees could make suggestions to their line manager, either directly or in 
writing via the firm's in-house journal. The convenor added, however, that the unions 
'preferred' employees to approach the union rather than their line manager with ideas in 
the first instance: 
'The staff are quite free to go into management and make any suggestion they 
like, but the trade union would prefer that they come to us first so we can take it 
up at a level that's predominantly more effective.' 
At Company One. respondents similarly pointed to a general increase in EP following the 
EBO, though one respondent, an inspector and employee director, attributed the increase 
to a change in senior personnel rather than to ESO per se. A new managing director had 
been brought in after the 1993 buy-out and was, according to the respondent, 'more 
inclined to involve everyone earlier than the last managing director would have done. ' 
Among the firm's remaining respondents, employee directors and the TGWU were cited 
as the primary mechanisms by which employees had influence in the firm. The TGWU 
secretary said that at one point the firm had introduced suggestion schemes, though these 
were later scrapped because they 'were a total flop '. 
Comments from Stage Two respondents at the six firms suggest that opportunities for EP 
were related, in some part, to employee ownership. The comments also confirm earlier 
quantitative results that opportunities for actual 'direct' EP were generally limited, while 
indirect EP was far more likely. Conversely, Stage Two findings in relation to 'desired 
participation' were rather more at odds with Stage One results. In most cases, Stage Two 
respondents said that employees had no real interest in and were at best complacent 
about participating directly in the activities of their firm. 
At Company One a TGWU shop steward said that employees 'had no real expectations' 
of direct involvement, though they still wanted to be 'kept informed of the .firm's 
activities '. The company's engineering director said that employees still had the 'same 
mentality' under employee ownership as when the firm had been council-owned, 
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believing they would 'still get paid regardless' of the company's performance. 
Similarly, the inspector and employee director commented: 
'People still have the old attitude that "the company should be doing this for me 
and should be doing that for me". In my perception it should be "what can I do 
for the company? I am a shareholder. How can I make the company better off? 
Ifthe company is better off ultimately I will be better off'.' 
A sense of apathy was also apparent at Company Two, in that employees were said to be 
only interested in what they could gain financially from owning shares. Reflecting on 
the period of ESO, the operations director said: 
'I don't think the average lay member was interested. If you said to them 
"you've got 1,000 shares at £6.40 each, so you've got £6,400", then they're 
interested. What motivates one person will not motivate another.' 
Company Two's TGWU chairman admitted, however, that both the managers and the 
trade union were partly to blame for the apathy, since neither party was able to motivate 
or 'involve' employees sufficiently during the employee ownership period. The 
respondent commented: 
'We didn't reach out to the shareholders. We could have made the company a lot 
better if we had reached out to the shareholders, which was the workforce, and 
said "look lads and lasses - we're all in this together. We're all shareholders ­
the managing director is a shareholder and you're a shareholder. We're all in this 
together - let's try to make this company good." We could have done it as well, 
but there wasn't the resolve to do it.' 
Across the six cases generally, employees were given opportunities to raise issues with 
managers but in some instances failed to make use of available channels. Company 
Three's human resources manager highlighted the general problem: 
'There is always the opportunity for a driver to see his manager and talk to them­
and they do. It tends to be the guy who has a bee in his bonnet as opposed to the 
normal average guy who doesn't want to get involved but who may have an issue. 
That's where we probably miss out - the guy who comes in, does his job and has 
probably been thinking for the past thirty years - "why haven't they done XYZ". 
And he's been thinking that for thirty years and never said it.' 
Employees at Company Three appeared to be equally disinterested In receiving 
information about the organisation's activities. Minutes from lee meetings were 
regularly posted around the various depots but employees could not be bothered to read 
• 
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them. According to a traffic assistant. 'people just get Jed up with posters " while a 
TG WU representative said that 'even when we attach inJormation to their pay slips we 
find that the bin is pretty jidl ojletters '. 
Like Company Three, employees at Company Five were also given opportunities to raise 
issues directly with their managers. One particular forum was the weekly 'talk-back' 
session, which was chaired by the managing director and open to all employees. A garage 
manager, formerly at Company B, said: 
'A lot of them [employees] appreciated the fact they had the chance to sit there 
and talk to him [the managing director] personally for a couple of hours.' 
However, the TGWU branch secretary, also previously at Company B, put forward a very 
different view of the sessions: 
"'What a waste of time that was" - that's the most common comment [from 
employees]. He [the managing director] is very careful to steer the discussion 
away from things like conditions and wages and on to other things , .. ' 
Balancing the two extremes, the firm's operations manager, again formerly at Company 
B, said: 
'It varies. I've got some drivers - I can name names now, who will note down 
every bit of information we put on the board, go home and study it and there are 
other drivers who just couldn't care less, And somewhere in the middle are the 
majority of people who are interested but not vitally interested.' 
At Company Six respondents referred to a 'general disinterest with the company', 
Employees did not read notices posted around the depots and monthly union meetings 
were often poorly attended. According to the TGWU secretary, 'there's only a hardcore 
of people who are interested and it's usually Jor more selfish reasons '. Similarly, a 
TGWU representative said: 
'Certainly, when it comes to information, regardless of what you'd like to put up 
there, most people will take no notice of it. Most people would rather go and 
have a pint of beer than read anything to do with this company. When it comes to 
involvement, I don't think there could ever be any involvement of employees 
when commercial interests are the overriding priority,' 
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The respondent added that employees now regarded working in the industry as just a 
job', making it difficult for managers and the unions to arouse their interest and 
encourage them to take a greater interest in the activities of the firm: 
'Whereas this may have once been almost a vocation, now it's purely ajob until 
they can get something better, Years ago, you had a very small turnover in 
comparison with today, and people would very often spend thirty or forty years 
working in London Transport because of all the benefits it had - pay, pensions, 
sick pay and everything else and the fact it was a long-term job. Once you had a 
job with London Transport you were there for life. You could get a mortgage, 
buy a house. Unless you did something really bad, you had a respectable job with 
a pension and you were relatively well-off compared with some people. That no 
longer applies and maybe that's why a different type of person is now in this job 
who has little or no interest in it.' 
At Company Four, respondents lay the blame for employee apathy with managers. 
Employees were willing to get involved, though according to the TGWU chairman, 
'people aren 'f going to be involved if they're talking to a brick wall ': 
'We've had suggestions put forward on numerous occasions and they've been 
ignored so people say "what's the point?" That's what they say - "I might as well 
save my breath because they [the managers] are not going to take any notice of 
what's going on". It's pure apathy and 1can understand that. I know from my 
own experience that people are fed up with being ignored so they think "I might 
as well come to work, get my pay packet and do what 1have to do", and that's the 
attitude people have got.' 
Employees were also receiving less information compared with the days of employee 
ownership. A traffic manager at Company Four said: 
'There's a lack of information coming down to me from head office - we don't 
get as much information as we used to before. We used to have divisional 
seminars and company seminars, which unf011unately no longer take place. At 
this moment in time, I suppose if I was being realistic, there is a lack of 
information circulating throughout the company.' 
7.3 Employee-manager relations 
Results presented thus far in the chapter indicate that opportunities for direct EP were 
generally limited across the six organisations, irrespective of the ownership structure of 
individual cases. The results also reveal a contradiction in that Stage One respondents 
generally expressed a desire for more say in matters directly affecting their day-to-day 
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working lives, though were said by Stage Two respondents to be generally disinterested 
when such opportunities arose. 
This section aims to provide further insights into EP by examining relations between 
employees and their managers at the six companies. In particular, the analysis focuses on 
three possible arguments. Firstly, employees may be perfectly content to allow their 
managers to 'manage' where they perceive them to be capable and efficient in the role. 
Alternatively, employees may have concerns about their managers' abilities and seek a 
more active role in the organisation to address these concerns, particularly where they 
perceive their own job or financial investment to be at risk. Finally, employees may 
simply be unwilling to get involved; they may 110t feel confident enough to assume the 
additional responsibility, or they may be reluctant to be seen to 'move closer to 
management' . 
Using a three-item scale adapted from Poole and Jenkins (1990) and Pendleton et al 
( 1995a, b), the first stage of the analysis sets out to examine employee-manager relations 
at the six companies. The scale items focus on three main areas: firstly, social divisions 
and feelings of 'them and us' between managers and employees; secondly, the extent to 
which managers take notice of employees' ideas and experiences; and thirdly, whether 
employees perceive that managers are efficient in running their organisation. Further 
details of the scale items used are featured in Chapter 4 and Appendix 5. Exploratory 
results for the six cases are featured in Tables 60 to 65, followed by the results of a K-W 
test (Table 66) to identify significant differences, if any, between the organisations. 
Table 60: Employee-manager relations at Company One: shareholders and non-shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable Mean 
Social division 19.1 18.0 62.9 3.8 
Take notice 9.0 22.5 68.5 4.0 
.............." ............... ...........................-.... 

Managers efficient 22.4 19.1 58.5 3.67 
• 
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Table 61: Employee-manager relations at Company Two: shareholders and non-shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
I ... Variable 0/0 Mean 
Social division 20.6 16.7 62.7 3.76 
Take notice 9.9 19.8 70.3 3.92 
................................ ................ -.. " .............. . ..................... . 

Managers efficient 9.9 33.7 56.4 3.68 
Table 62: Employee-manager relations at Company Three: shareholders and non-shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 
Social division 27.8 20.1 52.1 3.45 
........ " ......... . ' ''f' ............ ....................... .. 

Take notice 14.6 22.3 63.1 3.81 
.........." ..... .......................... .., ....................... -.........." .................. - ................. ,........................ " ......... . 

Managers efficient 29.0 33.9 37.1 3.21 
Table 63: Employee-manager relations at Company Four: shareholders and non-shareholders 
Agree Neither agree! Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 
Social division 27.7 12.7 59.6 3.64 
................ ..... ,.. 

Take notice 9.8 12.1 78.1 4.13 
......,.................................. " ....... .,. .... 
 ..•••• ........H .....•• 

Managers efficient 21.9 29.4 48.7 3.47 
Table 64: Employee-manager relations at Company Five: shareholders and non-shareholders 
Agree Neither agree! Disagree 
disagree 
Variable Mean 
Social division 24.2 12.5 63.3 3.70 
.................................... .....".......
~
• • ...........M•••••••• •••
...... , .............. ..."'........
~ 
Take notice 14.3 16.0 69.7 3.90 
Managers efficient 27.5 36.7 40.8 3.36 
Table 65: Employee-manager relations at Company Six: shareholders and non-shareholders 
Agree Neither agree! Disagree 
disagree 
Variable % Mean 
Social division 30.4 33.7 35.9 3.08 
.................................. ............................................" .. " ... """,,........................... 
Take notice 20.6 28.3 5l.l 
.........................".... 
3.53 
Managers efficient 34.8 37.0 28.2 2.99 
Source: Stage One survey 1997!8 
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Table 66: Employee-manager relations: K-W test 
Social I Managers 
division Take notice efficient 
Chi-Square 22.211 21.271 25.526 
df 5 5 5 
Asymp. Sig. .000*** 0.001 ** .000*** 
••• Significant at 0.001 .* Significant at 0.01 
Results in Tables 60-65 present a rather mixed picture of employee-manager relations 
within each organisation, though some common patterns can be detected across the cases 
generally. For example, a majority of respondents from all organisations agreed that 
managers did not take notice of employees' ideas and experiences. At the same time, a 
majority from five of the six organisations (Company Six was the exception) did not 
perceive a social division between managers and employees. For the third scale item, a 
majority of respondents at two organisations (Company One and Company Two) 
indicated that managers were inefficient in running the enterprise. Across the four 
remaining cases, 28.2 per cent of Company Six respondents up to 48.7 per cent at 
Company Four regarded their managers as inefficient. 
The results of a K-W test presented in Table 66 show significant differences across the 
six cases for all three scale items. Moreover, mean rank scores from the test reveal that 
Company Six respondents were the most positive in their assessment of employee­
manager relations for two of the three scale items: they were most likely to agree that 
managers took notice of employees' ideas and experiences (mean rank: 323.91) and that 
managers were efficient in running the organisation (mean rank: 327. 13). However, 
Company Six respondents were also the most likely to identify a social division in their 
organisation (mean rank: 311.95). Conversely, Company Two respondents were the 
group least likely overall to identify a social division (mean rank: 433.80) but also least 
likely to judge managers as efficient in running the company (mean rank: 454.00). 
Finally, Company Four respondents were least likely to agree that managers took notice 
of employees' ideas and experiences (mean rank: 443.26). Further details of mean rank 
scores for all six companies are given in Appendix 19. 
Overall, Stage One assessments of employee-manager relations were rather less than 
positive, though some variation was found among the firms. The results also show that 
favourable assessments in one area of employee-manager relations do not necessarily 
carry over into other areas, as illustrated by the example of Company Six. It is further 
• 
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suggested that employee-manager relations are not always more harmonious in an 
environment of employee-ownership. For example, a majority of respondents in all three 
employee-owned companies agreed that managers did not take on board employees' 
ideas and experiences, while in two of the three cases (Company Three was the 
exception), managers were considered to be inefficient in running the firm. 
At a qualitative level, Stage Two trade union respondents across all six cases generally 
regarded managers as efficient, in that buses ran on time and organisations were 
profitable. However, on a 'softer HRM' level, managers were seen as inefficient and 
uncaring when it came to recognising and addressing the concerns of their workforce. 
Comments from trade union respondents at Company Six that managers retained their 
routes fairly well but were guilty of 'cutting corners' in other respects were fairly typical 
of views found in all cases. The TGWU branch secretary at Company Six said: 
'Yes, they [managers] probably are effective because they had to cut wages and 
they had to start running a profitable business. Unfortunately with this trade it's 
a public service and running it for a profit creates a conflict. The reason why a 
lot of staff have gone is because of that conflict with profitability and running a 
service. They have changed too many things and it's caused such upheaval in 
this industry. So from that point of view there are many things they could have 
done better.' 
The conflict between hitting targets and addressing employees' concerns was similarly 
highlighted at the remaining organisations. At Company Two, for example, respondents 
spoke of a 15 per cent profit margin target set by the new management team in the 
aftermath of the 1998 take-over. The managing director said: 
'It's going to be achieved one way or the other. Whether that's achieved by a 
friendly dialogue or by each side chucking threats across the table remains to be 
seen.' 
Observations from Company Four respondents ran along similar lines. Typical 
comments included 'no such thing as discussion and consultation', 'all decisions come 
from head office' and 'no time to consider employees '. A TGWU representative 
described managers as 'money-oriented' who just wanted 'their pound offlesh ': 
'They don't seem to have any consideration for the people who are working for 
them. They're cutting down right across the board; they're cutting down on 
electricians, they're cutting down on fitters, they're cutting down on the uniform 
• 
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supply - anything at all they're cutting down on - cutting back, cutting back ­
anything to save money.' 
At a further two firms, Company One and Company Five, respondents indicated that they 
did not always agree with the methods of their managers, but added that methods used 
had proved successful for the companies involved. A foreman at Company Five said that 
the firm was making profits and winning a lot of awards, 'so they must be doing 
something right'. Similarly. an inspector and employee director at Company One said he 
did not always agree with the way managers ran the enterprise, 'but they are doing it fine 
so J think they are managing.' Respondents at Company Three also held the view that 
managers were generally effective. One respondent, a TGWU representative and traffic 
assistant, said that the effectiveness of managers could be judged by the fact that 
Company Three was the most successful, in profitability terms, of all the privatised 
London bus operators. A further respondent at the company, a TGWU representative 
and EBT trustee, said that managers were not effective without the trade union: 
'Unity and purpose are our goals and I believe that they [managers] take the same 
view. It's actually our constitution, we can't move from that and I think they've 
taken that on board. We will have our arguments obviously, but there is one goal 
and that is working for the company.' 
Despite a general consensus that managers were sometimes inefficient when it came to 
addressing 'softer' employee concerns, respondents across the six companies 
acknowledged that it was impossible to satisfy all employees. Typical comments 
included 'you will always get people that object to everything' (Company Five), 'people 
are always moaning about the way the managers treat them' (Company Six) and 
'management will never ever get the support of the workforce in any company' 
(Company Three). Employees were often seen as suspicious of management attempts to 
'break down barriers' and were keen to maintain a 'them and us' status quo because 
'they knew where they stood'. The traffic manager at Company Six summarised the 
general feeling of many Stage Two respondents: 
'It is the workers who put the barriers there because they want the barriers there. 
They don't feel safe once they're "into management". Until you break that 
barrier down I don't think you are going to get a really good working 
relationship. ' 
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Commenting on the situation in his own firm, Company Three's human resources 
manager referred to 'a certain suspicion of management's motives, generally speaking', 
The respondent said there was a 'reasonable relationship' between some staff and 
individual managers, but added that 'if you look at management as a group, there isn't 
the same sort of loyalty and commitment.' A TGWU representative and traffic assistant 
at the company said that 'most [employees} don '( know who the directors are, or who the 
senior managers are '. However, a garage manager said that the trade unions also had an 
important role to play, in that employees' views of their managers would be determined 
in part by union recommendation. 
7.4 Employee-trade union relations 
While a majority of respondents in two of the three employee-owned cases (Company 
One and Company Two) considered their managers to be inefficient, results presented in 
the previous section indicate 110 specific patterns in relation to ESO and employee­
manager relations. Moreover, for all six cases, respondents' views on the general state of 
employee-manager relations within their own company were mixed. In general, a 
majority of respondents agreed there was no social division in their company, but also 
agreed that managers did not take notice of employees' ideas and experiences. Stage 
Two respondents suggested that employees themselves were keen to maintain the 'status 
quo' and 'them and us' divisions and were often suspicious of managers' motives to 
establish a more co-operative working relationship. The role of the trade unions in 
influencing the opinions that employees had of their managers was also seen as 
important. 
Results from section 7.3 thus provide little evidence to suggest that ESO aligns the aims 
and goals of employees and their managers. In turn, employees in employee-owned 
companies may still look to their trade union for representation, particularly where they 
have concerns about the way in which managers are running the company, or are 
dissatisfied with opportunities for participation and involvement. Alternatively, even 
where employees have 110 such concerns and enjoy good relations with their managers, 
they may still regard trade unions as being necessary and desirable (see Pendleton et al 
1995b), though this may depend on the nature of the industry. 
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In the final part of the chapter, the focus moves to employee-trade union relations. 
Results are drawn from responses to a nine-item scale adapted from Angle and Perry 
(1986). Among the areas examined by the scale are commitment to the union and dual 
commitment (see Chapter 4). For the Stage One survey, responses (shareholders and 
non-shareholders combined) were placed on a scale of 1 ('strongly agree') to 5 ('strongly 
disagree') for each item but were then merged into three main categories ('agree', 
'neither agree/disagree', 'disagree') to assist in a clearer presentation of results. Tables 
67 to 72 outline the main exploratory findings, followed by a summary of 'within case' 
rankings in Table 73, multiple regression analysis exploring possible predictors of dual 
commitment in Table 74 and the results of a K-W test in Table 75. Finally, multiple 
regression models examining the impact of employee, trade union and organisational 
characteristics upon desired and actual EP are presented in Table 76 and Table 77. 
Table 67: 	 Employee-trade union relations at Company One: shareholders and non-
shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
MeanVariable 
27.6 46.0 26.4 2.99 ........_..................,.......................""......... ..
gCl:~y~'?~~)'?yCl:I .. 
········ji:·o 51.8 3.56Talk up 17.2 

Hard to agree 27.5 33.3 39.2 3.26 

.........................." ........." ......"".......................................................... 

31.0 32.3 2.92Ir.r:1.p'?~Cl:.l!~T'?I~ .. 36.7 

Concessions 43.0 ..............................",......"............,,,................n·'·· ...... ..............-...................................
33.7 23.3 2.76 
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25.3 2.68 
........",,,...................... H.._ .......... ,, ............. • ..•
Worker influence 45.9... ......... 28.8 	 ................................" 

18.4 2.33Survival 	 55.2 26.4 
Table 68: 	 Employee-trade union relations at Company Two: shareholders and non-
shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
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Table 69: 	 Employee-trade union relations at Company Three: shareholders and non-
shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable Mean 

Easy to be loyal 35.4 32.3 
 32.3 3.03 

Talk... ~.:.c................................................... ml...............................~2:::.:3:...:..6~ .........................mf m..?(j·!...m.m.................... 50.3 3.42 

........................................ ,.. 	 ........................--.... . ... .­.tIa~~!9~g~~~. 27.5 33.8 
" 
38.7 
'"~ 
3.21 
....... .......................... 
}J!lP()rt~rJtrole 39.5 18.5 42.0 3.06
.- ..."'.............. , ........._...... . 

Concessions 	 57.0 16.7 26.3 2.54..................... ,..................... ,..... -... ,,,..........,,",,.. 

t:.:()~operate 	 67.2 16.7 16.1 2.14 
.......... -1 ................ 

Lost influence 66.7 13.5 19.8 2.18 
Worker influence 32.2 ....................... +...............................2...:...6.:..... 8, ..................... , ............4:..1.0 3.19 

Survival 62.4 15.4 22.2 2.34 

Table 70: 	 Employee-trade union relations at Company Four: shareholders and non-
shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
Variable 	 % Mean 
Easy to be ....l..o.:..y"al ............... 1 .........................2....2.........5................................ 1 25.5 52.0 3.55 

...................._...... 

Talk up 	 24.4 26.8 48.8 3.38
.................... + ··.·..... ·..... m·.·......... . 

IHClr~ t()~gree 25.9 .................... ...... I 32.8 41.3 3.27 
3.15·················· IJ!lP9'.!~rJtE()I~ . 35.3 20.1 44.6 
It:.:gncessions 50.2 20.3 29.5 2.71 
............. ............ ... •••••....., ••· •••••.,.M.·•• 

of ·········································1 
.. t:.:0:()p~~ate .... 64.9 16.8 18.3 2.30 
69.5 	 9.0 21.5 2.061 Lost infl~ence ........ 1. 
................ 
Worker mfluence 34.9 32.0 33.1 3.01 
.........................."" 

Survival 	 62.1 16.7 21.2 2.25 
Table 71: 	 Employee-trade union relations at Company Five: shareholders and non-
shareholders 
Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
% 	 ~eanVariable 
40.2 45.1 3.53
.. I.?~~y~<?~e loy~I.... 14.7 	 ........................... , ....... 

... TCl!~.l:!P .............................. 20.6 31.4 ........................... ~?.:Q 3.39 
Hard to 21.6 44.1 34.3_ 3.18 
30.3 32.4 37.3 3.16 

Concessions 41.5 28.7 29.8 2.83 

IIl"lPC?'.!ant ro 1 e 	 ....... ,........_.."""' ..... -. 

32.4 18.6 2.59 
.. t:.:():9.p~rat~.... 49.0 ..._.................,.............. 

Lost influence 72.6 14.7 12.7 1.87 
........ ·.m.... ·"·.... 
~.~............... +...........................;., ...  

"" " 36.3 3.09Worker influence 30.4 -'-' .-' ..................... - ......" ............. . 

Survival 	 58.4 25.7 15.9 2.30 
Table 72: 	 Employee-trade union relations at Company Six: shareholders and non-

shareholders 

Agree Neither agree/ Disagree 
disagree 
.. 
Variable 	 % Mean 
35.1 36.3 28.6 2.90
..... §~~y.~C?i?~!()y(lI.... .. 	 ....... ................. ,,--- ............ 

20.6 23.0 56.4 3.54I~I~llP. 	 ......... .. 

30.4 	 24.1 2.86
.. lj~r~!()ag~~<:. . 
30.8 	 2.88
.. }I11PC?r:t:Clr:t.~()It:: 38.5 
38.4 15.2 2.47C()~ces~ions 	 46.2 
.............................. •..•..•. ... 

..c:()~?p~~Clte 58.3 32.9 
~ 
8.8 2.19 
Lost influence "92 18.4 22.4 2.29 
··········································1···········.............-'.: . 

Worker influence 25.0 43.4 34.6 3.14 

Survival 60.8 22.8 16.6 2.25 

Sou ree: Stage One survey 1997/8 

Table 73" 	 Attitudes towards the t rade umons - ,Wit. h'In-groups' rankings 
Company 	 I Company I Company i CompallY Company Company I IOne Two Three Four Five 	 Si'C 
Most likely Survival Lost Co-operate! 	 Lost Lost Survival 
influence influenceto agree 	 influence Lost 
. .... ..........-...,,, ... ........._.. .......................-............. 
............. 

...~ 
Lost Co-operate influence Co-operate Survival 	 Lost 
influence
,influence 	
........ ............., ... ....... ,............... -- ... ,,-.

" ... ".........,,-.
........... ....... .. ....... 
. ........... 
"" . 

.•• ...........'.....'N .. ··.. •···•
.c:C?-:?p~ra.t.~.. ... Survival Survival Survival ......... .....g?:()P~E(lt.~ ....... <::?:()perat~ .. 

Worker Concessions Concessions Concessions Concessions 	 Concessions 
influence 	
...... ,... ..... ........................ ,' ....... ,. ..... " .........................
' 
ImportantConcessions 	 Important Important Important Worker 
role role role! influence role . .... ........... , ......... , . 
......f······ 
Important 	 Worker Easy to be Worker Important Easy to be 
influence loyal influence role loyalrole 
Hard to Hard toHard to Hard to Worker Hard to 
agree! agree! influence 
........ 
mm~gr.~e .. .................. ... ~g:.~<:... .. ............... .,,:gt~e .... 
Easy to be Easy to be Hard to Talk up Talk-up Worker 
,,. 	 influenceloy~l. 	 loyal! agree .........-. .......... ....... 
Talk up Talk up Easy to be Easy to be 
" 
Talk upLeast likely Talk up 

loyal loyal
to agree 	 I 
Exploratory results presented in Tables 67 to 72 indicate that attitudes towards the trade 
unions were 	rather mixed within each of the organisations, though as in previous 
sections, patterns were detected across the six cases generally (Table 73). In all cases, a 
majority of respondents agreed that their union had lost some of its influence in recent 
years. It is suggested, however, that the level of consensus shown by respondents in 
relation to this item reflected as much the diminishing powers of trade unions generally 
since the 19805 as anything particular to the individual enterprise at the time of the 
survey. Notwithstanding, a majority cared about the survival of their union, while 
around half or more respondents from each company said their union tried to co-operate 
--------------------------~ ,.................................................................... 

with managers. There was also a considerable level of agreement that the unions made 
concessions to avoid problems, with a majority of respondents in three cases (Company 
Two, Company Three and Company Four) agreeing that concessions were made. At the 
same time, relatively few respondents across the six cases (up to a maximum of 30.4 per 
cent at Company Six) said they found it hard to agree with the policies of their union. 
Responses to the remaining scale items highlight those areas where respondents were 
perhaps dissatisfied, or at best indifferent, to their trade union and the role ofthe union in 
the enterprise. Well under half in each case said the union currently played an important 
role in their company, while around one-third of respondents in each of four companies 
(Two, Three, Four and Five) said the best way to obtain influence was through the trade 
union. At the two extremes, Company One respondents were the most likely to gain 
influence through their union (45.9 per cent) and Company Six respondents the least 
likely (25 per cent). Though still less than half, the result for Company One suggests that 
ESO had not 'displaced' the importance of union representation in the eyes of the 
company's employees. Nevertheless, Company One respondents indicated some 
dissatisfaction with their union in that only 17.2 per cent felt able to speak highly of their 
union to others, though responses to this item were generally less than positive across all 
SIX cases. 
The notion of dual commitment was similarly a problematic one for respondents. In all 
cases, only a minority - down to 14.7 per cent at Company Five - agreed that it was easy 
to be loyal to both their managers and trade union. As discussed earlier in section 7.1, 
the extent to which employees are able to demonstrate dual commitment may be seen as 
a reflection of the state of relations between the different parties. A regression model 
presented in Table 74 confirms the significance (p<O.OOl) of both employee-manager 
('social division') and employee-trade union relations ('union effectiveness') upon dual 
commitment. Dual commitment is less likely where there is seen to be a social division 
within the firm, but more likely where trade unions are considered to be effective. The 
model also reveals a significant and positive association between dual commitment and 
ESO, though at the 'company' rather than the 'individual shareholder' level (see section 
4.48 in Chapter 4 and Appendix 7 for a discussion of the different variables used in the 
regression model). 
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Table 74: Determinants of 'dual loyalty' (multiple regression) 

Variable Beta Coefficients t-values 

Union effectiveness 0.274 7.659'" 

Social division 0.147 
-4.115'" 

Employee shareholder status -0.3 77 
-0.707 

Employee owned company 0.127 3.559*'* 

Constant 
r - 0.344 r] 0.1 18 Adjusted / 0.115 
Significant at 0.001 
Results suggest, therefore, that ESO may lead to a greater likelihood of dual 
commitment, in that relations between the major parties are more co-operative since all 
sides have an interest in the company's sLiccess. However, as shown by earlier results in 
this section and in section 7.3, ESO is no guarantee of a more co-operative industrial 
relations climate. Moreover, the somewhat indifferent views to emerge from respondents 
across the six cases in relation to both their managers and trade unions go some way to 
explaining why a majority in each case found it difficult to demonstrate dual 
commitment. 
That none of the SIX cases 'stands out' in terms of a wholly positive or negative 
assessment of their trade union is further confirmed by results of a K-W test in Table 75. 
While the table shows significant differences on three scale items - 'easy to be loyal', 
'co-operate' and 'lost inf1uence', an examination of mean rank scores finds no single 
company emerging as 'significantly' different from the other cases overall. 
Table 75: Employee-trade union relations: K-W test 
Lost WorkerEasy to be Hard to Important 
Talk UP aqree role Concessions Co-operate infiuence influence Survivallaval 
16.712 24.354 9.333 1.322Chi-Square 28.896 3.886 7.297 4.767 7.231 
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5df 5 
.445 .204 .005** .000'" .097 .933Asymp.5ig. .000*" .566 .200 

••• Significant at 0.001 •• Significant at 0.01 

Company Six respondents were generally the most likely to show loyalty to both their 

managers and trade union (mean rank: 313.32) and Company Four respondents were the 

least likely (mean rank: 414.36). Additionally, Company Three respondents were most 

likely to report union-manager co-operation (mean rank: 330.89) and Company Five 

respondents the least likely (mean rank: 422.80). Finally, Company Five respondents 

were the most likely overall to say their union had lost a lot of influence in recent years 
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(mean rank: 323.90) while Company One respondents (mean rank: 442.46) were the 
least likely. Further details of mean rank scores are presented in Appendix 20. 
When combined with a number of 'key predictors', employees' attitudes to their union 
appeared to have limited impact upon levels of desired and actual participation in 
decision-making. However, Table 76 shows that individual share ownership had a strong 
significant effect (p<O.OO I) on desired participation levels. Thus, employees who owned 
shares in their company were more likely to want a say in workplace decisions. 
Moreover, in Table 77, management efficiency is shown to be positively associated with 
actual participation (p<O.OO 1), suggesting that managers are regarded as more efficient 
when employees participate in workplace decisions. The ownership status of the 
company (though not the shareholder status of the employee) is also positively associated 
with actual participation (p<O.OO 1) and indicates that actual EP is more likely where the 
company is an employee-owned company, though only in combination with other factors. 
Table 76: 	 The impact of employee, trade union and organisational characteristics 
on desired participation in decision-making (multiple regression) 
Variable Beta Coefficients t-values 
Union effectiveness 0.031 0.884 
Employee shareholder status 0.390 11.153'" 
Employee-owned company 0.100 1.849 
Trade union membership -0.0 II -0.307 
Management efficiency 0.067 1.899 
Constant 217.743'" 
r = 0.390 r2 0.152 Adjusted / 0.151 
Significant at 0.00 I 
Table 77: The impact of employee, trade union and organisational characteristics on 
actual participation in decision-making (multiple regression) 
Variable Beta Coefficients t-values 
Union effectiveness 0.008 0.226 
Employee shareholder status -0.94 -1.705 
Employee-owned company 0.350 9.918'" 
Trade union membership 0.016 0.455 
Management efficiency 0.139 3.943'" 
Constant 	 174.810'" 
r=0.370 r2 0.137 Adjusted/ 0.135 
Significant at 0.00 I 
• 
Like Stage One results, Stage Two observations on the trade unions and of their role and 
influence were similarly varied, with both favourable and dissenting views emerging 
from each organisation. Without exception, unions were seen to playa key role in their 
enterprise in terms of listening to members' concerns, in trying to secure the best deals 
possible and passing on relevant information to members as required. However, union 
officers were sometimes unrealistic in their demands (Company One) and only concerned 
with their own interests (Company One, Company Three, Company Five and Company 
Six). Unions also needed to work harder to 'educate' employees in situations where 
unpopular decisions had to be taken for commercial reasons. Concerns were raised 
among some management respondents (Company Four and Company Six) that union 
officers were putting their own negative 'slant' on information passed to employees. 
Some managers, therefore, preferred to speak to employees directly to ensure that 
information was passed on accurately (Company Four), though others recognised the 
'benefits in having an organised representation' (Company Five). 
There was widespread consensus from both management and trade union respondents, 
however, that the unions were not as dominant as in previous years, though membership 
of the main union had remained stable in each company. In four companies (Two, Three, 
Five and Six), respondents said that in the current employment climate employees 
regarded trade union membership primarily as a form of 'insurance'. Comments from 
the Company Five (formerly Company Five (AJ) foreman summarised the general view: 
'The unions don't have a lot of power nowadays, yet the workers know they need 
the union - a union is probably an insurance policy. When I was a union 
representative 1 "sold" the union to people as an insurance policy. If you ever get 
into trouble they are there.' 
A number of respondents also observed that employees were often complacent about 
their union. For example, union branch meetings were often poorly attended, prompting 
a garage manager at Company Five to describe the role of a union steward as 'pretty soul 
destroying '. As well as branch meetings, a lack of support for the unions was evident in 
other ways, as highlighted by a traffic manager at Company Four: 
'I think the balance has certainly moved from the trade union dominating the 
situation when I came here, to the present situation where they cannot get the 
backing of their members on a lot of issues. They had a ballot recently for 
possible industrial action and got a majority of those who voted, but they couldn't 
even get 50 per cent of their workforce to vote.' 
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Echoing the views of the traffic manager was a TGWU representative from Company 
Six, who said that in the event of his own union calling for industrial action 'it's very 
possible that you wouldn't get as much support as you might have done afew years ago '. 
A changing membership profile was among the reasons put forward for dwindling union 
support in a number of cases. For example, the garage manager at Company Five 
(formerly Company Five (AJ) said: 
'At the last count 70 per cent of the staff hadn't been in the union two years. The 
membership needs to have some age and service under its belt before it starts being 
supportive of its trade union leaders. Unfortunately, with such a new group of 
people, they don't know any previous history of what's gone on and they're not 
that supportive.' 
In contrast, employees at Company One and Company Two were said to support their 
union and were willing to take industrial action if necessary. Shortly before the Stage 
Two interviews, Company One had gone through a series of industrial stoppages and 
according to the TGWU secretary, the response from employees voting for strike action 
was the biggest in the company's history. However, an inspector and employee director 
at the company concluded that 'management involves the unions too much' and described 
the union as being 'pampered' by managers. The respondent recognised, however, that it 
was probably a deliberate strategy to get employees 'on side' and 'to help smooth the 
transition when there are changes '. 
Company Three's human resources manager highlighted a similar problem of 'too much 
union influence' in his own company: 
'At local level, managers would say they [the unions] have got too much power­
probably because they bear the brunt of it'. 
Views on the general state of industrial relations in each company were similarly varied. 
Across all cases, typical comments ranged from 'bad and getting worse', 'poor', 'okay', 
'reasonable' and 'pretty good' through to 'very good' and 'a high degree of co­
operation '. Company One illustrates well the extreme range of views to emerge from the 
Stage Two interviews. The TGWU secretary, for example, said that manager-union 
relations had just got worse', there was a climate of 'distrust', managers were 'out of 
touch' and did not know their staff. At the other extreme, the ACTS chairman described 
how managers 'involve the unions every step ofthe way '. 
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At Company Four views were clearly divided according to whether the respondent was 
from the trade union or management side. The TGWU secretary said there were 'no 
management/union relations' and described the current industrial relations climate as 
'very very weak'. Similarly, an employee director said he had 'never experienced such 
an untrusting and corifrontational union/management relationship in nearly thirty years 
in the company'. Comments from the TGWU chairman who had 'never known industrial 
relations to be at such a low' and describing employees as having 'no allegiance 
whatsoever' to their firm, paint a picture of a less than harmonious workplace. On the 
management side views were more positive in that respondents acknowledged that both 
sides did try to work together. Management respondents agreed there would always be 
arguments but that did not mean there could not be a good working relationship at the 
same time. One traffic manager commented: 
'They [the trade unions] have been very co-operative lately. We've put in some 
radical changes that have not been terribly palatable, but the trade union has gone 
along with them because they see that as the way to protect their members' jobs in 
the longer term.' 
At three companies, Company Three, Company Five and Company Six, respondents from 
both the management and trade union sides were generally in agreement that manager­
union relations were fairly co-operative at the present time, although there had been 
difficulties in the past. At Company Three, a TGWU representative and traffic assistant 
described how relations had 'improved tremendously' since the post-privatisation 
tensions of the mid-1990s. Similar comments came from a TGWU and health and safety 
representative who spoke of 'a steady improvement' since 1994, and from the human 
resources manager who described previously 'tetchy moments' between the two sides, 
but added that current manager-trade union relations were generally 'very good'. 
At Company Two, recent major changes within the enterprise had a very clear impact 
upon the views of Stage Two respondents. The TGWU chairman for the engineering 
workers described industrial relations as 'a lot worse' than they had been for a long time, 
though this was related, in part, to impending redundancies. The engineering unions 
were described as being 'very apprehensive about the future' and 'looking at industrial 
action '. Some respondents referred back to the time of employee ownership, typified by 
'give and take on both sides', One example of 'give and take' occurred during the mid­
1990s when ACAS was brought into the firm to help resolve industrial relations 
224 
-
~ ~,------------------------......................................................................... 

-
problems between managers and the union. The TGWU chairman said that the two sides 
did not suddenly become 'bosom buddies' following the ACAS intervention, though 
there was a different perspective and a move away from the 'tunnel vision' that had 
characterised the relationship previously. However, there was a general consensus that 
under the new owners, the relationship would revert back to one of 'us and them'. The 
firm's managing director said that future industrial relations would be marked by less 
consultation compared with the period of employee ownership, though this was attributed 
primarily to increased work pressures, the pursuit of more stringent business targets and 
a lack of time. Describing industrial relations during the period of ESO, the respondent 
referred to 'endless dialogue' and 'endless debates', which would disappear under the 
new ownership structure: 
'I think certainly in the days of employee ownership we spent a lot of time in 
informative discussion but perhaps we won't in the future - just because of the 
pressure oftime.' 
7.5 Summary 
Chapter 7 set out to examine EP and the extent to which ESO and industrial relations 
were important predictors of EP in decision-making. The chapter was underpinned by a 
number of key questions. First, was actual EP greater in employee-owned companies 
than in the 'post-ESO' enterprises and if so, was actual EP more likely to be found in 
some forms of employee-owned organisation than others? Second, was desire for 
participation in decision-making less where employees were satisfied with the way their 
managers ran the organisation? Third, did employees look to their trade union to secure 
participation in decisions, even if theirs was an employee-owned company? Finally, to 
what extent did employees' relationship with their managers and trade union influence 
their ability to show commitment to both parties simultaneously? As discussed at the 
beginning of the chapter, non-shareholders in an employee-owned enterprise could, like 
employee-shareholders, benefit from working in a more involving and democratic 
environment. Hence, the Stage One analysis was undertaken at the 'organisational' level, 
whereby the responses of shareholders and non-shareholders in the employee-owned 
firms were combined for the purposes of analysis. 
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Results presented in the chapter indicate that at a quantitative level, 'actual EP' was not 
found to any greater degree in the employee-owned organisations than in the 'post-ESO 
firms'. Moreover, in some cases, employees working in the latter were more likely to 
have actual influence in decision-making. One possible reason is that respondents at the 
three employee-owned companies had greater expectations of actual participation than 
were realised in practice, hence the fairly negative responses in each case. Employees' 
expectations of participation are beyond the scope of this thesis, though it is suggested 
that future work might focus on an examination of the 'participation expectation gap' 
between employees' expectations and actual participation. An investigation of this 
nature would require a rigorous longitudinal approach and will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter 9. 
Notwithstanding, actual EP was generally limited across all of the cases, though where 
apparent, was most likely to be found in relation to the respondent's own job and health 
and safety arrangements. However, the job undertaken by the majority of Stage One 
respondents was semi-autonomous in nature, so perceptions of greater influence over the 
job are not unexpected. Each firm had also appointed health and safety representatives, 
providing employees with a channel, albeit indirect, where they could raise any concerns. 
Typically, all of the companies also had other forms of 'indirect' participation, for 
example, employee directors, works councils or JCCs, though qualitative observations 
from respondents at the post employee buy-out firms indicated that these channels were 
generally more powerful when they operated in an ESO environment. Moreover, ESO 
was found to be important for actual EP in combination with certain aspects of the 
organ isation' s industrial relations cl imate, such as the efficiency of managers. 
Despite some degree of actual EP in relation to job and health and safety issues, a 
majority of respondents in each case wanted greater influence in these areas, as well as in 
areas such as pay and the activities of their own depot. At the same time, employees will 
often say they want more responsibility than they actually have, but then shy away from 
that responsibility if it is offered - a premise confirmed by findings from Stage Two 
respondents. Employees were said to be generally disinterested in having more influence 
in their company and ESO appeared to make little difference. One respondent at 
Company Two concluded that shares only really meant anything to employees if they 
were able to realise their worth. Financial rewards aside, the notion that a 'sense of 
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ownership' would encourage employees to become more 'actively involved' was not 
realised in the employee-owned companies. 
The second theme examined in the chapter concerned relations between employees and 
their managers and the impact upon desired participation outcomes. Within the ESO 
literature, arguments have been put forward that employees would express a desire to 
become more involved in the running of their organisation only if they were concerned 
with the way the organisation was being run and if their investment in the company was 
at risk. Alternatively, employees may have been content for managers to manage if they 
regarded them as able to protect their investment. A third alternative is that, irrespective 
of relations with managers, employees were simply unwilling to become involved in the 
activities of their organisation, either because they did not feel confident enough to 
assume the additional responsibility or because they did not wish to move 'closer to 
management' . 
At the quantitative level, exploratory results painted a rather mixed picture of employee­
manager relations across the six cases. With the exception of one case (Company Six), a 
majority of respondents in each of the five remaining companies agreed there were no 
divisions between managers and employees, while a majority in two organisations 
(Company One and Company Two) regarded their managers as inefficient. Across all 
organisations, however, a majority of respondents agreed that managers did not listen to 
employees' ideas and experiences. Once again, ESO on its own appeared to have 
relatively little impact upon the attitudes of employees to their managers, though as 
previously highlighted, a combination of ESO and management efficiency was important 
for actual participation outcomes. 
There was little evidence to suggest that employees wanted more say in how their 
organisation was run where they were dissatisfied with the methods of management. 
Indeed, conclusions from the Stage Two interviews suggest that employees were 
generally reluctant to become more involved and work co-operatively with managers, 
even in the employee-owned organisations. At Company Three, for example, 
respondents described how employees were suspicious of managers' motives and were 
keen to maintain 'employee-manager divisions' in the organisation. 
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It is perhaps, therefore, of little surprise that trade unions were still seen as relevant and 
important for giving employees a voice in their firm. In each case, around half or more 
respondents said their union tried to co-operate with managers, suggesting once again 
that ESO on its own was not a key factor. In combination with aspects of 'employee­
trade union' and 'employee-manager' relations, however, ESO was important for dual 
commitment in the organisation. Moreover, qualitative results reveal that the trade 
unions were important for listening to their members' concerns, in trying to secure the 
best deals possible for the workforce and in passing on relevant information to members 
as required. Union officers needed to work harder, however, to secure the commitment 
of their members who often regarded their union simply as a form of insurance. In 
addition, union officers were sometimes guilty of putting their own 'slant' on 
information, which led to negative repercussions. At the same time, employees were said 
to be complacent about their union, offering only limited support and rarely attending 
branch meetings. Such a variety of both favourable and less favourable observations 
from Stage Two respondents were generally found in all of the organisations and suggest 
that 'case-specific' factors, experiences unique to the individual respondent, plus 
historical factors, played a larger part in influencing attitudes than ESO per se. 
In conclusion, results indicate that ESO in isolation is no universal panacea for 
organisations. Managers are no more likely, necessarily, to take notice of the ideas and 
experiences of their employees and there is no guarantee of actual greater EP even where 
employees own a majority of the organisation's equity. Moreover, employees are not 
always more interested in exercising greater influence than their counterparts in 
organisations without ESO. Nevertheless, in combination with other factors, ESO can be 
significant for both EP and industrial relations outcomes, though the individual 
circumstances of each organisation are also key. One might argue for an approach to 
research in the field that 'excludes' from the analysis variables unique to the individual 
case that could 'cloud' the potential impact of ESO upon organisations. However, as 
argued throughout the thesis, attempts to exclude 'case-specific' factors would be to 
ignore the value of complex inter-relationships, the experiences of individuals, plus 
historical and other contextual factors within these organisations. Instead, it is important 
that future studies continue with a more 'holistic' research approach to aid a full and 
realistic understanding of the ESO phenomenon. 
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8.0 Durability of employee share ownership 
8.1. Introduction 
Chapter 8 examines whether reasons for ESO and the methods by which companies have 
created this organisational form are important for their durability as wholly or part 
employee-owned entities. Given the relatively short life-spans of UK bus companies 
operating under employee ownership (see Chapter 5), an alternative premise is that ESO 
was always going to be a transitional phenomenon within the industry, regardless of the 
model chosen by individual companies. Reasons for the susceptibility of bus companies 
and of employee-owned firms generally to take-overs were discussed earlier in the thesis. 
Findings in this chapter are based largely on Stage Two qualitative data and 
supplementary Stage One quantitative data from the three 'post-ESO' cases - Company 
Four. Company Five (A) and Company Six. The three companies entered into ESO 
arrangements to varying degrees during the late 80s or early 90s and had subsequently 
been 'sold on' to other transport groups by 1997. 
An examination of factors seen as contributing to the 'durability' of ESO in each of the 
three companies provides the main focus for the chapter. The factors include: the model 
of ESO adopted by each company at the outset; the objectives and motives behind the 
introduction of each ESO scheme; the involvement of key actors in the conversions; and 
the ways in which the schemes were operated and managed. Reflections from Stage Two 
respondents in relation to lessons learned from the successes and failures of their 
schemes, the impact of ESO upon employee attitudes and behaviours and the extent to 
which ESO objectives were met within each company are also presented in the chapter. 
The responses of those either directly involved in ownership changes, both pre and post­
ESO, and/or those with extensive knowledge of and involvement in related activities 
within their organisations were documented and subsequently analysed using role­
ordered matrices and partially-ordered meta-matrices. Further details of respondents and 
methods used were given in Chapter 4. As far as possible, it was the intention to obtain 
detailed information from all respondents in relation to each of the factors outlined 
above. However, the degree to which individuals were able to comment on each factor 
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naturally varied according to their involvement in ESO activities - whether as an EBT 
trustee, a member of a buy-out steering group or some other similar role. 
The first part of the chapter examines the main objectives of ESO at each company. An 
examination of objectives is central to the analysis, given that companies may enter into 
ESO with particular aims in mind. For example, some companies may regard ESO as 
only a short-term strategy at the outset, whereas others may see it as a more long-term 
arrangement. Ben-Ner (1988: 289) described employee-owned companies as 'strategic 
collections of self-interested individuals' who design and redesign their companies to 
best meet their own interests. 
The chapter also examines whether ESO created a 'sense of ownership' among 
employees at the three firms and subsequently led to changes in their attitudes and 
behaviours, including increasing their efficiency at work and changing their relationship 
with their trade union. Stage Two respondents also reflect on the lessons leamed from 
their own experiences of ESO, particularly the perceived successes and failures of their 
own scheme, plus alternative employee ownership strategies that could have been 
pursued in each case. The chapter also presents quantitative data collected during the 
Stage One survey from both Company Four and Company Six, which examines the views 
of employees as to whether their companies should have maintained their employee 
ownership status. At the request of the managing director, these data were not collected 
from Stage One respondents who had previously worked at Company Five (Aj. 
Before the main analysis, Figures 14 to 16 present summaries of key events in the history 
of each company. Event-listing matrices, which were used for the purpose (see Chapter 
4), allow the researcher to obtain an initial grasp of events in a summarised form and 
assist in suggesting subsequent lines of deeper analysis and interpretation to follow. The 
matrices, created using largely documentary data from each company, highlight a number 
of key areas including: the background to ESO in each case; details of the share offer; 
operation of the scheme; negotiating structures; and events surrounding the demise of 
ESO at each company. Further historical details of the three cases were presented in 
Chapter 5, while matrices created to assist in the main qualitative analysis for this 
chapter can be found in Appendices 12 and 13. 
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Figure 14: ESO at Companv Four - formation, life-span and demise 
Key dates Key events and details 
March 1989 Background to ESO 
• <=()l!1P~l1yl!1()y~~toI=:s()f()[l(?~il1gEel.~.asefr()l!11()c::~I'l.llt~ority.():::"ll~E~hip .................... 

• 	 l\umber of alternatives for a buy-out considered, including EBO and MBO. Company 
finally decided upon a MEBO. Trade unions wanted all employees to be given the 
opportunity to own shares, while financing institutions wanted guarantees that targets 
would be met. 
• Buy-out was completed at a cost of £12.5 million 

Share offer 

• . ..... ,~..?:,~,~g~.~.~...~.~y.~.~,~.~.9...~},.9..?;.Q.9.Q...gf...p.~t~.9.I!.~.I._,.~q.~.~.~...~9.....f~.~.9..._~0,.~.. ,P~,~.~.~.~~.~ ........ ," 

• 6,000,000 shares were made available to employees 
Share allocation 
• 	 Managers received a majority 51 % shareholding through an ESOP. Within this stake, 
three executive directors acquired ownership of 30 per cent ofthe shares. Employees 
received 49% of the share allocation.I 	 ................. 

• l\umber of shares for employees included a service-related allocation of25 shares for 
.............. ~.~.c..h.. y~~r()f~~ryic.~(?~~~.h'l.pt~~?)m..... . .............. 
• Original value of 5 pence per share 

Eligibility criteria 

• 	 Participants had to be permanent employees of the company at 31 March 1989 and 
working more than 16 hours a week. Subsequently, 12 months' continuous service at 31 
March each year was required. 
Operation of the scheme 
• Money annually set aside by company board for ESOP was transferred to PST. 

................M.()I1~y .. fr()l!1 ...e§.I..:::".~~...ll.~.~~...!.CJ...~c.q.ll.i..r..~...~h.~E~~.h.~.l~....~y.~.?T..:......_. ......... ... ............... ............ ............................... 

• Five years after initial allocation, shares were due to be released from tax restrictions 

and transferred to participants. 

Negotiating structures 

• ",....~.~~.P.~..~.y....~,~<~.~.~.".....".." ......""....................on............... " ...m .........." ..." ........ , ..........................." ............ " .. , ..",..... , •• ""." ...." .................... , p, ........"._ .."'" ....... .. 

Board included three executive directors, other senior managers and two employee 
................~.!.~~.c!.CJ.r.?:...... ~.rrlPI.()y~~.A.i.~e~t().r?.hCl<!...~ig~.t.~.()r.y~~() .. ().ll... ~.~t!.~.i.l1...~~~!l:!.1':gic..A~c..i~.i..C?.t:t.~.:........................... 
• Other 
Joint Advisory Committee - included three executive directors, other senior managers 
all~fjy~~l:ll:ploy~e.repr~S.~l1!'l.t~y~? ..... mm.m.m. .. ..m .. 
Divisional ESOP Consultative Committees - included local garage managers, two 
additional management representatives, five employee representatives and a JAC 
representative. 
Additional information 
• Employees received financial statements from the company and could attend AGMs 
where they could put questions to the board and vote on strategic issues. 

July 1994 Dissolution of ESO 

1 

• .......?.!.~..Tll.~.<!.~... f.CJ.r .. t.~~.c.CJrrlP~'.1y ..~y.<lI.e.~~!~g ...\:!}~...~r~lls.P()t!..gr.()1:!P.................. . .. ···...·...·............ mm............ m... .. 

• ........~El1p..I.CJye..~s .. :::"~~.~..()ffe.~~<!...~~.:.?~.. P.e.t.. ~..h~!.~..................... ..................................._ ...... ................................. ..................................... ... 

• 	 ..§,~.p.P.~.~....f<?.~.,!.b.~,.,.~~,1,~,.,9f..~.h.~.,..~.9..~.P,~~Y,,'!Y~.~...~.~,~.~.~.~g,~.~.,._.,. 
• .............~.~p..~.~.Y.~.~~... ,~~~~!.Y.~~....~Y.~E.~g~....~.~..~..~..f.~!.!.~ ...2.f..~.~~~.~.~.,,~?,~.Q.Q.Q....~.~~~..!':'.!.9.?.Q.9..Q ........................... 

• All employees received three-year job guarantees on the day of the sale 
-­
231 

... 2 	 ----------------------­...................................................... 

Fi~ure 15: ESO at Company Five (A) - formation, life-span and demise 
Key dates Key events and details 
December 1993 Background to ESO 
• 	 .~,9.~P,~~)',.,.~,9.y..e_~",_tg_, ..I?§.Q,...f~.~..~.2.~.~l!g"~,~,l,'~.9:,~.~.",tt5?~....~.9.g~..~., ..~or_'?.~.gh ...~.~.~.~.~,i.l 
• 	 Sold to employees for £1.5 million 
.................. 

• Approximately £300,000 required to fund the buy-out 
Share offer 
• 	 Minimum individual investment for employees was £1,000; managers were 
.r~ql1.!r~~~()i~yest£I5,99Q .. ~.(l.~~.. irthey.. VI!ish~4!().P(lrti~iEat~ ... .................... . 
• 	 Loan arrangement with local building society for those wanting to participate 
in share offer. Approximately 70% of employees took up the share offer 
Share allocation 
• 	 Directors received 8% of shares, managers received 3% of shares and 
employees, collectively, received 49%. No individual could hold more than 7% 
of the shares. 
............. 

f.c:(?'!l:PCl~y~~tllpan EBT that held 40% of the share 
......... 

• 	 Shares originally valued at 10 pence each. 
• 	 Operation of the scheme 
• ....,...,...~.!P.P..~.9.Y~.~.~... ,ry,.~.9....!9... ,~~.!.!.,,~~.~.!.~...~.h.~.~~,~...!?~~.~..~.?.... ~.h.~._ ..~9..~P.~~y....~h~.!l....~.h.~y.".~.~f~.....,.. 
• Employees were able to vote at the company's AGMs 
Eligibility criteria 
• Employees had to be working for the company at the time of the buy-out 
Negotiating structures 
• 	 Company board 
Apart from an independent chairperson, no external parties were appointed to 
the board. Board included two executive directors, two managers and three 
employee directors elected from the workforce. union representatives were 
notperrnittedto,...,s.i.t.•... o.n.c...t•.h"e•..b.:...o,.•a...r.d.•...•......................................................................................................................................................................... I 

• EBT board 

.................M.(ll1ag~.~... ~y.!~~.~.~....~!!l.p.l()ye~ .. r~l?E~.~.~I:'.!.Cl!~\f~.? ...ClI1~ ...(lI1...i,119.~P~I1.~.e..I1.!...~~(li.r.p.~~.~gl1 .....  

• 	 Other 
Bi-monthly 'sharp end' meetings - provided a forum for discussion 
May 1997 Dissolution of ESO 
• 	 Merged with Company Five (8) to f0n11 the new company - move passed by a 
.........'!l:~j()ri!y\f()t.f::()IC;(JJ'.Ip.qYlyFJ':!e..c1.Lf::.~plgyf::~? ........... ...................... ....... 
~..C;~'!lP(ll1yE.i.ye.(1.).. VI!(ls~()14f()E.(lPp~().~i'!l:(lt.~ly~~'!l:i!E().11.... 
• 	 Company Five (A) employees received average windfalls of £ 18,000 each on 
an initial £ 1,000 investment 
I~ 	 On its dissolution, the managing director at Company Five (A) left his position 
immediately. Majority of management positions were taken over by personnel 
.(l~_.9.()'!1p.ql1yEiye.(§)!.i~~I~~i~g~_be.P()~.i!!,()I1,()f~ClI1.Clgi.!:l.g ~.iE~~t()T 
• Employee director roles at Company Five (AJ were dissolved. 
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Figure t6: ESO at Company Six - formation, life-span and demise 
Key dates Key events and details 
November 1994 Background to ESO 
• 	 Company moved to ESO when London Buses sold the company on to a MEBO 
...f()ll()'A1i~gpriya.:!isa.:~i?D.. ... ....... ..... .,. ................ . 
• "'.......Q.~.~."g_.f..f.9.~E,."M.§.~.Q.?,~,?...gg...~.~_r~.~gh... r?,!..~..9..~.!.!!g.,P.~.~.Y..~~.~,~,?~.i.9.~...2.r.~_~,~A9_~_ Buses 
......... 
·A<:;9~i..~i~i()I1..E()J!lpl~!~~f()r<l.P.P~()~iJ!l~~~ly~~}~QQQ?Q9.Q. ..m... ... ..m.... 
• Management shareholders invested £284,000 via a subscription of management 
convertible ordinary shares 

Share offer 

• 	 Employees were offered ordinary shares at I pence each and 'employee preference 
shares' at 10 each 
...................................................................................................................................................... 

• ......QF.~.i..~,~ry... ~~.~.r..~~....~.~_~,~, ,~..P.. ,~.. ,P.~.~.,.~.~,~! .. 9.f.,!~.~..5?~9"i,~.~.ry ...~.h,~.~.~...~.~pJ_~,~~ ....  
• 	 'Further ordinary shares' made up an additional 17 per cent ofthe ordinary share 
.........<:;.api.!~!...::tl1cl.. l:lE!()....I..?,?n,..I...I...1... ~~P.l()Y..~~...P~~.f~~.~~.<:;.~.. sh.::tE.~S. .... 
• 	 'Further employee offer' gave employees the right to invest up to £ I,700,000 in total 
in the company 
• 	 Employees investing in the company received a proportion ofthe total number of 
ordinary and employee preference shares equal to the proportion of the total employee 
investment that their individual investment constituted. Minimum investment was £50 
and loans were made available to employees 
Share allocation 
• Managers held approximately 50 per cent ofthe company's equity, employees held a 
..................~().t~l...gf..?:.?...P~.r. ...~.~I1.t..~~cl...~h.~...~~.J!l<l.i!1cl.~E..~.<l~... b~.!cl...~Y...~.~!~T~.~1..i~.~!}!ll.t.i9..~.::;........ 
• .......~.!}.,.J?~.r....~.~.~ .,~.~!" ..~P,._~,<?,.b.9...~.~...~~.~...~.~.P_~ ~.Y~.~ ..gE~.~_~.~!J....~~~.~~.~....... 

• 	." .".Qt9}..!:.,~ry... ~.h,~t~~....~.~~~".y~.~.~.~.9._.~~."'L..P~.~..~.~"..~~.~~..... 
• Employee preference shares were valued at I0 pence each 
Eligibility criteria 
• For ordinary shares, employees had to be employed by the company on I May 1994 
<l~cl?()n!iI111()usly~l!lpl()y~clllPt()J!ye~Ell<lry]???: . 
• For further ordinary shares, employees had to be employed by the company on 3 I 
December 1994 and continuously employed up to II February 1995 
Operation of the scheme 
• .............T'A1()...~.~.<l.li.I1.g..p.~.ri?cl.~...~.~<:;h.y.~.~t...'A1h.~.I1.5).~cl.i.~.<l.ry...~h.~r~~()19.~.r.~... ~().l:I.I.cl ...s.~.Il ...!h.~i~...~.b.<lr.~.::; 

• Shares offered to the EST could be purchased by the trust and kept for future offers 
.()r~~()ffe~~cl~iE~ctlyE()~;ocis~\!1g~~p.Igy~~::;s.h<lr.~h()I~~Es ..................... 
• 	 .....?.~.P.~g>.:~,~.~.,_~,~~...~9....~,~.~.!,.,~.ry.~.~t".~h~~~,~....~,~~,~, ..!g...!_~.~_. §.?.T....~.~".,~.~.~Y..~.~g,.,~.~.~....~.?.~,P,~.~y....". 
• 	 Holders of institutional shares, management ordinary shares and ordinary shares 
could attend and vote at AGMs 
• Employees could appoint two non-executive (employee) directors for a two-year 
term of office 

Negotiating structures 

....c:::fl.~p~l~y~?~r.~ ... m." ......m. . ......m ... 
• 	 Made up of a non-executive chair, six executive directors, two employee directors 
and three non-executive directors 
........ 

• 	 Company has a lCC made up of management and trade union reps that meets once 
every three months.f·· 	 ........•..... < ........................................................................................................................................ ,_ ............•..........................•.................................... 

• Health and safety meetings are held once every six weeks 
Additional information 
, 
• Considerable de-layering of management structure since 1994 
August 1997 Dissolution of ESO 
• 	........??!cl...t?.~.~... ?.y~.r.~.~~!' ..plc...!'.~_~s!.cl.i~~J~ ... I.??.?...::t!...~ .. ~?.~.!...()f.~~}... t:J1!.1.Ii.?~...... 

• 	 "... ,~.~.~~.!.~.9..~.~....~9..~~f.9.~.~,~.. 'y'g~.~" ..~.~....~~,pp9..!},.g.f..~.~,~..,?.~.~..~.........,.'.'...H •••••••••••• , 

• At the time of the sale shares were valued at 74 pence each 
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8.2 Objectives of employee share ownership 
Across the three cases the key objectives of ESO were seen generally from two main 
perspectives: firstly, to retain control of the company in terms of being able to shape its 
direction and destiny and ensure job security for employees; secondly, to 'involve' 
employees in owning a part of their company, though this appeared to be far less of a 
priority at Company Six than in the other two post buy-out firms. 
Company Four and Company Five (AJ had originated from PTE and local authority 
backgrounds respectively and in each case the form of ESO chosen was that considered 
most likely to receive support from the local council. Gaining trade union backing was 
also important, however. An employee director at Company Four described the role 
played by the TGWU and the GMB during initial ESO negotiations: 
'The decision was taken by the unions that they did not want employees buying 
different numbers of shares. They set up an equal free share issue for all 
employees with a one-off issue of 25 shares for each year of service.' 
Company Four's trade unions had looked seriously at pursuing a full EBO in 1989, but 
decided that involving the company's directors and senior managers in an ESOP 
arrangement was the most realistic way to secure financial backing. A traffic manager 
said that 'the managers would not have got their 51 per cent if it hadn't been initially for 
the support of the trade unions, especially in the political arena where they had to deal 
with local politicians who had control ofthe company'. 
At Company Five (AJ respondents described the 'distinct advantages' of buying their 
own company and how a 'direct ownership' scheme was regarded as the best way to 
avoid 'fierce competition' and a 'hostile take-over bid'. The strategy was not seen as 
being long-term, however. An engineering manager at the company commented: 
'We knew that we would only be buying time. I don't think we believed it would 
go on forever and be anything spectacular. It was a great experience but it was 
short-lived. ' 
Like Company Four and Company Five (A), Company Six had also faced the prospect of 
a take-over following reorganisation of the bus industry. The company's directors 
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regarded a MEBO as the best option to move away from London Transport ownership 
after privatisation and retain independence and control. A garage manager said: 
'In buying the company, we became our own bosses effectively - we broke away 
from London Transport. We became our own negotiators, our destiny was in our 
own hands and control of the company was in our own hands as a whole group, 
including the employees.' 
Among trade union respondents at Company Six, however, ESO was described as 
'somethingfor nothing', 'the lesser oftwo evils' and 'a tiny bit of money for us and a lot 
of money for somebody else'. Despite trade union involvement in the ESO conversion, 
providing employees with a stake in their company was never seen as a key objective. 
Instead, 'profit' was regarded as the overriding motive for the buy-out. A service 
controller commented: 
'This company, when it first started as [Company Six], was too profit-oriented. 
The company wanted to make a lot of money fast, but there was not the 
investment. Everything was minimal with regard to controls, management etc. 
Everything was cut back to a minimum, anything to save a bit more money.' 
8.3 Perceived successes and failures of employee share ownership 
Albeit to different degrees, Stage Two respondents across the three cases identified the 
main successes of ESO as: financial reward; job security; improved consultation and 
communication; everyone in the organisation working towards the same goal; improved 
relations between different workforce groups; belonging to a family; job satisfaction; and 
being able to retain the company's independence. 
At Company Four a key benefit was having access to 'inside' information and learning 
more about the business, though it was the trade unions who were said to have benefited 
most in this regard. The TGWU chairman, for example, described how the unions 'had a 
transparent view of the company, we knew exactly what profits the company was making 
and what each division was making'. Greater access to information was also said to have 
provided the unions with additional power to negotiate better terms and conditions for 
their members. The TGWU secretary described how the trade unions were able to 
threaten Company Four's directors with strike action because 'their money was on the 
line '. 
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At Company Five (AJ, 'belonging to a family', 'giving employees more of a reason to 
come to work', allowing them 'more input into the business', increasing job 
satisfaction' and 'making it more than a 9-5 job' were among the main successes of the 
scheme as highlighted by respondents. The garage manager said that ESO gave 
employees 'a great amount of kudos out there against other companies' and said that 
efficiency was 'fifty times greater' compared with the pre-ESO period. Improvements in 
efficiency were attributed to managers spending a lot more time passing information to 
employees, and in particular, informing them what carrying more passengers meant for 
the company and ultimately the employees themselves. The respondent added: 
'They [employees] made sure that they picked up as many passengers as possible 
because they knew that the money wasn't going to the councilor to anybody else. 
It was going into their fund. It was their company and they were making it 
stronger. ' 
'Financial reward', not surprisingly, was cited as a further benefit of ESO by Company 
Five (AJ respondents, but was considered less important than 'feeling a part of the 
organisation' and working harder for its success. A foreman at the company commented: 
'When the buy-out became imminent, I was still on the buy-out committee. It 
was then "part and parcel" of the forum to really go out and sell the idea to the 
rest of the employees and to tell them it was a venture, which, in the long run, 
would be beneficial to them, although in all honesty we didn't really know how 
good or bad it would be. But looking at how other bus companies had gone and 
how they had really benefited at a later date by selling out to a much larger 
combine. it did seem at the time that we didn't have anything to lose. The 
council was excellent in that it insisted on an employee buy-out so that every 
employee would benefit from it in the long run, which really I think was the crux 
of the whole matter. It actually made people feel part of a company, whereas 
before, they just said - "011 well. we're with the council".' 
At Company Six, Stage Two management respondents similarly described how ESO 
encouraged everyone to 'pull together' to make the company successful and gave 
employees the opportunity to 'belong to a family again' following the company's 
breakaway from London Transport. The garage manager, for example, said that the 
company performed more efficiently 'because the responsibility is on us ': 
'We couldn't run to the Government and ask for lots of money "because we've 
made a complete mess of things and please will you help us?" It's down to us as 
employees at whatever level to make the company work. Everybody has got to 
pull their weight to be successful.' 
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The views of managers were not typical among Stage Two respondents at the company 
generally, however. Overall, ESO advantages were seen purely in financial terms and 
moreover, only became apparent once the company was sold in 1997 and employees 
were able to recoup the money they had lost at privatisation. Until that time, the majority 
of employees were said to have given very little thought to ESO. The TGWU secretary 
commented that even when the company was sold, the money employees received went 
little way to compensating them for what they had lost previously: 
'I got a windfall of about £ \ ,300, but considering the money I had lost in 
privatisation. What I've lost over the years is about £40,000 in wages. It has 
literally been about £4,000-5,000 a year since our wage cut, plus the actual rise 
we would have had on top of what we were earning. That's probably under­
estimating it. So getting £ \ ,300 meant nothing. I look upon it still, and I think a 
lot of them do, in a negative way. There wasn't enough involvement. lfI'd been 
able to buy something worthwhile, I probably would have taken more of an 
interest, but that opportunity wasn't there for me and many others - probably the 
majority of people. Not many people had the money, particular after a wage cut.' 
Employee apathy towards ESO was identified as a problem generally at Company Six 
and similarly at Company Four, in that ESO was seen to have been largely unsuccessful 
in generating 'feelings of ownership' among employees. Respondents at the two 
companies said that employees had had no voice or influence in company decisions, 
though this is not unexpected given that in both cases, the directors were still majority 
owners of their companies and so the balance of power remained unchanged from pre­
ESO days. According to Company Four respondents, the 49/5\ split for employees and 
directors respectively was regarded as perhaps the main failure of the ESOP. The 
TGWU representative commented: 
'The failure of the original arrangements to give a more equal share to all was the 
biggest failure. It also led to a small number of people who were very interested 
in the success of the bid when it was made and who did not, therefore, do very 
much to explore alternative avenues for the ESOP.' 
Shortly before the sale of the company in 1994, preliminary negotiations had taken place 
between the directors and the trade unions to address the issue of the unequal share 
allocation and to consider a move to a 100 per cent EBO. The TGWU secretary said: 
'The company agreed to fund all the legal and financial advice that we needed if 
we could come up with the funding. We got the funding from the Unity Bank 
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-and other institutions to fund it, and then [XXX] came along and made an offer 
worth twice what we were offering.' 
If employees had made some form of direct financial investment to their company's 
ESOP it is possible they may have been less likely to vote for a sale in 1994. which saw 
them achieve relatively modest returns of between £9,000 and £10,000 each (see section 
5.6.4 in Chapter 5). As it was, 99 per cent of employees voted for the sale, which, 
according to the TGWU representative was probably inevitable: 
'To an ordinary bus driver £10,000 is a lot of money - a lot of money. So when 
we were asked to vote it was just a ridiculous decision to ask you to make really. 
I think there were about twenty people in the whole company who said "no", but 
some of them did it tongue in cheek because they knew if a majority voted for it, 
it would go through, so they knew they would get away with it. But these people 
were able to say "weill voted against it". We could have all said that.' 
The TGWU secretary said that even if employees had been given the opportunity to 
invest money directly into the ESOP they would not have done so: 
'Only when they [employees] got notice of what the directors were making ­
"well I would have put £ 10,000 in". But they wouldn't have at the time. If we'd 
said to everybody "you've got to put £I 0,000 in they would have said "on your 
bike, I'm not paying for it".' 
As well as the problems of the 'free' shares and unequal share allocations. a traffic 
manager at the company attributed employees' lack of interest to the fact that they were 
given only limited information about the ESOP: 'There was no induction as such into 
what the ESOP was.' The respondent said that the trade unions were partly to blame 
insofar as they were given increased access to information via joint management-trade 
union ESOP committees, though they failed to pass this information on to employees. 
Hence, unlike the situation at Company Five (AJ, employees were said not to have had 
any real understanding about what being part-owners of their company really meant and 
were therefore unable to associate 'owning shares' with working harder for the company. 
Comments from Company Four's TGWU chairman that 'the job was still the same', 
were typical of those from respondents at the firm generally. The traffic manager went 
further, describing employee efficiency as 'terrible' during the early years of the ESOP 
and described how both employees and managers were to blame for the poor 
performance: 
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'As a publicly-listed company, we have targets set for the group, whereas when it 

was the old ESOP company, they [the directors] used to revise the budget every 

six months. If they weren't reaching the budget they would have a budget review 

and change things and they didn't have the urgency at times to tackle problems. 

Now the staff complain because we're extending duties, making other changes 

and they haven't accepted the fact that they sold the right to that sort of 

complacent attitude when they sold their shares and sold the company.' 

Company Six respondents similarly lay the blame for employee apathy with both the 
employees themselves and the directors of the company. The directors were said to have 
done little to nurture feelings of ownership among employees who were simply not made 
aware of the benefits of ESO. At the same time, a majority of employees had not 
participated in the 'further employee offer' (see section 5.8.1 in Chapter 5) and so were 
unable to appreciate fully what was being offered to them. Indifference was further 
compounded by the fact that employees never had any real influence in their company 
over the period. The TGWU representative said: 
'Certainly for the vast majority of people who had been given shares and had 
made no outlay for them at all- this could only be, at worst, a small pay-out, and 
at best, a large pay-out of money for employees who had never put up any in itial 
investment. I couldn't see that there were any real disadvantages at all, not for 
the average working man in this garage.' 
The respondent added: 
'It didn't matter which company they [employees] invested in - it just happened to 
be [Company Six} and they just happened to work here. But it could have been 
any company. Provided they made the money, that was all people were interested 
in.' 
Despite being 'interested in the money', however, the majority of employees did not 
associate financial gain with working harder for the company. According to the 
company's garage manager, the performance of employees remained unchanged from the 
days before privatisation: 
'The performance of the individuals should have taken an upturn as in ".everybody 
comes to work - no one aoes sick because it's my money now. If I go SIck and we 
lose a route, I'm losing °work". That's how it should have been viewed and, it 
wasn't ... We still had the same attendance problems that we had before. If 1m 
the managing director and I don't come to work because I'm sick, I'm the proble~ 
and I'm causing the company problems. If you're just a worker - "what does It 
matter?" And that "what does it matter" still carried on. Employees wanted to 
work for the finance but they didn't want to put a hell of a lot into it.' 
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Only employees who had bought shares in their company were said to have been willing 
to work harder for its success, while for the remainder of the workforce it was just 
'business as usual'. The company convenor observed: 
'It changed according to your commitment to the company and what you wanted to 
see as a return. The directors had invested heavily and probably taken a great deal 
of risk, so therefore they were very very interested in it being successful, because 
they had a lot to lose if it wasn't. People at the other end of the scale who had 
nothing to lose - "who cares if [Company Six] is bought? Who cares if it is sold?" 
They weren't interested. So along the scale, there was a great variance in people's 
interest. ' 
Given the apparent level of employee apathy at Company Four and Company Six, it 
comes as perhaps little surprise that the relationship between employees and their trade 
union remained largely unchanged at both companies. Company Four's TGWU 
secretary said that 'in their [employees'] eyes they didn't own shares '. Employees knew 
that the unions were still there to represent their members and the managers were still 
there to manage. Similarly, at Company Six, respondents described how employees still 
looked to the union to represent the workforce and in some cases, relied on the union 
even more post-privatisation to find out what was happening in the company. The 
garage manager said: 
'I think there was a lot of misunderstanding of what was going on - they [the 
employees] are not financiers, they're bus drivers. They were asked to get 
involved in something that they hadn't come to the company for. They'd come 
here to drive a bus, so they were guided by and relied heavily on the trade unions 
to find out what was going on.' 
According to Company Five (A) 's garage manager, the union continued to act in 'a trade 
union capacity when it became necessary', though subtle changes in the employee-trade 
union relationship were noted. The engineering manager, for example, referred to a 
slight 'calming' of the union role and described how the GMB union felt 'relocated a 
little' during the period because the company wanted to emphasise a culture of 'we're all 
in this together '. Many of the trade union officers had also bought shares and 
respondents commented that they were as keen as the rest of the workforce to see the 
company succeed. The garage manager added that the relationship between employees 
and their union was never really tested 'because of the commitment of staff towards the 
company'. ESO was thus regarded as a largely positive experience for more than 
financial reasons, and 'drew everyone closer together '. Respondents said there had been 
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-no real problems with the scheme as such, though a practical difficulty had been the 
relative inexperience of employees in having to run their own company on a day-to-day 
basis. The engineering manager described the period as both a 'struggle' and 'quite 
frightening' at times: 
'I don't know whether I was making excuses to my staff, or whether I just really 
needed to say it, but I kept on having to say to people when they were asking 
questions that we'd never done it before. None of us had every done it before and 
so we were finding our feet all the way through from the moment we bought the 
company to the moment we sold it - we were finding our feet. And yes - people 
would come up and say "is this right?" And I would say - "well I think it's right". 
My guts were saying it's right, my head was saying it's right, whether my heart 
says it's right - maybe not.' 
Despite such difficulties, employees ex.perienced a real sense of loss of 'being part of a 
family' when the firm merged with Company (B) in 1997. The garage manager described 
the general feeling among the workforce at that time: 
'1 was surprised how many people were in tears. It wasn't a case that they'd lost 
their shareholding because that you can compensate. What they couldn't be were 
members of the [Company Five (A)] family.' 
8.4 Reflecting on employee share ownership 
Reflecting on the period of time spent in ESO, observations from respondents in relation 
to whether objectives had been met varied across the three organisations. At Compan,V 
Four, jobs had been secured and employees made financial gains when their firm was 
sold. At the same time, however, the company was said to have lost sight of its main 
priorities during the employee ownership period. The directors became motivated by 
greed and were keen to save money, often by cutting back on investment and also on 
improvements to employees' terms and conditions. Moreover, it had been anticipated at 
the outset that the ESOP would be a long-term strategy for the company. The traffic 
manager said: 
'1 don't think either the managers or the staff envisaged a time when the 
company would have been sold on to another party. I think it was a long-term 
strategy - the shares were going to be issued from the EBT over a ten-year 
period. We didn't get anywhere near that, but they [the directors] wanted control 
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of the company; they got control of the company and after five years they found 
that wasn't enough and the incentive of all that cash actually made them sell out.' 
The incentive to sell was not only confined to the directors, however. When the 
company converted to employee ownership in 1989 employees had shown little interest. 
The TGWU secretary commented: 
'Because they [employees] never had a financial stake it was a case of "I couldn't 
care less - I'm going to get my money at the end of the week regardless". That 
was the biggest mistake of employee ownership. In hindsight, everybody should 
have had a stake and then it would have worked.' 
Employee apathy quickly disappeared, however, when the company was sold. The 
TGWU branch chair said 'when there was money on the line, people were asking "where 
are my shares?'" Notwithstanding, the view that employees had only been interested in 
financial gain is contradicted to some extent by findings from the Stage One survey (see 
section 8.1). From a total of 112 Stage One respondents, 62 per cent (n = 69) believed 
that Company Four should have remained in employee ownership, while 20 per cent (n = 
23) said it should have been sold because it was too small to survive on its own. A 
further 18 per cent of respondents (n = 20) were unsure either way. Some of the reasons 
put forward for the company remaining in employee ownership are presented in Table 
78, though responses given appear to have far more in common with the amount of 
money employees gained from the sale and the subsequent state of working conditions in 
the aftermath of employee ownership, as opposed to any sense of loss of 'belonging to a 
family' and 'owning a stake in the company'. 
Table 78: Reasons for Company Four remaining in employee ownership: 
Stage One respondents 
Respondents 
Reason given: (n) 
.... .I~.~.~.Cl.I19..~9119.!.~.!g.l1~m'Y.~r.~ ...~~.tt.~~...9..11Til1g.~§Q ..P~~!'<?9. ............ m 10.0..............................  

Morale was highc:IlllclC was more of an incentive to work harder 7.0 
.... ~I1~pl<:Jy~~s...~'.l9.J.'l1()~~..~.Cly .. il1 ...!h.~ ...'Yay!~.~ir ..9()!!:PCll1y.'!!.<l~ ...rlll1........ . 7.0 
.....I~~.. gg.~p.<l.12y...i~....I1.<?~9.~i.y.~l!...~Y ..PEg.Bt....... ................ ......................m 4.0 
Employees did not get enough money from the sale 3.0 
Valid cases (n) 31.0 
Like Company Four, respondents at Company Five (A) also described how some 
employees had regarded financial rewards resulting from the divestment of the company 
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as the most important aspect of ESO, while the job itself just 'carried on as normal'. 
The engineering manager said: 
'Some of them said "oh well, if that's what we're doing, we'll carry on with it". 
Some carried on as if nothing had happened. There were some that said "nothing's 
changed" and they just carried on. They've said the same since the merger ­
"nothing's changed".' 
Generally, however, ESO was said to have succeeded in changing the culture of the 
organisation and giving employees increased status among the local competition. 
Despite apparent employee support for ESO, however, it was recognised that the 
company would not have been able to sustain its position as an employee-owned 
organisation for much longer than the three-year period. The engineering manager said 
'we knew we would not survive' and described some of the competitive practices used by 
the company's main rival, including imposing a freeze on bus fares. Company Five (AJ 
had to respond to the actions of the competition accordingly and the respondent said 
'there was beginning to be a bus war between the two ': 
'Although it was quite light-hearted, the beginning was there and we hadn't got 
enough money in the bank really to take on another company.' 
The company was reluctant to become involved in a battle with other bidders and so 
decided that merging with Company (B) was the best option. The respondent added: 
'There's no doubt that we held [Company (B)) in very high regard as our 
competitors locally. We had a gentleman'S agreement for a number of years and 
between us we ran a very very good public transport network in [the area] and we 
always felt that if we did sell, they would obviously be interested. We'd gained a 
lot of respect for running some popular routes. It was good stuff. It was 
respected. We wanted to go on in some form. We also wanted to try and find 
the best option for the majority of our own people who had put their own money 
into the company back in 1993 and it came down to the devil we knew.' 
At Company Six, comments from a TGWU representative that the main objectives of ESO 
'had nothing to do with co-ownership, or a feeling of well-being' were fairly typical of 
views across the company. Like Company Four, interest in employee ownership was 
fairly limited, though reasons for employee apathy at Company Six stemmed from cuts to 
terms and conditions in 1994. The service controller summed up the general view: 
'I resented so much what the company had done to me earlier and then they said I 
was going to get some free shares. I couldn't afford to buy more shares because 
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they had cut my wages. Shares won't pay the bills at the end of the week. That's 
all these people work for - to pay their bills. In this industry, people can't be 
bothered.' 
Employee apathy was further highlighted by a 'dramatic changeover ofstaff' during the 
period of employee ownership. The respondent added: 
'Until such time as they [employees] found out that the shares were worth much 
more than their original value, people just didn't think about them. It was 
something that never entered their minds. And then they realised that all of a 
sudden, their shares were worth a pound each and not a penny each, so then they 
began to realise there might be someth ing in it.' 
Stage One findings generally support those from Stage Two that employees had 
relatively little interest in ESO. From a total of twenty-two respondents, only six said 
that the company should have remained in employee ownership, though as shown in 
Table 79, the reason put forward in two cases was that employees believed they had not 
gained as much from selling the company as they could have done. 
Table 79: Reasons for Company Six remaining in employee ownership: 
SOdtage De respon eots 
Reason given: Respondents 
(D) 
Company Six should not have been sold to an overseas competitor! 4.0 
()\1;'~.~.~~bi.p.~~()\lI.<:I.b.<1V~..T.~.~l<1.i~..~.c1 ... i.l1 ...t~e ...1d..~.. 
...................... , •• • ............. _,·.'· ......m ....•••• . .-- .. ~...... 
Employees did not make as much money as they could have done 2.0 
from the sale 
Valid cases (0) 6.0 
Out of a further thirteen respondents who said Company Six should not have remained in 
employee ownership, three said the firm could not have continued to compete with the 
competition on a long-term basis. In addition, eight said that the 1997 take-over was 
more likely to secure jobs and the company's future, while two said that the take-over 
would provide long-term investment for the company. Finally, three respondents said 
they had not understood ESO sufficiently well to form an opinion either way. 
Notwithstanding reservations from Stage Two respondents about ESO, particularly at 
Company Four and Company Six, around half of Stage Two respondents across the three 
cases overall said that the right decisions had been taken in relation to their ESO scheme. 
Respondents at Company Five (A) were all in agreement that the company would not 
....... 
have done anything differently, despite employee ownership being a relatively short­
lived experience. The garage manager said: 
'We knew what was going on in the bus world. We had seen what was going on 
in other places where people had tried to fight their corner against the giants. So 
we knew it was going to be a relatively short experience.' 
The idea of ESO as a deliberate short-term strategy was highlighted earlier in Chapter 3. 
Ben-Ner (1998) said that in some cases, members of an employee-owned company could 
rationally expect the demise of that company, even at the time of its formation, due to 
predictable environmental changes or internal weaknesses. At the same time, employees 
could expect a net gain from the company's operation during its limited lifetime relative 
to other alternatives as to warrant its formation. 
At Company Four, the overriding view among respondents was that the ESOP 
exacerbated an already existing 'them and us' situation. Five of the six respondents said 
there would have been more interest in employee ownership if employees had at least 
been able to buy some shares, though it was acknowledged that the majority would have 
not have been prepared to invest any of their own money. Only one respondent, the 
TGWU chairman, said he would pursue the same strategy again if the company repeated 
the experience. One of the main objectives of ESO at the outset had been to achieve 
equality of ownership for employees, which would not have been realised if employees 
had had to pay for their shares: 
'We still get the odd gripe that when we formed the ESOP people should have 
been allowed to buy shares, but at the time, and I still believe we took the right 
decision, people didn't have a lot of money and we did a deal that got the 
employees their share of the company at no cost.' 
The respondent added that four years after the company had been sold, employees were 
still complaining about not being able to buy shares in the ESOP, though this was based 
far more on a desire to realise large cash windfal1s rather than wanting to 'own a part of 
the company'. 
A desire to be on a more equal footing with directors was also raised at Company Six, 
though respondents similarly voiced doubts as to whether employees would have been 
willing to use their own money to buy shares. Two respondents, a TGWU representative 
-
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and a service controller said that in hindsight they would have bought as many shares as 
they could through the 'further employee offer', though this probably had far more to do 
with the potential for financial reward than a sense of ownership. The general view 
among respondents at the company was that, in hindsight, there should have been a better 
deal for employees. The traffic manager said: 
'It caused bitterness in the sense that people who didn't have money didn't get 
the chance to do anything. There were a lot of people who couldn't buy shares 
because of commitments to their family or whatever. They felt very bitter.' 
A majority of Stage Two respondents at the company described how employees were 
rather indifferent when the employee ownership period ended. The company convenor 
referred to employees simply 'grabbing what they could and that was it', while the 
TGWU secretary said that only a very small number of employees, those that had bought 
extra shares, were perhaps sorry to see the company sold. A traffic manager added that 
emp loyees might have had regrets because 'now they've got nothing to work for '. The 
respondent added however, that in repeating the experience, employees would still have 
been driven primarily by financial gain. 
Of the three companies, the notion of 'being an owner' and 'owning a stake in the firm' 
appeared to be most tangible among employees at Company Five (AJ. Stage Two 
respondents at the company suggested that the share allocation and the way in which 
employees acquired their shares were key factors in making ESO more meaningful to 
them. The size of the company may have also been a contributory factor. Company Five 
(A) was smaller than the other two firms by some way in terms of employee numbers (see 
Chapter 5). It is possible, therefore, that among employee shareholders, a sense of 
'belonging to a family' would have been more apparent than at Company Four and 
Company Six. The relationship between company size and the effects of ESO upon the 
attitudes and behaviours of employees was beyond the scope of this study, but is an area 
that future studies may need to address to develop further understanding of why ESO 
results in different outcomes for different organisations. 
246 

-
8.5 Summary 
This chapter set out to examine employee ownership experiences in three UK bus 
companies. The companies had entered into employee ownership in the aftermath of bus 
privatisation and by 1997, all had been 'sold on' to other transport groups. Specifically, 
the chapter looked at whether the reasons for and methods by which the companies 
established their systems of employee ownership were important for their durability as 
wholly or part employee-owned enterprises. The chapter looked at a number of 
potentially key factors, including the objectives behind the introduction of ESO in each 
case, the perceived successes and failures of each ESO scheme and the associated 
impact, if any, upon the attitudes and behaviours of employees. 
In general terms, respondents at all three companies regarded ESO as a key strategy in 
retaining control of their company and in ensuring job security for employees. Despite 
emerging from different backgrounds, respondents in each case spoke about being able to 
shape the destiny of their company and in the case of Company Four and Company Five 
(AJ. 'involve' employees in owning and running the company. At the same time, 
respondents from all three cases said that their company had had little choice but to 
pursue an employee ownership strategy to try and prevent a hostile take-over. Where 
respondent views differed was in relation to the anticipated duration of ESO and the 
extent to which ESO objectives were met. At Company Four, ESO was viewed as a 
'long-term' strategy with the potential to last for around ten years. In contrast, the aim at 
Company Five (AJ had been to operate as an employee-owned organisation for around 
three years and then sell. The objective was met at Company Five (AJ insofar as the firm 
remained in employee ownership for three years, jobs were secured and employees were 
said to have been motivated to work harder. In contrast, respondents at Company Four 
and Company Six said that ownership meant little to employees since they had not 
invested their own money directly to buy shares. At the same time, employees would 
have been unwilling to make such an investment and only became interested in owning 
shares when they thought the shares might be worth some money. 
Commenting on the successes and failures of ESO, respondents from all three companies 
agreed that employees had gained financially, though to different degrees. At Company 
Six, respondents said that when the company was sold in 1997, employees were on Iy 
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recoupll1g what they had lost at privatisation. Aside from the financial benefits, 
Company Four respondents spoke of having access to more information on the 
performance of their company, while Company Five (A) respondents said that ownership 
gave employees more of a reason to come to work by making them feel a part of the 
company. In terms of the perceived failures of each scheme, there was resentment at 
both Company Four and Company Six that directors had held the majority shareholding. 
In both cases, however, Stage Two respondents acknowledged that employees would 
have been reluctant to invest their own money in the company, particularly those at 
Company Six who had just endured cuts to their terms and conditions of employment. 
Inexperience in running a company and having to take responsibility for difficult 
decisions were cited as problems at Company Five (A), while the inability to take risks 
with the business was mentioned at Company Four. Despite the perceived failures, 
however, some respondents at Company Four and all respondents at Company Five (A) 
said that their firm had made the right decision in relation to the choice of ESO scheme. 
Respondents at Company Six, perhaps unsurprisingly, were the least positive in their 
views, and concluded that there should have been a more 'level playing field' in 
distributing shares among employees and directors. 
It would appear that the consequence ofCompany Four and Company Six employees not 
paying for their shares was the impact on their attitudes to ownership. In both cases, 
respondents commented that employees were unlikely to feel like owners of their 
company since they had not purchased shares. Moreover, employees in the two firms 
only became interested in owning shares when their companies were sold and they were 
able to benefit financially. During the period of employee ownership, employees did not 
feel part of a team, did not have a voice within their company and were disinterested in 
employee ownership generally. Thus, the benefits of ESO were only realised after the 
two companies had moved out of employee ownership and been 'sold on'. Only at 
Company Five (A) did respondents suggest that employees felt like owners during the 
employee ownership period and moreover, that at the time of the 1997 merger they felt a 
real sense of loss for something they had created and worked hard to maintain. 
The absence of a sense of ownership at Company Four and Company Six suggests that 
ESO also had little impact upon the performance of employees in their work, or in their 
relationship with their trade unions. At Company Four, employees were unable to see a 
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link between owning shares and working harder for their company, while at Company 
Six, respondents commented that only those employees who had bought additional shares 
in the company would have been interested in working harder for its success. One 
respondent at Company Six summarised the general feeling that commitment to work 
harder varied according to what employees had put into the company and what they 
wanted to see as a return. Company Five (A) emerged once again as the exception and 
this can probably be attributed, at least in paIi, to the fact that employees paid for their 
shares at the outset. One respondent commented that employees were encouraged to 
work harder because they could see that any extra profits made would benefit them and 
their company directly. Respondents at Company Four and Company Six reported that 
attitudes to the trade unions remained unchanged during the employee ownership period. 
Because employees did not feel like owners, there was no sudden shifting of allegiance 
to the management side and the trade unions were still seen as vital in representing the 
interests of employees. At Company Five (A), respondents spoke of a recognition among 
the entire workforce that everyone needed to work as part of a team. Moreover, many 
trade union officers in the company also owned shares. Put simply, there was less room 
for competing factions though not to the extent that the union was no longer required to 
represent the interests of its members. 
In conclusion, it is suggested that the model of employee ownership may be a key factor 
for the durability of companies adopting this organisational form. Findings presented in 
the chapter have suggested that employees are more likely to experience a greater sense 
of ownership where they have purchased their shares, are prepared to work harder to 
ensure the continuity of their company and may, in turn, be less likely to vote to sell the 
company. Where feelings of ownership are not as apparent, however, and ownership is 
viewed primarily in terms of financial reward, employees are perhaps far more likely to 
vote for a sale. Despite apparent differences across the three cases, however, the final 
outcome was the same for each company. Unable to respond to the threat of intense 
competition and falling bus usage, all three companies had been sold on to other 
transport groups by the late 1990s. This suggests that employee-owned organisations 
may well have been a 'transient phenomenon' (see Pendleton 2001: 195) and that the 
way in which systems of ownership were created and subsequently managed was 
ultimately of little consequence. Further discussion of the findings presented in this 
chapter follows in Chapter 9. 
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9.0 Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis has set out to examine the diversity of ESO and the potential influence of that 
diversity upon a number of specified outcomes. Underpinning the thesis is the argument 
that outcomes associated with ESO are influenced by the 'differing circumstances of 
ownership' as opposed to the mere fact of ownership per se. Among the key influential 
factors are the actual 'model' of ESO put in place by the organisation, circumstances 
leading to ESO conversion, the involvement of key actors in the conversion process and 
the way in which the ownership system is operated and managed in the workplace. 
Previous studies in the ESO arena have hypothesised and established associations 
between ESO and specific organisational and employee outcomes, although the empirical 
reality of individual cases has not always been addressed. Pendleton et al (1998) referred 
to the assumption inherent within much of the existing literature that 'the fact of 
ownership per se will affect employee attitudes' (p. 102), but which ignores the influence 
that other variables may have upon particular ESO-employee attitude relationships. The 
design of many studies, moreover, has been underpinned by the assumption that any 
relationship between ESO and attitudes will be 'straightforward and direct' (p. 104). To 
move forward with research in the area, a recognition of the 'contingent characteristics' 
(Wilson et al 1995: II) of individual ownership systems, taking in the varying 
circumstances of ownership conversions and the objectives and philosophies of those 
involved in mounting conversions, is necessary. 
The aim of the present thesis has been to develop further thinking in the field of ESO and 
to demonstrate empirically how different models of ownership and their 'diverse 
contexts' can be influential for resulting in particular outcomes for organisations and their 
employees. In a broader context, recognition of the different factors by key stakeholder 
groups, including employers, external investors and policy-makers, is vital if ESO is to 
become a viable and long-lasting strategy for achieving the outcomes as claimed by its 
supporters. Given the wave of recent government policies to extend the incidence of and 
simplify ESO conversions (Pendleton 2001; see also Chapter 2), this recognition is more 
important than ever. 
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9.2 Feelings of ownership and organisational commitment 
Chapter 6 reported on the findings of quantitative and qualitative research undertaken in 
three employee-owned companies with varying levels of ESO. The purpose of the 
analysis was to examine the attitudes of employee shareholders in relation to their 
'feelings of ownership' and levels of commitment to their organisation. Two central 
propositions guided the chapter: firstly, that the model of ESO and the motives and 
events surrounding its introduction were important for explaining possible 'between­
company' differences in relation to employees' 'feelings of ownership'; secondly. that 
'feelings of ownership' were similarly influential for explaining variations in commitment 
levels exhibited by employee shareholders to their employing organisation. Within the 
chapter, it was hypothesised that employee shareholders who had made a direct financial 
investment to purchase shares in their company would demonstrate more profound 
feelings of ownership and greater commitment to the firm than employee shareholders 
working under more indirect arrangements, such as in an ESOP organisation. It has been 
widely observed in the ESO literature that 'direct ownership' employee-shareholders bear 
a much greater degree of risk than their counterparts in ESOP companies. The former are 
financing part of the share acquisition themselves. which in turn helps to engender a more 
'responsible' form of ownership (Pendleton 2001): in short, employee shareholders are 
much more aware of the impOliance of corporate success and the relevance of their own 
work behaviour to that success. 
Employee-shareholders must perceive. however, that they have sufficient control over 
their work and the way in which the company is run to be able to contribute to its success. 
Cotton (1993) observed that when an employee owns one of several million shares. ESO 
still exists but it is regarded as trivial, as in the case of many of the privatisation flotations 
of the 1980s discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, individual employee owners must 
perceive a significant stake in their company and feel they have some influence. Pierce et 
al (1991) referred to the phenomenon of 'psychological ownership' (p. 122) and described 
a series of social-psychological and behavioural outcomes that resulted when employees 
were integrated into the 'ownership experience'. Direct ownership is said to be 
particularly influential in smaller firms, for example, when the percentage of stock owned 
by employees is large enough to influence the way in which the firm is run and make 
individuals feel more' involved' (see also Cotton 1993; Pendleton et al 1995a). 
• 
Quantitative findings presented in Chapter 6 suggested some support for the first 
hypothesis that 'direct ESO' (Company One) is more likely than 'indirect ESO' 
(Company Two and Company Three) to engender greater feelings of ownership among 
employee shareholders. As the chapter illustrated, however, the picture is somewhat 
more complex than the fact of direct ownership being more 'meaningful' to employees 
who have purchased their shares. While the transition to ESO for all three companies had 
been in response to changes in government policy (see Chapter 5), the system of 
ownership chosen, the proportion of equity held by employees and the 'aftermath' of each 
conversion was different. Chapter 6 asserted that these differences were ultimately 
influential for the outcomes reported. 
At Company One, the purpose of conversion had been to ensure continuity of membership 
in the Local Government pension scheme and to prevent the uncertainty of coming under 
third-party control. The reasoning behind the direct ownership model chosen was that it 
would encourage employees to 'become bonded to a level of performance required for the 
buy-out to succeed' (Featham and Powrie (1998: 3). An ESOP arrangement had been 
rejected on the basis that it would weaken the motivational effects of a buy-out and 
potentially invest responsibility and influence in a small group of elected trustees at the 
expense of individual employee shareholders. Rather, employees who had invested their 
own money to purchase shares would be more interested in the performance of the 
company and prepared to put more effort into their work. An investment of £ 1 ,000 was 
required from each participant, the take-up rate to purchase shares was 91 per cent and the 
percentage of equity owned by 'employees', including the company's senior managers 
and directors, was 100 per cent. 
At Company Two and Company Three, both employee shareholder groups participated in 
ESOP arrangements but there were few other similarities between the two enterprises. 
The Company Two ESOP had been created in 1993 following a PTE privatisation and 
employees at that time acquired 80 per cent of the shares (26 per cent of this total was 
retained in an EBT), although no financial investment was required from individual 
employees. In contrast to the situation at Company One, a direct share ownership 
arrangement had been rejected on the grounds that it would discriminate against those 
employees without the money to buy shares. Employees were, however, given the 
opportunity to purchase additional shares on three subsequent occasions following the 
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initial share allocation in 1993 and details were outlined in Chapter 5. Significantly, the 
set-up of the ESOP meant that employees could potentially own a greater number of 
shares in the company than senior managers. In the case of many ESOPs, shares had been 
allocated entirely on the basis of seniority, which in turn had obvious implications for the 
distribution of power within these organisations (Toscano 1983). Company Two's 
directors did hold 'golden shares', however, and these carried majority-voting rights 
although certain matters relating to the business required a 75 per cent majority vote from 
'ordinary' employee shareholders. 
Company Three had moved into ESO following the privatisation of London Buses in 
1994 and was one of ten London bus companies electing to do so at that time. On the 
day of privatisation in October 1994, Company Three's 'employees', all those below 
senior manager level, were invited to apply for shares lip to a collective total of25.1 per 
cent. The remainder of the shareholding was divided between venture capitalists who 
acquired 45 per cent and the company's directors and senior managers who attained 29.9 
per cent. One of the most significant aspects of the ESOP was the background to the 
conversion, which resulted in cuts to employees' wages and holiday entitlement (see 
Chapter 5). Although recouped at a later date, the cuts proved, not unexpectedly, to be a 
major bone of contention with employees and the level of resentment some three to four 
years later during the data collection phase of the research programme was still clearly 
apparent. Personal losses to employees had become inextricably linked with ESO and 
consequently, negative feelings towards 'ownership' were perhaps more likely and 
indeed detected, even though an ESOP arrangement was considered to be the only viable 
option for the company in 1994. 
Given the circumstances of ESO conversion at Company Three, it is not wholly 
unexpected that employee shareholders' 'feelings of ownership' were somewhat less than 
profound compared with results for the other two cases, particularly Company One. 
There were fewer significant differences in relation to 'feelings of ownership' between 
Company Two and Company Three respondents, although the former were significantly 
more likely to find their work more satisfying because they owned shares and 
additionally, to want to continue working for their company. It is suggested that, given 
the proportion of collective equity held by employees at Company Two, employee­
shareholders would be more aware of the implications of ESO and the benefits likely to 
253 
be derived from it. At the onset of ESO, Company Two had promoted itself as a business 
that aimed to invest in its shareholders as employees, who were recognised as its most 
valuable asset and a considerable amount of information promoting the ethos of the 
company was circulated to employees. Additionally, the fact that employee shareholders 
could potentially own more shares than senior managers may also have helped to 
facilitate 'feelings of ownership'. There were no significant differences found in the 
responses of Company One and Company Two employee shareholders, with the one 
exception that the former were significantly more likely to say that ESO was very 
important for their company. 
Aside from the main 'between-company' differences, a rankings analysis of items within 
the 'ESO satisfaction scale' (see Table 19 in Chapter 6) indicates that employee 
shareholders in all three companies were most likely to 'care' about owning shares in 
their company, but least likely to feel like an owner or find their work more satisfying 
because they owned shares. Even at Company Three where employees had suffered 
direct and tangible losses, just under half of respondents said they 'cared' about ESO, 
which suggests that they still recognised the value of being able to participate in securing 
the future of their job and the company. Conversely, the more indirect and perhaps 
'additional bonus' outcomes of 'increased work satisfaction' and 'a greater sense of 
ownership' were regarded as less important all-round. 
It is not unexpected, therefore, that 'feeling a part of the company' was not considered to 
be the main benefit of ESO by any of the companies surveyed: Company One 
respondents ranked it only eighth from a list of ten although somewhat surprisingly, 
Company Three respondents ranked it as the second main benefit overall. In interpreting 
these results, it is suggested that respondents at Company Three had no real expectations 
in relation to some of the more 'tangible' benefits of ESO, such as greater influence in 
their organisation. While 'more involvement for employees in company decisions' was 
identified as a major benefit by Company Three respondents (ranked third out of ten), 
employee-shareholders held a minority stake in the firm and the balance of power 
remained unchanged from the days prior to ESO conversion. The more realistic 
., h I ld erhaps therefore limited to 'theexpectations of Company Three s are 10 ers were p, ' 
, 'I' rt f ·tl cOlnpany' At Company One inprospect of extra money and fee Il1g a pa 0 1e . . 
contrast, 'more involvement' and 'more information' were ranked as the first and second 
main benefits respectively. Given the nature of Company One's ESO system, it is not 
surprising that there were greater opportunities in practice for 'involvement' and 
'information' compared with Company Three. At Company Two, 'more involvement' 
was similarly ranked as the main benefit although 'more information' was ranked tenth 
and this may be interpreted in one of two ways: firstly, additional information about day­
to-day matters at the company was regarded as unimportant; secondly, employee 
shareholders had expectations for more information following ESO conversion but these 
had not been realised in practice. 
Despite the benefits identified in all three compa\1les, a majority of respondents at 
Company Two and Company Three claimed that owning shares had made no real 
difference to the way in which they thought about their company: at Company One, some 
three-fifths of respondents pointed to a shift in attitudes following ESO. Across the three 
cases, where owning shares was said to have made a difference, employees pointed to a 
greater interest in commercial matters and how the company was spending money, as well 
as providing a greater incentive to work harder. More negatively, one respondent at 
Company One said it was now 'management against the workforce' while at Company 
Three four respondents said they felt discriminated against because the senior managers 
had more shares. 
For the second hypothesis addressed in Chapter 6 - that a greater sense of commitment to 
the organisation will ensue where feelings of ownership are stronger - Company One 
respondents were the most likely to indicate that they were committed to their 
organisation and Company Three respondents the least likely. Respondents at Company 
Three scored particularly low in terms of identifying with and displaying loyalty to their 
firm and, as with 'feelings of ownership', findings are not wholly unexpected. The 
motivational and attitudinal effects that are said to equate with investing a sum of one's 
own money into their employing organisation are well documented, but would not 
necessarily explain why there were no significant commitment differences between 
Company One and Company Two. One possible explanation may stem from the fact that 
Company Two respondents were given opportunities to purchase shares subsequently. 
A further explanation may be found not so much in terms of the extent to which 
employees had invested financially in their organisation, but rather in the number of years 
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they had' invested' in the firm. It may be anticipated that longer-serving employees at 
Company Two would show loyalty to their company given that long service was 
associated with greater share allocations. In future research it would be valuable to 
examine in more depth the relationship between organisational commitment and the 
number of shares held by employees, both collectively and individually. In the present 
study, the numbers of shares held by individuals at Company Two were too varied to 
categorise into meaningful sub-samples for analysis. Sub-samples at Company One were 
similarly too small to undertake a comparative analysis with Company Two. 
Notably, no significant differences were found between any of the companies in relation 
to the 'involvement' sub-scale of the BOCS, indicating that ESO alone is not necessarily 
influential for increasing certain aspects of organisational commitment. Moreover, there 
were no significant differences found between the attitudes of employee shareholders and 
non-shareholders at either Company One or Company Three. Given the argument of ESO 
lobbyists that ownership may increase commitment to the organisation, it may be initially 
surprising that there were no differences between employees who owned shares and those 
who did not. It could be argued, for example, that the latter would feel isolated in their 
company although this would depend on the total number of employees overall who 
owned shares in the enterprise. 
For employees who own shares. it is purported that they will share a sense of unity with 
other employee shareholders through their common stake in the firm. Moreover, such 
feelings of solidarity and membership could lead to increased commitment to the 
organisation. although social divisions between employee shareholders and non­
shareholders could also result, as indicated in the work of Poole and Jenkins (1990). At 
the same time, non-shareholders may consider that the 'net rewards' of remaining with 
their current organisation are greater than would be found at an alternative organisation. 
Results reported in Chapter 6 suggest that employees at Company Three would be 
significantly more likely than those at Company One and Company Two to leave their 
organisation for greater rewards elsewhere, irrespective of their 'shareholder' status. 
Further insights into the ESO/organisational commitment relationship were gained from 
an examination of qualitative Stage Two findings. Chapter 6 had hypothesised that 
Company One respondents would show greater commitment to their organisation because 
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ownership was more direct and tangible. Indeed, respondents at the company highlighted 
I 
equality, employee commitment and avoiding a 'them and us' situation as key issues and 
described how a direct ownership arrangement was regarded as the best way to achieve 
the company's aims. It has already been noted, however, that where employees do not 
own shares, whether they are unwilling or unable to buy them, social divisions between 
employee shareholders and non-shareholders may occur. A continually increasing share 
price meant that after 1993. many employees at Company One were unable to afford to 
buy shares. One respondent at the company observed that the idea of' shares for all' had 
disappeared since the initial buy-out because the higher share price had put shares beyond 
the reach of many employees. Since new entrants could not afford to buy shares, there 
was a constant drain on the company's profits when existing shareholders left. The same 
problem was apparent at Company Two. One respondent had commented that the three 
subsequent share offers at Company Two should have occurred much sooner than they 
did, although the set-up of the original ESOP meant that employees were not excluded 
from becoming shareholders. It is worth remarking on the aim at both Company One and 
Company Two to provide an equitable system of ownership in which all employees could 
participate, although the methods pursued by the two companies to achieve the same aim 
were very different. Moreover, while both companies suffered from a drain on their 
profits when existing shareholders left, Company One continues to retain its position as 
an employee-owned firm in 2004. The outcome for Company Two has been rather 
different. 
Company Three's ESO system was not set up with the intention of placing employees on 
an equal footing with managers and so it is not unexpected that 'feelings of ownership' 
and 'commitment to the organisation' were less compared with Company One and 
Company Two. Respondents from both the management and union sides at Company 
Three argued that employees should have been able to invest money into the ESOP in 
1994, but admitted that employees would have been unwilling to invest anything due to 
the loss of their London Transport contracts. Not unexpectedly, it was only when the 
company floated on the London Stock Exchange in 1997 that employees wished they had 
been given the opportunity to participate in a direct ownership arrangement three years 
earlier. 
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9.3 Employee participation and industrial relations 
Chapter 7 explored the relationship between ESO and EP to investigate whether systems 
of ESO in organisations offered increased opportunities for employees to become more 
involved in the running of their organisations than firms without ESO structures in place. 
Quantitative and qualitative results from all six cases - the three employee-owned and 
three 'post-ESO' companies - were reported in the chapter. Previous ESO studies had 
addressed the proposition that opportunities for increased EP could occur in a number of 
ways other than through trade union representation. Methods have included the 
introduction of works councils, .lCCs and the appointment of employee directors to 
company boards (see Hammer and Stern 1986; Dilts and Paul 1990; Rosen et al 1986; 
Pendleton et al 1995b). Moreover, shares held by employees generally carry voting 
rights, thereby allowing them to become 'involved' by virtue of being able to vote on 
major issues affecting their company. A general 'culture' of participation instilled by 
managers and resulting from the introduction of ESO could also have a positive impact in 
terms of giving employees, including those who did not own shares, the opportunity to 
have more influence in matters relating to their job and workplace. 
A second issue addressed in Chapter 7 was whether employees actually wanted more 
influence within their organisation and if so, at what level - in their job, within their 
department or in relation to overall corporate matters? While it may be assumed that 
employees would welcome opportunities for more influence and responsibility, previous 
studies have suggested this may not always be so. French (1987 proposed that employee 
shareholders would not actively 'seek out' more influence if they perceived that managers 
were better equipped to look after their shareholding interests by having sole control in 
running the firm. Some years earlier Hammer and Stern (1980) had reported that 
employee-shareholders saw themselves primarily as 'financial investors' and regarded 
managers, rather than themselves, as 'owners'. However, one interpretation of the 
Hammer and Stern (1980) study was that respondents had skilled interesting jobs which 
they found 'intrinsically satisfying': hence, they did not seek additional satisfaction via 
greater influence in organisational decision-making (see also Klein 1987). Addressing 
the alternative argument that employees as shareholders did wish for greater influence in 
terms of the way their company was run, Pierce et al (1991) proposed that desire for more 
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influence would occur only where employees perceived a 'legitimate right' to become 
involved. 
Chapter 7 also examined the proposition that, following ESO, employee shareholders 
become less committed to their trade union since the interests of the former become more 
closely aligned with the interests of managers, subsequently reducing the need for a trade 
union presence. Alternatively, where employees are dissatisfied with the degree of 
influence they have in their company, or are unhappy with the performance of managers, 
they are more committed to their trade union and regard it as the most appropriate vehicle 
for representing their interests. A further premise is that organisations perceived by 
employees to enjoy 'favourable' industrial relations will be characterised by a climate of 
loyalty ('dual loyalty') to both managers and trade unions. 
The involvement of trade unions in the initial buy-out of a firm was identified as a 
significant factor in the context of the present research. As McElrath and Rowan (1992) 
concluded, trade unions may still be seen as relevant in an ESO environment but only if 
their functions and attitudes are adapted to what could be viewed as the 'constraints' of a 
new operating climate. Additionally, employers and unions do not necessarily have to 
compete for the commitment of employees and indeed both may gain from management­
union partnerships aimed at building and maintaining a harmonious climate of industrial 
relations. However, employees' perceptions of the instrumentality of the union are an 
important factor influencing union commitment. Thus, iftrade unions are to maintain the 
support of their members they need to ensure that any co-operation with the employer 
does not come at the expense of the effective representation of members' interests, as 
highlighted by Hammer and Stern (1986). 
In the present study there were generally no significant differences between the six 
companies in relation to desired levels of influence: a majority of respondents in all cases 
expressed a desire for more influence than they had at present. Not unexpectedly, the 
'participation gap' between desired and perceived influence was found to be highly 
significant across all six cases for all eleven items measured by the Stage One survey. 
Where respondents indicated that they did have some degree of influence it was usually in 
relation to their job. However, a bus-driving job (undertaken by the majority of Stage 
One survey respondents), is semi-autonomous in design. It is suggested, therefore, that 
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the 'nature' of the job was perhaps more significant for employees perceiving some 
degree of influence in their job than a culture of 'participation' in the \\orkpiace. In 
summary, the findings presented in Chapter 7 suggested that employee-owned companies 
did not provide employees with considerably greater influence in decision-making than 
companies without ESO. 
The relative significance and ultimately the success of EP arrangements in any 
organisation may be dependent upon how employers and employees as t\\/O separate 
groups define participation in the workplace. Some employers may regard the 
distribution of financial reports to employees, or notice board displays, as forms of EP 
(see Chapter 2). Employees, on the other hand, may have very different expectations. 
Where previous studies have focused upon the views of managers to investigate the 
impact of ESO, it is perhaps not surprising that positive results have been found. 
Additionally, even where systems of participation and involvement are in place, there is 
no guarantee that employees will secure an effective say in the way their company is run 
(Pendleton 1997). Specifically, if managers are not genuinely committed to workplace 
EP, ways wi 11 be found to circumvent democratic structures of decision-making. Equally, 
employees must be willing to assume the new responsibilities of ownership if managerial 
interest in EP is to be created and sustained: some employees may simply be 
disinterested in having more opportunities for EP, while others may believe in the 
traditional division of labour and the practical utility of allowing managers to manage 
(Hammer and Stern 1980). 
Nevertheless, the fact that a majority of all employees across the six companies expressed 
their desire for more influence is not unexpected. Generally and probably irrespective of 
ownership status, employees will often say they want more influence in the workplace 
than they have at present and this was indeed found to be the case judging by comments 
from Stage Two respondents. Realistically, however, the prospect of having to attend 
extra meetings outside of normal working hours and assume additional responsibilities 
may be greeted unenthusiastically and the initial euphoria associated with having more 
influence will quickly dissipate. Although difficult to test directly, a lack of enthusiasm 
within the 
among eITIployees could be one reason why 'actual' greater influence 

employee-owned cases featured in the thesis apparently failed to materialise. 
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Overall, results presented in Chapter 7 follow conclusions from studies by Klein (1987), 
Klein and Rosen (1986) and Kruse (1981), which reported that employees were motivated 
primarily by the prospect of financial gain resulting from ownership. Kruse (1981) 
further suggested that employee shareholders could resemble most non-shareholders and 
define ownership solely in terms of rights to the profits generated by the invested capital. 
In other words, employee owners could view themselves simply as investors who by 
coincidence owned shares where they worked and limited their expectations to a 
satisfactory rate of return on their investment, as long as they viewed ownership from an 
'investment' rather than a 'control' perspective. Where financial returns were deemed to 
be inadequate, dissatisfaction on the part of employee shareholders could increase their 
desire for influence to ensure that solutions were found for their firm's financial, 
managerial and personnel problems (see French 1987). 
As with outcomes of EP, ESO was not an influential factor in terms of the way in which 
employees regarded their trade union, although 'attitudinal differences' in relation to 
'employee-trade union relations' were evident across the six cases overall. Respondents 
from all six companies agreed that the survival of their trade union was important, thereby 
indicating that the trade unions were still seen as relevant and necessary regardless of 
company ownership status. Pendleton (200 1) has described the experience of ESO in the 
UK as 'moderately encouraging' (p. 188) for trade unions, although much depends on the 
degree of involvement unions have at the outset of an ESO conversion. In the context of 
the present research, the trade unions were directly involved in the conversions at 
Company One, Company Two and Company Three and in some instances, union 
personnel had served as employee directors on their company board. Even at Company 
Three where a good deal of resentment had been directed towards the trade union in 1994, 
respondents still recognised the need for union representation. Pendleton (2001) 
concluded that there was little evidence to indicate that employee shareholders turned 
their back on the trade union once they became owners. That trade unions are perceived 
as 'necessary' within employee-owned organisations is consistent with the work of 
Baddon et al (1989); Dunn et al (1991), Kruse (1984); Nichols and O'Connell-Davidson 
(1992); Pendleton et al (1995b) and Toscano (1984). 
• 
It is reasonable to assume that the degree to which the trade unions are regarded as 
necessary to protect employees' interests is related to the state of relations between 
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employees and their managers. If employees are happy with the way in which managers 
are looking after their interests then it may be the case that allegiance to the trade union 
wi II be weaker. If employees do not have confidence in their managers then the reverse 
outcome might be anticipated. In short, views on employee-manager relations were 
mixed: across the six cases perceptions of social divisions between managers and their 
employees were low, but perceptions that managers took notice of the ideas and 
experiences ot' employees and were efficient in running their organisations were similarly 
low. Interestingly, respondents from 'post employee-owned' Company Six were the most 
likely to identify a 'social division' between employees and managers but also the most 
likely to agree that managers took notice of employees' ideas and experiences and were 
efficient in running the organisation. The results show, therefore, that assessments of 
employee-manager relations can be variable within individual organisations and 
moreover, that ESO provides no guarantee of more harmonious industrial relations. 
O'Toole (1979) reported that employee-manager conflicts 'are often at the heart of poor 
performance in employee-owned firms' (p. 188). In addition, when managers are seen as 
incompetent or inefficient, satisfaction levels among employee shareholders are likely to 
be lower than among employees who do not own shares, since the former have more to 
lose (French 1987). Rhodes and Steers (198 J) in turn concluded that employees' 
perceptions of the efficiency of their managers were important for influencing the level of 
EP desired in the workplace. 
9.4 Employee share ownership durability 
The final theme addressed by the thesis and reported in Chapter 8 concerns the 
'durability' of employee-owned companies. Theoretical, and to a Jesser extent empirical 
research has highlighted some of the factors that are influential for helping to determine 
likely ESO durability. Ben-Ner's (1988) study (discussed in Chapter 3) addressed some 
of the environmental and endemic features that placed employee-owned firms in a high 
'risk of demise' category of organisational forms. Ben-Ner also explored whether 
employee-owned finns exhibited discernible life cycle patterns and moreover, if 
particular forms of ESO, such as workers' co-operatives, were more susceptible to demise 
than others. The durability and viability of co-operative organisations has long been an 
tl ' d more fully earlier in the thesis. area of focus for researchers and arguments were ou me 
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In contrast, ESOP and other employee-owned structures have received far less attention 
from the research community, although as Pendleton (200 I) noted, ESOP companies are 
not subject to degeneration in the same way as co-operatives since there is less to 
degenerate from. In many ESOP organisations management hierarchies have been 
present from the beginning and the allocation of equity between employees and their 
managers is often unequal. 
Chapter 8 set out to explore two key issues: firstly, are the reasons for, and methods by 
which organisations elect to establish systems of ESO significant for determining Iife­
cycle patterns? Secondly, is the eventual demise of employee-owned companies 
inevitable, regardless of the system of ESO in place? Using primary qualitative data from 
Stage Two trade union and managerial respondents at the three 'post employee-owned' 
companies - Company Four. Company Five (AJ and Company Six - the chapter examined 
a number of key variables which, as claimed in the thesis, could be influential for 
determining the life-cycles of employee-owned firms. The industry in which the three 
companies were operating may well have been one major factor: in each case, the period 
of time spent in ESO exceeded the average for all buy-outs of 3.42 years (Wright et al 
1992). Moreover, the duration of ESO at Company Four and Company Five (A) exceeded 
the average for bus buy-outs of 3.7 years (Pendleton 2001), while Company Six recorded 
slightly below average ESO duration among bus companies. Ben-Ner (1988) noted that 
employee-owned companies become exposed to more perils of demise as they mature. 
A particular weakness of the UK bus industry and one identified in the work of Pendleton 
(2001: 194) is the lack of a 'sense of ownership' among employees. Results in Chapter 8 
revealed that, in the main, transitions to ESO bad been based on defensive strategies of 
protecting companies from hostile take-over bids, being able to retain control and 
independence and hence being better placed to preserve jobs. Respondents at Company 
Five (A) were something of an exception among the three cases in citing their intention to 
'give employees a stake in their company', despite the fact that ESO was never 
considered by the company's managers to be a long-term strategy. The model of 
ownership may have been influential however, given that employees at the company were 
required to invest £1,000 of their own money to buy shares in the firm. Stage Two 
respondents described how ESO 'changed the culture' of their organisation and gave 
employees a certain degree of 'kudos' because they owned a stake in the firm. 
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In contrast, no such culture changes were apparent in the remaining two cases following 
ESO conversion. One respondent at Company Six described the share offer to employees 
as 'something for nothing', while the threat of a hostile take-over at Company Four was 
seen as the overriding impetus for ESO back in 1989. Overall, results in Chapter 8 
revealed that ESO meant very little to employees who did not have to pay for their shares: 
they did not have a 'voice' in their company, were not made to feel a part of the company 
and were generally disinterested in owning shares. ESO was also found to have relatively 
limited impact upon organisational efficiency where methods for acquiring shares were 
indirect, with employees making little or no association between 'being owners' and 
putting in greater effort for their company. In contrast, a strategy of keeping employees at 
Company Five (AJ fully informed encouraged them to work harder because they could see 
that extra profits would benefit them and their company directly. Company Five rA) 
employees were also made to feel part of a family, although this did not extend right 
across the organisation since not all employees could afford to buy shares. In Company 
Four and Company Six, respondents commented that employees only appeared to care 
about ESO when they thought they were going to get something out of it - generally 111 
the form of financial reward. 
Results presented in Chapter 8, therefore, support the work of Pendleton (2001) which 
also found that the prospect of financial reward heavily outweighed any psychological 
benefits of ownership. The financial rewards to be gained by selling to an outsider, 
moreover, appeared to far exceed the financial rewards of retaining shares in one's 
company. In many situations of ESO, employees have only been able to sell their shares 
when they leave their organisation; as long as they choose to stay they receive little 
tangible financial benefit from owning shares. In some of the bus buy-outs of the 1990s, 
external bidders were offering employees nearly 100 times the original value of their 
shares and so it is hardly surprising that employee-owned bus companies became 
particularly susceptible to take-over bids. 
In summarising the findings from Chapter 8, it may be stated that employees are likely to 
feel far more like 'owners', expend greater effort for the good of their company and thus 
be more reluctant to vote to sell the company if ESO is more 'meaningful' to them. 
Designing an ESO system whereby employees purchase their shares directly, ensuring 
. ., d I a reoular basis and havin cr systems inthat relevant mformatJOn IS passe to emp oyees on b b 
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place, whether direct or indirect, that allow employees to have their voices heard, are 
among the possibilities for companies to take on board. 
However, the outcome for all three companies was ultimately the same. Even at 
Company Five (AJ where ESO may have been expected to continue given the heightened 
'feelings of ownership' among employees, the activities of the local competition 
eventually proved too great. The company's engineering manager described some of the 
competitive practices employed by its main rival Company B during the period of ESO 
and eventually a merger between the two was seen as the best option for all concerned. 
Employees at Company Five (Aj had already invested money into the firm and their jobs 
may have been at risk if the company had become involved in a battle with bidders. Ben­
Ner (1988) remarked that in employee-owned companies, employees risked a decline in 
their personal income through buying shares and perhaps the loss of their jobs as well. 
The author added that employees were often better off working in capitalist enterprises 
for risk-averse capitalists who assumed the risk of running the firm. 
Ultimately it appears that the priorities of ensuring the continuity of the firm and 
safeguarding jobs remain paramount for employee-owned firms, although these would 
similarly be among the priorities of more 'conventional' organisations without ESO 
structures in place. The conclusion from this aspect of the research may be that the 
demise of employee-owned firms is largely inevitable: the financial rewards of 'selling 
out' are too great for employees to ignore, particularly when they work in low-paying 
industries; similarly, the temptation for senior managers to agree to a sale where they 
have invested a large proportion of their personal income into buying shares may be 
overwhelming. Employee-owned firms can also become 'victims of their own success 
and employees may find they are unable to buy shares due to a continually rising share 
price. Finally, competition from local rivals can escalate to a level where employee­
owned companies can no longer survive on their own. 
Given the factors above that pertain to impact upon the life-cycles of employee-owned 
businesses, the example of Company One as an employee-owned entity eleven years after 
its inception is all the more significant. Factors that have contributed to making Company 
One a 'unique' case and perhaps a 'model' for other companies are discussed in the final 
section. 
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9.5 Summary 
The overriding theme of this research has been 'diversity in ownership'. which, it is 
contended, can have a powerful impact upon the attitudinal, behavioural and performance 
outcomes generally associated with ESQ. Within both academic and political circles, 
'employee share ownership' has often been used as a 'catch-aIl' term; in turn, it has been 
assumed that its presence in organisations will result in greater employee commitment 
and subsequently, improved corporate success. As highlighted throughout the thesis. 
however, there is considerable diversity in ESQ, which means no such outcomes can be 
guaranteed. The circumstances in which ownership conversions occur and the objectives 
of those conversions, the individuals involved in managing the conversion process, the 
proportion of 'collective ESQ' within organisations and the ways in which employees 
acquire their shares are all influential. 
Recent ESQ studies have pointed to the need for more systematic explanations of the 
interplay of different variables within case study investigations. Until now, both the 
recognition and analysis of different variables has been largely inconsistent in empirical 
studies. Some of the methodological approaches used have been the subject of some 
criticism (see Chapter 3), particularly the reliance on 'cross-sectional' as opposed to 
longitudinal data. The author recognises that longitudinal data is similarly absent from 
the current study and perhaps, therefore, a limitation of the research. Difficulties 
associated with the capture of longitudinal data were discussed earlier in the thesis; 
within the context of ESQ, ensuring sustained co-operation with employee-owned 
organisations can be especially problematic due to the variable 'employee ownership life-
cycles' of these types of firms. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the approach taken by the author was one of 'interrupted 
involvement': the researcher is present sporadically within the company, moving in and 
out of the enterprise to deal with other work as necessary across a number of different 
cases. The process is not one of continuous longitudinal involvement but it allows the 
researcher to spend a period of time in a particular setting, witness perhaps significant 
events in the history of the company and subsequently garner potentially richer insights 
from the environment under investigation. For the future, given the experiences of the 
UK bus industry during the 1990s, it is unlikely that, aside from a limited number of co­
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operative structures, ESO will be characterised in the same way again in terms of majority 
share allocations for employees. Much more likely is the continued proliferation of 
broad-based share ownership schemes. By their nature, broad-based schemes do not 
'unsettle' traditional organisational hierarchies; they are, therefore, inherently more stable 
and' long-term' than ESOPs or direct ownership buy-outs precisely because power shifts 
are unlikely to occur. These characteristics make them a suitable focus for longitudinal 
examination in future research, particularly in terms of the expectations employees may 
have on becoming 'shareholders' in their own companies. 
To conclude, it is fitting to consider some of the main points that can be drawn from the 
research for the benefit of key players involved in the promotion and diffusion of ESO, or 
in the adoption of ESO programmes for their own organisations. If ESO is to become and 
remain a 'durable' method for motivating employees and creating organisational success, 
then employers, business leaders and current and future governments need to learn from 
the 'empirical reality' as illustrated by the featured cases. The example of Company One 
and the way in which it has functioned as an employee-owned business over the past 
eleven years merits particular consideration: 
• 	 ESO has the most impact, in terms of creating a 'sense of ownership' among 
employees, when ownership is 'meaningful' and 'tangible' to them. At Company One, 
the entire workforce had the opportunity to be 'involved' in the ESO conversion and 
safeguard their jobs and pensions by investing directly in the buy-out. At the outset, 
the company had decided to reject an ESOP arrangement because of concerns that it 
would weaken the motivational effects of owning shares. The Company One view of 
ESOPs is supported by results presented in Chapter 6, whereby a majority of 
respondents at both Company Two and Company Three said that owning shares had 
made no difference to the way they thought about their company. 
• 	 A 'broad base' of ESO was seen as important at Company One. Senior managers, 
trade union officials and employees alike had viewed as problematic the idea of an 
EBT holding a significant proportion of the shares. There were concerns among the 
parties that the accumulation of a large amount of shares in a trust would invest 
responsibility and influence in a small group of elected trustees at the expense of 
individual shareholders. The comments of one respondent that Company One should 
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be owned by the majority rather than the minority of employees captured the ethos that 
lay behind the initial design of the ESO model. That shareholding was intended to be 
'equal' was also put forward as one of the reasons for Company One's longevity. The 
same respondent had comn:tented that the company's senior management team would 
not be keen to sell the company given that employees and managers were on an equal 
footing in terms of individual share allocations. In situations where senior managers 
have held a sizeable stake in the business, as at Company Three for example, the 
temptation to sell has often been too great. At Company One, senior managers would 
be unlikely to walk away from their company with a large pay-off as a result of selling 
their shares and so the likelihood of a sale was reduced. 
• 	 A 'strong sense of ownership', moreover, emanating from inside Company One, 
suggests that employees themselves were less likely than their counterparts in 
companies with 'lower proportions of employee ownership' to vote in favour of a take­
over and lose their independence. The company's finance director had observed that a 
potential buyer would have to convince two-thirds of the workforce to vote in favour 
of a sale. Despite the high proportion of shareholders found within the business, 
Company One was the smallest of all six companies by some way with only 300 
employees. The next smallest was Company Five with just over 750 employees (see 
section 4.4.2 in Chapter 4). Company One's finance director added that the company 
was too small to create real problems for other transport groups and it was simply not 
worthwhile for one of the larger groups to put in a bid for the company and risk 
running into problems with the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 
• 	 Notably, out of all of the six cases, Company One respondents were the most likely to 
say that the best way to gain influence was through their trade union, thus indicating 
that ESO and related structures within the company (see Appendix 2(ii)) had not 
usurped the traditional union role. At the same time, less than one-fifth of Company 
One respondents from Stage One felt able to commend their union to others, although 
responses in relation to this issue were generally negative across the six companies. 
One respondent at Company One had commented that managers were sometimes 
guilty of 'pandering' too much to the union but added that this was probably a 
deliberate strategy to get the unions 'on side'. It is asserted that, despite the apparent 
depth of feeling among employees towards ESO, managers recognised that share 
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-ownership alone was insufficient to completely eradicate 'them and us' feelings. 
Rather, managers still needed to work with and rely on the unions to ensure the co­
operation and commitment of employees during periods of major change. The 
assertion is further supported by the finding that Company One respondents were the 
least likely to say that their union had lost a lot of influence in recent years. 
• 	 Findings relating to the nature of the trade union role at Company One also reveal 
much about the state of 'employee-manager' relations at the firm. Analysis in Chapter 
7 revealed that relationships between employees and their managers were not 
necessarily any more harmonious in an environment of employee ownership. It is 
perhaps the case, however, that employees had higher expectations of their managers 
once they became 'owners' and subsequently took a greater interest in how they were 
running the company. Where expectations had been frustrated it is 110 surprise that 
employees turned to their union, perhaps even more so than in the period prior to ESO 
conversIOn. 
• 	 Further, it is possible that employees at Company One, and similarly at Company Two 
and Company Three, had greater expectations of influence in their firm than were ever 
likely to be realised in practice. Actual EP was not found to any greater degree in the 
employee-owned organisations than in the other three cases. As discussed in Chapter 
2, there is little evidence to suggest that share schemes, whether ESOPs, direct 
ownership or broad-based schemes, are intended by employers to provide employees 
with greater influence. The proliferation of these schemes has often been in response 
to favourable tax breaks rather than any attempts to 'empower' employees. From 
results presented, it is suggested that the dissemination of information and the process 
of simply 'keeping employees informed' is more realistic; it is, moreover, an approach 
that employees are more likely to welcome than structures of participation and 
governance requiring them to assume further responsibilities. Employers are also 
more likely to welcome the approach; there is no loss of control and the company 
benefits from having a better informed and possibly more contented and in turn 
motivated workforce. At the same time, the trade union maintains its 'traditional' role 
as 'representative' of employees' interests. 
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• 

Addressing more broadly the employee-trade union-ESO relationship, t\\/O alternative• 
perspectives can be said to have emeraed from the research b 	 Fl'rst tf d a e unions may ., . 
benefit from functioning in an ESO environment when they are involved in the 
conversion process from the outset and supplied with relevant information. At 
Company Five (AJ, Stage Two respondents remarked that the role of the union 
'shifted' slightly during the period of ownership. Employees and managers were 
drawn closer together into working to ensure the success of the company, which may 
have at first appeared to be potentially detrimental to the union's position. However, a 
large number of union representatives had also bought shares in the company and were 
similarly committed to seeing their firm succeed. Conversely, a supportive union 
stance towards ESO could be problematic if employees begin to question where their 
union's loyalties lie. At Company Three, the trade union had full involvement in the 
1994 buy-out, though this resulted in employees feeling very resentful of the union. 
Employees felt betrayed that the union had 'negotiated away' some of their terms and 
conditions during the buy-out process and it was some years before those feelings of 
betrayal diminished. 
• 	 If ESO is judged to be 'successful' where it has been sustained, then Company One 
can be regarded as a 'successful' company and one from which others can learn. 
Significantly, employees at the company acknowledged that their firm's strategy 
would not necessarily work in other companies with ESO. The finance director said 
there was no set formula for success and each situation would differ. In short, results 
presented in the thesis suggest there is no 'ideal' model of ESO that will guarantee 
success and company longevity. At Company Five (AJ a direct ownership mechanism 
was also put in place but competitive pressures meant that the company survived as an 
employee-owned entity for less than four years. It may be posited that employee­
owned firms are essentially no different from other organisations and will experience 
successes and failures to the same degree according to the circumstances occurring in 
their external environment, such as the activities of the competition. Employee-owned 
firms may also be less 'stable' in that the extension of ESO may be dependent upon 
the ability of new employees to buy shares (for relevant discussion refer to section 2.2 
in Chapter 2). Where shares become too expensive for employees to purchase, the 
company may have little option but to seek investors elsewhere. 
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• 	 Notwithstanding, there are certain factors, such as a 'greater sense of ownership 
among employees' and 'more equal shareholdings for employees and senior managers' 
that may help to create an environment in which ESO is more likely to be sustained. 
As highlighted earl ier in this section, it is unlikely that ESO will feature again in the 
UK to the same extent as found in the country's bus industry during the 1980s and 
1990s. Given the continued legislation introduced by the current Government. the aim 
now is clearly to encourage the spread of wider ESO via broad-based share schemes. 
Broad-based schemes do not provide and are not intended to provide the rights or the 
basis for employees to take responsibility for the management of their company. 
Instead. schemes may be regarded as an individualist form of EI and a further way to 
remunerate employees, rather than as a means to extend EP and partnership. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Appendix 1: Company data record questionnaire 
Research site: .......................... . 

Section 1: Ownership structure and company type (all companies) 
For each of the questions below please write your answer in the space provided or circle the 
appropriate response 
1.1 In which year was your company established? 
Year ............................................................. . 

1.2 Is your company part of a larger group? (If yes, please specify the name) 
Yes Name: .................................................................................. . 
No 2 
1.3 Where is the head office for your company located? 
1.4 	 For each of the staff categories listed below please state the total number employed 
by your company: 
Staff cate or Total no. of em 10 ees 

Drivers 

......~.J:tgiJ:t.~.~.~iT1g ... 

Maintenance 
Other 
1.5 What is the legal form of your company's registration? 
Private limited company I 
Public limited company 2 
Other (please specify) 3 .......................................................................................... . 

1.6 Please give details of who sits on your company board: 
.................................................................................................................................................... 

............................................................................................................................................ 

.............. ........................................................................................................................ ... .... .. 

Appendix 1 
Section 2a: For completion by 'employee-owned' companies only 
Information on employee share ownership at your company 
2.1 	 When and how did the current ownership status of your company occur? 
Date ....................................................................................................................... . 
Nature of change .................................................................................................... . 
2.2 	 Please indicate the % of equity in your company held by the following 
people/groups: 
Grou % of e nit owned 

Directors 

....................................OH·· ...... • ........................... . 

...M..<.I:I1.(lg~J!l.e.l1t(~)(cJll~il:lg.Ai~~c:t()~s) 
Employees 

owners 
the above and trusts 

I······..··· .. ··..····..·•····....········..·····..·..····..····..................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .. 

.... tI.21.¢.if,lg...c:9.f.YlP<1:.I1Y... 

ESOP/EST trust 

2.3 	 Please state the proportion of ordinary shares held by employees in your company: 
............................................................... 0/0 
2.4 	 Please state the proportion of preference shares held by employees in your company: 
............................................................... 0/0 

2.5 	 Please give details of how the equity was raised to buy the company: 
.............................................................................................................................................. 

........... .................................................................................................................................... 

2.6 	 Do employees in your company have voting rights on their shares? 
Yes 
No 2 
[fyes, please give details: ............................................................................................... . 
............................................................................................................................................ .. 
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2.7 	 How many opportunities are there each year for employees to purchase shares in your 
company? 
2.8 	 Please provide brief details of how employees join your company's share ownership 
scheme: 
2.9 Please provide brief details of how employees exit your company's share ownership 
scheme: 
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Section 2b: For completion by 'post buy-out' companies only 
Information on the current ownership status of your company 
2.1 	 When did your company cease to be owned by its employees? 
Date: .......................................................................................... . 
2.2 	 Please state the reason for your company ceasing to be owned by its employees: 
2.3 	 Please state the proportion of equity sold: ......................................... 010 

2.4 	 Please state the sale price of the company: 
2.5 	 Please state the price per share paid by the purchaser: ....................................... .. 

2.6 	 Please state the proportion of the workforce voting for the sale: .................... % 

2.7 	 Please state the proportion of equity votes in favour of the sale: .................... % 

Previous ownership status of your company 
2.8 	 When and how did ownership by workers and management of your company occur? 
Date: ................................................................................................................................. .. 
Nature of change: ............................................................................................................. .. 
2.9 	 Please indicate the % of equity in your company formerly held by the following 
people/groups: 
Group % of ~quitrowned 

Directors 

............................"......................................... . ...... " .."."..........·..H.········ 

.....~.~~.':l:g~1E.~~!..<~~~I..~9..!~g9.il.:~.~~~.~s.)........ 

Employees 

... (~~c:)~9iT1g!b~':l:~9Y~(iT1~t.~~t~~~c:J ....... . 

Private investors 

""F~;;; iiy~~~ers 
......tI.1?}9i.~g ..c:(?1EPa.:E1Y........ 

ESOP/EBT trust 

...................,.........................."',................... . 

Other (please specify) 
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2.10 
2.11 
2.12 
2.13 
Please state the proportion of ordinary shares formerly held by employees in your 
company: 
............................................................. 0/0 
Please state the proportion of deferred shares formerly held by employees in your 
company: 
............................................................. 0/0 
Please state the proportion of preference shares formerly held by employees in your 
company: 
............................................................... % 
Please give details of how the equity was raised to buy your company in the first 
instance: 
2.14 Did any employees in your company have voting rights on their shares? 
Yes I If yes, please give details below 
No 2 
2.15 How many opportunities were there each year for employees to purchase shares in 
your company? 
2.16 Please provide brief details of how employees were able to join your company's share 
ownership scheme: 
2.17 Please provide brief details of how employees were able to exit from your company's 
share ownership scheme: 
...................................................................................................................................................... 
............................................................................................................ .......................................... . 
............... ................................................................ ....... .............................................................. . 
3.1 
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Section 3: Your company's markets (all companies) 
For Qs 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 below please circle one number to indicate your response. For 
example,for Q 3.1, if you believe that demand in your company's market(s) has been stable since 
1993 you should circle one of the lower numbers (lor 2). If however you believe that demand in 
your company's market(s) has been unstable you should circle one ofthe higher numbers (4 or 5). 
In general, how would you assess demand in your company's market(s) since 1993? 
i ; 
Very stable 2 3 4 5 Very unstable 
demand demand1 

3.2 	 Approximately what % share of the total market in your operating region(s) does 
your company have? 
........................................................ 0/0 

3.3 	 In general, how would you describe your company's cash flow position since 1993? 
Highly cash 3 4 5 Highly cash 
flow positive flow negative 
3.4 	 In general, how have the prices of your bus services changed relative to the general 
level of prices since 1993? 
Increased 	 2 3 4 5 Decreased 
3.5 	 In general, how have the prices of your bus services changed relative to the 
competition since 1993? 
Increased 	 2 3 4 5 Decreased 
4 
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Section 4: Work organisation issues (all companies) 
4.1 	 Please state the current average full-time working week for the following categories of 
staff in your company: 
Staff cate or 

Drivers 

.....l\:19:I?9:g~ri9:1....... 

Other 

4.2. What was the labour turnover rate in your company in 1997? 
................................................................... % 

4.3 What was the labour turnover rate in your company in 1993? 
.................................................................... % 

4.4 What was the rate of absenteeism in your company in 1997? 
.................................................................... % 

4.5 What was the rate of absenteeism in your company in 1993? 
.................................................................... % 

4.6 	 In the space provided below please give details of any job losses that have occurred in 
your company since 1993: 
Year 	 Job category Numbers affected 
4.7 	 For each of the categories below please state the % of your workforce employed on 
permanent full-time contracts: 
Staff cate or 

Drivers 
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4.8 	 For each of the categories below please state the % of your workforce employed on 
part-time contracts: 
Staff cate or % 

Drivers 

..............,.. ................................. 

4.9 	 For each of the categories below please state the % of your workforce employed on 
temporary contracts: 
Staff cate or % 

Drivers 

~'l.I'l'l.g,,?~i~I .. 
Other 
% of workforce 
Appendix I 
Section 5: Remuneration issues (all companies) 
5.1 How many rates of pay do you have in your company ..................................................... . 

5.2 Have any settlements been linked directly to efficiency/productivity agreements? 

Yes 

No 2 

If yes. please give details below: 

Year(s) Details i 
5.3 	 At what percentage of normal rates of pay are overtime rates set? ........................... % 

5.4 	 How many collective bargaining units are there for pay determination in your 
company'? 
No ................................................. . 

5.5 	 Please indicate the existence of any of the following types of financial participation or 
payment schemes in your company by circling the appropriate response in each case: 
System 
Profit-related 
pay 
Cash profit­
sharing 
Approved 
profit-sharing ..... 
Executive share 
scheme 
Group bonus 
scheme 
Individual 
Used by 
com an 
Yes 
No ............................. 
Yes 
No
···1············· ····································1 
Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 

Yes 

No 
 .................................., .....................,............................................." ...... ,_ ................" .... .. 

Yes 
No 
Year 
introduced 
........................................ 
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Section 6: HRM/industrial relations issues (all companies) 
6.1 	 Is there a senior manager at your company with specific responsibility for industrial 
relations or HRM/personnel matters? 
Yes 1 

No 2 

Ifyes, please give details: 
6.2 	 Is there a director on the board with specific responsibility for industrial relations or 
HRM/personnel matters? 
Yes 1 

No 2 

6.3 	 Please indicate the number of staff who deal specifically with industrial 

relations or HRM/personnel related matters in your company: 

No............................... . 

Details: .................................................................................................................... . 

6.4 	 Do you have an overall industrial relations policy in your company? 
Yes 1 

No 2 

6.5 	 Please give details below of any externally assessed HRM quality awards gained by 
your company such as Investors in People: 
Year gained Award 
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6.6 	 Please give details below of any externally assessed HRM quality awards with which 
your company is currentIv involved: 
Date Award Expected date 
commenced of completion 
6.7 	 Are any HRM/related activities regularly contracted out to external agencies? 
(For example, regular use of training or recruitment agencies) 

Yes 

No 2 

If yes, please give details below: 
Activity Date commenced 
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Section 7: Communication and participation processes (all companies) 
7.1 	 Please tick boxes as appropriate to indicate which of the following groups are 
provided with information about each of the issues listed below: 
Trade union 	 All other 
Labour turnover 
Absenteeism 
.....~.~.c::.i..9..::.I1.t.~/il1j.l1t.i::~ 
......l:.'.':~.?l1.~... PT?.~l1gtiyity ... 

Labour
I····::::·::::·:··::··:·c:··..·:···:·:··:·:···················........... I·· ................................... .... ..... .......... . .... ....... ...... .... ..... ...... 

Sales information 

Financial infonnation 
7.2 	 Please indicate whether your company uses any of the following communication 
methods by circling the appropriate response in each case: 
Frequency of method 
Used by (E.g. monthly/ 
Method ~()I11P~:lflY .... Year introduced ....~J:'!!()l1t~ly). 
Notice boards Yes 
No 
..................................................................,.................. . ................. . 

Newsletters 	 Yes 

No 

Company newspapersl Yes 

Ip?:g~7:il1es .... No 

Company reports Yes 

No 

Mass meetings Yes 

No 

Road shows Yes 

No 

Attitude surveys Yes 

No 

........" .................................................- ................. 

Other (please specify) 	 Yes 

No 

Appendix 1 
7.3 	 From the list of 'involvement' methods below please indicate which you have within 
your company by circling the appropriate response in each case and specifying the 
date they were introduced: 
Scheme 	 Used by Date 
... ................................................................................................._ ..................................~g~p.~~y ........................ i~~EfJ..~.uced 

Employee trustee(s) of a pension scheme 	 Yes 

No 

......... ,... -................... 

Employee trustee(s) ofa profit share-save Yes 

scheme trust No 

Worker directors Yes 

No 
............................. 

Works counci I Yes 

No 

Joint consultative committee Yes 

No 

Joint health and safety committee Yes 

No 

............................. 

Chairperson's forum 	 Yes 

No 

....................,............. -..,......... ,.. 

Shareholder's forum Yes 

No 

Team briefing Yes 

No 

Suggestion box Yes 

No 

Suggestion scheme with rewards Yes 

No 

Joint job evaluation Yes 

No 

Job rotation Yes 

No 

Mentoring system Yes 

No 

......................"'............................................. -, .................................. 

Other (please specify) 	 Yes 

No 

2 
Section 8: Industrial relations/h'ade union issues (all companies) 
Appendix 1 
8.1 	 Please state the approximate % of employees in your company belonging to a trade 
union: 
•••..••.••...•.•••..•••••••••.•..•..••.•••.••••••..• 0/0 
8.2 	 How many trade unions does your company recognise for representation and/or 
negotiation purposes? 
8.3 	 Please state the names of these unions: 
8.4 	 Please indicate how overall union density has changed in your company since 1993: 
i 	 i 
Increased I 2 " ) 4 5 Decreased 
substantially substantially 
~ 1 
8.5 	 Have there been any changes to industrial relations procedures and systems since 
1993? 
Yes I 

No 2 

Ifyes. please give details below: 
IChang' 	 IDat, 
8.6 	 Has there been any form of industrial action at you r company since 1993? 
Yes If yes. please give details below: 

No 2 

IDat, 
Thank you for your assistance in this matter 
-- -------- ---
- -- -
Appendix 2(i}: Responses from data record questionnaire 
Que. ISection l: Ownership structure and company type 
no. 
l.l 	 In which year was your company established? 
I}. .Is_)'().urcompa.ny part ofa.~arger_grouJ)? 
l.~ .._ 'Yb.e~e is the. head office f~)l"yollrcoI11pal1YJocate(f? 
1.4 	 For each of the staff categories listed below please state the total 
l111mber employed by your (;omIJan),: 
Drivers 
J::I1gil1~er_ing 
Maintenance 
~a!.ering/clelit1ing . 

Clerical/administrative 

~tlI'.ervisory .. 

~anag~ria.1 .. 

Other 
1.5 	 l~ha!iS the legal[ormjourcompany's registration? 
1.6 	 Details of who sits on your company board 
Company One 
1993 

No 
North West 
198 

36 

25 

33 

4 

4 

Private limited company 

Managing director, traffic 

manager, engineering director, 

finance director, four employee 

directors (representing drivers, 

inspectors, office workers, 

craftsmen and non-craftsmen) 

and a non-employee non­

executive director who has no 

vote 

Company Five 
1935 

Yes 
South East 
547 

12 

52 

45 

44 

32 

12 

8 

Private limited company 
Not stated 
Company Six 
1989 (incorporated December 
1988) 
Yes 
London 
1,243 (including trainees) 
106 

31 

64 

70 

48 

.77 (conductors) 

Private limited company 

Non-executive chairman, 6 

executive directors, 2 

employee directors, 3 110n­

executive directors 

Appendix 2(i) 
I 
----- ---
--
2.1 
ii..\.L.-~"" · ~.;;- .Wferffm:irfRi("%1url1~'cj"(kWJX\.J~"~:"lf_J't 'J'lLF'B_ J•.-Yi¢i_ '~.j,;'. rlhtW 1i&VniJI -;;; 
Que. 
no. 
occur? 

Date 

~a~re_ol~ha_nge___ _ 
2.2 	 Please indicate the % of equity in your company held by the following 
p~opie/gr()ups: 
Directors 
~~Ilagement(exclu<:ling din~ctors) 
E.n1ployees (ex_cLuciiI1glhe aboye_,md trusts etc.) 
Private investors 

Farl1ib'owneE~ __ _ 

.H0ldiI1gco.mpany 
ESOP/EBT trust 
Other (please specifY) 
2.3 --I P~~p~;tion ~f ;;rdina;'Y shares held by e-n1ployees in your company 
2.4 	 IProportion of preference shares held by employees in your company 
2.5 	 IDetails of how the equity was raised to buy the company 
2.6 100 employees in your company have voting rights on their shares? 
Details 
2.7 	 No. of opportunities each year for employees to purchase shares in your 
company? 
Company One Company Five 	 Company Six 
31 March 1993 
Employee buy-out 
100% employee owned - no 
individual is allowed to own 
more than 1% 
100% 
Nil 
Bank loans, plus employees 
paid cash for~h<lr~s 
Yes 
On major and special business 
No regular opportunities. On 
two occasions employees have 
been offered the chance to buy 
more shares 
Appendix 2(i) 
Que. (Section 2a continued Company Olle Compa,,)' Fil'e Company Sit 
no. 
2.8 	 (Details of how employees join your company's share ownership scheme IEmployees complete the 
necessary forms when they join 
or anytime thereafter. New 
employees (and existing ones) 
can purchase up to a maximum 
of 1,163 shares and can pay by 
regular deductions fl'om wages 
--t-	 ------------ - --- -- --­
2.9 	 Details of how employees exit your company's share ownership scheme IUpon ceasing employment or 
the company being sold 

Section 2b: InfOJ'mation on the current ownel'ship status of your 

comQanyJ'pQS_Lb!lY-=0!l~ c~IIll}anies.only) 
2.1 	 When did your company cease to be owned by its employees? Company B ceased trading in May 1997 August 1997 

and merged with Company A 

- -- - -- --- ---_. ­ I·· 
2.2 Reason for your company ceasing to be owned by its employees 	 Shareholders decided that the long-term Purchase of share capital by 
future best lay in ownership by one of new buyer 
Ithe bigger transpolt groups 
I 
2.3 Proportion of equity sold . 	 [00% 100% 
2.4 Sale price of the company Not stated £41 million 

;2.5 
 Price per share paid by tht.:purchaser 	 Not stated 74 pence 
2.6 	 Propoi1:ion of the workforce voting for the sale 100% 100% 
12 .7 Propo!tion ofequity votes in favour of the s(ile 	 100% 100% 
2.8 	 When and how did the previous employee ownership status of your Company A was sold by the local Sale to a management 
company occur? council to its shareholders employee buy-out (MEEO) 
Date December 1993 November 1994 
Appendix 2(i) 
-- --
Que. ISection 2b continued 
no. 
2.9 	 IPlease indicate the % of equity in your company formerly held by the 
followingpeople;groups: 
Directors 
Management (excluding directors) 
Employees (excluding above and trusts etc.) 
Private investors 
Family owners 
,~ ..- .. -- ........ . 

H.ol§ing£ompany 

ESOP/EBT trust 

()therJplease~ spe(;ify) 

2.10 	 Propmtion of ordinary shares formerly held by employees in your 
c()rnpany__ ~_~~~ __ _~ ~ 
2.11 	 Proportion of deferred shares formerly held by employees in your 
company 

2.\ i ~ rpl·oporti~~ ~f pref~~~~l~~-~~~h~r~s formerly held by ~mployees in your 

co~n2.any 
2.13 	 Details of how the equity was raised to buy your company in the first 

instance 

2.14 	 Did any employees in your company 
~. 
have voting rights on their shares? 
-
Details 
2.15 	 No. of opportunities each year for employees to purchase shares in your 
company 
Compal/y One Company Five 
go/
, ° 
J% 
49°.-0 
40% 
49% 
Nil 
Nil 
Via building society loans 
Yes 
All shareholders 
Once a year 
Company Sir 
/40+% 

9.5% 

40+% (institutions) 

9.5% 

Nil 

12% 

Venture capital plus the 

purchase of shares by 

management and employees 

Yes 

One Yote, one share 

Twice a year 

Ap/II.'ndix 2(i) 
----- -----
- -------- -
--------- - -- - -- - - - -------
-- -- --- --
-
- -- -
------ -- ---------- -- --- -
::~>~~--"-...-----~ 
Que. Section 2b continued Company One CompallY Five Company Six 
no. 
2.16 	 Details of how employees were able to join your company's share Those employed in 1993 at the time of Offer of shares followed by 
the bu),-out and then once ayear dealing periods _~w_'!er~~iE~ch~~~_________ .. _______ .. __ 	
--
.... --- .--..-.........---.....­
--------	
···-1 
2.17 Details of how employees were able to exit from your company's share Once a year (when employees also had I. Selling during dealing 
ownership scheme the opportunity to purchase shares) periods. 2. On leaving the 
company for any reason 
employees had to sell their 
shares back to the EST 
Section 3: Your company's markets 	 I 
3.1 	 [n general, how would you assess demand in your company's market(s) 2 2 1 
since 1993? (Refer to questionnaire for code definitions as appropriate) 
3.2 	 Approximately what % of the total market in your operating region(s) 90% Company A used to run around 28%. 85% 
d~esxou~ornpanyEave? ...... Company Five now runs 95% 
3.3 	 In general, how would you describe your company's cash flow position 2 I 1 
since 1993? 
---_. --	 --- - - ---------- - --- -- -
.. 
- ---
- ... 
- --­
3.4 	
~-
In general, how have the prices of your bus services changed relative to 3 3 2 
th.e_gelleralJ~_veL~fprJces siJ1ce} 993? . __ .._ 
-- - - ----	 ......
-----------	
-I···· 
3.5 	 In general, how have the prices ofyour bus services changed relative to 3 3 3 
the competition since 1993? 
Section 4: Work organisation issues 
4.1 	 Please state the current average full-time working week for the 
fo lJoVJ.itlg_cate.g?~i~_9fs_taffi!l.)/ollr.c9_ll1p~ny=. .. 	
.. 
--	 . ­
Drivers 	 39 hrs 45 hrs 39 hrs 
- - ---- -------------- ---.- ---- ------- - --------- - - -- ..­
~nginec:ri.ng__ ___ 38 hrs 
­
Maintenance 
- --------------------- - ----------- ---- -------- -	
_.­
C='!.~eri!lg(c;leCl[ling____ ._ 
._._-
_. 	
- . 
Clerical/administrative 
-
37 hrs 37.5 hrs 	 35 hrs 
Supervisory 
--	
42 hI'S 37 hrs 
.-	
- --­
~~n(lg~rial .._ 
. 	
37.5 hrs 35 hrs 
Other 
-- - -	
39 hrs 
-_. 	
-------­
Appendix 2(i) 
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:tU'WW_f"Bh?!iVft 
Que. (Section 4 continued Company One Company Five Company Six 

no. 

4.2JW_ha!.\Va~h~ l<l_b_~~ t_ur.llO~eI~r'lte inyour c()mpanY}rl..19.27? <5% 15% 35-40% 

4.3 	 IWhat was the labour turnover rate in your company in 1993? <6% Not known, but thought to be c.lS% 25-30% 
4.4 	 What "",asthe_ rate of absenteeism inyour companyin_1997? c.4.5% 10% Not stated 
4.5 	 _\Vh<lt~as_!~!~at(!o! (lb~cnteeism ~n.X<?lI!COI~pa.l~y iI1t99}_~ c.4.5% _ 10% Not stated 
4.6 	 Details of any job losses that have occurred in your company since 1993 Reduced the number of drivers No significant ones until the merger. 33 bus cleaners and 6 bus 
by 10 Post merger: 20 administrative and 30 mechanics lost their jobs in 
-- --
engineering posts have gone 1995 and 1998 respectively 
4.7 	 For each of the categories below please state the % of your workforce 
e~ll{lI02'ed ()npermancn_t f~ll:tirne contracts: 
Driver 
Ellgine_ering 
Maintenance 

<::at~ri!1g1c~eat1 i11g. All except 7 part-time drivers 
 99% of the workforce are full-time 100%Clerical/administrative and 1 temporary office worker 

~_upel"v isory 

1\1at:lageria~ 

Other 
-- ----- -. 	 ­
4.8 	 For each of the categories below please state the % of your workforce 
employed on_J)l.lr!=titl1e_~ol1tracts:._ 
Drivers 7 out of200 drivers 
~ngin.eetjng _ 
Maintenance 

c::~tering/(;'-ean}l1g _ 
 I% of all staff 	 NilClerical/administrative Nil 

~Llper'V'is()ry 

rvt:an~gerial 

Other 
Appendix 2(i) 
Que. ISection 4 continued Company Onl! Company Fil'e Company Six 
no. 
4.9 IFor each of the categories below please state the %, of your workforce 
employed on temporary contracts: 
Drivers 
Engineering 
Maintenance 
Catering/cleaning 
Clerical/administrative 
8 staff across all categories Nil Nil 
Sup_er_\fi.sory. 
~~nagerial 
Other 
Section 5: Remuneration issues 
5.1 How many rates of pay do you have in your company? Numerous One each for drivers, skilled staff, c.IOO 
cleaners and for supervisory engineers; 
two for supervisory operators and 
personal rates for administrative 
staff/managers 
5.2 Have any settlements been linked directly to efficiency/productivity Yes Yes 
agreements? 
Details Enhanced pay for overtime was Each year managerial salaries 
eliminated in 1994 increase according to 
performance 
5.3 At what percentage of normal rates of pay are overtime rates set? Varies depending on job - can IFlat time Not stated 
he 1'1., to 2'/, 
SA How many collective bargaining units are there for pay determination in 13 
Iyour company? 
2 4 
Appendix 20) 
- --- - ---- ---------- ---
- - - --- - -- ------- ----
dt'Mt\,f,WVfW j1 
Que. ISection 5 continued 
no. 
5.5 	 I Please indicate the existence of any of the following types of financial 
participation or payment schemes operating in your company: 
~.r()fi!:r~late~ paX 

Year introduced 

0,,1, of ~orkfo~ce_eli~ibl~ 

'}-'O ()f \\forkforcepastic;ipating 

'Yo of p.aye~chyear 

Cash.profit-s!taring 

Year introduced 

-----~----
0/0 ()f~~kforc;eeILgi.!>l~ 

~_()Lw~r~force p_artici pating . 

'Yo.()f p~xea~~ye.ar . __ .___ 

~ppl~ov_edp~otit-:.sh.~r!l1g 

Year introduced 
.!"00!.\\,o~~fo_r~~~li£ibl~_. 

y<>of ~()I"~torce partic;ipCitil2cg. 

"(0 ~fpay eil.c~. tear 

Executive share scheme 

Year introduced 

~ 
°,,1,.oLworkforce eligib}e. 

% ()f~()rkfor.ce.JJ~rtic;pa~illg _ 

"(0 ()fpay e~c~ )'<!~r __ _ 

C;:ro,:!P.b_O[Jllssc.heme 

Year introduced 

----_._- - --------­
0/0 ..<2f~orkforceeligi~I~_ 

%..s>L\V()~~forc;e P'!'!ic;ip.ating. 

% of nay each vear 

Company One 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Company Five 
Yes 

1996 

AI! 

99% 

Employees are c. 7% net better off 

No 

No 

No 

No 
Company Six 
Yes 

1995 (backdated to 5 

]\[Ovember 1994) 

100% 

100% 

4% 

No 

No 
No 
Yes 
Prior to 1993 
3 
3 
Not stated 
Appendix 2(i) 
Que. ISection 5 continued CompallY One 
no. 
Individual bonus scheme No 
Year introduced 
% of workforce eligible 
0/0 o}'\V~rkforce partic_ipating 
% of pay e~chyear 
.Other (e!ellse s~ecify) 
Year introduced 
- -----~- - ---­
% ofworkforce_eligi~Ie 
'l/o_~~~rl<f'0r_~e_ ~al:tic:ieatlll!L 
% of pay each year 
No 
Section 6: HRM/industrial relations issues 
6.1 Is there a senior manager at your company with specific responsibility INa 
roril~d~striC:ll relations or!i~tvl/Pt)rsonnel matters? 
Details 6.21i~-th~~~ ~ dir~ct~r~~tl~~boa;X\\lith-~pecific respol~sibility for industriallNo 
relations or HRM/personnel matters? 
6.3 	 - IN~. ~f~t~ff\~il0 d~alspecifically wjthindust~i~1 r~l~tions or Nil 
HRM/personnel-related mattersin your company 
Details 
6.4 	 Do you have an overall industrial relations policy in your company? Not a written po.licy 
6.5 	 Details of any externally-assessed HRM quality awards gained by your INone 
company, such as Investors in People 
6.6 	 Details of any externally-assessed HRM quality awards with which youriNone 
company is currently involved 
6.7 	 Are any HRM/related activities regularly contracted out to external No 
agencies? 
Company Five 
No 
,No 
No 
I 
No 
9 
Compan)' Six 
Yes 
Prior to 1993 
3 
3 
Not stated 
No 
No 
No 
4 
All managers deal with it as part of their 14 head otTlce staff but some 
remit 
Yes 
None 
None 
No 
HR issues are devolved to line 
management 
No 
None 
None 
Yes 
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Mf_~.qlrW(ti'!'?$Wj% 
Que. Section 6 continued 
no. 
Details 	 Payroll bureau and pensions 
administrators (since 
Iprivatisation) 
Section 7: Communication and participation p.-ocesses 
7.1-7.3 See Appendix 2(ii) for full details 
Section 8: lndustrial relations/trade union issues 
8.1 	 Approximate % of employees in your company belonging to a trade 100% 90% 75% 
union 
8.2 	 No. of trade unions recognised by your company for representation 2 and several craft unions 3 2 
<:.nd!o!.l~eg()t~ationYllrp_oses? 	 I ­
8.3 	 Names of unions TGWU and ACTS GMB, TGWU and ACTS TGWU (3 sections) and TSSA 
8.4 	 Please indicate how overall union density has changed in your company 3 3 3 
sin~e1923Jr_~fer to guestionnair~for_co~e d~til1itiOl!S) 
-~--
8.5 	 Have there been changes to industrial relations procedures and systems No No No 
since 1993? 
-~---
Details 
8.6 	 Has there been any form of industrial action at your company since Yes No No 
1993? 
-- --- --
-,- ---- ..- - ------- --- - --- - - -- --. ---
--
"-- ._" --
--	 -- ­I
Details 	 3 two-hour stoppages in 1996 
Appendix 2(i) 
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Appendix 2(ii) 	 Communication and participation processes 
(from company data record questionnaire) 
Company One: 
Q7.1 A vailabilit of information to different staff rou s 
Staff 
Trade union 	 All other 
Information on: re 
; 
resentatives em 10 'ees 
Labour turnover X 
Absenteeism X 

Accidents/injtiries 
 X 
Labour produ~tivity X 
Labour costs X 

Sales information X 

'r" 
Financial information X 
./ Group provided with information 
X Group not provided with information 
* Financial information in addition to that relating to ESO 
Q7.2 Methods used to disseminate information to staff 
Method Used b com any 
Notice boards ../ 
Newsletters ....... 
XComPGln~l.newspap~Ts/1Tlilga.:?:\!1e~ .... ···· .. 7 

Comp(lJ1'y.rep('rt~ .... ..... ........... "........ 

Mass meetings ../ 

XRoad shows 

X
Attitude surveys 

../ Method used by company 

X Method not used by company 

'" Annual General Meeting 

Q7.3 Methods used to 'involve' staff and the date of introduction 

Used by 

Method 	 com an 
../ 

Employee truste~(s) .ofaE~!1~!?!1~~h~1Tl.~..... ... X 

E.!l~P l()y~.e·..t.~l.lst~.~(~)· .•().f.Gl.PT().~.~...?hil~~:.~.il~.t?....~~h~.l!.l.~...~~t1~~.....··.· ..... ·······1· ........ · .......,...................... , 

... El!.lpl()yee directo rs X 
Works council 

J0 int . c()!1sul!.<itiy~ ..~().1Tl.1Tl\~~~~. ..... .................. ................. ................ X 

......_... -.... "....... ..
Joint health and 	 com.~m...~:..i:t,:.t~.e::.e::.................................................................................. ··.. ·1 
 X 
Ch.<iirp~rs()r.1.'Sf()~lll11....... . ............................, ....... ,.........." ............." ................ ..,.... 
 X 

Shareholder's forum 
 X 
.................................... [............ :; ................. I
Team briefing. 
.,•••w ...,."" ...... •• ..,···-·· ..••••••••••Sllgg~s!iorl~()~ ... X 

Su"gestion scheme with rewards 

" ..... i;il .....,,,.................,,",........,,.,, X 

Jointjobe"aluation 
 X 
Job rotation X 

Mcntoring system 

./ Used by company 

X '"' Not used by company 

Source: Company One data record - 1999 
Date 
introduced 
1993 
........ . 
 1993 
1986 
1993 
Appendix 2(ii) 
Company Five: 
Q7.1 Availability of information to different staff groups 

Staff groups 

Trade union All other 

Information on representatives Management em~loyees 

Labour turnover 

.........,,,........................................... . Im .......................1 I ......................./m"' ........................ I ................. X
......'.m..... ........

./ ./ ./..,....... ............ j
Absenteeism 
.!.\<::S~cf.t:~~~(i~j~ti~~.. .. -< ... mm" .j.".................... / ./
... "'..........................."I 

... ~~~~~tP.~9cf.~~ti:vi!y... X ./ X 
Labour costs ./ ./ X 
. . .... . ...... ...... ... ......... .......... t·....· ........m.....m..""................. m..... I ....... ··.... .........,...................m...

Sales information ./ ./ '7 .. 

Financial information ./ ./ ./ 

./ - Group provided with information 

X = Group not provided with information 
Q7.2 Methods used to disseminate information to staff 

Method Used ~ comj)"a'!Y. 

Notice boards 
'- -
./

.............. ........................................................ ... 

Newsle~.~r.~........................... .... ............... ............."." ...... m.~ 

~()!11P<l~)'~~~sp<lp~r~!I!l<lg~:zirl~s X

································7···· .~()!11p'1.~yrep~t:t~ 
Mass meetings X 

Road shows 

................................................................ 	 .............~....... 

Attitude surveys X 

./ Method used by company 

X = Method not used by company 

Q7.3 Methods used to 'involve' em 10 ees and the date of introduction 
Used by Date 
Method com an introduced 
... ~"l!lp!?y~~.!~lI~!~~(~)(?L!lp.~.~~!()~s~~~!!l~ . .... ..m.m .. . ..... ...m ..... .......:. NS 

.~!!l:pl()y~~tE\l~!~~(s) of a share-save scheme trust X . ...... ....... ...... ....." .............. 

~!11pl()y~~ cf.ir~?t9r~ ................ I.. ...... . .. x: ................. . 

Works council 	 XI,,··,,··· ........·...., ....··................ I.... ·.......................................... 
Joint consultative committee 
.................................................... -...................... ",."...."'............. . ....................." ..... . ......""......... ·1···..·......·......m •......····I·············p.t~.J.??~ ...
.., .. •••• ........ 

Joint health and committee 
............................... 	 ......................... pr~I??~. 
X.~hlliT~E~9.!1'~J()E~~ 
Shareholder's forum 	 X 
...................................... -..................................................................... ..................................... ···· .. ···········•··· ..·•··•·· ..M·.···· ..." ..........._............................ . 

Team X 
.~lIgg~s!i()~~()~ 

_~.lIgg~~t!()t.:I ..~<?~~!11.~~i~.b~~~.<l~cf.s... .... ......................... . X 

evaluation X 

X 

·M.... .. 	 ..............-........ " ................. --"....................... ""..... 

Mentoring system X 

./ = Used by company 

X = Not used by company 

NS= Not specified by company 

Source: Company Five data record - 1999 
Job rotation 
~.........~ ............ _............ 
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Company Six: 
Q7.1 Availability of information to different staff groups 

Staff groups 

Trade union All other 

Information on: representatives Manl:!gement employees 

Labour turnover ../ ../ X
Absenteeism! ../ ../ ............................ . 

.!\~~I~~h!~/i~j~d~i:· :...................................'j. ....................... + ....,. X 
........................ / . ······X· 

!::~~9!!~P~'??t.'.~!iyi!y ... .. .... ....X I...................... ./ + ..................··...·.·.··.·.....:X.·.·· c..................................................... j
.. .r ......................... 

Labour costs X ../ X 

........................ ............. .... ......................... ·············1····················,,··················... + 

~~~:~~j!fi~}~;i~~t;~·~ ·········ZS~le~tive' ......... 1)"...................... ~ 

../ = Group provided with information 

X = Group not provided with information 

Q7.2 Methods used to disseminate information to staff 

Method Used by company 

Notice boards ../

.............,.."..... .........................__ .....-- ...... - .................................................... ,..." ......." .......... -, ............................ 

Newsletters ../ 
.g?~P~!!yT1~~spGlP~t~!t11Glgll~iT1e~ ../ 
.gg~PGl!1Y.r~P'?~s. .. . ... ../Mass meetings ......... ··············7 

I·c············:··,······'~···························................................................................................•........................................+ ..................... ../., ........................... 

Road shows 

Attitude surveys ../ 

../ = Method used by company 

Q7.3 Methods used to 'involve' empl~yees and the date of introduction 
Used by Date 
Method company introduced 
1995.~t11p!'?y~.~ ..~rl:l.s.t~~(~)gfllP~T1~ig1.1?~~~~~ ...... ......... ... .. ......... ......'!'. 
.....~~p.I()y~~.tEt.J?t.~~(s.)'?rGlpr'?ntsryGlr.~~s~y~ s..~I~.~.t11.~....~~~s..!. ....... ... .... X 
EnltJlvycc directors ../ 1995 
................. 

Works council X 

Joint consultative committee ../ NS 

... j·~i~t··i~~~lth··~~d·~~i~ty··~·~·~·~jtt~~········ NS 
X
.....gb~.i..tp.~.~~.().T1'.~... f.()T~l11..... 

Shareholder's forum X 

T·~~~J:::;:A~;; ................. .......... .......... .. .... ..... ,··X 

I......:....,...:.:.:..:":.u...~.:l1' ..:..:.5Q ............. "........................................... ".................................. .......... .....•..... ...........................................
...':."'.:..1:..':"' I ................................... 

.~~gg~~!lgT1.~.?~..... ... ...... ................ ...................... X 

.... ?~gg~~~!g!1 ...~.~b~I!,l.~ ...~.!.~.~....~~.~.C:l.r..9~...... ... X 

Joint job evaluation X 
.n•••• •• ........ •• ....................................,.•• " ••• 

Job rotation X 
....................................... ..................• ...............-.................._-..... 

Mentoring system X 

../ = Used by company 

X Not used by company 
=0 
NS =0 Not specified by company 
Source: Company Six data record - 1999 
Appendix 3 
Appendix 3: Stage One questionnaire 
Information for employees at [Company xxx] 
You have been randomly selected to participate in a study that looks at employee 
participation and commitment employee share ownership and industrial relations at [this 
company]. 
The information you provide is to be used solely for an academic and independent study 
being undertaken at the University of Luton for a PhD thesis and for no other purpose. 
All information given will be treated in the strictest confidence and your individual 
responses will not be made available to your line manager/supervisor at any time. 
Your assistance is greatly appreciated 
The questionnaire will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Please answer the 
questions by circling the relevant number or by writing your answer in the space 
provided. Please mark all of your answers clearly in ink. Some of the questions may 
not be relevant to you personally. Where this occurs, the questionnaire will tell you how 
to proceed. If you are unsure about a question, leave it blank and go straight to the next 
one. 
Please ensure that you complete this questionnaire by yourself because it is your 
own personal opinions about [this company] that are of particular interest 
This survey has the full support of both the management team and the trade 
union(s) at [this company] 
Thank you for your help 
Lisa Trewhitt 
llLll 
Research site: ........... . 
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Date: ........... . 

Section 1: General details 
Please circle one nUlllber to indicate your response or write your answer in the space provided. 
(a) 	 Are you: 
Male 
Female 2 
(h) 	 Please indicate your age range: 
Under 20 
20-29 2 
30-39 3 
40-49 4 
50 r 5 
(c) 	 How long have you worked for Ithis company]? 
Years .................................. Months ........................................... . 

(d) 	 Nature of employment status: 
Full-time 
Part-time 2 
Temporary 3 
(e) 	 Please indicate your job category: 
Drivcr 1 Clerical/administrative 6 
Engineer 2 Supervisory 7 
Conductor 3 Managerial 8 
Maintenance 4 Other 9 
Catering/c leaning 5 
(f) 	 Are you currently a member ofa trade union? 
Yes Name of union ......................................................... . 
No 2 
If you answered 'no' please go straight to Section 2 
(g) 	 00 you currently hold a position within your Uni~n?ffi . I tc)(E.g. treasurer, branch secretary, steward, electe 0 ICIa e . 
Yes Position held ..................................................................... .. 
No 2 
I 
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[this company] you should circle one of the lower numbers (1 or 2). If, however, you are not 
proud to be able to tell people that you work for [this company] you should circle one of the 
higher numbers (4 or 5). 
(a) 	 I am quite proud to be able to tell people that I work for Ithis companYI 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(b) 	 I feel myself to be a part of Ithis company! 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(c) 	 To know that my own work had made a contribution to the good of [this companYI 
would please me 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(d) 	 In my work I like to feel that I am making some effort not just for myself but for 
(this companYI as well 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(e) 	 Even if [this companYI was not doing too well financially, I would be reluctant to 
change to another employer 
2 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(I) 	 The offer of a bit more money with another employer would not seriously make me 
think of changing my job 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
Section 2: Views about your job at [this company] 
Company One, Company Two a1ld Compa1lY Three Only 
Please circle one number for each statement below to indicate how you feel about working for 
[this company]. For example: if you are quite proud to be able to tell people that you work for 
2 
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Section 3: Attitudes to the trade unions at [this company] 
Please answer this section onlv if you are a member of a trade union at (this company] 
If you are not a member of a trade union please turn to Section 4 on the next page 
Please circle one number for each statement below to indicate your attitude to the trade 
union(s) at [this company]. For example: if you agree that it is easy to be loyal to both the 
union(s) and management at [this company] you should circle one of the lower numbers (lor 
2). If, however, you disagree that it is easy to be loyal to both the union(s) and management at 
[this company] you should circle one of the higher numbers (4 or 5). 
(a) It is easy to be loyal to both the union(s) and management at Ithis companYI 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(b) I talk up my union to my friends as a great union to belong to 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(c) I find it hard to agree with my union's policies 
2 ~" 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(d) The union(s) play an important role at (this companYI 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(e) The union(s) make concessions to avoid problems 
,.,2 ~ 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(I) The union(s) try to co-operate with management 
2 ~ '" 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(g) The union(s) at Ithis companYI have lost much of their influence in recent years 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(h) In this company the best way of obtaining worker influence is through the union(s) 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(i) I care about the survival of the union(s) at [this company] 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
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Section 4: Employee influence at [this company] 
(1) Influence you would like to have 
Please circle one number for each of the issues below to indicate how much influence you 
would personally like to have in each case. For example: if you would like to have a great 
deal of influence over the overall policies of [this company] you should circle one of the lower 
numbers (lor 2). If, however, you would not like to have a great deal of influence over the 
overall policies of [this company] you should circle one of the higher numbers (4 or 5). 
(a) Overall policies of [this companyI 
2 3 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(b) Matters affecting your own depot/department 
2 3 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(c) How your own job is done 
2 3 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(d) Wage and bonus payments 
2 .) " 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(e) Health, safety and conditions of work 
2 .)" 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(1) Changes in staffing levels 
2 ".J 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(g) Introduction of new products, services or processes 
2 .) " 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(h) The purchase of new machinery or equipment 
2 .) " 4 5 
A great deal of say No say at all 
(i) Investment decisions 
2 3 4 5 
"No say at allA great deal of say 
(j) Recruitment 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all A great deal of say 
(k) Training 
4 52 3 
No say at allA great deal of say 
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(2) Influence you actually have 
Please circle one number for each of the issues below to indicate how much influence you 
actually have in each case. 
(a) Overall policies of Ithis company I 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(b) Matters affecting your own depot/department 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(c) How your own job is done 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(d) Wage and bonus payments 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(e) Health, safety and conditions of work 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(f) Changes in staffing levels 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(g) Introduction of new products, services or processes 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(h) The purchase of new machinery or equipment 
A great deal of say 
2 .., .) 4 5 
No say at all 
(i) Investment decisions 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
G) Recruitment 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
(k) Training 
A great deal of say 
2 3 4 5 
No say at all 
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Section 5: Relations with management at [this company] 
Please circle one number for each statement below to indicate your views about management 
at [th is company]. 
(a) 	 To what extent do you feel there is a social division (i.e. feelings of 'them and us') between 
management and employees at [this company[? 
2 3 4 5 
No social division Large social division 
(b) 	 To what extent do managers at [this company] take notice of the ideas and experiences of 
their employees? 
2 3 4 5 
To a great extent Not at all 
(c) 	 To what extent do you believe managers are efficient in running [this company)? 
2 3 4 5 
Very efficient Not at all efficient 
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Section 6: Variable sections on employee share ownership 
Company One, Company Two and Company Three only 
Please circle one number for each statement below to indicate your response. 
(a) 	 Do you own any shares in [this company) at the present time? 
Yes I If you answered 'yes' please go straight to question (c) 

No 2 

(b) 	 Please indicate which one of the following statements applies to you: 
I have not worked at [this company] long enough to own shares I 
I do not wish to own shares in [this company] at this time 2 
~cr 	 3 
(c) 	 To what extent do you agree that owning shares has made a difference to the way you 
think about [this companYI? 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(d) 	 Please state below how owning shares has made a difference to the way you think about 
[this companyl: 
Company Four, Company Five and Company Six only 
Please circle one number for each statement below to indicate your response. 
(a) 	 Did you previously own shares in your company? 
Yes 

No 2 

(b) 	 Do you believe your company should have remained employee-owned? 
Yes 

No 2 

Do not know 3 

(c) 	 Please give the reason for your answer: 
............................................................. n •••••••.• ••• •• •••••••••••••••••••• ..••••••••••••• ................................................. . 

.... ..... ......... ... ...... ...................................................................................................................................... . 
~ 
............. 0-.................................................................................................................................................. . 
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Section 7: Benefits of employee share ownership at [this company] 
Company One, Company Two and Company Three only 
Please select from the list below what you personally consider to be the five main benefits of 
employee share ownership at [this company] by ranking your top five choices only on a 
scale of 1-5, (first choice:::: 1, second choice = 2, third choice = 3; fourth choice = 4; fifth 
choice = 5) and writing the appropriate number in the space provided. 
(Please rank your top five choices onlv): 
(a) More influence (or say) for employees in company decisions 
(b) The prospect of getting some extra money 
(c) More information about day-ta-day matters at [this companYI 
(d) The opportunity to own a part of Ithis companYI 
(e) To be able to exercise voting rights 
(f) Making me more interested in [this company'sl success 
(g) Making me feel a part of Ithis companYI- working with it, not just/or it 
(h) Increasing co-operation between management and the workforce 
(i) Providing an incentive for employees to stay at [this companYI 
(j) Encouraging employees to put more effort into their work 
· " 
Section 8: Views about employee share ownership at [this company] 
Company One, Company Two and Company Three only 
Appendix 3 
Please circle one number for each statement below to indicate your views about employee 
share ownership at [this company]. 
(a) My work is more satisfying because I own shares in [this company] 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(b) Owning shares in [this company] makes me want to continue working here 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(c) I feel like I really own part of [this company) 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(d) I care about owning shares in [this company] 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(e) It is very important to me that [this company) has an employee share ownership scheme 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
(t) I am proud to own shares in [this company] 
2 3 4 5 
Strongly agree Strongly disagree 
You have now finished this questionnaire 
If you would like to add any further comments, please do so in the space below 
oo .. oo .. oo .... oooooo .. oooooo .. oo ...... oooo .. oooo .............. oo .......... oo ........ oo .. oooooo ...... oo ............ oo .... oo .................. oo .................... oooo .... oo ........ oo .................. oo ............ oooo .. oo .... .. 

.... oo .................................. oo .................. oo ...... oo ...................................................................... oo ...... oo .......................................... oooo ......... oo .. oo ........ oo .... .. 

.............. .......... oo ............ oo .................... oo .............................. oo .... oo ....................................... oo .......... oooo ..................... oo .... oo .................. oo .... oo .............. .. 

Thank you for your time 
r. n 1.111 
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Appendix 4: British Organisational Commitment Scale - nine-item version 
1. 	 I am quite proud to be able to tell people who it is I work for (identification) 
2. 	 I sometimes feel like leaving this employment for good (loyalty) 
3. 	 I'm not willing to put myself out just to help the organisation (involvement) 
4. 	 Even if the firm was not doing too well financially, I would be reluctant to change 
to another employer (loyalty) 
5. 	 I feel myself to be a part of the organisation (identification) 
6. 	 In my work I like to feel I am making some effort not just for myself but for the 
organisation as well (involvement) 
7. 	 The offer of a bit more money with another employer would not seriously make me 
th ink of changing my job (loyalty) 
8. 	 I would not recommend a close friend to join our staff (identification) 
9. 	 To know that my own work had made a contribution to the good of the 
organisation would please me (involvement) 
Cook and Wall (1980) 
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Appendix 5: Attitudinal scale items and variable labels 
Table (i) Variables and variable labels for the 'British Organisational Commitment Scale' 
Variable Variable label 
... I ...;:t~9.~it~pr.()~~~()l:>~':ll:>I.~tg.!.el!.p'~()pl~t~<:ltI ..\\f()rk.. f()F[!11~~~()EllE':lf!Y] ..... ........... ......... ...... .. ...~t()~.<:I 
If~~Ifl1X~~.!Lt<:l.l:>~i.l:E<:l~()fJt~i~c()l~p'lf!Yl.. .... .. ..... ................ .. ...... ......... Fee I 
To know that my own work had made a contribution to the good of[this Contribution 
.... 
~()~p':l~yl\\f()~!9EI.~"l.~~~~.. . .. .......m... ..... ........... ....m..m......... .. 

In my work I like to feel that I am making some effort not just for myself but for Effort 
.I!~is~()r.f!p':lnYl':l?\\f~II. 
Even if [this company] was not doing too well financially, I would be reluctant to Financial 
~~<t!:lg~ ..~o..<tr.1.()~b~E~l"l1pl<:ly~r ....... ... ..... ........ ... ....mm. .. ... ... .... •.. 
............. 
The offer of a bit more money with another employer would not seriously make Money 
me think of changing my j_ob 
Source: Cook and Wall (1980) 
Table (ii) Variables and variable labels for the 'employee-trade union relations' scale 
Variable Variable label 
.... r~... i.~... ~':l~Y!() ..l:>~.I()Y':l.I..!()... l:>().!~ ..t~.~....~l1i()f!.(?) ...<tI1.~ ... II1<tI1':lg~.~.~I1E ...<:l~... [t~.is .. ~.()r.f!p<tI1Yl...................... g<:l§.y...!().l:>~....1()Y9!..... 
.....I ...~.i.I:.l~... I1.P..r.f!y... I1r.1..i()I1... t()... fl1y.f.~i~.I1~.~... i.I:~....<:l... g~~i.I:!.. lIl1.i()I1 .. !().. l:>el()l1g..!()m.......... ....... ... .T<tl.~... I1P........ 
.....I.fipcl}.~.h..<trcl... ~<? ...i.l:gr~~... \\f..i.~.~....~Y...lI.~.i()I1.'.? .. p()li~i.e~.. ..Ii.<:lr.cI...~.() ..<tgE~~ ....... 
The unions plav an important role at [this company]~~~.P.C>r.!<:lr.1.~E()I~
.fb.~~ri~9.~irii~~~:.~9.ri~~~si~~~to~~oidp~o·ble~;··m.. ... . .. ..................... Concessions 

.T.h.~.. I1!1}()I1S!r.Y!()~()::()P.~t<t!~\\fit.h.~<tI1<tg~fl1.~l1t ....... ...... ....m.. ......m..m... ........ .. ...............c:::.C>:()P.~Ei.I:!~
The unions at this company have lost much of their influence in recent years Lost influence 
In this company the best way of obtaining worker influence is through the Worker influence 
unions 
..................................................................................................................... 

rcare about the survival of the unions at [this company] Survival 

Source: Angle and Perry (1986) 

Table (iii) Variables and variable labels for the 'desired participation in your company' 

scale 

Variable Variable label 

I?~~i~~~patti~ip~~io~i~: .. ... ........ ...... .... ......... 'mm. 
Q~~Ei.I:.jlp'?Ii~i~s.()f.[t.~is.~()~p~l1yl.. . .. ... .. ... .... ........ .g()fl1pi.l:r:1.yp()lic.)~~ 
..... tyI.~.~.~.r.~....":ff~c.t.!.l1g.y'?.~.~ .. ()~T1 ...~~p()y~~p":r.!':!leTl~...... jO::: .....' j...w..n:.:.... d,,:.e.::,p.:..o..:..t............................................................ 

How your ownj~h is done Own job
JVU ..................................... 

.~.~g~<tI1.~~()11l:1~P<tYl11~l}t~..m ...m .. . .. ..... ....m ..\Y<tg~sa.T1c1l:>()T1~S.~~ 
...H.~.a..!!h.: ..~.a.f~Y .. a..I1.~ ..~()T19.i!i().I1.s..()f\\f()~.~............. .. .. .....Ii.~":I.th... i.l:T1ci...s..a..fe..ty................................... 
... c:::~a.t1g~s.il1s.!a.mt1g}~y~I..s. ... ... ... ...........m........?ta.ffing 
}11.t~().ci~.c.~.i().I1.()fl1.~.~.. P~()9.~c.~s..? ...~.~EYic..~?. ...()E.P~().C..e.s..s.~.s....... . ..tJ.~\\fP~()ci~.~~s. ....... 
. I.h~.P~tc.~i.l:s.~()tl}~:vl11i.1:c.~.i.l1~ry.()r..~gyip~~r.1.~. ... !'l~\\ffl1i.1:~J1.il}~ry ................................. . 
)ny':!..~t~e.I1~cI~c..isi()11 ....... .... ..... I.n vestment 
Recruitment Recruitment 
............................., .....,..... " ............"....... 

Training Training 
I 
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Table (iv) Variables and variable labels for the 'actual participation in your company' scale 
Variable Label 
£ 
.. A~~l1~'P~r..!!~!pl:lt.~()':I.i':I.:... .... . ......... .............. ..... ....... .. ........ .. ................. ..... .. .. ..... ... .... ... ............................... ................................... .. 

Qy~r~!Ip()I!gi~~()rJ~~is.~()!!lp~l1yl . ..... ....................... .......... ... .. .... .... ........ .. ...... .. .... ...<::(?l!!PCi1.:Xp()li~i.~s. .. 

.....M:.~.~~~~.Cif.f~~.t!l1g ...Y.().':IE.. ()~I.:!.9f'.P()!!9.~.PCiI!rJ1e.l1!...... ....... .. ................... ........... 9..~I1 ...9e.P().!............ 

How your ownjob is done.Q~l1j()?.. 
.. Y.Y..~g~.~r.!.9~()I1':1?P~y!!le.I1~?.. .................................... ....... ......... Wages and. bonu.s..~s 
.J:Ie.(lI~1],~.Cif.~!Y(lI19<?()119.i~!()I.:!~gf:Y.()E~. ... ..... .......... ........... ..... ........ ... ........ ......f:I..e.(ll..!b~l!~.. ~Cif.e.tY. 
<::h.(ll1ge.?.. ir.!~.~Cif.~l1gI.e.ye.ls.... ..... .......... ..... ..... .... ... ......... ... ?~Ciml1.K 
1r.!!~()<:I':I~.!!()n()Lr.!e.~p~<?<:I~~t.~"~e.TY\~e.~()r.p~()~.e.S..~e.S. ....... ...................... .J\:!e.:Y.p~()<:I~..~!~. ... .... ..............  
..Ibe.p.~r~hCi~e.()rl1e.:Y.I!I:Ci<?hil1e.TY()r.~911iEl!!e.r.!!. New machi nery 
Investment decisions Investment 
"................................"........... • ............" ......".................... "............................... ""....... '"" ......."........ -................ ,.............-"............ ····.··.....··.. ·.on...... ···HH ....•• 

Recruitment 	 Recruitment f·····~::·::··~···c.::..:.::.:.:..:.:...:...................................................................................................................................... ..................................................................... ........................ .j ............................................... 

Training Training 
Source: Adapted from Pendleton et al (1995 a, b), Poole and Jenkins (1990) and Walley 
and Wilson (1992) 
Table (v) Variables and variable labels for the 'relations with management' scale 
Variable Variable label 
To what extent do you feel there is a social division (feelings of ' them and Social division 
.l:'.~'1~e.!\Ve.~I1TI1~l1age~el1~~lld~l11ploye~s.~~[this~()~PCi!ly.l? ..................................... / ...................................... . 
To what extent do managers at [this company] take notice of the ideas and Take notice 
.e.l.'p~ri~l1ce.s()rtbe.irerJ1pl()y~~s? ................. 
To what extent do you believe managers are efficient in running [this Managers efficient 
company] 
Source: 	 Adapted from Pendleton et al (1995 a, b), Poole and Jenkins (1990) and Walley 
and Wilson (1992) 
Table (vi) Variables and variable labels for the 'satisfaction with ESO' scale 
Variable Variable label 
l~y\Vork is more ~Citisfyil1g~e~(l~s.e.I():Y.ns..hllT~.S.....i.J"l.Jt~ i?~g!!lPCil1xl... ................. mm. .§.~!.is.fyil1g ... 

.....Q.\V.ll.i.I1g.. s..h.llE~s...il1. .. I.!.hi.s......~.()I11.P.CillY]....I11.<t.~.e~ ...!!le....:Y..<tI!..t ..t.() ..~(?I1!!.ll.':I.~... :Y..':?r..~.i.ll.g ...b.~r.e.... .......§.~.lly.......... 
Own
..If~~IIi~e.!re.~Ily ():y'nEi3I!()rUh.is.~()EI1P~llY] ...... ..m ..........................,.......................... .. 

..... I.... <?'.l:~~ ... ~~g~.~....':?:Y..ll.!.l1g...s..h.'.l:r.~.s.!.I1....l!his.... <?()I11EGlJ"lyl... .... ... ..... ..... ........ ............... ..................... ............. ....  Care .,.. " ......,.."., ... . 
It is very important to me that [this company] has an employee share ownersh ip Important 
scheme 
I am proud to own shares in [this company] Proud to own 
Source: 	 Rosen et al (1986) 
Appendix 6: Codebook for data entry 
('N' = numeric; 'D' = date; 'A' = al hanumeric) 
Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 

number variable 

All companies: 

I Number Questionnaire number 	 N 
I.?...__.. ~=.~~.: :=J:ja.i~~:: •. :~~:·· •. ~...•::..•·.:: .. :)?~!~2I~~i·y..~y .•..••.·•••.. ··.••.. .......... ....... .................... ........................ _....... ... ..........••••.•..••••••••••••.•••••.•::...... D 

;3........ ..........._.... g()!llP<l!lL_g9~!1P.(lI~y'Y~~r~.s~r~~y~~.s<?()!l411~t~<.l. ...... ...... ..... ........ ........ .... A 

'!.. ..... _.I?I!.P9! ..............I.:>~P?t~~~I:~~t.l~~(!y'Y.~~<?()I~<:l\l~te<:l ...... .................. ....... ............. ....... ....... ........ .............. ....... . I. ,Ac......................... ...... + ·····:······.:·····································c····c········· ......... 

5 Sex Sex of respondent Male N Missing 99 

Female 2 

6 Age Age of respondent 	 Under 20 40-49 4 N Missing 99 

20-29 2 50+ 5 

30-39 3 

N Missing 99,··1:·····:~~~~fh.~:.::}·t~~:}6:~~H~i~:~~{~;~~~~~:· .. 
9 t Status ·1 Employment status I·F~)ii-time l:::·r~ ... ~·~i~if~f .... .....~~: ........, 
Part-time 2 
I····· . .. ·······1···················································································1················........................................................ ..................................... .. ... ... .... ..... ........ ............................. ····I··T.~lllp()E(l~ 3 ......................)....... ·······l··· ··········· ... ·... ······················1 
10 Category Job category Driver 1 N Missing 99 
Engineer 2 
Conductor 3 
Maintenance 4 
Cateringl cleaning 5 
Clericalladll1in i strati ve 6 
Supervisory 7 
Managerial 8 
Other 91·····················-····-·····-·····+··············................ 
II Member Are you currently a member of a trade union? Yes I N Missing 99 
No 21-······················· .··············-f········ .......................................+.........................-......................................................-.................. .... ........................ f·················· 
12 Union name Name of trade union A Missing 99 
999 
............ IN ·····I~{~~1~~li<?(l?I~
13 Position Do you hold a position in your union? 	 Yes 99 

No 2 Not applicable 999 

Appendix 6 
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__.~",,_:1?i1.¥'.'{:;.?'~~~eftteWt~ 
Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 

number variable 

14 Type Details of position 	 Chairman 1 N Missing 99 

Vice chairman 2 Not applicable 999 

Steward 3 

Other 4 

Employee-owned companies ooly_: 

15 Proud I am quite proud to be able to tell people that I Strongly agree N Missing 99 

work for this company 
 ~ 
Stro!lgly disagree 5 
..-.-........ ......----..... --......... --....._... 	 ..................--..-.-.................................._........._... 
.......................­
16 Feel I feel myself to be a part of the company 	 Strongly agree N Missing 99 
~ 
5 
..................................._.........._....._- ...-._ ..-...._...................................................................--"........ 
.?!r()llg.ly~is_llgr~~ 
........................................................- ........................... ........ _...... 	 ....................... - ........................... 

17 Contribution 	 To know that my own work had made a Strongly agree N Missing 99 

contribution to the good of this company would 
 t 
please me 

.................... ....... --...._..........._... ....... ..............-......-...... ......... .....-- ..............._........................._..... 
.?!!~()l~gIYC!i~(lg~~(;.? ....... ....... ..... ._ ..........................._.....,...... 

18 Effort 
~ 
In my work I like to feel that I am making some Strongly agree N Missing 99 

effort not just for myself but for the company as 
 ~ 
.........__......._•...._-
__·,_·····.'''·.. _~.,···_··.. 
well 	
..s.!r()!1.g1y._~\~(lg!·~(; ..?....... 
. ....................... " ................ ., ............ -..........- ••.•••••.•• _ •••.• , ................... ··,.·.....··""'u •• ••• ...................._ •• _ .• ,_•.•
~.-,-•u ___ ....._.·.···· 	 ................... 

19 Financial 	 Even if the organisation was not dOl too well Strongly agree N Missing 99 

financially, [ would be reluctant to change to 
 ~ 
another employer 
...... ... ..... ..-~......-.~.-.---..-. 	 .. ?!r()llgIY..~~~<lgr~(;..? .. ... ...... ................ . .........-----_ ... -.-- ......... -._......_...........- ....... ......_. --- -_.--- .._..,.- ..-._. 

20 Money 	 The offer of a bit more money with another Strongly agree 1 N Missing 99 

employer would not seriously make me think of 
 t 
changing my job Strongly disagree 5 . 

All companies (trade union members only): 

21 Easy to be loyal It is easy to be loyal to both the union(s) and Strongly agree N Missing 99 

management at this company 	 Not applicable 999t 
........._--...---....._ 	 ...........-................ •••••••• ................ .................. _._ ....................................................................... _•••••••••••••••••••••••• H •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••M ....~t~~()!lg[X...~i~~g!~e(; 5 
..... 
22 Talk up 	 I talk up my union to my friends as a great union Strongly agree N Missing 99 

to belong to Not applicable 999
~ 
Strongly disagree 5 
Appendix 6 
Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of 
number variable 
23 Hard to agree 	 I find it hard to agree with my union's policies Strongly agree N 
J, 
··_····1 ..-..............-........................-.......................... ..................................... ................. ... ·······f·····?~r.?t~gIY .. 4i~~gt~e~.?
24 Important role 	 The union(s) play an important role at this Strongly agree 
company J, 
·······t-··_·······_···· ····-·-_···_····_-t·· 
25 Concessions 	 The union(s) make concessions to avoid proble;~st~ii;~~G~ir~~I:~~. 5 N 
J, 
..,?tt:?l~gl)'. Ais~gl·~(;.S.. 
26 	 Co~-;;pe~ate- ......... ·jihe unio;~(;)t;:yt~ co=operate with I~a~~age·lnent Strongly agree 

J, 
......1...._..._.+ ..................................................................................................................................................................... f~t.~{)~gly ..c!i?ag~(;:.~ 
27 Lost influence The union(s) at this company have lost much of Strongly agree 
their influence in recent years? J, 
Strongly disagree 
'2S············ ···············I·····W~~ke;~i~fl~e~~e·· ··t···i~·thi~·~;~~pa~ythe··Ge~t;ay··~f·obtalnlng··;ot~kei:···r St~o~giy·ag;:e~ 
influence is through the union(s) J, 
1....._................•......_.............._1......_.........•......_.......................... .._ ....•.j................................................................. _................ .......... ....... ................................. . .........I.....~t~?I~glY... c!iS~gl:.~e 
29 Survival 	 I care about the survival of the union(s) at this 
company 
All com~anies: 
30 I Desired policies 	 Desired influence in company policy 
~_......•.. ......•._...,.._.____........".,._._.<, ......_... _...._____ ......"........."...................m •••••• __ •• _.... _ ••••••_ ..........................-_ 

31 	 Desired own Desired influence in matters affecting your own 
depot depot/depaltment 
32 Desired own job 	 Desired influence as to how your own job is done 
Strongly agree 
J, 
Strongly disagree 

A great deal of say 

J, 
.!'J~~~y~t~IL ... ......... . 
A great deal of say 
J, 
No 
A great deal of say 
J, 
No say at all 
N 
... 5 'N) ................. 
5 
......... ......... .................................................... 'I'N ............., 

5..................................................... 

. ·····1·······N·· I· 1 

5 

N Missing 99 

5 
 99 ···· .... 1I 	 N Missing 
5 
....... ·······_··············1·-············ • • 

I 	 N Mtssmg 
5 
Appendix 6 
99 
Column Variable name I Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 

number variable 

33 Desired wages I Desired influence in wages and bonus payments A great deal of say N Missing 99 

and bonuses ~ 
1--------------------- -------+----------------- ------------ -----1------------'-----------------------'-'-------------------------- --------------,----------,- ---------------------------------------------- '---------------------'-------------__ --l-N?so:t)'_~t~!I---- ~- 1----­
34 Desired health Desired influence in health, safety and conditions A great deal of say N Missing 99 

and safety of work 	 ~ 
No say at all 5 

36 Desired staffing I Desired influence in changes to staffing levels A great deal of say N Missing 99 

~ 

1'!2_s <lY'i.t'1.~I -- --~---- "- __1_____ 

37 Desired new Desired influence in the introduction of new A great deal of say N Missing 99 

products products, services or processes 
 ~ 
No at all 5 

,----------- --------------'-------------- ------+------' 

38 ----~:~~~~~~;~- -------'-------l--~:~~f:~~~~~~~~t~fp~~:!urchase of new A great deal of say I N Missing 99 

~ 
No say at all 5 

..... ......~ 
39 	 Desired Desired influence in investment decisions A great deal of say N Missing 99 

investment 
 ~ 
No say at all 5 

.._.. 

40 Desired Desired influence in recruitment A great deal of say N Missing 99 

recruitment 

1--------------------- --+------ ----------------------- -- ---- ---------1----'-----------------------------'---------------------------",- ----------------------,------------,----­
~ 
at all 5 

41 Desired influence in training N Missing 99 

No si:l}' at all 5 

All companies: 

42 I Perceived policies I Perceived influence in company policy A great deal of say N Missing 99 

~ 
______________ ,N2S?Y<l_~, 'i.!l __ ,__  5 

.....•.... ,~..
----IN43 	 Perceived own Perceived influence in matters affecting your own A great deal of say Missing 99 

depot depot/department 
 J, 
No say at all 5 

Appendix 6 

Column 	 Variable name Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 
number 	 variable 
44 	 Perceived own Perceived influence as to how own job is done A great deal of say N Missing 99 
job ~ 
at all 5 
45 Perceived wages Perceived influence in wages and bonus payments I N Missing 99 
and bonuses 
No say at all 5 
46 Perceived health Perceived influence in health, safety and A great deal of say N Missing 99 
and safety conditions of work ~ 
47 	 Perceived staffing I Perceived influence in changes to staffing levelsIXOg~~;i·~~~{of~ay ~ N Missing 99 
~ 
I···· ...........................f..................._..................................... ················1·····················..·..·······....···.................................................................................................................................................I ~.~~~y~t. ..~l! .......~ ........................... . 
48 Perceived new Perceived involvement in the introduction of new A great deal of say N Missing 99 
products products, services or processes 	 ~ 
Nos~yat all 5 
49 Perceived new Perceived influence in the purchase of new A great deal of say N Missing 99 
machinery machinery or equipment ~ 
.. . ......................... .........,........._....... _.............. _....._.......................................-.......... .. ..........................................._...................................... ~.?~(iy..~t.(lll... ....... 5 

50 	 Perceived Perceived influence in investment decisions A great deal of say 1 N Missing 99 
investment ~ 
No say at all 51···.._···......·····_..·······_··· ....•·....1·····.._··.._........····......····..·..·· ....... ·......····..·..····1.. . . ...... ....... .... ..... ..... .. ....... . ...... ................- ..... \...................... 
51 Perceived Perceived influence in recruitment A great deal of say 'N Missmg 99 
recruitment ~ 
... ·..........·-..·....·......·· ..1........._ ......................_. ......._... 1...... ··· ....·······.... ·····..·······_.· .................. ....................................................... ............... 1·1'!~.s.(l~(l!<l!I... 5 
52 Perceived training Perceived influence in training A great deal of say I N Missing 99 
~ 
No say at all 5 
Appendix 6 
Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of 

number variable 

All companies: 

53 Social division To what extent do you feel there is a social No social division N 

division (i.e. feelings of 'them and us') between t 
management and employees at this company? Large social division 5 

........_.............................._..-	 ............................._. 

54 	 Ideas and To what extent do managers at the company take To a great extent I N 

experiences notice of the ideas and experiences of their 
 t
employees? Not at all 5 

..............................- ...-........ .........-....._........ 	 . ......._.........., .......... 

55 	 Managers To what extent do you bdl managers are Very efficient N 

efficient efficient in running the company? 
 t 
Not at all efficient 5 

Employee-owned companies only: 

56 Share owner Do you own shares in this company at the present Yes 

time? 	 No 2 

...._.... ..__ ......._..- .... - ......................._.. 	 ..... .................-........•...-.............._......--_.......................~..... . ... ....................... ... ......... ... ... ..... 

57 	 No shares Please ind which one of the following I have not worked at this company N 
~ 
statements applies to you 	 long enough to own shares 1 

I do not wish to own shares at this time 2 

Other 3 

..............-... "" ...................._........ 	 .........._-...-. .................................... " ....- ........................._...._..._..-... -....... ........ _.. 

58 Difference 	 To what extent do you agree that owning shares To a great extent N 

has made a difference to the way you think about 
 t
your company? Not at all 5 

.........- ..... - ...............................- ...... --_.........._......_......... .......-......... 	 . ................. ...-... ...........-.-.................................-- ................................................................ ................................ 

59 	 Comments 1 Additional comments I Refer to additional comments 1 for open- A 
ended responses (see p. 175 - Chapter 6) 

Post buy-out companies only: 

60 Previous share Did you previously own shares in your company? Yes N 

owner 	 No 2 

..............._........._......... ..................-..._...._... ...... ................... .._......_......_.-._................... -.............._........- .......... _.....-...." ....-..--.- ............................ -... ................_......._......
".~........ 

61 Employee-owned 	 Do you believe your company should have Yes I N 

remained employee-owned? No 2 

Do not know 3 

~
.................._......- ........ _.......__.......__.....-.. _.- • •· .._..ri"' .... ·_........ •• ••••••• ••••••• •••••• ........ "._.......__••••••••_ 	 ............. ................... ........ 

62 Comments 2 Additional comments 2 	 Refer to additional comments 2 for open- N 

ended responses (see pages 242 and 244­
Chapter 7) 

Missing value 
Missing 99 

Missing 99 

............-.-._ .. -..._...- . 

Missing 99 

Missing 99 

.......... " ....... ,...................... 

Missing 99 

Not applicable 999 

. .................... _.... 

Missing 99 

Not applicable 999 

Missing 99 

Not applicable 999 

Missing 99 

.......................................................................·······························1 

Missing 99 

Not applicable 999 

Missing 99 

Not applicable 999 
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----- -- ------ --- ------
-- - ---- -- - -
Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 
number variable 
Employee-owned companies only: 
63 More influence !nfluence in company decisions 	 First choice 1 N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

Fourth choice 4 

.-.­
Fifth choice 
...,.--... ,..--..... ... _._.-.-_.._-.-,-------._.-._._... -,--_.. , .....- .....•....._.........................._... -.__..._•
5 

.. _-_ .. _...... . ...........•_................__.. ............................._... 

64 
~ 
Extra money Getting extra money First choice I N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice " .) 

Fourth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

........ ._-- ...._...... _.._....... .--_._...---.--._--..-_._........ ._....__...... _....- ._............._.... "._..... -..._.....•......__....-._.. _--.....- ...... ----.-....--- .._-- .. -...._- .. -..._....._.... --- ...--. .... -.. ... - ..........._-_ ....•- . ..........-.•......-.................... _.... 	 ................ _........._.. 

65 More information Information on day-to-day matters 	 First choice I N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

Fourth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

...-~.......--.----.....---....-...-. ..... -- .- ..........__... -..._-- ------.- .. ~.- ---. . ............-._..... __ ._..•.. _..._... -... " .._._-_ .._. 	 ........_-----_ .. _._....... ..-.......... ..................... -.- .... ..... .__..-- ....._.. -- .. .--_.- ..._...,,-_._---_ .._.--_.._........- " ..-.. ...... - .--.-.~---, ...... 

66 Own part Opportunity to own a part of the company 	 First choice N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

Fourth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

...._.. -..-_._ .. --_.-- ..- ..-.----~-.- ...•-.-...~.-.- .. ...~ 	 ....... - ..._. .. ...------.... -... _........ _....... .....----...... - ............_......_.........__ . ....... -...... - ....•. .- ..... .......
--.~ 	 -~ ~.--
67 Voting rights To exercise voting rights 	 First choice 1 N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

Fourth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

.-_... -_ .._.._.- .. _._------- ....-----._.- ..-._-----._- .......... ---- ...- ... -...-.. -- ............. ... ,...-.. -.--... -..-........-... __._-_.. .... . . --......_._.......... ..... . _._ ..• ••m' ... _..... • " ........... ___ • ...........--.- ... - ... _........_......._............... _... --" ...._..... 	 ..... -- .._..........................................
~-
68 Success Interest in the success of the company 	 First choice I N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

FOUl1h choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

~ 
Appendix 6 
~~------~~------------.----------------------------------------,--------------------------------------~~--~--,-~~----------Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 

number vadable 

69 Feel part Feel a part ofthe company 	 First choice N Missing 99 

Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

Fourth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

.........._.._........._........- ..... - ...................._.....,.... - . - ..•..... -..-......- ........-....-..................._,.... 	 . ................... _..... 

70 Co-operation Increasing co-operation between management and 	 First choice 1 N Missing 99 

the workforce 	 Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

Fourth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

71 ·[;1~enti-ve-t~-sta:y-·Pr()~id'i;:;g'an incentive for employees t()st:ay- with 	 First choice 1 N'- Missing 99 

the company 	 Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

FOUlth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

..•...•. •m.. .._..___ ". •...•. __.... ..._ . .... ..... _,,_____________ ... __ ........... _.."..... 	 . ..._ ... .ou._.._..... ______ ._._._...._ ....... ....______................"._... ............... _ • ••••••••••••••••••
......._.~.......H.. 

72 More effott Encouraging employees to put more effort into 	 First choice 1 N Missing 99 

their work 	 Second choice 2 Blank 9999 

Third choice 3 

FOUlth choice 4 

Fifth choice 5 

..........._...............---......--.-...... -........,.. .. ............. . .......................... __..... 	 _.-- .. - ........................................................ _...... 

73 Satisfying 	 Work is more satisfying because respondent owns Strongly agree N Missing 99 

shares .} 

.....,_. ... §t~()I~gJy~i~~gE~~ .. 5 ................. ,_ 

74 Stay Owning shares makes respondent want to stay Strongly agree 1 N Missing 99 

with the company .} 

_ .. _,_"'_""_, ... , ....._ ........" StrO\1.g;ly~_is~g;~~e 5 .. ...... . ...... . ...... ......_ . .. .. . . . ............... ,_. 

75 Own Respondent feels that they own part of the Strongly agree N Missing 99 

company .} 

... . ''''''­ ............ ,,"'_'" _ .. ,'_ .... _,... ... _,__, ....... , ...... ,§t~()I~,gly~!~~gr(::e 5 ....................... _, 

76 Care Respondent does not care about owning shares in Strongly agree N Missing 99 

the company .} 

Strongly disagree 5 

Appendix 6 
~~_'Ii.n""""","','..... ill! gy__"...wa,.",N,*,1ii ..L ...,,_._:__ ,...'U,'" ....., ...... At .. -" 
.­
Column Variable name Variable label Value label Type of Missing value 

number yariable 

77 Important 	 It is very important that the company has a share Strongly agree 1 N Missing 99 
ownership scheme 
-l.­
Strongly disagree 5 
.~------ -..--
-
---. ----- --.. 	 .... 
78 Proud to own 	 Respondent is proud to 0\"11 shares in the Strongly agree 1 N MISSlI1g 99 
company t 
Strongly disagree 5 
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Appendix 7: Regression variables 
Chapter 6: 

Table 24: The impact of employee ownership characteristics on ESO satisfaction 

• 'Company type': 	 direct ownership = I; ESOP = 0 
• 	 'Total company shares': total employee shareholding in company (e.g. Company 
One = 100; Company Two = 80; Company Three = 25) 
• 	 'Relative employee shares': actual individual employee shareholding as a proportion 
of the mean individual shareholding in each company 
(e.g. Company One = 957; Company Two = 1,565; 
Company Three = 914) 
Appendix 7 
Table 37: The impact of employee ownership characteristics on identification, 
involvement and loyalty 
• 'Company type': 	 direct ownership = I; ESOP = 0 
• 	 'Total company shares': total employee shareholding in company (e.g. Company 
One = 100; Company Two = 80; Company Three = 25) 
• 	 'Relative employee shares': actual individual employee shareholding as a proportion 
of the mean individual shareholding in each company 
(e.g. Company One = 957; Company Tvpo = L565; 
Company Three = 914) 
• 	 'ESO satisfaction': average of all six items from the Klein et al (1986) 
'ESO satisfaction' scale ('satisfying'; 'stay'; 'own'; 
'care'; 'important'; 'proud to own') 
Sub-components of the BOCS: 
• 'Identity': 	 average of 'proud' and 'feel' 
• 	 'Involvement': average of 'contribution' and 'effort' 
average of 'financial' and 'money'• 'Loyalty' : 
2 
Appendix 7 
Chapter 7: 

Table 74: Determinants of dual loyalty 

r 
• 'Union effectiveness': average of five items from the Angle and Perry (1986) 
'employee-trade union relations' scale ('important 
role'; 'concessions'; 'co-operate'; 'influence'; 'worker 
influence') 
• 'Social division': single variable 
relations' scale 
taken from 'employee-manager 
• 'Employee shareholder 
status' : 
'employee owns shares' 
shares' = 0 
I; 'employee does not own 
• 'Employee-owned 
company': 
'employee-owned 
company' = 0 
company I; 'not an employee­
• 'Dual loyalty': single variable 
relations' scale 
taken from 'employee-trade U11lon 
Appendix 7 
• 

Table 76: 	 The impact of employee, trade union and organisational characteristics 
on desired participation in decision-making 
• 	 'Union effectiveness': average of five items from the Angle and Perry (1986) 
'employee-trade union relations' scale ('important 
role'; 'concessions'; 'co-operate'; 'influence'; 'worker 
influence') 
• 	 'Employee shareholder 'employee owns shares' = 1; 'employee does not own 
status' : shares' = 0 
• 	 , Employee-owned 'employee-owned company 1; 'not an employee-
company': company' = 0 
• 'Trade union membership'; 	 yes = 1; no = 0 
• 	 'Management efficiency': single variable taken from 'employee-manager 
relations' scale 
• 	 'Desired participation': average of all eleven items from the 'desired 
participation' scale ('company policies'; 'own depot'; 
'own job'; 'wages and bonuses'; 'health and safety'; 
'staffing'; 'new products'; 'new machinery'; 
'investment'; 'recruitment'; 'training') 
______________ ~ 	 ~.s.............................................. 
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Table 77: The impact of employee, trade union and organisational characteristics 
on actual participation in decision-making 
• 	 'Un i on effecti veness': 
• 	 'Employee shareholder 
status' : 
• 	 'Employee-owned 
company': 
• 	 'Trade union membership': 
• 	 'Management efficiency': 
• 	 'Actual participation': 
average of five items from the Angle and Perry (1986) 
'employee-trade union relations' scale ('important 
role'; 'concessions'; 'co-operate'; 'influence'; 'worker 
influence') 
'employee owns shares' I; 'employee does not own 
shares' = 0 
'employee-owned company I; 'not an employee-
company':= 0 
yes = I; no = 0 
single variable taken from 'employee-manager 
relations' scale 
average of all eleven items from the 'actual 
participation' scale ('company policies'; 'own depot'; 
'own job'; 'wages and bonuses'; 'health and safety'; 
'staffing'; 'new products'; 'new machinery'; 
'investment'; 'recruitment'; 'training') 
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Appendix 8: Descriptive results from Company Five (B) 
Desired participation: all respondents 
A great deal of Neither a lot No say at all 
say nor a little say 
Decisions % Mean 
45.1 38.5 16.4 2.55
..~()!!.1p~ny.p()\.i~!~~ ... .............. "."....................................- ..,..... .......................................................................... " ........................................... . 
Q~!l9~P().! ..... 70A 18.7 10.9 2.13 
... ·.m... ·........,... 

Own 71.5 15.3 13.2 2.11 
............... " ........................................ ··....·· ....•···.. · .... ··· .. ···..··,,····· ....···· .. ···H..······· 

"mm"~':l:ge.?~r.!9~()I1~I?e?.. .............. ..... ... ......... .??} ................ 17.5 ....... ... ... . .. ..1}:?' 2.04 

Health and safety...... ......... ........ ...... ...?}:7.. ...............18.7 ................7.6... 1.90 

§~aff'il1g 55.0 28.5 16.5 2.42 
.. 1'Je.'Ypr()~l1.~ts .......1............................ 55 .0 25.3 19.7 2,48 
... 1'Je.'Yrl1~l~hiI?e~y 55.6 2 1 . 1 23.3 2.50 
Investment 26.7 31.1 42.2 3.24 
Recruitment 27.5 
Trainin 37.4 
Actual participation: all respondents 
A great deal of 
say 
Decisions 
~()~P":I1Y.p() li~.ies 9.8 
... Q..wI1.Ae.pot 
......................................................... 
10.8 
OWI1 33.7 + 
.......................... ···················7.6·· 

.... ~.~ge.~.~~9... l?()nl1.~..e..? .... 

.. }j.e..~.I!.~...~.11.9 ...~.~rety. 19.5 

10.9
.. §t.~m!:1.g ...... ..... ............................ 
.... ~e.~ .. P~()~u.~.!.~.............. 4.4 
....~.e..:y..!~.<l:c:..h.i~.~~X ... . 2.2 ........ .......... .......... 

Investment 5.4 

Recruitment 9.7 

Training 9.8 

Employee-manager relations: all respondents 
Agree 
Variable 

Social division 22.0 

........." ........... ,............-.......... ................." ...........,...... ...- .........- ................
' 
.I9~.<::~.<l:!.l9~l.<p~ri~!lc:.e.~. 17.8 
Managers efficient 24.1 
33.0 39.5 3.18 
33.0 29.6 2.87 
Neither a lot No say at all 
nor a little say 
Mean 
10.9 79.3 4.29 
......... '." .. .
" 
4.0916,3................... ..... 72.9 
18.5'47:8 3.27 
."'"............... ,, ......... 

14.1 78.3 4.32 
............. " ........................................" ..... 

21.7 58.8 3.74 
.. . ..................... .................. -, ...._.... 

15.2 73.9 4.23 
........................ , ... 

17.4 78.2 4.33 
...................... " .. " ............,......... " ......" ... " ....- " ................. " .....................-........ 

13.3 84.5 4.50 
......... ,..................-....... ........................... ..".................. " ..... . 

87.0 4.57 
• ...,._.. _... "H .."' .. • .. ••• 
83.8 4.39 
79.3 4.22 
Neither Disagree 

agree/disagree 

Mean 
3.2811.0 
4.2114.5 
37.4 38.5 3.69 
----------------• .2............................................ 

Employee-trade union relations: all respondents 
Agree Neither agree/ 
disagree 
Variable 
17.1 44.7
.....~~~y .. tS>.... ~.~... l.<?y~.I........ ................................. -........... 
Talk up 18.5 32.9 
23.7 44.7)jc:t~cl~?~gre.e.. . ...................-........................ 

31.5 30.3
... }I!t.po~~~.~E<:lIe. .. 
Concessions 38.6 30.7 
I.mr~;.j~()-!..::~~····.·Pt···:·.·e::·····rl.·.·a~·····.t~···.e:··.·.· ......................... , ................. 48.7m. .. ... ...... m.. 28.9 
Lost influence 77.6 10.6 
.. c.c... c······················.I·····················................................. . 

Worker influence 31.6 31.6 
......... 

, ······················1············ 
Survival 59.3 26.3 

(n = 76) 

Source: Stage One survey -1997 
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Disagree 
Mean 
38.2 3.96 
48.6 3.19 
........................-............................."................. 

31.6 3.38 
........ " ..........-.................... ,......... 

38.2 3.19 
30.7 2.62 
··".m ... "·.· ............. , ............................." ...................__ ....•_............. " ..... . 

22.4 2.38 
11.8 2.19 
36.8 3.12 
......................, .................................... . 

14.4 2.36 
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Appendix 9: Stage Two respondent profiles 
Company One 
Respondent no. 	 Position held Length of service Involvement in ESO activities Additional information 
(e.g. position on steering 
committee) 

Branch of the TGWU 
 .~ir~~~~er~Y~<ll:S 
2 	 Shop steward for the TGWU automotive Not stated 

section (represents vehicles, builders, 

coach painters and upholsterers. Section 

.~'.l:.?.<lr9..1l1!.~ .t.~il:.~..ll1~ll1~~rs) 
Chainnan of ACTS 	 Thil1een 
....................................................._... .... .................... f····:·:··:··::··:·::.:··:·:···,,··:·:·:·::··:···········............................................... +.................................................................................................................................. t················... ···············......·········... ·········..........................................................................................................  
I ...................................................................... ··t··A~~i~!a.I~!!l~a.fI'i<:!1!a.l~a.g~r. ................. II1ily-siJ<:y.~a.I:~ .. Member of ACTS 
Stores manager and member of the Twelve years 
1.........··......I_TQ~(~I~ri~...~I_a'2~~llP~0'!~()l)'~e...~ti<?I1.). ..... ........ ....... ... . 
6 Finance director I,"'.~l,:,~yellrs 
Nine years I~'" ..... ················l~~~e~~~i~~£e.l~gi'2~.e.~i~g Eleven years Member of ACTS 

9 I Inspector and employee director Not stated Member of the TGWU 
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Compa1lY Two 
Respondent no. Position held Length of service Involvement in (former) ESO 	 Additional information 1 
activities (e.g. position on 
steering committee) 
Chairman for the engineering employees Twenty-two years Represents between 430 and 440 
section of the TG WU 
......-.- ...."'.............. , ....-'..., .... 	 . ............................................................................... -...-...---..-.....-.. -- ......................................................... -.-... -.-..- .. -........ -. eE\gil~~~r~. ..... ... .... ....... . 

2 Chairman of the TG WU Twenty-one years 	 Represents approximately 1,200 

members, including around 900 bus 

drivers 

....._......•.•_, .. , ....._".- .. ...... -_........._- ...-	 _.... ........... - ......-..........-........... ..- ...- -- ......... .
-.-~ ~,,--. 
3 Branch secretary of the TGWU Seventeen years 	 Sat on the company's EBTI and Sits on the national General Executive 

was involved in the initial Council for the TGWU 

.pego!il:lt.i()l!sror.th~.~SQ~ 
..... ... ...-..........-.... 

4 
~ ··-Op~;:~ti~;~~·di;:~~t~;: Not stated 

........"'....... .............. 	 ..........................._.... ...... - .._......_..........-........................... 

-""-'.----. 
5 	 Group human resources executive Not stated 
....-.--.- ...... - ........... 	
............................._H····· 

6 	 Managing director for one of two Not stated Formerly operations director 

company sites 
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Company Three 
Respondent no. 	 Position held Length of service Involvement in ESO activities Additional information 
(e.g. position on steering 
committee) 
1 	 Representative for the TGWU and an Fifteen years Sat on the employee buy-out Former branch chairman of the TGWU. 
EBT trustee steering committee 
~ ~-... ........ •.... - .-,."........... -..........._..... 	 ..............._..............._................. --.--... -.. -......................................_..............._.......- ... 

2 Traffic assistantlTGWU representative Twenty-six years 	 Represented his section on the Represents other members of staff at 
buy-out steering committee and disciplinary hearings. Also health and 
sits on the EBT safety officer and sits on the company's 
Joint Consultative Committee. 
_."....-. ----.-- .. -... - .................-".- ..--_ ... ...................- ........................._..... _... ....... ............. I···· 	 •.........................._ •••••••••••••• _•••_••• _..................... _••• _•••••_ ..._..... M··• 

.) " 	 Bus driver, TGWU trade union/health Thiliy-one years Sat on the employee buy-out Fortner branch chairman and vice 
chairman of the TGWU. 
•• _ ................... ·········_.. ··~H ....~'?9s11f~~E~P~~S~I!tClt.iy~. 	 ..... M .......... •••••••••••• •••••••••••••••••• . .. ste~l·iIlgC?ll1rnitt~I:! .. .........
•• •• •• 	 _ _.............• •••M 

4 Company convenor Thirty years 	 Looks after 1,200 employees and 
authorised to make decisions with the 
trade union representative if the garage 
manager cannot resolve an issue, but no 
.... .··n_· ....•... _....._................,.,...... _. ___..... .. - .... , ......, .....__••• • ••·.M ,~_........._ ... _. __ ........ - ..n.._........... ..__... _._.n ..... " ..•. _.. ••••• ,,_ ....._M ........_ ... .., .............._ .,. ....... Mo' ....._ ........... _. __ ••_ ••• ··n·...··"..·_.·......._ .. __ ..............."'"....",,"' ...•......_.....,.......... ., .......... " .._...._..._~.• i.~~y~\y.~ll1~fl!..iIlPCly..I~~g~till!\?fl~: ....... '.' ......... 

5 
~ 
Garage staff manager Twenty-nine years 	 One of three representatives Responsible for two of the company's 
who formed the 'inner sanctum' five main garages and 280 employees. 
of the employee buy-out Liaises with trade union 
steering group and met with the representatives. Representative for the 
venture capitalists. Also sits on British Transport Officers' Union until 
the company's PST. it was derecognised and managers were 
.... , ...." ..""......._. .....--_._-_.................. __ ... _. ....... --.--- .. ••••••••• ••••••••••• '''_'m _____ __ 	 . .I11()y.~~!Ope.I:~o.l~lll...~()!~trll.~t~.:.....
•• _ ...................... ....... ._ ........ .M_.
~ 
''''H.......M ......... _ ••• .................. ..........." • ..... M ••••", ........................................ _ ......................................... 	 ...,," 

6 Human resources manager Nineteen years 	 No direct role in the employee Responsible for HR issues at corporate 
buy-out in 1994 or the flotation level for around 2,500 employees. 
in 1997, but was involved in Reports directly to the managing 
related administration for both director and indirectly to all main board 
events. directors. Involved with local strategic 
community issues including the 'New 
Deal'. Also trustee for two of the 
company's five pension funds. 
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. . .......  "* .-~bni;- .'!'Ibm "<~-•.
r....·. '. '.. .'. . . ... ~."'...~.... """".- - -~.-fttS'W'- Mc-.- " • .*.WtfaH:i\"tuJ'cttefli§:JJfI ,~IJ_ ,.• ".,"rcM4iWXJLQ, ,.~-.h 14ts:~ij)(~ii3?!!!!!f'~~;.,Jt~il\'"!IIIf!'liiii!i'.'.\IiII.' ,.' .. 'f ' •. .' •.., ' 
Com all., Four 
Respondent no. Position held Length of service 	 Involvement in (former) ESO Additional information 
activities (e.g. position on 
steerin committee) 
Branch chairman of the TGWU TI~irt)' years 
..... ---.­
2 Branch secretary of the TG WU Fifteen years 	 Secretary of the company's Central 
Negotiating Committee and a member 
of the loint Negotiating Committee and 
.u._._._....._.._ 	 ,..... .... .!?i.n.:~.~4.yi~()I)'...g()~l1l!lit!t:t:"....• M •• _ ••• __ ."........_ .. _ ........._ •••__........ _ ..................H .........M •••••••••• _."••••_ ... _.H_••••_..... 	 . 

..... 	
3 
-._. ..................-_...................... 
_!?l.!lpIg>::e..e.~.irector ... !?igl~te.enjt:Cl!·s .... ....... ..,.. .. . ... ..... 
................-
Member of the TGWU 

4 
.........~e.P~:t:.~t:.I!:~,I~i.yt:..f()E ..~he..J'CJ~y ... Not stated 

5 Divisional traffic manager Eight years 	 Responsible for all operational, 

strategic and planning matters at his 

site and for all of the company's travel 

... _..·......_.. _.N._._. 	
..---...._ .. - ......... 
... ~Il()p~:f()EI!~~r~r~:ffi~~llP~I:ifl!e~ci()~t: .... 

6 Divisional traffic manager Sixteen years Formerly a trustee of the PST 	 Responsible for the traffic operations of 
his division and for over 200 
em [0 ees, including 190 drivers. 
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B;iIIJII)\,ililtJ,.,,:IIIl>'III1l'•••' iIIiV- .. !III, &>."_>lIiIId••' ..h ••• '.,.... '..., .'."i!!!lIlill'_.'.'~_',I!Ii!. '.',."•. ,iii:. ,Wl " 	
• 
Company Five 
Respondent no. Position held Length of service 	 Involvement in (former) ESO Additional information 

activities (e.g. position on 

steering committee) 

Branch chairman of the GMB (formerly Sixteen years 
....... . -- .__.. 
.',." . 
, r;f!,!1E(ll})!(dJ2_ 
...... ...... --.- ..._.. 	 ..... ...... ........ _........._.. -. ......•. ..- ... ....... - .--. ..... ......-­~.. ~ 
2 Foreman (formerly Company (A) Seventeen years 	 Sat on Company (A's) buy-out former GMB representative 

committee. 

~, ...,- ..• , ....." ... _......, ......., ................., ............., ........ , .... ,.',.....,.,..... ' 	 ................._-.,. .........._....._.................. -- ......... -.- .......-.- ...._.. ­
3 Engineering manager (fonnerly Company Twenty-three years 	 Responsible for all engineering activity 
(A) 	 on site, including the maintenance and 
preparation of around 60 vehicles. 
Also co-ordinates engineering activities 
on other sites when engineers are 
..........." ............................... _ ...._..... ............................._........... ..........-.....-,...... .......- ~!?~.~!~t..:,.~9.I:~!I~I:,9~~!:~P.E~S.,~lltt;lt.i\,,~:............ 
4 Garage staft· manager (fonnerly Eleven years 
~ 
Responsible for all staff matters, 
Company (A)
.-- ....--.................. 
.... il'!:~J.l!(].i.ng ...hiEi~~g.t;ll1cinr.il~g.:.... 

5 Branch chainnan of the TGWU Eighteen years 

.. ........ . ...... 
.. (f9l:I!l~E!y9,C?111P~l}yf§)) 	
..... - ... - ............... _.... .. .. .---- .--. -- .. ---......................__......
.,..~.-....... 

6 	 Branch secretary of the TGWU (fonnerly Fifteen years 
e"mnnm (B)) 
• ••___••__ ••__ ••• _.__ d ••••••••• _ •••_. ___• _ •••••••••••• _••••••••••••••••• 	
. .... . ..... .. . ... . ......... 
-.~-... ....-- ..-.................................._................._......... 

7 Garage manager (formerly Company (B)) fifteen years 	 Responsible for 240 drivers and four 
-~. ........ -.........................-...-......-
................._..... ..........-.. ---.-- ..................- ... ..... ..................... 	 .-- ....- ....... -.. 
.il1~pe(;t()t:s:., 
.... ---........... ......................_....... 

8 Operations manager (formerly Company Thirty-three years 	 Looks after day-to-day operations. 
(B)) 	 Also responsible for planning new and 
revised routes, alterations to existing 
routes and fare structures. Directly 
responsible for fourteen people and 
indirectly, through the garage staff 
managers, for around 700-800 drivers, 
plus all of the driver supervisors and 
customer liaison officers. 
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Compan)' Six 
Respondent no. Position held Length of service 	 Involvement in (former) ESO Additional information 

activities (e.g. position on 

steering committee) 

Branch representative for the TGWU Twenty-four years 	 Formerly branch chairman of the 
TGWU 
.. ... ...........-...............~ .................-.................
~...... 
2 Company convenor Not stated 	 Responsible for all of the company's 
.__.... _... ... Tg~VI·e::PI:~~~I~!(ltiye::~ .................................. 

3 
~ 
Not stated 

......................... _ •••••_ •• ,n ........................................ ......---- ..--.._.-.... ._...... 	 ........... 

........................ 
..._I?!(lI.~.~.~ ...~~.~I:t:!tllD'...?f.!~e::.IqY!l! 
4 Garage generaimanager Twelve years Has general overall responsibility for 
the whole operation of the garage 
including engineering, staffing, finance 
and discipline. Responsible for 400 
employees and for health and safety at 
-.-.~....- .- - ....~.-- .-... -.-.....-......-.,,-~.-.. . . __ .. _.. -- ... .. --.-------.--..- ......_.... , ....._............ ............-..,..... ....._... 
····1·······_-	 ..hi~g<lr<lge·.torf!:1~r ..()ElCr<l~!!1g.!~(lIl<lg~I:: ... 

5 Service quality manager Twenty-one years 	 Responsible for the company's twelve 
service controllers . 
.........- ... -...................... .............. ..................- .............................- ..- ............................................................ ...... ..._... 

6 Traffic manager ThiIty-five years 	 Deals with 'first-line' discipline, 
including reports 'from the road', 
compassionate leave, sickness, referrals 
and the general day-to-day running of 
the garage. Responsible for around 
350 employees, including drivers, 
conductors, driver operators and 
service contro !leI's . 
7 Service controller Eighteen years 	 Goes out on the road making sure that 
buses are running to time. Acts as a 
'go-between' for management and staff. 
......... ...._._ .•............_.........- ................................-.... -_......... -..........._.........--.......................................... ..... -...-.............. .-...........-.... 	 ......... 
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Appendix 10: Stage Two interview questions 
Section 1 - General information (all companies): 
1.1 	 What is your (managerial/trade union) role in the company? 

1.2 	 How long have you worked at the company? 

1.3 	 How many employees are you responsible for? (management respondents only) 

1.4 	 Approximately what percentage of the workforce, including managers, are 

members of your union? (trade union respondents only) 

1.5 	 Have there been any major changes to the management structure in the company 

over the past five years? 

1.6 	 What do you consider are/were the main objectives of ESO in your company? 

1.7 	 Do you believe these objectives are being/were met? 

Section 2a - Management attitudes to the unions - management respondents only ­
(all companies): 
2.1 	 Do you consider union representatives at the company to be skilful bargainers? 

2.2 	 Do you consider the union officers to be effective leaders of their union? 

2.3 	 Do you believe that the unions are generally reasonable in their claims? 

2.4 	 How do you feel about using the unions as the main channel of communication to 

employees on company policy? 

2.5 Do you think that the unions in the company have too little, too much, or the right 

amount of power? 
-
-ae 	 2 
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2.6 	 Do you think that managers here have a relatively free hand In running the 
company? 
2.7 	 Do you believe that the unions co-operate with management? In which areas? 
Section 2b - Union attitudes to managers - trade union respondents only - (all 
companies): 
2.1 	 Do you think that management is effective in running the company? 
I 2.2 Do you think that management is interested in the welfare of employees? 
I 
~, 2.3 Do you think that managers have tried to undermine the position of your union 
I through direct dealings with employees, or have they been careful to safeguard the 
union position in such contacts? Please give details . 
• 
2.4 	 Do you consider managers to be generally reasonable when it comes to discussing 
union claims? 
2.5 	 Overall, what do you believe to be the attitude of management to your union? 
2.6 	 Overall, what do you believe to be the attitude of the unions in the company to 
management? 
2.7 	 In your opinion, does management try to Jive up to its agreements? 
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Section 2c - Management and trade union respondents: 
2.1 Overall, how do you personally view management/union relations in the company? 

2.2 	 Do you believe that the union(s) have the support of employees in the company? 

2.3 	 Do you believe that management has the support of employees in the company? 

2.4 	 How would you describe the current industrial relations climate e.g. 

consultative/co-operative/adversarial? 

2.5 	 Do you think this has changed in recent years? 

2.6 	 What are the current consultation/negotiation arrangements between management 

and the unions on particular issues? 

2.7 	 Has this changed in recent years? 

2.8 	 At the present time, what scope do YOLl have in the company for involving 

employees - e.g. disseminating information, joint consultative committees etc. 

2.9 	 Do you have any worker directors in the company? How many? 

2.10 	 Do you consider them to be effective in their role? 

2. I I 	 Do you think there has been a change in morale in recent years? 
2.12 	 Do you think there are likely to be any job losses in this company? 
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Section 3 - Variable company sections 
Company One respondents only: 
3.1 	 Could you describe the circumstances surrounding the buy-out in 1993? 

3.2 	 How much involvement did the trade unions have in the buy-out? 

3.3 	 Do you believe employees/trade unions were provided with full information? 

3.4 	 Did you have any specific role in the buy-out? 

3.5 	 How do you personally feel about the way in which shares were distributed to 

employees in the company? 

3.6 	 How do you feel about 'free share' distributions as opposed to 'direct purchase' 

share schemes? 

3.7 	 Is there anything you th ink should have been done differently? 

3.8 	 How likely do you think it is that there will be a bid to buy the company in the near 

future? 

Company Two respondents only: 
3.1 	 What were the main reasons behind the sale of the company in 1998? 

3.2 	 Could you describe the circumstances regarding the sale? 

3.3 	 How much involvement did the trade unions have in the recent ownership change? 

3.4 	 Do you believe that employees/trade unions were provided with full information? 

3.5 Did you have any specific role in the sale? 

E 
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3.6 What do you believe to be the general feeling among employees, employers and 

the trade unions since the sale? 

3.7 In what ways do you think the new ownership structure will change the way the 

company is run, if at all? 

3.8 	 What will happen to the company's share trusts? 

3.9 	 What do you think the effects of the sale will be on existing systems of employee 

involvement and participation? 

3.10 	 How far do you think share ownership previously affected industrial relations? 

3.11 	 How far do you think the new ownership structure will affect industrial relations in 

the future? 

3.12 	 Is there anything you think should have been done differently? 

Company Three respondents only: 
3.1 	 What were the main reasons behind the flotation in 1998? 

3.2 	 Can you describe the circumstances surrounding the flotation of the company? 

3.3 	 How much involvement did the trade unions have in the flotation? 

3.4 	 Do you believe that employees/trade unions were provided with full information? 

3.5 	 Did you have any specific role in the flotation? 

3.6 Is there anything you think should have been done differently? 

3.7 What do you see as having been the main consequences of the flotation for the 

company? 

-
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Company Four respondents only: 
3.1 What were the main reasons behind the sale of the company in 1994? 

3.2 Can you describe the circumstances surrounding the sale of the 

company/dissolution of the ESOP in 1994? 

3.3 	 How much involvement did the trade unions have in the sale? 

3.4 	 Do you believe that employees/trade unions were provided with full information? 

3.5 	 Did you have any specific role in the sale? 

3.6 	 Is there anything you think should have been done differently? 

3.7 	 What do you see as having been the main consequences of the sale/dissolution of 

the ESOP for the company? 

Company Five respondents only: 
3.1 	 What were the main reasons behind the merger of the two companies in 1997? 

Could you describe the circumstances surrounding the merger. 

3.3 	 How involved were the trade unions at the time of the merger? 

3.4 	 Do you believe that employees/trade unions were provided with full information? 

3.5 	 Did you have a specific role in the merger? 

3.6 	 Would you have liked to see anything done differently? 

3.7 What do you see as having been the main consequences of the merger? 
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Company Six respondents only: 
3.1 What were the main reasons behind the sale of the company in 1997? 

3.2 	 Can you describe the circumstances surrounding the sale? 

3.3 	 How involved were the trade unions at the time of the sale? 

3.4 	 Do you believe that employees/trade unions were provided with full information? 

3.5 	 Did you have a specific role in the sale? 

3.6 	 What do you see as having been the main consequences of the sale? 

Section 4 - post employee ownership ('post buy-out' companies only) 
4.1 	 Can you describe management-union relations during the time the company was 

employee-owned? 

4.2 	 What do you vIew as having been the main advantages of employee share 

ownership? 

4.3 	 What do you vIew as having been the mam disadvantages of employee share 

ownership? 

4.4 	 Do you think employees cared about share ownership? 

4.5 	 Do you think they ever felt like owners? 

4.6 	 Do you think employees were sorry to see the dissolution of share ownership at the 

company? 

4.7 Would you have done things differently during your time as an employee-owned 

company? 
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4.8 In what ways do you think share ownership affected the overall efficiency of the 
workforce? 
4.9 In what ways do you think ESO changed employees' attitudes to their work? 
4.10 What do you see as being the future for your company? 
,
• Ii 	 H' 
Mutual attitudes scale (Stagner et a11958) as featured in Rim and Mannheim (1964) 
II J 	 *11 
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Management attitudes towards unions: 
I. 	 Are the local union officers skilful bargainers? 
2. 	 Are the union officers effective leaders oftheir organisation? 
3. 	 Is the union generally reasonable or not in its claims? 
4. 	 How do you feel about using the union as the main channel of communication to the 
workers on company policies? 
5. 	 Are the union officers interested in the welfare of the rank-and-file workers? 
6. 	 Does the union have too much power in your establishment? 
7. 	 Does the union interfere seriously with how the company is managed, or does the 
management have a reasonably free hand in running the plant? 
8. 	 Does the union co-operate with management on production matters or not? 
9. 	 Has the union tended to weaken employee discipline or has it co-operated with 
management on disciplinary matters? 
10. 	 In general, how do you personally feel about your company's relationship with the 
union? 
11. 	 Does the union have the support of the workers? 
-
.... '.lIa~""""""""""""""""""BI""""""""""""""""""". 
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Mutual attitudes scale continued: 

Union attitudes towards managements: 

I. 	 Are the top management officials effective executives of the establishment? 
2. 	 Are the top management officials interested in the welfare of the workers? 
3. 	 Has the management tried to undermine the union position through direct dealings 
with the workers, or has it been careful to safeguard the union position in such 
contacts? 
4. 	 Is the top management generally reasonable or not when it comes to discussing 
union claims? 
5. 	 Has the management shown any understanding of your problems as a union officer? 
6. 	 In general, how do you personally feel about your union's relations with the 
company? 
7. 	 Does the company try to live up to its agreements? 
8. 	 What is the top management attitude toward the union? 
9. 	 Does the company abuse its power in this establishment? 
i 
I 
I 
t 
-
a.x !I .. 
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Poole and Jenkins (1990) 
Questions for managers: 
1. 	 What were your objectives in introducing the scheme? 
2. 	 What are the advantages of your scheme to the company/employees? 
3. 	 What are the disadvantages of your scheme to the company/employees? 
4. 	 What changes, if any, would you make? 
5. 	 Do you have an overall industrial relations policy in the company? What 
contribution does profit sharing/share ownership make to this policy? 
6. 	 Which trade unions/staff associations are recognised by your company? 
7. 	 Please gIve details of the percentage of employees represented by these 
unions/staff associations 
8. 	 What collective bargaining and consultative arrangements do you have with these 
un ions/staff associations? 
9. 	 Were the trade unions/staff associations consulted before the introduction of the 
scheme? 
10. 	 How did you inform your employees of the scheme - directly, through union/staff 
association channels? What mode did this take? Did employees find this 
satisfactory? 
11. 	 Have you continued to inform employees/advise them on the scheme subsequent to 
setting it up? 
t\ 
~l 
~. 
~Jllllh'"IIIII"Mii."II'__________________T
I 
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12. 	 Has financial participation by employees: 
(i) increased profitability through improved efficiency? I 
(ii) made organisational changes more acceptable to employees?~ (iii) reduced levels of absenteeism/ labour turnover I 
I (iv) improved employee attitudes at work? 
I 13. What other forms of employee involvement are there in the company? To what 
extent do these link with profit sharing/share ownership? 
,f 
I 14. Has the introduction of the scheme affected/changed company employee
I involvement policy? 
Questions for trade union representatives/officers: 
I. 	 What were management's objectives in introducing share ownership into the 
company? 
2. 	 Do you think these objectives have been met? If not, can you recommend any 
alternative schemes more likely to achieve these aims? 
3. 	 Are union/management relations in the company satisfactory? 
4. 	 Have members' attitudes to the union changed since the scheme was introduced? 
5. 	 Was your union consulted about the scheme? Was the infonnation satisfactory? If 
not, how could it have been improved? 
6. 	 Has the introduction of the scheme changed management/union relations in any 
way 
k 
i• 
~t.···"···.~d....__________________ 

I 
r 

Appendix 11(i) Contact summal'y fonn 
Respondent details: Engineering manager 
Company: Five (AJ 
Respondent no: 3 (refer to respondent profile sheet in Appendix 9) 
Date of interview: 19 November 1998 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 	 THEMES 
no. 

'They lack the necessary skills. [t's not just a badge you could go and grab and then "look after the lads". A lot of skills are required ARE UNION 

and the skills are not there. People who wear the trade union badge don't give it their full appreciation in terms of what they arc doing REPRESENTATIVES 

...................+._a..n ..........w .... a..t,,!.hey~Et!9:yit1gtC!~<.:11i~yt! :...!..t.:s':l..~!'=illt!~pa~!!I11e:' ''....................... ....... ........ ........ 	 .... ......... .. ......_ .~~..!..~
......d .......h F.!:!..L IJ_A R~~~J\T~ ..gS? 

2 • 'We all prefer to come to a satisfactory arrangement rather than slog it out. ARE UNION OFFICERS 

• 	 'What I try to do is help them be representative, to try and get them to "come at me with something" that we can really mull over, EFFECTIVE LEADERS OF 
to and them with their skills.' THEIR UNIONS? 
2 	 'I think every trade union negotiator worth his salt will package a claim with a certain amount ofthings to be knocked away .. ' ARE UNIONS REASONABLE 

IN CLAIMS?
I.................................\......".............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................."................. :.C...:.: :.:.e::::....:................................................. 1 
3 'Policy should be carried out by managers through a supervisory structure. Unions can help the process but they are not the process.' VIEWS ON UNIONS AS THE 
MAIN CHANNEL OF 
COMMUNICATION TO 
EMPLOYEES ON COMPANY 
POLICY 
........................................................... ­
3 • Most effective is one-to-one. 	 MAIN CHANNELS OF 
• Emphasis needs to be on management to get things across and then invite feedback. 	 COMMUNICATlON USED BY 
• Trade unions always say 'management doesn't tell us anything'. COMPANY 
I... ........f ...~.....·.······.~.b:lTlill1.ilgel·,.i[11~~~.tg .. cl2..hisjg~L.l~~.~~.~... t9..A~I~gflt~.~9111~ ..gf!h~... il1[()l:ITlil!i()11 ...thl:9.~lgh ...I.1..i~.. ~lIperyisors.:.' 
:; 	 About the right amount at respondent's own depot. There are different cultures at the different sites. DEGREE OF POWER HELD 

BY THE UNIONS 

• 	 In terms of the supervisory chain the structure is top heavy. When Company Five (A) was employee-owned, responsibility was ARE MANAGERS ALLOWED 
cascaded more down the ranks. Some management levels were phased out. TO MANAGE? 
• 'We thcn merged and went backward. We had to have people supervised and everything. To me that's wrong, because we're in an 

1.':lgel!g\\'\\'.I~el:<:...~.ITlPO""~EITle!~!.. is\'~TY11~llch ...fl..~u~~\\,ord. In.~.iyiduals do want to come to work and use their brains.' + .........
I 
5 By and large - co-operation is pretty good. 	 DO lJNIONS CO-OPERATE 

WITH MANAGEMENT? 

Appendix II(i) 
4 
Appendix l1(i) continued 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 

no. 

5 Good - no deadlocks. Compromise takes place. 

'Policy should always be left to the management, but issues need to be discussed and communicated to the workforce. The union 
otlicial is there when we're not getting it right, so the guy's got another option. The first option should be to see his immediate 
5 
~lll"\pr\ll~l\t·. ' 
6 • General consensus that unions are there for the employees and that employees should embrace them. Definite decline in 

membership during the years of ESO. 

~... ... __.+~_]'J<:l.!::I<::()'1.~~i()l!s'''Y.~d.()'1.'!.!1~~9tJ1.!~~11yl!!.or~:-~!l0.r.~<l.~~::IlE'li!\g'gr!~~ T()I~~!~<l!g<l~!~~r~9I!.1.()I?~nt~11l.':lf't~Eth~11l~Eg~I~:. 
8 • Good by and large. 
I- ..... +_~_~Vi~'I~~.I1~~~r..g()il1g_.t() .. ?'.Clti.~.9'.~~~!}'~()~X=!~~re.:~ .<l.l~<lx?g()in:g.t()_?~ ..~. (;()~ltil~gel1_t!~<lt~.~ys..~I1()!.~,:.ci()I1't~ypp()r1:lll<l':l<lgt:Il1t:':It ..' 
9 • Company tries to adopt a 'one-to-one' approach. 
• The managing director encourages managers to get out and communicate. 
LiI.::.:•.::I ..~~~~~~?·;'~i~~~ir~{~~~~ri~~41\1:4~~~~::[';~i:i~~rii;i~~'.{'~~~~j1:~i~ir~~~i~~i.i~i:1:?o~:-!~~.=t~=.' 
12 • Very involved - makes his presence known at all of the depots. 
• Never short of new ideas - always looking ahead. 
• 'Sometimes his enthusiasm and commitment are not SUDDortedl:>ysome of the staff under him.' 

16 Once ESO ended, the trade union representative was happy to be off the EST and 'one of the team again'. 

18 • 'A lot ofthem did, a lot of them didn't.' 
• 'Some carried on as if nothing had happened.' 
18 'A lot ofthcm did, but a lot couldn't afford to become owners.' 
18 Attitudes to work 'probably changed for the better.' 
THEMES 
MANAGEMENT-UNION 
RELATIONS 
CURRENT INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS CLIMATE 
EMPLOYEE-UNION 
RELATIONS 
...... .. .... ..... ...._ ......... ... ......~._ ... 

MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE 
~.~ ~AE!0 NS........ ........ ... ..1 

EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT/ 
PART[C fPATION 
MORALE
...+.........._..............._................................................................  

INVOLVEMENT OF THE 
MANAGING DIRECTOR 
DIVIDED LOYALTIES (E.G. 
TRADE UNION 
REPRESENTATlVF,S ALSO 
HOLDING A POSITION ON 
010 EMPLOYEES CARE 
ABOUT EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP?
··········1··········································· ..........................................._............................ 

om EMPLOYEES FEEL LIKE 
OWNERS? 
IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
EMPLOYEE EFFICIENCY 
Appendix ll(i) 
Appendix l1(ii): Contact summary form 
Respondent details: Garage general manager 
Company: Six 
Respondent no: 4 (refer to respondent profile sheet in Appendix 9) 
Date of interview: 20 November 1998 
Page Key points/quotes from interview THEMES 

no. 

'I wouldn't say that they're all very very good at what they do.' 	 ARE UNION 
REPRESENTATIVES 
SKILFUL BARGAINERS? 
.......j................................................................................._...._._......... 

'At grass roots level it's pretty weak really.' 	 ARE UNION OFFICERS 
EFFF:CTIVE LEADERS OF 
THEIR UNIONS? 
........._....... ... __ .•.. ...._..... 

• 'We've built up a very good working relationship.' 	 ARE UNIONS GENERALLY 
• 'We like to be honest and fair and they've reciprocated that.' 	 REASONABLE IN THEIR 
CLAIMS? 
2 'Because of the lack of experience, I don't have a lot of confidence that information I want to put over is cOlTununicatcd to them VIEWS ON UNIONS AS THE 
[emp loyees] effectively and accurately .. ' 	 MAIN CHANNEL OF 
COMMUNICATION TO 
F:MPLOYEES ON COMPANY 
POLICY 
........... ............ ........._..... 	 .........,.....•••_...............,.._..... .. 

..._"... 
3 'About the right amount.' 	 DEGREE OF POWER HELD 
'fIJYTJ-tl~ (IN'QNS.. _......_ ._............ 
2 'We do have a relatively free hand.' ARE MANAGERS ALLOWED 
TO MANAGE? 
3 • 'Good, very open.' MANAGEMENT-UNION 
• 'Good attitude at meetings.' 	 RELATIONS 
f 	 ... _+.. ~ ... 'M!:'~u~Lr~s.p~c:t:'.... 
j • 'There have been major changes and a lot of that has caused a bit of distrust and a bit of scepticism.' MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE 
RELATroNS 
_...........................I.....~................'Ih~_.~f.l1p.lgy('!('!~...hCl':'I,!....~I1c:!~i~!().().~...!h~!":Y.\~(}t'.~.. ~e(';I1 ...~.()I~e ...iI~~h('! ..pa~t ..!1(}s.!:>.~.~.I1 ...~ .. I1.~c.~ss.it't..:.' 
4 'There is good co-operation, which comes from good consultation.' CURRENT INDUSTRIAL 
RELAnONS CLIMATE 
4 • 'One of tile difficulties of our industry is that you cannot get everybody together_' EMPLOYEEINVOLVEMENTI 
• 'We tend to rely on notices and written information.' 	 PARTICIPATION 
Appendix ll(ii) 
I 
APpenriX l1(ii) continued: 
Page Key points/quotes from interview THEMES 
no. 
6 'They [trade unions reps] worked together because they knew what was required, what was wanted.' DlVlDED LOYALTIES 
(TRADE UNION ATTITUDES 
TO EMPLOYEE SHARE 
1_··:::···_·········· 
7 
··1,·····:·:::-····;····:····:·····:·····......·..·..•··..•..···.................................:..........:.............................:....:.......... :..__ 
'I think those who were truly interested in the 
........................................: ....:.............................................................................................................................................................................:...................................................................................................................... 
success of the company and the shares they had invested in and wanted to see a return 
I .Q'\Yl'-(fi:~~I:!!~) .. .... ................. ... 
IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
from them - yes, they had a vested interest in seeing the company succeed.' SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
EMPLOYEE EFFICIENCY 
••••••••••h ••••••••••• h ..........._._ •••__ •• •••••••_ ............_._.. • ••••••_._.. • •••••h •••••••••••h •••••••••••••••••••••••••• __••••••••••••••••••••••• h ••••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••h" 	 ••_..... • ••••_.... .._•••••••••••_ •••••__ ...___................._ ••••••••••••••••• 

8 'The commitment was there according to what you had put into the company and what you wanted to see come out.' 	 IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 

SHARE OWNERSHiP ON 

EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES 

9 ~~~~.~e~~~~: ~~~:re:~do~c::~~~et~~!~t::e~l~~~~_u~~:~~:I~~v;O:~:~~~t~:l~~~~~~:~~~:t~~~s;~:y;~:1I~et~:~~~ ~~~:t~~:'~~ ~;t~:;:~~·····I····~Cf~:~:~~~;:~~·w·EEN·········· 
deal, to get the company strong, for everyone to benefit from what's happening. Therefore you want to work at getting things sorted. 	 UN IONS (AS A RESULT OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
)................... ....1' .............................................. .................................................................... .......... .... ........ .. ..........."........._............. .................................................................................. ................................. ........... . .. ......................... ....................._............._....... Q.~l'-(~~§.I:!I~~L 
9110 • 'The company itself perfonned much much better because the responsibility was on us.' MAIN ADVANTAGES OF 
• 'It was down to us as employees at whatever level to make the company work.' 	 EMPLOYEE SHARE 
f...................+~........... :.y9l!):(;!.I1.1()nit()!(;!<:I~ ..~().~!.!I~.~!!:lly..~~yi.(;!~~<:I(lIl<:1if.y.<?l!<:I.<?I1'tp~.r.f().I~.~...~....~.~~~I1 ..y()!:'r!()l!t~~.C.()I~~.. lIP.fol:...~~I1<:1.~.~..y()l!c!()ll,'t ..g~!.!.I~.~.111.'................. OWNERSHIP ........................................... . 
10 'There is a big group of staff who gained nothing from it, they lost nothing from it, they stayed the same, but there are a hell of a lot of MAIN DISADVANTAGES OF 
people who made a tot and there is that distrust.' EMPLOYEE SHARE 
'There were also essential wage cuts. We had to get into a position financially where we could afford to buy the company and be OWNERSHIP 
f-.".'''' +c9!11:pe~j!ly~._<,JI1~~!'<:I~E~1.~()!.~~r~.~.(l<:l!()~~_'Y(lg~(;t1!.~·'... .."............ . ..... .... ............... .... .._. ..... ........ ......... .+. 
10 'I think if you were to turn the clock back, they would say it was a bad thing. It took them away from their comfort zone of being pmt DID EMPLOYEES CARE 
of London TranspOlt - but it varies.' ABOUT EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP? 
11 'The performance of the individuals and the company should have taken an upturn as in "everybody comes to work - no one goes sick DID EMPLOYEES FEEL LIKE 
~_.... ....f..b~(;.~.l.I.?~".it's...~1.1y.I:!l:()nt::y!!..ovy~..I.fLgo...~1(;~.~~~<:I...~~ ..I()~~ ..(lI:()ut~,.I'.~11.. lo~!I1.g ...~9t~": .....I!1.11t'..~}1.0~it .. s.!!()1l~<:Ihay~ ...~.~~!1... v.i~\V~.<:I...all<:1... it"Y!'lsfl:!.:' OWNERS? 
...-...... ... -.- .. -- ...-.....--- ......•...••~ 
Ii • 'No not really. I don't think there's a full understanding of the principle. Nothing has changed, we still have the same directors, WERE EMPLOYEES SORRY 
the same garages, the same managers.' TO SEE THE DEMISE OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE
• 	 'So does it really matter?' 
OWNERSHIP? 
Appendix ll(ii) 
Appendix l1(iii): 
Respondent details: 
Company: 
Respondent no: 
Date of interview: 
Contact summary form 
TG WU branch chairman 
Four 
1 (refer to respondent profile sheet in Appendix 9) 
23 October 1998 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 

no. 

2 • 'There's no such thing as discussion and consultation.' 

---.... 
• :I~~re's...~~...I.~.~.~aY...~4a!~.9_e\f.~r .. ' 
2 • 'They [managers] haven't got a clue about operating a bus service.' 
• ......Ih.<:!...I!l(iI1agil~g.ciir<:!(;t()l~is .. 'lJ.(l~i(;alIy.(lfil~c.tI1c:.<:! ...p<:!r~()n '.:............... 

3 	 • 'Very unreasonable'.' 
........ 
~....'lc()\y!!l()I1~y,I()l"lgh()tII~~!ll1ci.p<:~pl<:!lE<:jtI~tggt)ll:l\fiI1git (iI1YI!l()!:C:.' 
.................-.... -.--......-............................................ ••••••••• H .. 

4 'You now have to try to negotiate everything with the managing director, otherwise agreements will not be made at localleve\.' 	 MANAGEMENT-UNION 
RELATIONS 
....... ..... - .__..__.- .._.. . .........H.....__...__ ...H._....... ................... . ............. _...... . ......... _............. 	 ........................___............. .......,_...... .........................__.- ............._-_._....... 

4 'If the trade union came back with a good argument for a dispute I'm sure it would be supported 100 per cent by their colleagues.' 
4 
5 
.. 
_..... 
-- ........ -.-.... 

6 
~ 
6 
......- ......._._...... 

9 
...........................,--......................... ...................................................................... - ................................................................- ...........- .................-...•........---.............................. 	 ........................ 

• 	 'Morale in this company is so low. People will not do a thing to help the company.' 
• 	 'There's no alle,S':iance to the CUIUI-'<111. whatsoever.' 
• 	 'They still talk to us but the problem is, I think they're being dictated to from above.' 
'}r~.gctt~I!!L~?l:la~..=_~y:::ryJl:llstE!l_t.i~g.' 	
.. ..........._._..._.......... ,.... 

• 	 'It's getting more and more bitter everyday.' 
• 	 'There is 'apathy' and 'divisions'. 
• 	 'I've never known industrial relations at this company to be at such a low.' 
• 	 'Morale is so low it's unbelievable.' 
.................................._._........... • .............................ouou._ .............................
-. 	 . ......................_....... 

• 'There's stacks of scope but I think the company just plays around the edges.' 
• 	 'The Joint AdvisOlY Committee appears not to involve anybody in anything at the moment They just want to do their own thing 
and decide what they're going to talk about, what they're going to implement and just do it' 
• 	 'A guy who is driving a bus up and down every day on a certain route - he knows where the problems are, they should be asking 
him, but it doesn't happen.' 
THEMES 
MANAGEMENT 

EFFECTIVENESS 

............ •.•. ·.__H.······ ... ___ H.·__.······H._. ....... __ ......•_......... 

STAFF WELFARE 
'REASONABLENESS' OF 
MANAGERS 
.-...................._...... 
----.---- .... --..........-........--............................- ....................­
UNION-EMPLOYEE 

RELATIONS 

............................ .-.................. - .....................­
MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYF:E 
RELATIONS 
..........................._.... .......-................. -........_.. _ ................................ - ..-

ATTlTUDE OF 
MANAGEMENT TO UNIONS 
ATTlTUDE OF UNIONS TO 
MANAGEMENT 
CURRENT INDUSTRIAL 

RELATlONS CLIMATE 

.............................. ,.... -................_..................................................................._... 

EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT/ 
PARTIC[PATlON 
Appendix 11(iii) 
l 
ADDendix H(iii) continued: 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 	 THEMES 
no. 
12 'The only difference was that we did get more infonnation on the company's budgets. So we had a transparent view of the company, lMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
we knew exactly what profits the company was making, what each division was making.' SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
EMPLOYEE EFFICIENCY 
12113 I. Managers 'still had to manage' and unions 'still had to be there to represent our members'. IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
• 	 Didn't lose any members over it. SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
EMPLOYEES' ATTITUDES 
TOTHE TRADE 
13 • 'The only time people actually saw money from those shares was when they left or when we were bought alit.' IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
• 	 'The CatTot was dangled and they took it.' SHARE OWNERSHrP ON 
EMPLOYEES' ATTITUDES 
THEIR 
14 There was nevcr a problem. The unions made sure that people nominated for the EBT were those who could be trusted - not DIVIDED LOYALTIES (E.G. 
necessarily a trade union official, but perhaps an ex-trade union official. 	 TRADE UNION 
REPRESENTATIVES ALSO 
HOLDfNG A POSITION ON 
.Itl~I':~!) 
15 'You learned a hell of a lot.' MAIN ADVANTAGES OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
16 'Privatisatioll has just gone from bad to worse - it's not easy.' MAlN DISADVANTAGES OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
...._. 
16 People think they should have been allowed to buy shares in the ESOP. but a lot of people didn't have the money.' 	 DID EMPLOYEES CARE 
ABOUT EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP? 
17 Employees are living to regret the demise of the ESOP now. 	 WERE EMPLOYEES SORRY 
TO SEE THE DEMISE OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP? 
Appendix ))(iii) 
Appendix l1(iv): Contact summary form 
Respondent details: TGWU branch secretary 

Company: Two 

Respondent no: 3 (refer to respondent profile sheet in Appendix 9) 

Date of interview: 4 September 1998 

Page Key points/quotes from interview THEMES 

no. 

5 'I think going back a year or so we had got to a point where I felt industrial relations were going very sour. I think we've built some MANAG EMENT-UNION 

bridges - I don't really think the sale has created a different atmosphere in negotiations or anything like that. We had problems then RELATIONS 
1_ ............... ·········.I·~~~9..~~:..'L~.g9.t..PE(?~.!~I!~~!!(?~:...... !(l:?!~:!...~.~.~~l1y.~ig~lifj~<lI1t.~h~l1.g~~!.!.I~i.?~tllg~:.'.................................................................... ...................................
.,
. 	 'The employees themselves saw very little employee involvement under the ESOP, if any at all. In some respects, management used EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT/ 
that to give themselves more managerial power anyway, so there was more of a traditional management-trade union-employee role PARTICIPATION 
under the ESOP than there had been before it in my opinion. So I don't think we will see very much change in that. There was very 
little in involvement and there won't be under the new "u,'npl,'~hm
.........-.!' .........................................................................- ........................ _·······1·· ............................................. ···························..·····-··.. ··1 
8 'In some respects we were proud to have shares in the company and feel as though we could make something of this company together. IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
However, in terms of normal industrial relations - the fact that bus drivers were still being screwed to the ground and schedules were SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
tight and wages were poor - meant there was not a great deal of difference to the traditional way of operating. People need their trade INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
union to talk to management to try and secure the best deal and on several occasions we came close to considering ballots for industrial 
action. The fact that we were an ESOP I don't think really complicated that.' 
11112 ~--.. ;Th~~:~;;~~;·i~t~f;;;'i'~~d·f~~lil~g~b~~tth~~rl~·pl~y~~di~~~t~~~.TI~~;~~;~·;10·d~~..bt~bout it - you p~t~'~~t';:~de union representatives ··'·EMPLOY·EE"iiiRlicToR:·s" .. ·· .. 1 
on the board and give them an enhanced salaty and all the responsibility of sitting on the board and their attitude does seem to 
change a bit. After some initial problems I think we ended up getting a reasonably good bunch and they did try to act together in 
the interests of the workforce. [think they did have quite an influence over the managing director and the other executive directors 
and probably did make some influential changes to board decisions. It might not have been fully what we wanted but r think they 
had a positive role.' 
• 	 'It's easy to believe that every employee director will ensure that employees' interests are always taken into account. I just don't 

believe you can expect that. r don't have that much ex£ectation of employee directors but I think they did what they could.' 

Appendix ll(iv) 
Annendix l1(iv) continued: 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 
no. 
12 • 'For most people the shares were just an added bonus - you got something of value which you were given free and could only 
increase in value. 1 think certainly we all felt that about it. The trouble is, the first five years of the ESOP were never really going 
to be the big change. The managers had the ultimate power by right that we agreed - they had what we call 'A' shares and could 
override the decisions of everybody else.' 
• 'I think perhaps we were guilty of not doing more to make the workforce aware of how the ESOP was supposed to work and what 
its future was going to be. There was a surprising amount of ignorance about the set-up and about how the structure worked. 
Perhaps that was our fault really - not doing more to explain it better and keep on explaining it.· 
13 '1 don't think the ESOP really did captivate the minds of people - there wasn't enough practical benefit from it. We didn't have the 
capital and resources to develop the company - we were struggling with competition and the wages and conditions package just 
gradually deteriorated.' 
14 'The advantages were more apparent to the trade union I think than to the workforce as a whole. We were able to see the directors on a 
regular basis, we were able to discuss with them the company strategy, we were able to ask questions, we were also ablc to criticise 
them. We were certainly better informed about the realities of where the company was in the market place and how its performance 
was 
14 'The disadvantages really come back to the fact that we were an independent company. The ESOP structure had left us with precious 
few assets and very few resources to invest. An ESOP company starts off with some financial disadvantages over a capitalist 
company. ' 
THEMES 
DID EMPLOYEES CARE 
ABOUT EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP? 
WERE EMPLOYEES SORRY 
TO SEE THE DEMISE OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
MAIN ADVANTAGES OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
MAIN DISADVANTAGES OF 
F.MPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
Appendix II (i\') 
Appendix l1(v): Contact summary form 
Respondent details: Human resources manager 
Company: Three 
Respondent no: 6 (refer to respondent profile sheet in Appendix 9) 
Oate of interview: 14 December 1998 
Page Key points/quotes from interview THEMES 
no. 
112 I 'At local level the reps are fairly good at taking the staff with them.' I ARE UNION OFFICERS 
EFFECTIVE LEADERS OF 
THEIR UNIONS?1-···_·· ·····1················································.........................................................................•......................................................................._....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .....•..••..... .........•..................•.... ·········1········································ ...................................................................... 

4 'There are times when we tend to over-rely on it - the message doesn't get through as effectively as we would like it to. So we have to VIEWS ON UNIONS AS THE 
have a medium where we do parallel stuff.' 	 MAIN CHANNEL OF 
COMMUNICATION TO 
EMPLOYEES ON COMPANY 
4 'I think the balance is about right at the moment. In the early 70s it was too much the other way. I think leading up to 1993-94 it was DEGREE OF POWER HELD 
too much our wav. I think there is a balance now. Thev know how far to Dush and we know how far to Dush.' BY THE UNIONS 
4 'You do have a lot of freedom - yes. There are constrictions - you have to negotiate with the trade unions. People have come a IARE MANAGERS ALLOWED 
cropper because they think they can circumvent them. Often with trade unions, you find it's the little things that bother them, but other TO MANAGE'! 
1........1 than that there's a lot of freedom.' 
5 'On balance they're fairly good. There are moments when we get tetchy each other in any given year.' MANAGEMENT-UNION 
RELATIONS 
. -.._­ ... ­....... ----. ...... _........,........ .-•............_....-.-. 
5 'They [the union reps] sometimes have a problem convincing them [the employees] that they're not in bed with us, but they manage to UNION-EMPLOYEE 
I···· do it most ofthe time.'·-1········· .........................._............................................... .. .. .................... ......... ...... . . ........................... .... . .. ...... ... .. . ... ............... RELAnONS ............ ... .......... . ._......... .............. ........................ ............................ 
6 'I think there is quitc a bit of loyalty to managers as individuals. If you look at management as a group there isn't the same sOl1 of MANAGEMENT-EMPLOYEE 
and commitment I don't think.' 
........ ..... ...•.............. ...........•......•....... .................. . .... ... .. ............... ....... ........ . ..... 
RELATIONS 
........ _...................... ...... .................. ·······················1 
6 'At the moment it's consultative. It has been adversarial and it will be again. At the end of the day there is a balanced approach from CURRENT INDUSTRIAL 
both sides.' RELAnONS CLIMATE 
Appendix 11(v) 
- ------ -- 'f 	------------­
Page Key points/quotes from interview THEMES 

no. 

7 'Most of the stuff is done through the trade union. There are joint consultative committees where staff can raise things with their trade EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT/ 

union who can then raise them with the management. There is always the opportunity for a driver to see his manager and talk to them. 	 PARTICIPATION 
We do have an in-house journal, which gives people the opportunity to write in about most things, but generally speaking people don't, 
or it's the same people who do it all the time.' 
..__....._--_...._-
......_....._._-.._.... _.__.........._........... __ ...._.._.... __ ._-_.......•.••_.......•.._........-...­
8 of motivation it would be fair to say. ' MORALE 
...._-_.....•_......- .. :L~~'~J:~~~!!1()~~I~J~_p'.l:!!i.~_L1I~~Ix...I1ig!1(?11t!!~~h.op floor. There are 
..................._.•...... ­
12 'It put even more pressure on managers to cut costs - as simple as that, and we did. We didn't spend money Ulmecessariiy, people did IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
more and drivers were doing longer hours because there were fewer of them.' SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
EMPLOYEE EFFICIENCY 
13 	 'I think it would be too much to say that things changed significantly, but I think that subconsciously they did. When you talk to people IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 

they might moan and moan and moan but they would say - "well yes, I suppose I did do that". There was more co-operation to get SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 

things done than there was before.' EMPLOYEES' ATTITUDES 

TO WORK 
.. _..._......._._ .... _._. • ......_ ........_ ..........._ ••••••• _ .._ ...... _. ________ • __ ,,_ .. _ ...._,. •••• ••••• 'MM •• _.. •• • • •••M .... __ ..____••• 
.---.--.._.... -... .. --- ...-.. ...... -....-.." ... -....-
......... -.....__.... " ........_...... ............._-,.............. 	 .............._.... -- .. --_......... ......_... . ...._..................,,,....._.........._..........._.............................. 
--.~ ~ 
13 • 	 'It made them [employees] more suspicious of the trade union. I don't think the trade union fully recovered from what was IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 

perceived by some staff as having been "sold down the river". SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 

• 	 'People have formed into groups, into cliques in the canteen. They won't leave the trade union, they're just "anti" the reps and EMPLOYEES' ATTITUDES 
TO THE TRADE UNIONS 
. . ._:.'(i~.~i:.~~'.l:~.'.lg_e1.~~E:t'_'.!.~_~<::.(iLl~.~... ??t~_.~i~~s...g(?t...!9g~t~~..r.. '.l:':ld._~_().lg_.!~~I~_~9""n_!~e..Ei"~r.'....._ ............. 	 ....__ .......__.......-
......
..... 	 .., .... ··.·_.···'_·_M·~....··,· .... ~····· 
13 'A benefit to a lot of people who wouldn't have had a shareholding - who wouldn't have had the amount of money in shares that MAIN ADVANTAGES OF 
they've currently got. The company has managed to remain independent in a sense.' EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
14 'In the beginning it was difficult because we had to make some very difficult decisions in terms of costs. We did some things that were MAIN DISADVANTAGES OF 
perceived as unpalatable at the time.' EMPLOYEE SHARE 
OWNERSHIP 
...",-._.. .. __...,- .. _.. ........_._.... " ....... ...._........•._... ,.,.,.._...... ...............__ ._.._---._..- . ......... _.......__.......- ............. -..............._.............. -. ............._...... -, .... ..--.-- ...... .. -........-.... ..._..._-- .... __...",- " ...._... 	 ....._-- .. _...... ....... -_ ........- . .............. , .. 

14 'Not in the beginning. They do now.' 
-~ 	
DID EMPLOYEES CARE 

ABOUT OWNING SHARES? 

. ···___ .. ·_M·_·······._._.······__·_· .. ·..._..•· ..._-_............_....................._,. ......--......... ...........-.-. .............. ...... " .. --..-." ... --.__.---. .....- .. " ..............-._ ..... ,......... ......_.... -....__._--_ ........--. ....... -.--...._.--........_.. . ......... -.- ..-........-- ...._.... _............_.. ......_...... _......................... 

14 '1 think some do now.' 
~ ~ 	
DID EMPLOYEES FEEL LIKE 
OWNERS? 
------_. __ .. _---_._- -	
- ---_. -- - --­
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Appendix 11(vi): Contact summary form 
Respondent details: Inspector and employee director 
Company: One 
Respondent no: 9 (refer to respondent profile sheet in Appendix 9) 
Date of interview: 21 May 1998 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 

no. 

• 	 'It might be beneficial at times to have more information released so that employees are kept informed and that there are better 
lines of communication perhaps. However, management should still be allowed to manage.' 
• .'!t1..E~~~rlt_y~a.Es...~_~~!:.e..h<ls_~.~~ll_<ln.~l<:!~e<l~.~.I!rl ...~I!1.p.l~ye~.il~y~!y~~!l_~~tJP(:lI!.i.cip<lt.ig~l, ...g~rl~E<l.!.!Y~pt:.<lki~g::_ ........ ... ................. 

3 'You weren't actually buying your job, although some people felt that that was what they were doing. The infonnation I had inspired 

me more and pushed me fUliher in the direction of buying shares for all the right reasons. J don't think there were any other 
considerations. The information, from my point of view and from others I spoke to at the time, was clear enough.' 
1---· 
3 'This is the first bone of contention. It is like self-enlightenment - it is in our own interests to work with management so that the 

company becomes prosperous. That's certainly my and my colleagues' point of view. However, there are some sections of the 

not who seem to have the attitude "what's in it for me?''' 

5 	 'I havc to say yes. Being an employee director I do get a fuller and more detailed picture than others get. I attend board meetings once 
a month so I do know what's going on. I don't always agree with the way they do it but they are doing it fine so I think they are 
managing. At the end of the day you have to look at where you are and where you could be, and [ am where I want to be. So that 
counts for 
5 	 'r have not worked at any other firm where the management does its utmost to help wherever it can. In some respects you would say 
............... 
~J~~Y~.<:~9~Y.<:E~~<:.~'Y<lr.9_S.~()~~lp_pt:!()p.Ie.:TI~~~~lg~srl()tjLI~_tg~J()I:~h<lr.el~oJ9~E~blltX()J:?tl!~I:.<:~!lEI())'t:!~~~s.\'V:~Il:' 

S 	 'I personally feel that the management involves the union "too much". I would not be as accommodating although I'm only too glad to 
_~~lpiLt~~1l'~\()~~~~l:l:_pr()~I~'!l:ljg\'V:~y~~,r""()1l.14!~()tit:1y~lye.!I!~ll~ill<lILcl~\:'~I()pl~t:!!1~.p'!~I!S.(\t~~I<::!l<l~l~(\I}y~t<lge.::::1(\t~ro'll~(\),~i:::' 
6 	 'Managers regard the unions as a useful tool. r f they can get the unions on side the rest of the staff will follow.' 
6 	 'r think that's how it should have been. There is a top limit to the number of shares that people can own, the potential to own all the 

shares up to the maximum number is still there. It's not possible for everyone to own the same amount now that the share value has 

gone the way it has. However, wherever possible, it should be maintained that everyone can own the same amount and that no one 

ersoll can go alloping ahead. rt's a shame we can't give everyone shares.' 
THEMES 
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT/ 
PARTICIPATION 
._......._... 
EMPLOYEES' 
UNDERSTANDING OF 
EMPLOYEE SHARE 
IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE 
SHARE OWNERSHIP ON 
EMPLOYEE EFFICIENCY 
ARE MANAGEMENT 
EFFECTIVE IN RUNNING 
THE COMPANY? 
STAFF WELFARE 
.-.-.-........" ........­
MANAGEMENT-UNION 
RELATIONS 
MANAGEMENT ATTITUDE 
WAY IN WHICH SHARES 
WERE DISTRIBUTED 
Appendix) l(vi) 
• 
A 
Page Key points/quotes from interview 	 THEMES 
no. 
617 'Even if we had the money to buy the company without buying the shares. I feel that people should have invested money in the first FREE VS. BOUGHT SHARES 
lace iust to show that the)! had some commitment to the iob or to the companv.' 
7 'There is a constant rumour ... People are not going to pay a large amount for [Cump(lIlY One] because they are not going to get LIKELY SURVIVAL OF THE 
their money back on it. There is not the sort of scope for a big bid and it would have to be a big bid.' COMPANY/LIKELIHOOD OF 
• 	 'Management does not want to sell. Managers are equal shareholders with the rest of the workforce. They would not end up with THE COMPANY BEING SOLD 
a large sum of money that would support them for the rest of their lives. If they did decide to sell, who would be the first ones to 
8-----r~-~~-~;;_:~~~~h~~1~~:~;;~~~I~i~~t~i~~~;el;~~~;~~?l~~e~~l~i~h~~~~~~~g:!;e;uo~:.: ~~;_r:-b-!=~i~;t~~Ul~'tile 'utopian' idea at"the time. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
The share value since the purchase has rocketed and now it is difficult for new people to become shareholders because of the 
financial cost and obviously there is a drain on the company when shareholders leave. However, the idea is still the same - lots of 
shareholders owning the company so it is owned by the majority, not the minority. Hence, there are a lot of people to convince to 
sell. Ifthe company doesn't sell, competitors have got to force us off the road which is costly for anybody and therefore it is 
unlikely to happen.' 
• 	 'We not only need to consolidate what we are doing, but we need to improve what we are doing. In today's climate, while we do 

not have oredators at the door, just being in business is hard work, certainly in our industry"' 

Appendix ll(vi) 
Appendix 12(i): Stage Two !£:Pol1~ellt_Yie,;'s~)he..l~f~_de19J.!~~_:-_CompanJ' Olle _I Respondent type i Respondent no. Rol~__,___-+CllOice of ESO scheme/method of share distributionJ 
, Trade un ion o~ficersl Ii 2 ~P ste~vard for I' .It was right th~t workers bought.~heir shares.' . , 
I representatives I the TG~U . I' 'Everyone put Il1 £1.000 for "our company. It was done fairly. 
automotIve sectIOn , 
I ~ ! 3 -I Chairman of ACTS !-~ 'The ultimate objective was to have equality - we did not want to have a "them and us" situationI I ! ,,,hprp "nmp h"rl " lnt Innrp ~h"rp" th"n nth",r" ' 
Managers i 4 Assistant traffic r. 'It was done the right way in order to increase commitment. but people should have been able to buyI I manager I as many shares as the' liked.' 
I 5 Stores manager .'Buying shares gi ves the company money. If you get them free the company does not get any 
money. but when employees leave they still get the money - the company has to payout.' 
• 	 'I think the company has done all it can to help people who cannot afford to buy shares, Most 
people who want them have bought them - some people just don't want to buy them anyway.' 
• 	 'Maybe now, to raise capital, it might be reasonable for some people to buy more, but initially, that 
was the best way to do it.' 
6 	 Finance director • 'Direct purchase schemes generate more commitment as everyone takes the risk. We had to raise 10 
per cent of the value of the company - where would the money have come from if we had formed an 
ESOP?' 
• 	 'We wanted to make things equal. We had to put our case across to the banks that the workforce 
was committed. This was the best way of obtaining money internally,' 
7 	 .... 'IDirect~;:'of ... ······1 .;:r~;~~~k~thi~g~f~i~:~~~~Y~~~~h~~-ldi;~~~-fi:~~~i;~I:~~b-~tti;i~i~I~~tgood from a business point of 
engineering view, Not everyone can afford to buy the shares so the concept of shares for all has gone,' 
• 'The platform union in particular wanted things to be equal for everyone. Length of service 
... shouldn't be an issue, It's how you do from day one of the buy-out rather than what you did 
previously.' 
Other 8 Accountant • 'Free share issues should be made a bonus but purchasing shares gives employees more of a stake ­
"I've put money in my company".' 
• 	 'The way the shares were distributed was satisfactory - the unions did not want anyone party to 
have a controlling stake.' 
9 Inspector and • 'Even if we had had the money to buy the company without buying the shares, I feel that people 
employee director 	 should have put the money in to buy the shares in the first place just to show that they had some 
commitment to the job or to the company.' 
• 	 'No other routes were preferable. None of them would have provided the broad base or the security 
that most people now feel they have because of share ownership, No one feels now that someone 
would come along with a wad of money and buy us out -. it wouldn't be worth it for each individual.' 
• 	 'It's not possible for everyone to own the same amount of shares now that the share value has gone 
the way it has. People just cannot shell out that sort of money all in one go. However, wherever 
possible, it should be maintained that everyone can own the same amollnt. No one person can go v galloping ahead. It's a shame we can't give everyone shares.' 	
,-, 
Appendix 12(i) 
Appendix 12(ii): Stage Two respondent views on the model of ESO - Company Two 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role ! Choice of ESO scheme/method of share distribution 
Trade union officersFT I IChairman for the!. • A lot of ESOPs had been set up on a similar S0I1 of basis. We thought that was quite a good thing and 
representatives engineering! it made sure that the more service people had. and in my opinion the more loyalty to the company, the I 
, employees section I more shares they got out of it.'
I of the TGWU I. 'There were some people against doing it this way, but by and large I don't think we had a lot of 

I I problems putting that across to people and they seemed to accept it fairly well.' 

• 	 'There are perhaps things we would have liked to have done differently and better but it was the best we 
could do at the time, , 
• 	 'We'd done a lot of research and learned the pitfalls and the problems of other ESOPs and therefore we 
and so on to make it better.' f~""""""""""""""""""""""""""........ f 	 =:....................... c···.···················] ".:'...:.".. =.•::.:.9. :c==:::.•.•.. :.: ....: ...................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................................. I 

2 Chairman of the 'We didn't reach Ollt to shareholders. We could have made the company a lot better if we had reached 
TOWU out to the shareholders, which was the workforce and said "we're all in this together, we're all 
shareholders - the managing director is a shareholder and you're a shareholder. Let's try to make this 
3~-- +~~r~~~~~':=~~· 
with the EBT! owning only 26 per cent but I was a minority voice.' 
• 	 '{ would have had a much larger collective share - a common ownership project. I don't see the value 
of individual employees having shares in their company. That doesn't give the workforce any influence 
- it gives i.ndividuals a very small, negligible amount of influence which isn't nearly as powerful.' 
• 	 'ft [ESO] is only going to work if everybody has one vote. It's the vote that matters rather than the 
shares. If you have a common ownership structure then you don't have a financial stake but you have a 
,. 
vote and that's a much more positive way of getting employee involvement and pmticipation on a more 
democratic basis.' 
Managers 6 	 Managing director • 'There was always going to be an equitable scheme - we were never going to get an opportunity to do 
(at one of two anything else so I think that under those circumstances there was actually very little we could have done 
company sites) differently. Looking back with hindsight, we ought to have stm1ed the shm'e sale sooner, rather than the 
company having to buy the shares back and draining its profits every year. With investment being low, 
they ought to have started share shops straight off. ' 
• 	 'With another scheme you would have to have the ability to pay and people would have said "I can't 
afford it" and so they would have got no shares.' 
Appendix 12(ii) 
Appendix 12(iii): Stage Two respondent views on the model of ESO - CompallY Three 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role I Choice of ESO scheme/method of share distribution 
Trade union offieersl I I I Representative for 18 'To say it was free would be wrong. How they [the employees] paid for their first set of shares was 
representatives the TGWU and an through wage negotiations where they lost a week's holiday.' 
EBT trustee • 'Shares have now become a secondary issue, outweighed by the fact that the job is not paying enough. 
f··2·······_········­ ···I····Tr;it1cassTsiantT··· .• ·····~·~~~~i!;JI~~~t~:~~l~i~f~~~~;~f!k~li~·~··!~;~·;~f;y~~~1.1~~i~~;;·ti~~;~~d~i~~!~~t~~i~~~;~~\~·~~i·d~;,:~:~~ 
TGWU 
representative 
3 Bus driver, 
TGWU trade 
union/health and 
safety 
representative 
4 Company 
convenor 
Managers 5 Garage staff 
manager 
how much money the directors put in as long as the employees could also put money in. What I don't like 
is when the directors earn £4 million and then they try to keep your wages down. But I think the ESOP 
was because was involved in it from all sides.' c ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
 I 
• 	 'I believe that the ESOP changed the culture of the company. Privatisation was like a sore and if you 
treat a sore with the proper medication it will heal over a period oftime. The healing process is still going 
on four years later.' 
• 'The loss of our contract was part of the price we paid.' 
• 	 'If anything, we just wanted to have an employee buy-out, but that didn't happen for a lot of different 

reasons. We weren't in a position to be able to do that.' 

I. 
• 'The willingness of employees to put some money into an employee buy-out - at the time the vast 

majority wouldn't have invested anything.' 

'We should have tried to get the maximum for everybody. Tn hindsight T would have sought to convince 
them that the investment would bring a greater reward.' 
I. 

• There was a large number of people who left the union over it [the ESOP). The general reaction was that 

gallows corner was still operating. They would have hung us from the gallows. So it took a very strong 

will from the reps to be able to go about their work, smile and take the insults from the staff.' 

'Employees should have been given more shares. r believe we were really kicked in the teeth.' 
• 	 'They [the directors] told us that there weren't enough shares. The unions had pulled the rug from under 
us in insisting on the 25.1 per cent. The eight senior managers and the four directors - we call them the 
"dirty dozen". I'm not financially astute to really understand it but we had to accept it. I felt like a 
second-class citizen.' 
.. .. .............. .·f····.. ······1 ..'\Y~~~~~i<1<:lJ~l!l:Cl!~Clg.~~~~~t~~p~sll-'~d()~!!rltl~~~()I<1=~~~~1~etlo!gi\'~tl~I~~.()pp()r1.lIl1ityt.()~l:lX~I1(ll:~~:'. 
6 Human resources .. 'We should have perhaps tried to see if we could get employees to put a stake in - they did it for the 
manager flotation. rt would have meant that less money was needed from the venture capitalists.' 
• 	 'The trade union had said that people wouldn't buy shares. They may have been right - I don't know. A 
lot ofpeop\e are now saying "if only we'd bought shares, we would have been even better off". That's all 
hindsight now. Drivers are saying - "I wish we could have bought shares. Why weren't we allowed to 
buy shares?" But the funny thing was, it was the trade union that said - "no, we don't want to get 
, 	 involved in that". They wanted to issue free shares. Well they were never free, they were shares that 
didn't cost anything to buy.' 
Appendix 12(iii) 
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I 
0..,-­~~ 
" Respondent tYI!e Respondent no. Role Likelihood of a buyout/future of the company 

Trade union officersl I Branch secretary of • 'A buyout of the company is not likely. Management 'appears' to be fully supportive of share 

representatives the TGWU 

- ................. ..-....................................- ·······_H·····H_.·······.•................._............ ,................ .............?~~~~.I:~.h.i.p.:.....I~.~ ..i.~~<l:..<?L~!~?!:~...<?~.~~r.S.~!P.}.ll...!??}...~.'cl~.. g9?~~.!.th.e....!.\I~.e.::........... ............ ........... ..................................................... 
2 
~-
Shop steward for • 'It is hard to say, although I am surprised that [XXX] hasn't done so already.' 
1 the TGWU automotive section .....M ........ _._ ...... _•• _ •••••• _•• M ....................... .. •••M ••••• ·......... • •••••• ·'.' __H.· .. ·_ ........ 
.., -' 	 Chairman of ACTS 
Managers 4 	 Assistant traffic 
.manager 
5 Stores manager 
.............-.~ ....•._......_....._........•-....._.._.. _..­
6 	 Finance director 
,,. 7 Director of 

engineering 

Other 8 Accountant 

.......... -~.-........... •_.M·_ .•·.....·· ..........._...........---........ 

9 	 Inspector and 
employee director 
• .......___._••••••M •• _.. _...... _.." •••••••••••_ .........._••••• 
.... . ' ..'- ........____ ._ ••••• _ ••• M •••••••M ............." •• . ....... _-- ......-......... 

• 	 'There is no reason why the company cannot continue as it is. 
with the borough council to service other vehicles in the town.' 
• 'Very likely.' 
-~..-.....- .........._.._. ......... ..... . ................. _........._..........- ........... 

• 	 '1 don't think there will be. The big groups cannot own everything - there have to be some 
independents. I think if someone was going to make a bid for us they would have done it before now.' 
• 	 'Someone who has a long time left at the company would probably vote against it, while others with 
only 12 months left might vote for it - 'money talks".' 
• 	 'It is not likely. The way the company is at present it is not big enough to cause any real problems for 
the big players - it is not a threat to anyone else. Everyone within the company has to compromise at the 
,end of the day. Ours is not necessarily a good recipe for everyone to follow - it will not always work in i 
every situation There is no set formula - each situation will differ.' 
• 'It may happen but who knows? Things change from day to day.' 
..~. . ....'!t .. ~i 1!...?~"..il~~yi!.~~}~..?t:>..o.~.~ ..p.q\l1t,.a!!~<?!1gl1~he~~~!!1p~l1y ...i.~...f1.I!.'t.I1.~.i?lly ..q~it~.s<?ll.l1.~ .. ~t .. the.~ngl!1.e.ll!~' ........._... 

• 'There is a constant rumour.' 
• 	 'People are not going to pay a large amount for us because they are not going to get their money back 
on it. There is not the sort of scope for a big bid and it would have to be a big bid.' 
• 	 'Management does not want to sell. Managers are equal shareholders with the rest ofthe workforce. 
They would not end up with a large sum of money that would support them for the rest of their lives. If 
they did decide to sell, who would be the first ones to go? It would be the managers. It is therefore 
unlikely that the managers would support a buy-out.' 
• 	 'The SOli of money that I would get from a buy-out would not equal what I could earn at this company 
if I stayed until I was 65. Nobody is going to give that SOli of money in a buy-out bid - not when there 
are 200 shareholders.' 
• 	 'Generally speaking, I don't think there would be widespread SUppOit for a buy-out. If a buyer came 
along they would have to convince 200 shareholders.' 
Appendix 12(iv) 
................ - ...........- .................__......•_... . ...... __.........._.......__....... 
The company has a maintenance contract 
.........­
Appendix I2(v): Stage Two respondent views on employee JIlvolvement ana commuUlcanon - LomoallY ulle 
Respondent type Respondent no. Role Employee involvement Effectiveness of management in Union as the main channel of 
running the company (trade union communication to employees on 
respondents only) company policy (management 
respondents only) 
Trade union officers/ 1 Branch secretary • 'Employees can only express • 'Management is out of touch. 
representatives of the TGWU their views through the union. They don't know their staff and 
The company did introduce listen to rumours too much.' 
suggestion schemes but these were 
a total flop.' 
........ .............. ........_ 	
...................................-,- ... -..._
M ••••••••_ •••••••••••__••••••••M._ ••••••••••••••••••• •••••••••••••• M ............. _ ••••• 	 .... . ,.- ... _.".... ...... 

2 	 Shop steward for • 'The workers have no real • 'They could be better but there 
the TGWU expectations as long as they are are no real problems.' 
automotive kept informed.' 
section 
m •••••• "M"'" . ,,_'M ..... _._ ............ M..... . ........_ ••••M •• ..._...... __ ........_ ..... ··_.M.. ...___" "......._._, ....................................... ........- ........." . ......................- ......-" ..... ..... .. .._.................... _............ -...-....... ...._.........._..... ....._.­
J Chairman of .. 'Each workforce group has a • 'It is in their interests to be 
ACTS worker director and there is a non- effective. They have a lot to Jose 
U' executive representative on the if the company is sold.' 
board.' 
Managers 4 Assistant traffic • 'There needs to be more .. 'Workers should consult more 
manager communication, more consultation with the management. A climate of 
._........_.._....... _._............_...........-
_......................_........._.......... ................ .... 
vv!.t_~eI:t!pl()~~~s:'__ .............. __ ...... ._ 
..................._.. ..... __." ......._.._... .-.....-............. -
....... .._<::()~()P..~ra.!!()n!~~n<::()llr~g~cl::_._ 

5 Stores manager 
~ 
• 'We have worker directors so the • 'The worker directors provide 
workers can get their point of view employees with a lot of the 
I--Pl!!-across at board level.' information. ' 
.............".......... ._....._................__." .. _..................__..........__................._................... 	 ....._...... ,.......-.................. ._..... ..._.................... ............._....... ....._..

----"" 
6 Finance director • 'We have worker directors and a • 'The worker directors have a big 
works committee that meets every input in communicating policy.' 
six weeks.' 
.......... ....__."....,.................._. ._..... _......- ................ . ..............- ..... ..........,_._~...................o<.... ~...... • ..._....... • , .... " .........._.. .. .......... .....-... ......._.........-- ..........................._.........__............- ................ 
........m .. 
_._.... 
7 Director of .. 
~ 
'Employees did expect to have • 'The managers need to know when 
engineering more say in decision-making. At to communicate and when to leave 
the time of the buy-out, they it to the unions.' ,,. 
wanted to know the areas where 
they could have a say.' 
Other 8 Accountant • 'There could be more • 'They do communicate policy to 
consultation with employees.' their members but they're not the 
only channel.' 
1 	
.........__............_..... 
9 	 Inspector and .. 'There has been an increase, .. 'I don't always agree with the • 'Managers try to involve the union 
employee generally speaking, but managers way they [the managers] do it, but at an early stage in most things. If 
director should be allowed to manage.' they are doing it fine so [ think they get the unions on side the rest 
they are managing.' 	 of the staff will follow,' 
Appendix 12(v) 
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Respondent type I Respondent no. Role Current industrial relations climate ManagemenUunion relations .1_ Management/employee relations 
Trade union officers! I I Branch • • Employees and the unions don't • 'The relationship has just got 'Management does not have the I • representatives I 	 secretary of trust management. During the 1996 worse. human touch it used to have.' 

the TGWU stoppages, the duty officer said it 
 Iwas the biggest response for strike I action he had ever seen.' 
.,._, .._. . ..•...,~. -- ,.,....- ..--.... ......_- -_ .... _.....- ....- "-"-_.. . ......-	 .._....- ..._..... 
2 Shop steward • 'It is a pretty "laid-back" company. • 'Management and the unions have 'People are just happy that their 
for the TGWU There have been no strikes on the a good working relationship, jobs have been secured.' 
automotive engineering side in the last seven 	 although the managing director 
section years. ' 	 would like to see more flexibility.' 
h­
........_._._- ...............--_ .............................. ........................ _... ,.............-....... 	
..-.... -.--- ..---..........-.... ,--..........." ....._..... 

3 Chairman of • 'Management tries to involve the • 'They are very good. Managers • 'We try to avoid a "them and us" ~, 
ACTS unions every step of the way.' do try to talk things through.' situation at the company.' 
Managers 4 	 Assistant • 'A lot of the decisions made are the • 'They can be poor at times. Somc • 'The workers think that 
traffic same old decisions. Things are still of the demands made by the unions management is working behind 
manager the same as when the company was are not feasible.' their backs. There is some distrust. 
owned by the council.' 	 Share ownership has not been good 
_......- .........._- ... ... -.•...._................................._..... for """'.'uvu. ' 
5 Stores • 'The general industrial relations • 'They're okay. But management • 'The managers are very 
manager environment is fairly co-operative.' 	 and unions can't agree on approachable, but platform staff 
everything - each side has to try would normally go through the 
and save face.' union' 
.................-_•.... ..__.- ........_- -.. -. __....... -- ....._... 	 _..... - .. _....•...
1·······_· 
6 Finance • 'Issues are fully discussed with the • 'Relations are satisfactory but • 'Managers are doing their best 
director shop stewards. The strength of the there is room for improvement. under the circLlmstances. They 
unions has not been diluted.' The unions don't realise the have to do what is in the best 
.... ....- ....................- .....................................- .........................._..... .... -......_ ........................ 
...................I:(!i1\iti(!~ ...()r.th(!tracl.illg...~.i~llil!i()ll.:..' .... .. illt(!r~~ts ...()r.t.~.~.. C;()lllPIl:I"lX.:'......... 
7 Director of • 'There are no militant attitudes as • 'Quite good. Relations have • 'The company is on a fairly even 
engineering such. There are ways of getting become neither better nor worse. keel - relations between managers 
things done withollt wielding a big There has been no real change and employees are quite eo­~Ir 
stick.' since share ownership.' operative. ' 
Othel' 8 Accountant • 'It is reasonable. Things have not • 'Managers regard the unions as an • 'Managers flll iii their obligations 
really changed since the buyout. integral part of the company with to employees.' 
whom they mllst do business.' Issll.~.~...ll:r.~ ...~.i.~C;lJs.~!.:.~....il1~(Ieptll.:.' 	
..........".................. 

···········1····· 
9 	 Inspector and • 'I think we only get real problems • 'I personally feel that the • 'It is cel1ainly in our own interests 
employee when there are wage negotiations, management involves the unions to work with the management so 
director as in the 1996 stoppages. too much. I certainly feel that they that the company becomes 
Flexibility is the name of the game. 	 need not be so accommodating prosperous. However some 
There is co-operation when it is 	 most of the time.' sections of the workforce have the ~r 
necessary. ' 	 attitude· "what's in it for me",' J
----------------------- -----.-- ­
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role 
Trade ullion officers/ 1 	 Branch secrctary of 
the TGWU representatives 	
-._.- ....... - ...................................._- ..... .H.__ .... __.__.H._.... __.. ___.........._ ...........,.... 
j 2 Shop stcward [or the TGWU automotive section .....--.............- .....--......._---..-_ ..,.. . ......- .......-....-....-....-.............. .....-.-.......
~-3 	 Chairman of ACTS 
Managers 4 	 Assistant traffic 
manager 
.. .... ..... ......_... _..._-_...... .. -..............-.... .........._.............- ..___ 

5 	 Stores manager 
"'~_'n" ......_....... • •. _._................ _ ................................................ _.- ....._.... ---. 

6 	 Finance director 
..._ ......._.-...... ........_.......-._ .. ........................................ 

7 	 Director of 
engineering 
'F 
Other 8 	 Accountant 
.....__.. _.......-.. .................. ." .............._..._........
~ ..-...... 
9 	 Inspector and 
employee director 
1" 
Union/employee relations 
• 'Some think that the unions are not 
._ ....~~_p()~~~fl1}_~~t~~yl1~~~t()~~.'___ .. 
• 	 'The engineering staff sometimes 
find it frustrating that the platform 
union has more say, ' 
• 'The unions are given information 
every step of the way to pass on to 
the employees.' 
• 'Drivers gel a lot of information 
from their union but other sections 
~te;:r.!9.!l::g!1sl1lte;:4C;:.n<?.':!gh.:..._..... 
• 	 'The workers do support the 
unions, but the unions have to be 
seen to be making a few waves. If 
they don't make any waves then 
............. the;:y_~<?r.!.~_t.._g~_t_e;:I~~t~4:'_ .... _......__ ....................... 

• 	 'There was almost 100 per cent 
SUppOit for the [1996J stoppages. 
The unions represent in general the 
views of the workforce.' 
. ._........... ...-.........."'.. .. ........... -............................................................. 

• 	 'The workers support the unions in 
some areas but not in others, It is to 
do with the way the unions are run. 
Some workers perceive that they 
don't get as much out ofthelf union 
as others do.' 
• 'The unions have a secure position 
within the company. That has not 
__c..h~t1g~~_si!1:~~th~.211X:()_l1t~' _ ... ." ......... 
• 	 'The bulk of the workers are 
drivers and their union has the 
biggest membership in the 
company. Workers are out for 
themselves. It is not a case of "I'm 
an owner".' 
_._. ­
Effectiveness of union officers Degree of power held by the unions 
(management respondents only) (management respondents only) 
.. --- ...• 
...__... 
......... _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••_•••••••••••••••••••H.__ •• • ...__ MO._, ••••_ ............. _ ............._ ••••••••••• ..... -...-._._.." . ..H._... ....__'H...... 

n_'" ........._ ..............__.......................... _ ••••• , .........._ ...................__._••...•.••..•••••_ ............ _ • .._......................_.......,.. ..,.........""...,..............................._........................ -- . 

• 'They try to do their best for • 'Some of the demands made by 
the workers.' 	 the unions are not feasible.' 
......_.
._..........--.... .......................-.......... -.._._..... ... _.__ ......._" ................ .... ........... ........- ..._.-_..... ........_..-...............-..... ................... 

• 	 'I would say that the union 

officers are effective.' 

• 'They are fairly effective,' 
. ..._..... ._..... 
• 	 'On the engineering side there 
is a "more pay, less work" 
mentality. The unions don't 
want to know that the company 
may not be able to afford a pay 
rise because of having to buy 
back shares.' 
•••••••••••••••..••••• .. ••..••••.. •• __ •• ......•......... m ........." 
_......- ............... 

• 'Sometimes you feel that the 
unions are there to help you and 
at other times you think they're 
only out for themselves.' 
'The unions do have influence ­• 
sometimes that's a good thing, 
sometimes it's not. Managers 
should be allowed to manage.' 
• 	 'Consultation is "far and wide". It 
is very extensive compared with 
some other organisations, although I 
we do not have much room for I 
......... .................. ll1an.:<?~uy.E~()'.!.~"'flg<::~·~ .. ..___ ....._ ..... : 

--_ .... _..... 
• 
• 	 'The driver's union has too much i 
influence, Drivers can be taken off I 
the road fOf any minor quibble. 
The TGWU is the only union in the 
company that gets time off on a 
Friday.' 
....... 	 .._._._..... .. _......
' ~ 
'Managers try to involve the union 
at an early stage in most things and 
make every effort to maintain them 
as the main negotiating body. It 
helps to smooth the transition when 
there are changes.' 
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Appendix 12(viii): Stage Two respondent views on employee involvement and communication - Company Two 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role I Employee involvement 
Trade union officers/ Chairman for 
representatives the engineering 
employees 
section of the 
TGWU 
• 	 '[During ESO] people had an input 
at board level through the worker 
directors. Now we've only got one 
worker director and he's kept a lot 
more in the dark now than he ever 
Effectiveness of management in 
running the company (trade union 
respondents only) 
• 	 'The new managers will make 
sure that the company has a 
bigger profit margin than ever 
before. There'll be reduced costs, 
better utilisation of resources and 
~.2 '-+~~~;;"ofth'I~:;~;:~~~~~iO:~;'I~;:~:;;::';:,;;;01 
IF 
3 Branch 
secretary of the 
TGWU 
Managers 4 Operations 
director 
5 Group human 
resources 
executive 
6 Managing 
director for one 
of two company 
sites 
.. 
• 	 'The employees saw very little 
involvement under the ESOP. In 
some respects they used the ESOP 
to give themselves more power.' 
• 	 'At present we are just carrying 011 
as we are. The big motivation to be 
involved came at £6.40. Since that 
time, I don't think people have been 
interested.' 
,..............." . .--..... ···············...........................M..... 

• 	 'lWith ESO], people realised the 
importance of company profitability 
and I think that will still be the case. 
Employees will not want to do 
l!:~Y.t:h\l1g!()llP~f!tt.h~~fl:I:oi.~~<?f!.:.'._ 
• 	 'There's never been secrets 
between management and the trade 
unions - that won't change. But 
being part of a pic you often have to 
react very quickly, so the time 
scales will be a lot less, but that's 
no reason not to give staff 
information. ' 
going to be more investment 
because the new managers want 
to make a profit.' 
r • 'We'll have a more professional 
management, but it will be 
tougher. They'll be a lot more 
profit conscious and determined 
to get their decisions 
implemented. ' 
....................................................._........M........... 

............... .. ... ........... 

Union as the main channel of 
communication to employees on 
company policy (management 
respondents only) 
• 	 'We have our differences but a 
good working relationship. I'm 
implementing management's 
policies and they're trying to get a 
better deal for their members.' 
..... _..... 
• 	 'We've always had well-
established procedures for working 
and consulting with the unions. In 
future there'll probably be less trade 
.ll n} ()ntilllf!I!ll!:~f!l!:.':'[lil[l~If!:: 
• 	 'I f the trade union wants to know 
what's going on and if there's a 
need for information, we're not 
normally secretive.' 
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Appendix 12(ix): Stage Two respondent views on company industriaL..elations - CO,!lpanj' Two 
Respo.ndent type I Respondent no. I Role I Current industrial relations climate 
Trade union officers! Chairman for /- 'It's a lot worse than it's been for a 
representatives the long time. The new structure is 
'PI·inn quite a change.' engint:_. H'b 
employees 
section of the 
TGWU 
2 Chairman of I • '[ think the engineers will be 
theTGWU looking at industrial action very 
very shortly and we won't be far 
behind them. It's alright saying 
"we've got a new company", but 
we've got to show them that we're 
not going to be trodden on, 
otherwise we'll lose everything.' 
3 Branch • 'There's every likelihood of a 
secretary of ballot for industrial action in the 
theTGWU next 12 months. I don't think that's 
because it's [company xxx] - I think 
it's the whole history of the bus 
... 
 industry since deregulation.' 
Managers 4 Operations • 'Everyone's still on a high at 
director present - they're happy that they've 
got "x" thousands of pounds. We 
can't say what will happen in the 
future, other than that the company 
IS ·····-1 ..•.._...................,..,,_.. Group human 
__ 
• 
_.V!.il.lpro!1..~c<:...'.l... lS..Fel:...~.~ll!Fr()f}t. ' ..... 
'The engineering unions are very 
resources very apprehensive about the future. 
executive There are going to be job losses. 
The TGWU is not anticipating any 
major changes, but they may be 
surpt:ised. ' 
6 Managing • 'Targets will have to be met one 
director for way or another. Whether that's 
... 
one of two 
company sites 
achieved by friendly dialogue or by 
each side chucking threats across 
M an:IKementlunion relations 
• 	 'There was give and take on both 
sides [during ESO]. But since 
[company XXX] has taken us on 
relations have got a lot worse - they 
have a hidden agenda.' 
• 	 'They had been pretty poor for a 
while but then we went to ACAS. 
We didn't suddenly become bosom 
buddies but there was a different 
perspective to the tunnel vision we 
had had before. But now it's going 
to be back to "us and them".' 
• 	 'Going back a year or so, 
industrial relations were very sour. 
I think we've built some bridges. 
It's now a case of seeing what the 
new senior management is going to 
do. We've yet to see their real style 
in operation.' 
• 	 'There is an understanding. We 
[the managers] know where they 
[the tracle unions] are coming from 
and they know where we're coming 
from. At present, nothing is 
.c:.l1al}ging:' 
• 'They're reasonably healthy.' 
• 	 'They haven't actually changed. 
We've been marking time because 
we've been more involved with 
redundancies. ' 
!\1anagement/em-..f.l!Qyee relations 
• 	 'Managers will expect people to be 
more committed to the company than 
before. [fthey aren't toeing the 
company line, they' II be dealt with 
more severely than in the past.' 
• 	 'They [the managers] don't sort out 
the good employees from the bad 
employees - that's wrong. I think 
that if you've got a good workforce, 
they should be told they're doing a 
good job - not just keep on at them 
because that will get their backs up.' 
• 	 'Drivers are still being screwed to 
the ground, schedules are tight and 
wages are poor. The employees saw 
very little employee involvement 
under the ESOP and there certainly 
won't be any under the new 
ownership. ' 
• 	 '95 per cent of staff here are work-
oriented but the other 5 per cent you 
will never motivate.' 
• 	 'No one is under any illusions about 
what's going to happen. [Company 
xxx] has said there is an urgent need 
to see profitability levels in the region 
of 15 per cent. Morale is quite low.' 
• 	 'C'ertainly there won't be the loyalty 
to [company xxx]. Commitment will 
probably go down. I think 
employees' interest has obviously 
the table remains to be seen.' 	 declined. ' 
- ~---~--~-~ ------ - - _.---­
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Appenmx l~lX): ~tage I wo responaenr vIews on (raae union Issues - LOmpaltJ' I wo 
Respondent type Respondent no. Role Union/employee relations 
Trade union officers/ I Chairman for • ' In the past the union had been 
representatives the engineering put in a compromising position 
employees through its connection with the 
section of the EBT. It was difficult for people 
on the shop floor to understand. ' TGWU
,.._- " .-_..._-_..__._....._--_.....-.- .... ----. --.-- ...._..... ..........,.... 
..--
......_--....- ......... _-_.....................-.-......-._.. • •• ••, ••• 4'__ '" 

2 	 Chairman of the • 'The industry that we're in 
~ 
is 
TGWU 	 very union-oriented. Employees 
appreciate the benefits they get 
from being in the union.' 
.-................................................_..................... 

3 	 Branch • 'People need their trade union to 
sel:retary of the try and secure the best deal, and 
TGWU on several occasions we have 
come close to considering ballots 
for industrial action. The fact that 
,,. we were an ESOP, I don't think 
really complicated that.' 
Managers 4 Operations • '[fyou talk to drivers they will 
director 	 say they've got bad terms and 
conditions 110 matter what, so you 
will never get a true picture. 
.........._..............._ .................................. 

5 	 Group human • 'There will be a return to reality 
resources now, in that the employee 
executive representatives will concentrate 
on looking after employees' 
interests and the management 
team will look after the interests 
of the business. With the ESOP, 
the dual role of the unions had 
muddied the waters.' 
..._.......................................... 

6 	 Managing • 'I think there is a good 
director for one relationship there. No one says 
of two company "you're in management's pocket" 
,.. sites. 	 or anything like that. 1 think the 
trust is there.' 
Effectiveness of union officel's 
(management respondents only) 
• .. .... ..- ........-.... ......._, 	 ........ -.-......__., •...... _.....- ... -...." ...... 
-~ 
• 'There is no problem.' 
• 	 'There's a mixture really. It 
depends on the individual 
concerned. During the ESOP a 
lot ofthem faced a conflict of 
interest. There were some who 
never really divorced 
themselves from being a trade 
union representative. Others 
had their own hidden agenda.' 
• 	 'They have coped very well. 
I 
They have been in an 
extremely difficult position at 
times.' 
Degree of power held by the unions 

(management respondents only) 

~..•.....- .......-............... --"" .................._........._-- ,. ..._............._.............. 
• 'I deal with the unions on everything 
from recruitment to dismissal. We 
don't set the policies, we have to 
implement them and work alongside 
each other. ' 
• 'We've always had a consultation 
process that allows for a lot of input 
from employee representatives. But at 
the end ofthe day, you can debate and 
debate but somebody has to make a 
decision, and I think that process had 
become extremely muddy over the last 
fOllr or five years.' 
..... 
• 'There won't be quite the time for 
dialogue in the future. There's no 
reason why each side can't have its 
input, but the target' 5 got to be hit.' 
---­
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Appendix 12(xi): Stage Two respondent views on employee involvement and communication - Companr 11lree 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role 
Trade union officers/ 
representatives 
2 
3 
4 
r 
Managers 5 
Representative for 
the TO WU and an 
ERT trustee 
Traffic 

assistant/TGWU 

representative 

\...............-..................-..........-- .........-...-.... 
Bus driver, TGWU 
trade union/health 
and safety 
representative 
Company convenor 
Garage staff 

manager 

I Employee involvement 	 Effectiveness of management in 
running the company (trade 
union respondents only) 
• 	 'The information side of it is 
really down to the union. I 
would rather tell them 
[employees] than have 
ma!~a~etllellt d() it.'. 
• 	 'ft's all done at local level. If 
anything is happening the 
minutes of the lCC are always 
posted up for people to read. 
Otherwise, no information is 
provided by [Company 
, 
• 	 'We have too many notices 
and people don't have time to 
read them. Even when we 
attach information to their pay 
slips we find that the bin is 
_PTet!yfllll()LI~tt~!.~~'_. 
• 'The staff are quite free to 
• 

Itrl Human resources ·················I······~······· 
manager 
.. 
go to management and make 
any suggestion they like, but 
the trade union would prefer 
that they ~o to them first.' 
'Sometimes an employee 
will suggest something. If it's 
reasonable and positive we 
might go ahead with it if it 
doesn't cost too much.' 
'Not a lot. We do have an 
in-house journal, which gives 
people the opportunity to 
write in about most things, but 
generally, people don't, or it's 
the same people who do it all 
the time.' 
• 	 'Not without the trade union. 
Unity and purpose are the goals 
and I believe that they 
[managers] take the same view.' 
• 	 'If you look at every other 
company that has gone through 
privatisatioll, we're the only one 
that has bought other companies 
and expanded, At the end of the 
day, we have to put some of it 
. c\.9.'>V~.. ~()t~~n~.i.l:!1a&~Es:·:·" __·___f ......... 

• 	 'They're as effective as any 
management would be.' 
• 	 'The senior managers are 
effective - yes. I sometimes 
wonder if the people below 
them get to grips with 
everything_that is going on.' 
Union as the main channel of 
communication to employees on 
company policy (management 
re~n<!ent~ ..only) 
..--...-1 
• 	 'I would prefer that every 
member of staff was a member 
of the union. When I'm talking 
to the union rep, I'm talking to 
... everybocly.'! 
• 	 'There are times when we tend 
to over-rely on the union, which 
doesn't help thelll or us, because 
the message doesn't get through 
as effectively as we would like it 
to.' 
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App~O(fix 12(xii): Stage_!w~re~on~ent views on company industrial relations - Company Three 
Respondent type I Respondent 110. I Role Current industrial relations I Management/union relations Management/employee relations 
climate 
Trade union officers/ I I Representative for the • '1 would say that we are • 'There have been quite a lot of • 'With long-service people I 
representatives TGWU and an EBT consultative and working sacrifices made by all grades think it's a matter of them 
trustee towards being co­ and buying companies gives the having been in the job for so 
operative.' wrong signals when pay isn't long that they go with the flow. 
being raised.' The younger people are here just 
................!s>.'!I~ke.l.J10_~e)'.::. 
2 	 Traffic • 'r think it's very co- • 'They have improved • 'Some of the workers don't get 
assistantlTGWU operative, though tremendously. Prior to to see the senior managers as 
representative sometimes there doesn't privatisation it was always often anymore. Most of them 
seem to be any lee-way.' 	 "them and us". The unions are don't know who the directors 
now more involved than they are, or who the senior managers 
ever were before.' are. ' 
.+.......................................... 	 ................................._.. . ....................................................._.... ....................................- ........._..... ....................... _..... 

3 	 Bus driver, TGWU • 'Consultative. It used to • 'f would say that since 1994 • 'Managers will never get the 
trade union/health be more adversarial and it there has been a steady support of the workforce in any 
and safety was frowned upon I think improvement. At present company. But our management, 
representative 	 by both union and relations are still moving in an since privatisation, has had more 
management if it wasn't. upward direction.' support from the workforce than 
That seems to have gone they had pre-privatisation.' 
out of the window.' 1···-·-··· ......-.... ·-····1··-...·· 	 .............-.-.........-........................j ...-- ........ .................... . ....... -.............. ..........'1 

4 Company- convenor • 'Industrial relations - • 'It's pretty good. I can achieve • 'As long as what is being done 
without co-operation it pretty much aliI want within is in the best interests of the 
won't work. The reason. It's a "give and take" workforce, employees will give r 
consultative machinery is game.' their support to managers.' 
very good.' 
Managers 5 Garage staff manager • 'Nothing's been bad- • 'I think the co-operation is • 'A lot of employees go on 
nothing has been terribly quite good all round.' union recommendation. In this 
good. [think with industry you will always get 
industrial relations we still people who want to be led ­
plod along pretty much as want their representative to say 
we ever did.' something or their managers to 
'j- •• .........._ ............+._ ... ... ......~~y ~s>tl1~!~it1.g.'.... 
6 Human resources • 'At the moment the • 'On balance, they're fairly • 'On an individual basis there is 
manager climate is consultative. It good. There are moments where quite a bit of loyalty to 
has been adversarial and it we get tetchy with each other in managers as individuals. For 
will be again, but so far any given year. But generally management as a group there 
there has been a balanced speaking they're very good.' isn't the same sort of loyalty and ... 
approach from both sides.' 	 commitment. ' 
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Appendix 12(xiii): Stage Two respondent views on trade union issues - Company Three 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role I Union/employee relations 
Trade union officers! I 1 Representative for the .. 'There are many reasons why 
representatives TGWU and an EBT people join unions. I think the most 
trustee important one is protection. 
.. ......... ,...E:y~.ry~!l.~l1g.~~sei~_se~9..l1cl.~rY:' ............. ..... f 
2 	 Traffic • 'Some of the older ones have 
assistantlTGWU dropped out of the union because 
representative they felt let down after privatisation. 
Privatisation is 
3 Bus driver, TGWU .'1993 was a watershed with the 
trade union/health loss of our old contracts. 
and safety Employees who were here through 
representative that and who are still here today 
have a far better understanding and 
they benefited as well from it, even 
though they had to make a major 
sacrifice at the time.' I·..·······....·· .. .................... ...... +...-... .......··..·-1 ...... -..................... .... ........ -........... . 

4 Company convenor • 'About 75 per cent of the workers 
SUppOlt the union. It goes back to 
1993. The die-hards can't drag
, 	 themselves out of the past and into 
the future. ' 
Managers 5 Garage staff manager • 'Long servers will make up their 
own minds one way or another, but 
they will still carry their card with 
pride because they've had it for so 
long:' 
6 	 Human resources • 'The unions sometimes have a 
manager problem convincing the workforce 
that they're not in bed with the 
managers, but they manage to do it 
most afthe time.' 
... 
Effectiveness of union officers 
(management respondents 
only) 
• 	 'They try to get as much as 
they can for their members. 
Some more than others have 
got the company at heart' 
• 	 'The union officers are very 
effective. At local level, the 
reps are fairly good at taking 
the staff with them. There 
are problems sometimes but 
generally speaking, the reps 
manage to do it.' 
Degree of power held by the 
unions (management 
respondents only) 
• 	 'The union probably has 
about the right amount of 
power at the present time.' 
• 	 'In the early 70s it was too 
much the unions' way. I 
think leading up to 1993-94, 
it was too much the 
managers' way. There is a 
balance now. They know 
how far to push and we know 
how far to push.' 
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-Appendix 12(xiv): Stage Two respondent views on employee involvement and communication - Company Foul' 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role 
Trade union officers/ 
representatives 
2 
3 
4 
... 
Managers 
6 
... 
Branch chairman of 
theTGWU 
Branch secretary of 
the TGWU 
Employee director 
Representative for 
theTGWU 
·..·......··..·.... 1··.._· ........······ 

Divisional traffic 
manager 
I Employee involvement 
• 	 'There's stacks of scope but 
this company just plays around 
the edges.' 
• 	 'They [managers] just want to 
do their own thing.' 
• 	 'There are consultative 
committees which are supposed 
to be the forum for involving 
the employees on the shop floor 
but they rarely occur now.' 
• 	 'When the employees owned 
the company there were regular 
briefings and seminars. All 
aspects of the company would 
be open for discussion. This 
has now finished.' 
• 	 'The communication 
sometimes leaves a lot to be 
desired - the right hand doesn't 
know what the left hand is 
doing sometimes.' 
• 	 'We do try to keep people 
informed basically by notices 
or through word of mouth ­
talking to key drivers who I 
know will then pass on the 
information to other members 
of staff. ' 
.. ... .................... .. .. ·1 

• 	 'We pass on information 
through the Divisional 
Consultative Committee.' 
• 	 'Occasionally we have 
seminars where we invite the 
staff to come along. We're 
I Effectiveness of management in 
running the company (trade union 
respondents only) 
• 	 'I think industrial relations in 
this company are probably the 
worst I've ever known.' 
• 	 'There's no such thing as 

discussion and consultation.' 

• 	 'I don't think that managers are 
able to manage now. They are 
being pulled from above. There 
are decisions being made at Perth 
by the Lxxx] board and they are 
.....~(!!.~.g~(!I::tY(!~.~9.~t1.~..' 
• 	 'As profitability is at record 
levels then management is 
effective. However, long-term 
prospects are poor.' 
.................................................._... 

Union as the main channel of 
communication to employees on 
company policy (management 
I'espondents only) 
l ........ .. 

._....••.•.... 
• 	 'Some individuals in the union 
will put forward a reasonable 
view ofwhal management 
wants, and there are others who 
will put their own slant on it. I 
tend to talk to staff myself in the 
depot.' 
• 	 'I agree with the trade union 
system and collective bargaining 
procedures. I'd rather be 
dealing with a trade union, then 
you can work together really.' 
fairly open really.' 
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Appen()ix l2~v)=- Stage Two respondent views on company industrial relations - Company Four 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role Current industrial relations 
climate 
Trade union officers/ Branch chairman of 'I've never known • 
representatives the TOWU 	 industrial relations at this 
company to be at such a 
low.' 
• 	 'Morale is so low it's 
unbelievable. ' 
2 	 Branch secretary of • 'Very very weak' 
the TOWU 
····--··113 ···_·1 Employee director 
v 
Managers 
4 
5 
6 
.. 

Representative for the 
TGWU 
Di visional traffic 
manager 
Divisional traffic 
manager 
• 	 'Current industrial 
relations in this company 
are advel'sarial.' 
• 	 'At the moment the 
climate is consultative, but 
it's swings and 
roundabouts. ' 
• 	 'It's a very consultative 
system. We do have a lot 
of arguments, but we tend 
to work together to reach 
sensible compromises, 
rather than always being 
in a confrontational 
'We [management and 
trade unions] consult on 
most matters. Even 
though we disagree about 
some things, it's not 
confrontational.' 
I Management/union relations 
• 	 'We're now in a situation 
where local line managers 
cannot make agreements 
because if they do, they're 
fearful of the repercussions from 
the top.' 
• 	 'There aren't any 
management/union relations.' 
.................-..... __..... 	 ..... __., ......................-....... 

• 	 'Bad and getting worse. I have 
never experienced such an 
untrusting and confrontational 
union/management relationship 
in nearly thirty years in the 
.... (;~!pp~!~y.' 
• 	 'Managers accept the unions as 
being a necessity that's there 
and they've got to put up with 
them, so they do.' 
• 	 'We both give a little, take a 
little and tend to work pretty 
well together. We don't always 
agree - it can never happen, but 
I've got a good working 
relationship with the trade union 
here.' 
.................. -­
• 	 'We're okay - there's no major 
issues on the go at the moment. 
Things are not too bad, though 
some ofthem are a bit strained.' 
Management/employee relations 
• 	 'People will not do a thing to 
help the company - that's how 
bad it is.' 
• 	 'There's no allegiance to the 
company whatsoever - they'll 
[employees] not go out of their 
way to help the company in any 
~~Y,~.~flP~...or._f{)~!!!.:..'.... . __........ _...... 

• 	 'They [employees] believe that 
the management and the trade 
unions will do \Iothing for 
them.' 
............_.... -- .. " ...._._,--.,...........--_... - ...... 

• 	 'Managers are driven only to 
produce greater profits and have 
no time to consider employees.' 
......... ..... _ ..... 

• 	 'Local management has the 
support of the employees but 
higher management has not.' 
• 	 'The majority [of employees] 
support management. Every 
company has an element that no 
matter what you did, they 
[employees] would never 
suppOli management.' 
..... ·1 
• 	 'I've got a good relationship 
with the workforce here, I 
believe, but I think throughout 
the company overall there's still 
a problem between [xxx] as a 
company and the shop floor.' 
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Appendix 12(x~i): S~~g~lwJU'esj)ondent views on trade union issues - Compam' FOllr 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role I Union/employee relations 	 Effectiveness of union officers Degree of power held by the 
(management respondents unions (management 
only) respol1dents only) 
Trade union officers! Branch chairman of I 	 • 'I think if the trade union came 
rep resen tatives the TOWU 	 up with a good argument for a 

dispute, it would be supported 

100% the workers.' 

.. ..•........................._._.....-.__ .. .....-.............-.................._......__.+...................c ........... . .................... , .....,,_... . 
2 Branch secretary of I • 'There's an apathy that we (the 
the TOWU unions) do nothing for them 
Je~p\~y~~~l.~~~~'.... ....... . 1-. 	 ...•••••••• !- .. .. ... .. ........... ........ ... ..
.m 
3 I Employee director • 'Over 80% of the drivers have 

recently supported the trade union 

in voting for industrial action over 

proposed changes to working 

conditions. ' 

................ ........ ··f
1.4"--.. ... tR~p;~~~~~t~ti~~f;';;:"·· 
• 'If we were asking people to take 
the TOWU 	 industrial action they wouldn't 
just follow. We have got 
employees' SUppOlt but not the 
way it was in years gone by . 
... Sometimes I tend to think that's a 
_good thing.' 
Managers 5 Divisional traffic I. 'I think people are less interested • 'They are pretty effective. I. 'Celtain people think the 
manager 	 ill the trade unions because in the They tell their members that unions have too much 
past they were quite it's in their interests if they power, but the balance has 
confrontational. Quite regularly are willing to accept and go certainly moved ti-om the 
they can't get a quorum at their along with celtain things. trade union dominating the 
branch meetings. ' situation. ' / ..... 
6 ·Ibivisiollaltraffic r • 'I think relations are a bit • 'I think that unions arc I • 'Probably about the right 
manager 	 tentative. There are a couple of changing and national full- amount. ' 
different factions. The trade time officers should realise 
unions do come in for a lot of that and try and cducutc 
criticism because people blame people a little bit more un 
them for the change. ' the shop 11001"_ I'm inclined 
to have to rely 011
.. 	 experience rather than 
1-.____._._____ 	 ________----i_______ education. ' . _~ .. _L._~.__... _ .•..___________J 
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role 
Trade union officers/ 1 Branch chairman of the 
representatives GMB (formerly 
Company (AJ) 
---
- --- ---------------------
---- - ._-., 
Employee involvement 
• 	 'We have information on the 
walls about what the company 
has been doing. All the profits 
and losses are put up evelY 
quarter.' 
~ -....-.~ .-.........._-_..............._....._... .. ... .... .._- .. ...•. ...__.. . .-- _...... _... __ ..___.. _______ ......... ···_······_·_····..·_········.H.__ ....- .........,. .. -.­~. .~ 
2 	 Foreman (formerly 
Company (Aj) 
r 
Managers 3 	 Engineering manager 
(formerly Company (AJ) 
................... ..... ... ,........ ·•·..M.·_···..·..........·· ........... 

4 	 Garage staff manager 
(formerly Company (Aj) 
~r 
• 	 'They [the managers] are 
pretty good with the paper 
work. They've also started 
one-to-one meetings where the 
managers are there and you can 
go along and ask whatever you 
like.' 
• 	 'You do have a certain amount 
of scope to talk to your staff. 
By and large, I think the 
managing director does 
encourage us to get out and 
communicate. ' 
..."_ ....H...... H." ....,...........__ -. __ -..._ ......................-_-....--....... .-_-...H... -..-_-.._ ,..........­
• 'It's down to individual garage 
sta[fmanagers. I've always 
had the beliefthat as long as it 
can't do any damage or harm in 
any way - any information 
we've got that is relevant to the 
troupes should be shared.' 
• 'I can always go down the 
trade union line and speak to 
the trade union who would then 
pass it on.' 
- _. ­
Effectiveness of management in 
funning the company (trade 
union respondents only) 
• 	 'This management, quite 
frankly, just does not know 
what it's doing. It's because 
I've worked with two, and 
seeing how management should 
.............." ..........._...._-_...-.........................._.. 

• 	 'Well they're making profits 
and they've won a lot of 
awards, so they must be doing 
something right.' 
be and how it is now are two 
different things.' 
Union as the main channel of 
communication to employees on 
company policy (management 
respondents onlv) 
.... ............. --... . ............. - ... -- ..._- .........-............_.... 

• 	 'I think policy should be carried 
out by managers through a 
supervisory structure. I think 
there should be consultation with 
the unions, but they shouldn't 
become the communication 
vesseL They can help the 
process but they arc not the 
..... process.'
..... 	 ..................... 

• 	 'I slIppose it's the main 
communication channel but it's 
not the only one. I[we go back 
to the [CO/llpaIlY (A)] days, the 
union was very effective here, 
but we also had regular meetings 
with staff where they could come 
and question us and ask us how 
we were doing. ' 
• 	 'With (CompallY Fire], the 
unions are the main 
communication channel hut they 
make a valiant attempt with their 
f0l1nightly newspaper and 
weekly "talk-hack" sessions.' 
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Stage Two respondent views on employee involvement and com}!lulli~at~on - Company Five (continued) 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role 
Trade union officers/ 5 Branch chairman of the 
representatives TGWU (formerly 
Company (8)) 
6 Branch secretary of the 
TGWU (formerly 
Company (8)) 
~ 
Managers 17 Garage manager 
(formerly Company (B)) 
8 Operations manager 
(formerly Company (B)) 
.. 

I Employee involvement 
• 'They put up their profits on 
the walls in the paying-in 
rooms, in the depots, their 
accident damage and 
aspirations. There has certainly 
been more information in the 
last couple of years than there 
was before.' 
.........._..... _ ......... -... 
I • 'Well we have the local 
company paper. Apart from the 
talk-back sessions that is their 
main vehicle for conveying 
information. I think there could 
be impJ·ovements.' 
I • 'It's something we don't tend 
to do. We tend to use the 
unions to a certain extent and 
that's about it. The only other 
way we do it is through the 
training of new staff. We've 
recently just gone through a 
period where we had to draft 
some of our drivers into the 
training school to draw on their 
• 'We encourage all managers to 
spend more time talking. I 
think we can improve on that. 
I'd like to think that our way of 
communicating is perhaps 
better than a lot of other 
companies. We come from a 
viewpoint where we feel that 
communication is fairly good 
anyway.' 
Effectiveness of management in 
running the company (trade 
union respondents only) 
I. 	 'Wherever you go, there is 
never ever a perfect working 
area and cock-ups happen, but 
they don't just happen at 
[Company Fire]. So I would 
say they [managers] are 
effective. ' 
Union as the main channel of 
communication to employees on 
company policy (management 
respondents only) 
• 
.......... J-....... 
They're a little bit too 
effective for us sometimes. 
They know we're constrained 
by laws now. The bully-boy 
tactics do come out 
occasionally.' 
• 'Generally they [the trade 
unions] are a good medium to 
meet and discuss problems and to 
say "this is the way we're going 
to do things". But we still like to 
have some direct contact with 
everybody because you mustn't 
be deemed to be treating the non­
members unfairly.' 
• 
• 
'We have quite a good system 
of communicating with our 
employees, our drivers 
particularly, which has nothing to 
do with the union process. 
We use the unions to some 
extent but don't look upon them 
as the main channel for 
disseminating infonnation.' 
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Appendix 12(xviii): Stage Two respondent~ie\V~ O~~olllparly iI!dustriaJrelations - Co!!,!!anr Five 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role Current industrial relations 
climate 
Trade union officers! Branch chairman of the • 'Things are fairly okay. We 
representatives OMB (formerly were a family because we were 
Company (A)) a small company and 
everybody knew everybody 
else. This is a much bigger 
company. It's not like how we 
were.' 
2 Foreman (formerly • 'It's reasonable I think. I 
Company (AJ) wouldn't say it's excellent.' 
.. 

Managers 3 Engineering manager • 'I think it's consultative. 
(formerly Company (AJ) 	 While 1 personally believe that 
company policy should be left 
to the managers, I still think 
there should be consultation 
because we all know there's 
someone somewhere who will 
not listen to their supervisor on 
a particular subject. I would 
not ignore the union official, 
but the union official is there 
for when we're not getting it 
right. 
4 Garage staff manager • 'It's co-operative to the extent 
(formerly Company (A)) 	 that a good majority of tile staff 
have got to a stage where they 
are really apathetic. They think 
that whatever [Company Five] 
decides to do it's going to do, 
so why waste your energy and 
make a fuss about it? So they 
[employees] are co-operative 
by default in the sense that they 
don't want to challenge it.' 
Iv 
Management/union relations 
• 'Relations are not too bad' 
• 	 'I think they're reasonable. 
They're not bad and not 
brilliant. 1 think we're 
probably in the middle. I think 
one side has to tolerate the 
other, otherwise things don't 
work.' 
• 	 'They are good. My feeling is 
that the unions challenge some 
things but I don't think there is 
ever any deadlock. I don't 
think anybody ever comes out 
and says "right, this is what 
we're going to do brothers". [ 
don't think it ever gets to that 
stage. It's fairly co-operative­
compromise takes place.' 
• 	 'I think we're got a very good 
management-union 
relationship. ' 
J 

Management/employee relations 
I • 'Employees do not support the 
management. rt's different 
things - like spread-over pay. 
When we first joined with this 
firm they didn't tell us anything 
about spread-over pay, so we 
went on for quite a long time 
~it~c!lItg~!t!!!git:.: ...................................... 

• 	 'I think the management needs 

us as much as we need them. 

Without us, they haven't got 

anything. ' 

• 	 'We [the managers] are never 

going to satisty everybody. 

There's always going to be a 

contingent that says they don't 

support management. You will 

always get people who object to 

everything. ' 

• 	 'The workers do their job and 
basically that's all they want to 
do. The longer-serving people 
are the people who've got the 
commitment and they will 
support you ill 1110st things YOll 
do. But some of the newer 
members of staff don't see why 
they should support YOll.' 
Appendix 12(xviii) 
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role 	 Current industrial relations Management/union relations Management/employee relations 
climate 
Trade union officers/ 5 Branch chairman of the 
representatives TOWU (formerly 
Company (B)) 
••_ ••••• _._-. .............HM......_' •••••••• , ••••••• .._M.... ...._~._ .... _.M.... ...._.__.. ___ .___
,__ ..._._ ......................... 
.•. -..... 

6 Branch secretary of the 
TGWU (formerly 
Company (B)) 
" 
Managers 7 Garage manager 
(formerly Company (B)) 
8 
.-....... ....... 
Operations manager 
(formerly Company (B)) 
" 
...... <0 ••••••_. 
• 	 'We [the trade unions] do not 
get everything that we want but 
if you stari issuing threats then 
you're going to get threats 
back. At the present time, the 
committee as a whole - we try 
and negotiate - yes. We talk 
and try to put our points 
across. ' 
._._... 
. .. --............._.-..._._.........................._.....-- ...__. 

• 	 '[ would say that the climate is 
co-operative. Things are 
improving but it's been an 
uphill struggle.' 
• 	 'I would say that we are 
making every effort on the 
management side now to 
consult and explain to the staff. 
On the other side of the coin, 
my gut feeling is that despite 
the good reports, there is still an 
underlying suspicion that we 
could do more and give more, 
and that we're keeping 
.~.'2 n~~t!l iI~g~.<1(;~,: ......-•........_.... 

• 	 'We have a very informal way 
of resolving problems - more 
informal than it's ever been. A 
great deal of the problem-
solving within the company is 
done very quickly and very 
satisfactorily by informal chats, 
sometimes on street corners, 
when we go out on the buses. 
We talk to people and get 
problems solved.' 
• 	 'In the company they're good. 
In an ideal world we wouldn't 
have to fight so hard, but sadly 
no one is going to give you "out 
for nowt". But on the whole, 
relations are pretty good.' 
..... ...._.... ....-._.. 
• 	
~.. 
'Although we have 
differences, relations are 
reasonably good. They [the 
managers] are always courteous 
to us - they're always prepared 
to listen to us and discuss 
things. You may not get the 
answer you want but they'll 
always listen.' 
• 	 '1 think they're excellent. 

There's always consultation, 

but not necessarily always 

agreement. Nothing is just 

decided carte blanche, and 

despite the fall-outs and 

arguments from time to time, 

there's generally a reasonable 

discussion.' 

.........._..... • •••_<0 •• 

• 	 'I would say generally across­
the-board, there is a very high 
degree of co-operation. I would 
stick my neck out and say we 
probably work together more 
now than we've every done.' 
• 	 'Judging by comments made in 
the paying-in room and the 
canteens, employees do not 
support the managers. But when 
the m~ority of workers face the 
management it's a different 
story. They tell us one thing, but 
when it's face-to-face with the 
managers it's a little bit 
different. ' 
" ••__ ... -........ • ••••••<O'•• • ••••~••••••••
~.. ....-.-............-. 

• 	 'Employees have been beaten 
down uver the years. As far as 
general terms and conditions go, 
we haven't done too badly really. 
Perhaps the grass iSI1' t greener on 
the other side.' 
i 
I 
• 	 'There is still room for 
improvement - we've had to 
make some quite harsh business 
decisions. Ifpeople understand 
the reasons for those decisions 
they're more likely to accept 
them. Communication is the 
important thing really. We 
haven't got it right yet but we 
have made a good start. We try 
and make the effort.' 
...- ....._......._..........._..... 
-..... 

• 	 'Employees look for a strong 
management that is going to 
safeguard the company's interest 
and safeguard their jobs. In that 
sense I think generally speaking 
the staff have got to appreciate 
the way we manage the 
company. But you will always 
get people who criticise the 
company - that's human nature.' 
Appendix 12(xviii) 
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Appendix 12(xix): Stage Two respondent views on trade union issues - Company Five 
Respondent type Respondent no. , Role , Union/employee relations 
Trade union officers/ Branch chairman of the 
representatives GMB (formerly 
Company (.4) 
1-··_···_· ···_· .. 1···············_······························- ...............+ 

2 	 Foreman (formerly 
Company (A) 
.... 
Managers 3 	 Engineering manager 
(formerly Company (A) 
I 
4 	 Garage staff manager 
(formerly Company (A) 
.. 

• 	 'The employees are the union 
and they've had to support 
themselves half the time. Over 
the years it's changed. You get 
some of the backroom noise ~ 
all the hot air. But you try and 
get them to stick together and 
don't ' 
......_.,......... _............................. + 

power nowadays, yet the 
workers know they need the 
union. A union is probably an 
insurance policy.' 
• 	 'The general consensus of 
opinion is that the union is 
there and a lot of people's 
perception is that they should 
be a part of it. 
• 	 'I think it's pretty soul 
destroying being a steward 
within this depot because 
there's a lot of apathy from the 
members. The membership 
needs to have some age and 
service under its belt before it 
starts being suppoltive of its 
trade union leaders. With such 
a new group of people, they 
don't know any previous 
history of what's gone on and 
they're not that supportive of 
Effectiveness of union officers 
(management respondents only) 
I • 'There's a difference between 
being a leader and being a 
steward. Some are much more 
oriented towards being a good 
leader - they can command the 
sort of respect that people can 
relate to. Others are just there 
because no one else will do it 
". It's not just about wearing 
the badge and getting a day off 
a week for union duties or 
atte~lding some meetings:' .... j.... 
• 'I think they're effective in I • 
leading their members and 
making sure their members get 
a fair deal.' 
J 

Degree of power held by the 
unions (management respondents 
only) 
I··· 
• ' About the right amount at [this 
depot]. r would say it all 
averages out across the three 
depots. Overall the 
representation is about right. In 
the first few months after the 
merger, I was a little bit 
concerned about the amount of 
involvement there was with the 
union. It wasn't something we 
were accustomed to.' 
. .. 1 
'At the end of the day, the 
amount of power they've got is 
in their hands, because they ean 
only put forward anything with 
the knowledge of what SOlt of 
support they've got behind them. 
Branch meetings are very poorly 
attended- it's not a secret. So 
they never know exactly what 
power they have got, because 
their strength is only in the 
support they can get from their 
membership. ' 
the group.' 
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Stage Two respondent views on trade union issues - Compal1Y Five (continued) 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role 
Trade union officers/ 5 Branch chairman ofthe 
representatives TGWU (formerly 
Company (B)) 
6 	 Branch secretary of the 
TGWU (fonnerly 
Company (B)) 
;, 
Managcl's 7 	 Garage manager 
(formerly Company (B)) 
8 	 Operations manager 
(formerly Company (B)) 
... 

I Union/employee relations 
• 	 'Once you get out from depot 
level, it's just a full-time 
official level and then up and 
up and up, They're removed 
and remote and quite frankly 
don't know what's happening 
because they're dealing with 
the broader 
• 	 'It would be difficult to justify 
why they [employees] pay 
£2,35 a week each if they didn't 
support us.' 
• 	 'We have meetings twice a 
month and don't get people 
turning up and complaining as 
much as they used to at one 
time. So whether that means 
they're happy, or whether it 
means they've just become 
apathetic, I don't know.' 
• 	 'They [the trade unions] 
haven't necessarily lost a lot of 
their members. They're still 
basically very close to 100% 
but there are people, in much 
the same way that they will 
stand in the canteen and 
criticise us, will also criticise 
the union. So I think the unions 
have lost a bit of their 

... f()ll()~i'!g;:' 

• 	 'I think there are probably 
fewer workers who see the 
union role as vital as it used to 
be. But on the other side of the 
coin, [ think those who do see a 
role for the unions are fairly 
satisfied with their officers and 
the officers do respond.' 
Effectiveness of union officel's 
(management respondents only) 
• 	 'They are very effective. 
Obviously it's in their best 
interests to get the best for their 
members and in order to do that 
they are always going to ask for 
a bit more than they would 
actually be happy with, but 
that's all part of the bargaining 
procedure isn't itT 
1+ 
• 'The union leaders here have • 
certainly got the personality 
and leadership skills. [prefer 
to deal with a good strong 
leader rather than somebody 
who has not got those skills.' 
Degree of power held by the 
unions (management respondents 
only) 
• 
 'I would say that the balance is 
about right. We've gone through 
patches where it's been patently 
obvious that the management has 
had the upper hand and it can 
swing the other way, where the 
unions have the upper hand. We 
win some, we lose some - on 
both sides.' 
'It is probably about right at the 
moment. [wouldn't want them 
to have more power than they've 
got. But on the other hand, there 
are dangers if a union has too 
little power. There are decided 
benefits in having an organised 
representation. ' 
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AjJpenl!i! llixx): Stage Two respondent views on employee involvement and communication - Compwll'Six 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role I Employee involvement I Effectiveness of management in Union as the main channel of 
funning the company (trade union 
respondents only) 
communication to employees on 
company policy (management 
respondents only) 
Trade union officers! 
representatives 
2 
Branch 
representative for 
theTGWU 
.................I.....·.. .. .......................... . 
Company convenor 
3 Branch secretary of 
the TGWU 
Managers 4 Garage general 
manager 
,.......................................................................,...................... ·..·..........·..·.........f........ 

5 Service quality 
manager 
.. 
Other 
6 
7 
Traffic manager 
Service controller 
• 	 'Virtually none. (don't think there 
could ever be any involvement of 
employees when commercial 
.!~.ter.~.~ts.l:l.r.e ..~l~~ ...~y~r~i.~il1g..'p.ri.~r.itX:.:... 
• 	 'They [the managers] are starting 
to involve employees a lot more 
because we have two worker 
directors who go out and do surveys 
...........y!iy!.i.fl..!h~ .. c:gl~P~flY.:...:........... . 

• 	 'Management posts notices quite 
often. Whether people read them is 
another thing. Monthly branch 
meetings are very poorly attended ­
there's a general disinterest within 
the company.' 
• 	 'A difficulty of our industry is that 
you cannot get everybody together. 
Sometimes, drivers will go three or 
four weeks, if not more, and never 
meet. We tend to rely on notices 
and written information.' 
........................................................ ........................... 

• 	 'Involvement is achieved via 
notices on notice boards. 
Employees ask management rather 
than the trade unions.' 
• 	 'You're sometimes tied down with 
paper when you should be talking to 
staff a little bit more. One of their 
biggest criticisms is that they don't 
know what's going on in the 
company.' 
• 	 'Informing staff about what's 
going on - yes, that's fine, but 
involving staff seems very limited. 
All the negotiating and talking takes 
place through the union.' 
• 	 'Insofar as on a day-to-day basis, 
most of the buses run and run on 
time. We tend to retain our routes 
w,.ee.,l,.,!..: ..'.........................................................................................................+................................ .............. ..................... .................-...........................................-1 

• 

• 	 'They could do a lot better in my 
opinion. They seem to cut corners 
and they don't communicate with us 
as much as we would like.' 
'Yes, they probably are effective, 
because they had to cut wages and 
start running a profitable business. 
Unfortunately with this trade, it's a 
public service and running it for a 
profit creates a conflict.' 
......................................... ................................................ 

• 	 'They're elected and we recognise 
them. I've got no problem with 
that. I just have a concern over how 
effective they are in communicating 
information accurately and 
effectively.'
. ............................................................ 

• 	 'The trade unions like to think they 
are the main channels of 
communication but there is apathy. 
Their members don't get to hear the 
information but that is because they 
.......<:l()I~.'..t.tll.~!1 .. lIPt()..I.~~(!t::!i!1g~:...'...... ........ .......... 

• 	 'When you have a new policy, if 
the unions don't like it they can put 
out the wrong vibes - as 
management could. That's where 
discussions between unions and 
management come in.' 
• 	 'If the union is doing it's job and 
communicating with its members 
then that's fine. (fthe union isn't 
communicating properly that's 
when the breakdown comes.' 
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Appendix 12(xxi): Stage Two respondent views on company indust.-ial relations - Company Six 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role I CUlTent industrial I'elations climate 
Trade union officers/ Branch 'The managers try to do their best, I. 
representatives representative for but they're not backward when it 
the TGWU comes to breaking agreements that 
don't suit them.' 
2 Company convenor • 'The people higher up are quite 
good. It's lower down where there 
is a problem.' 
3 	 Branch secretary of • 'It's less consultative than it should 
theTGWU 	 be, although it is co-operative 
because there is two-way traffic. 
There is not enough involvement on 
a wider front.' 
lr 
Managers 4 	 Garage general • 'You talk and you're open and then 
I-
manager the unions co-operate. [fthey find 
that you're trying to do something 
underhand, then they shut up and 
they don't want to know. We've 
never had that. Good co-operation 
comes from good consultation.' 
5 	 Service quality 'It is more consultative than 
manager 	 anything else.' 
1---. ...._..·· .. ·····_.... ·........·1····-......·· ......·........ ··· .. 
6 Traffic manager I - 'Currently we've got a very good 
relationship with the unions all the 
way down the company. There was 
an awful lot of bitterness when we 
came out of national isat ion into 
privatisation. It used to be "them 
and us". Now it's more informal ­
we try to reason things out.' 
r 
Other 7 Service controller - 'It's quite co-operative. r think 
everybody has realised that you've 
all got to pull in the same direction 
otherwise it's just not going to 
work.' 
Man~meIlt/uIlioIl relations 
• 	 'I think they're fairly good and we 
have a fairly good working 
relationship. ' 
• 	 'In the dealings I've had, relations 
are not too bad. You get the odd 
problem but that's pa11 and parcel of 
the job.' 
• 	 'They [managers] rely on us to run 
things in the spirit of industrial 
relations. We've hadjoint 
management-union industrial 
relations courses, so J think things 
are pretty good. There's always 
room for improvement.' 
• 	 'They're very good - very open. 
Good meetings, good attitude at 
meetings, mutual respect and so on. 
We've got a good relationship.' 
-
'f don't see that we've got a 
problem now.' 
• 	 'We've only had one or two 
occasions where it looked as through 
problems were going to arise. But at 
the moment, [ would say it's a very 
good relationship. [wouldn't say 
it's a soft relationship, but it's a good 
working relationship. We've got 
worker directors, which also helps.' 
• 	 'f think they're quite good. I'm 
quite happy with them.' 
Management/employee relations 
-
'Most people, if they were given 
the opportunity to get another job, 
wouldn't think twice about leaving 
here. I think it has become a very 
.t!:(l11~i~!~!J?~~ 
-
'The workers are always moaning 
about the way the managers treat 
them. The majority wouldn't give 
-
.....!~e~fln(ls..\~~.s..uppgli::............ 
'There are still probably around 80 
drivers here of long service who 
actually remember a much better 
job. It's okay to realise that 
privatisation was an inevitability, 
but there's an underlying problem 
within the industry.' 
• 	 'We've gone through a lengthy 
period of dramatic change, which 
caused a bit of distrust and 
scepticism. But in the main, the 
workers understand that what's been 
done in the past protected the 
.... CglllP,111)' ..!l.1.1.~.!~.~i.~.j.()~.~.:.' 
• 	 'Some people come to work and 
they are as good as gold - there is 
no problem. Others give you grief ­
.. Y..~~~y.e.gg!.(l?pIit.:..:...... ....... ......................... 

• 	 'There's always a "them and us". 
You could have a driver and you're 
best friends with him. Put an 
inspector's hat on him and he 
becomes "them". It's very hard to 
remove that barrier. It is the 
workers who put the barrier there 
because they don't feel safe once 
they're "in" with management.' 
• 	 'The employees know that the 
managers here are available to see 
them.' 
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Appendix 12(xxii): Stage Tw~ respondent viewJi on tra~~nion issues - Company Six 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role 
Trade union officers/ Branch 
representatives representative for 
the TGWU 
2 Company convenor 
Ir 
3 Branch secretary of 
theTGWU 
Managers 4 Garage general 
manager 
5 Service quality 
manager 
6 Traffic manager 
"* 
Other 7 Service controller 
I Union/employee relations 
• 	 'Commitment to the [union] cause 
has been diluted. I think today, if 
you called a strike, it's very possible 
that you wouldn't get as much 
support as you might have done a 
few 
'We've got so much legislation 
now that our hands are tied, 
although the employees don't see 
the legislation. They just see what 
the union hasn't done.' 
• 	 'The memberships' feelings are a 
lot weaker than we would wish.' 
• 	 'The employees know it is best to 
have representation.' 
• 	 'Some support the unions - some 
don't. Some people here have 
totally denounced the trade unions.' 
• 	 ' At the moment I don't think the 
unions have got a very good rapp0l1 
with the staff. The governments in 
years gone by have gone out 
purposely to break the unions­
they've discredited them and I don't 
think they've got their credibility 
back.' 
.. 	 'When you're working with a large 
number of staff, you're always 
going to have your disagreements. 
think people have got less faith in 
the unions - people feel as if they 
Effectiveness of union officers Degree of powel' held by the unions 
(management respondents only) (man:tgeme'!tJ"Cs~ondents only) 
..............-!................................................... ···_..·······_..···········..················1 

• 	 'At the top it's very good. At grass 
roots level, it's pretty weak really.' 
• 	 'They are all out to get what they 
can for themselves, rather than 
working for their members.' 
• 	 'You need to have a very good 
union official because [he] can 
control a lot of things within the 
garage. If he's passing on the wrong 
views, for example. I'm not saying 
the current person is doing that. 
[He] needs a bit more training and a 
little bit more experience.' 
• 	 'The people we have at the moment 
are very good. The drivers have 
their moans and disagreements, but 
generally there isn't much problem.' 
• 	 'They [the trade unions] know that 
the managers have a relatively free 
hand. But we don't abuse it so 
therefore they don't give us too 
much of a hard time. They know 
that what we're trying to do is for 
the benefit of everybody. But we do 
...~?~?.P~.~~!t::.:... 
• 	 'It is about right·- when they lthe 
unions] use it! Some of the issues 
they should get involved in, they 
don't, and with other issues - they 
......,!!i.!.L!11!:*~ .. Cl.!?i.g!!li.l!g..()t.I!()f..!~.~l~:' .. 
• 	 'In the past they [the unions] have 
had too much. Now I would say it's 
on an equal basis - it's just right. 
We've got a good working 
relationship. Whether the staff 
would also say that to the same 
extent - but that's always the case.' 
• 	 '[ think now there is quite a nice 
balance, compared with the 1980s 
when they [the unions] had too 
much power.' 
L __________________~______________L-________________~__~a~re~b~e!~·n~g~l~e~t~d~o~w~n~.'____________~L-______________________________~______________________________~ 
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Appendix 12(xxiii): Stage Two respondent views on ESO objectives and outcomes - ComfJfl!!L Four 
Respondent type 
Trade union officers! 
I Respol\l!e-'I1:!'o~II I RoleIBranch chainnan of the I Main objectives of I<~SO ,. 'To prevent other big groups from buying the 
representatives TGWU company'. 
• 'To get the best deal we could for the workforce'. 
• 'Our hand was forced to a certain extent due to tbe 
2 	 Branch secretary of th~'1--~I:~+~~o~~~'t~ii~I~~~:1~~~~~9:;~~:~~~~ participation - to 
TGWU 
3 Employee director 
... 
Managers 
4 
5 
Representative for the 
TGWU 
Divisional traffic 
manager 
.. 
6 Divisional traffic 
manager 
involve them in owning a part of the company.' 
• 	 'The main reason behind the formation of the ESOP 
was political. The directors wanted to buy the company 
and could not persuade the council to sell to a 
management buy-out. A marriage was the only answer 
and the best offer was a 51 :49 management-employee 
buy-out. The decision was taken by the unions that they 
did not want employees buying different numbers of 
shares. ' 
• 	 'I think it was job security and we felt that we could run 
the company because wc kncw what bus work was about. 
At the time we were frightened of people coming in who 
didn't know what they wcre doing. From a union point 
of view, we pushed it with local MPs - wc wanted to buy 
it. ' 
• 	 'Because of our relationship with the local council, the 
ESOP was the onty route for us to pursue. ' 
• 	 '[ think because the trade unions were so involved in 
the set-up of the buy-out and they had so much power in 
those days, an ESOP was probably the only road they 
could go down.' 
• 	 The government at the time wa., encouraging Passenger 
Transport Authorities to divest their interests. Basically 
they were going to be under threat - they had to sell off 
their bus companies.' 
• 	 'The opportunity was there and with the ESOP we 
proposed, it wa.s easier to raise money through the 
Were objectives met? 
.. 
1­
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
'Yes - if we hadn't gone down the ESOP road we 
wouldn't have been in such a strong position three or 
four years later when the company was sold. We (;ould 
have been swallowed up and would have probably been 
in a worse situation.' 
I
• 	 'No - I think we got derailed half-way through. Greed 
started to motivate the directors. They were keen to save 
money.' 
• 	 'No - the ESOP didn't work because employees did not 
- it did not them.' 
'Yes - the directors had wanted to control the direction 
and strategy of the company and this was achieved for 
the duration of the company's independence.' 
'To provide a financial stake in the company - this was 
definitely achieved.' 
'Yes - although we could have done better in hindsight. 
We knew how to run buses because that was our 
expertise - running buses, putting buses on the road and 
keeping them on the road. Hut how to actually make a 
profit out of doing it - a good profit - was something that 
we've had to be shown: 
I don't think so - people weren't really interested. We 
have a Divisional Consultative Committec, which we 
also had during the time of the ESOP and velY few 
people used to attend. People just wantcd to get on with 
their own lives. They wanted to come here, get paid and 
go home.' 
The directors had wanted control orthe company and 
they had that for five years. However, at the start there 
was an expectation that share ownership would be a 
long-term project. I don't think the ESOP came in for 
them to sell the company five years down the road. I 
don't think that was their expectation.' 
banks.' 
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Appendix 12(xxiv): Stage Two I'espondcnt views on advantages/disadvantages of ESO and aItemative strategies - Company Four 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role I Main advantages of ESO I Main disadvantages of ESO 
Trade union officers/ Branch chairman of the • 'You learned a hell ofa • '] would have preferred to 
representatives TGWU lot. ' stay in public ownership, but 
• 	 'I t was a way of trying to we had to go down the line of 
protect your wages and protecting what we had as far as 
conditions at the lime, possible. r think the ESOP was 
which it did.' the way to do it' 
2 Branch secretary of the • 'When we had share • 'The ESOP was the right road 
TGWU ownership we could go to go down but Hle mechanism 
into meetings and threaten we used wasn't sul1icient to 
the directors with strike keep everybody level.' 

action. Their money was 

on the line. 

3 	 Employee director • 'As someone who was on • 'The failure to give a more 
the inside of all decisions, 1 equal share to ali.' 
obviously had five very 
interesting years.' 
.. 
I .. ... ._+___________ 
4 Representative for the • Job security - a chance to • 'I don't think there were any 
TGWU try and work out our own disadvantages.' 
future, secure our own • We had to wake up and 'grasp 
future.' 	 the nettle a little bit.' 
Managers 5 	 Divisional traffic • 'I didn't actually think it • 'Very few people were really 
manager worked. ' interested in it at all.' 
• 	 'There was no effort made • 'The unions had 100 much 
to say what an ESOP really power because they had been so 
is and "this is what will involved in the ESOP. If you 
happen_ this is when you made a decision at divisional 
will get shares".' level, they would just go 
straight to the directors and get 
.\t cl?~T1g~~:_' 
6 Divisional traffic • . Probably the consultation • 'As a company we looked 
manager and communication inwardly, there was a lack of 
process. I think that was investment and basically we 
the advantage to some didn't take the bull by the 
people who wanted to horns.' 
know what was going on. 
Financially, people 
benefited when we sold the 
... comRany and that was it.' 
What would you have done 
differently? 
• 	 'r think we would have gone 
for the same ESOP as we did. 
don't think we could have 
bettered it.' 
• 'J would have bought shares'. 
• 	 'The 51 :49 split of shares 
should have been different.' 
• 	 'There should have been more 
co-operation between employee 
directors at different bus 
.. ..E.~I11E~_11i~~:: 
• 	 'People should have been 
invited to put money in - there 
would have just been that much 
more interest. But they weren't 
asked.' 
• 	 'If people had been required to 
put in a stake, rather than just 
be given a free share issue, it 
would have created a better 
environment for its success.' 
• 	 '1 think if employees had had 
the option to invest in the 
company, I think that would 
have given them a greater 
incentive. They had 49 per cent 
as a group of people, but 
personally, it meant very little 
to them.' 
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Appendix 12(xxv): Stage Two respondent views on ESO and employee behaviours - Con~Four 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role I Impact on employee efficiency I Impact on attitudes to work Impact on attitudes to the trade 
unions 
Trade union officers/ Branch chairman of 
representatives the TGWU 
I·-I································· .... j
2 	 Branch secretary of 
the TGWU 
3 	 Employee director 
4 I Representative for 
the TGWU 
... 
Managers 15 I	OI,I,lon,1 !mfflc 
manager 
6 	 Divisional traffic 
manager 
,.. 
• 
I • 
I • 
• 
'1 don't think it made any 
difference. The job was stilI the 
same.' 
'The only difference was that we 
did get more information on the 
company's budgets. We knew 
exactly what profits the 
company was making. ' 
'Because they didn't have a 
financial stake it was a case of "1 
couldn't care less - I'm going to 
get my money at the end ofthe 
'Owning the company provided 
a spur to employees to begin 
with.' 
• 	 'The number of shares we had 
from the ESOP weren't a great 
deal anyway. ' 
• 	 'The only time-share ownership 
meant anything was when the 
company was sold.' 
• 'The carrot was dangled and 
• 	 'I think everybody still stayed 
in the trade union and everybody 
knew it was still the trade union. 
• 	 'Management still had to 
manage and we still had to be 
there to represent our members. ' 
.....they!(?{)!<:.)t:.~ .1 
• 'When they had free shares • 'It didn't change their attitude 
they weren't interested. In their because the shares were wOlth 
eyes they didn't have shares. nothing to them. [n their eyes 
There was no value to them.' "they didn't own shares".' 
'There was a lot more financial • 'There was no change in 
information given to employees attitude.' 
when we owned the company. 
The result was a knowledgeable 
workforce and an obvious 
change in attitude to their work' 
'I don't think it changed the employees in any way. I don't think they realised they actually owned the 
company. Although we had a 49 per cent share, I don't think we used it in the right way. I think we could have 
been more dominant and we could have forced issues in different ways.' I know I certainly never considered 
myself as being a part-()wner. I was just an employee.' 
'They certainly weren't very 
emcient in the early years. 
Efficiency was terrible and 
productivity was extremely low.' 
'I don't believe that the overall 
feeling on the job changed very 
much from pre· ESOP ownership 
to ESOP ownership.' 
• 	 'They had a complacent 
attitude because they were 
owners.' 
• 	 'Now we have targets set for 
the group whereas when it was 
the old ESOP company the 
budget used to be revised every 
six months' 
• 	 . A lot of people here just come 
along every week, do their job, 
pick the money up and go 
home.' 
• 	 'r don't know whether it 
resulted from the ESOP, but the 
majority of staff now approach 
management over problems.' 
• 	 'When employees realised what 
the value of the company was, 
they said "why couldn't we have 
invested in the company? 
We've been sold out by the 
unions",' 
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role Did employees feel like Did employees care about Employee attitudes to the demise of 
owners? ESO? ESO 
Trade union officers/ 1 Branch chairman of • '[fyou put £50,000 in it • 'We still get the odd gripe • 'They didn't care at the time who 
representatives the TGWU 	 will mean something. But that when we formed the was taking it over - they saw the 
I still believe we took the ESOP people should have money and they grabbed it. Some 
right decision. People did been allowed to buy shares.' of them are now living to regret it 
not get the opportunity to - most of them.' 
buy shares and I think that 
........... . ..... ......................... ......... ......... .. ....... . ......................... was the right way to do it. '........ ........... ................ ....... ................ , 
2 Branch secretary of • 'Because the shares were .. 'There were actually quite a • 'They hadn't initially invested 
the TGWU worth nothing to them in few people who opted out of anything themselves and that's I 
their eyes it didn't change the free shares. Some people what it's all about - investing in I 
their attitudes.' said "I don't want them". your company for your future.' 
......_... •••• _....... __ ._, ,...•_._. ".__ ,•• _... .._••. _. __ ..•••. 	 .._._ ...•.•, .._..••._ .._,__ . . ............" ...... _ ............................,_.. ____ .. _ •. _____ .....~, ••••.••.,...,~_. __ .. . •.•.•........H...... . ._._... .•. ••. . .".... ............•.•.H.••.......•m.__ ••••_ ........••••• •••••••••••••••.••• .••••••••.••• ........................................... • ••.•••••• 

3 Employee director • 'The reality was that the • 'Only for a few months • 'The vote to sell the company 
management still when the shares had real was 99 per cent. The averagc 
controlled their day-to ..day value.' payment from (XXX] was 
lives and the feeling soon £ 10,000 and that was enough for 
...... .. ............................................. ..... .................. .......... ...............W(?..r~ off.' ...... ........... ... ..... .. ......... ..................................... . ..... C1I1X~9.~yi!~C1~...f.elt.:: ........................... 
4 Representative for the • 'No. I don't think they • 'No - not the majority'. • 'One day they had shares that 
TGWU fclt like owners.' they didn't rcally have and the 
next day someone was offering 
them £10,000 . 
." • 'It was just a ridiculous decision 
to ask you to make really.' 
Managers 5 Divisional traffic • 'There might have been a • 'They only cared at the time • 'They all saw the pound signs.' 
manager few.' of the sale to [XXX], when 
• 	 'We did provide they saw the cash.' 
information at seminars, 
but people just weren't 
interested. ' 
~............- ............................_.- ..__........• __..... ........._.. ................. ..•.........-... .. .... . ....-... .. ....... 	 . ....................."... ......... . ...._..- _........._... ........- ..•........._..... .... .................._.- ......._.- - .. . ................. _.. 

6 Divisional traffic .. 'Owning the company • 'The sholi answer is no - • '99 per cent of them voted to 
manager actually meant very little - not until the end.' take the money so it wasn't a 
a lot of people resented the matter of - "well, the ESOP has 
,~ faet that the managers gone". They hadn't been getting 
owned 51 per cent.' anything out ofthe ESOP.' 
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Appendix 12(xxvii): Stage Two respondent views on ESO objectives and outcomes - Company Five (AJ 
.. 
Respondent type Respondent no. I Role I Main objectives of ESO 
Trade union officersl 2 Foreman (formerly Ie 'The whole idea was to have share ownership 
representatives Company (AJ) for a three-year period to avoid a hostile bid. If 
we sold in the first year we had to pay the 
council 90 per cent of any profit we made, 60 per 
cent in the second year and 30 per cent in the 
third. After the third year we became quite open 
to sell, so we went the full three years and then 
we sold.' 
Managers 3 	 Engineering manager • 'I remember saying to myself"we're either 
(formerly Company (Aj) going to be sold off to the private sector by 
[XXX] council, or we're going to take it on 
board ourselves". We were given distinct 
advantages if we decided to take it on board 
ourselves. The managing director said "we've 
got some good people here -let's give it a go 
because we can then dictate a little bit of our 
fate", Once we did it we knew we would only 
be buying time. I don't think we believed it 
would go on forever and be anything 
spectacular. It was a great experience but it was 
short-lived. ' 
I···.. ·..·..·..····......·····.......·..·· . ................ , ..........__.. _............ ............................. ............._... j ..........._.. ......................... 

4 Garage staff manager • 'We knew that we could possibly be the target 
(formerly Company (A)) of some fierce competition from outside 
operators. ' 
• 	 'When you buy shares you have a real stake in 
the company. I think it gave employees a great 
amount of kudos out there against other 
companies and they really achieved maximum 
satisfaction - "those guys may be in the bigger 
company but they haven't got a stake in their 
company - we own ours".' 
Were objectives met? 
• 	 'The directors had probably known they could 
run the company for about three years before 
getting into trouble.' 
• 	 'Employees got an excellent return at the end of 
it. £1,000 became £18,000. It was an excellent 
return, bearing in mind that over three years they 
were also given free shares and anyone with 10­
12 years' service would have picked up another 
£10,000-£12,000 of shares as well.' 
• 	 'We decided to take it and do something with it. 
We changed the culture, we invested in a 
training campaign. We bought new vehicles. 
We made a big splash in town with a new route 
and state-of-the-ali vehicles. We got a lot of 
interest going, knowing that just around the 
corner we would not survive, but it was great 
fun. It was the most enjoyable time I spent at the 
company in 23 years of working there - the three 
years of employee share ownership - because 
there was never a minute to sit back.' 
• 	 'We enrolled ourselves on a limited time of 
ownership. Some of the board may have thought 
- "this is it - we're going to do it forever", but 
they would have been kidding themselves. It 
was for a limited time, but it was better than the 
...~I.I1.~~~.lli.n!.y ...().f~c::..il1g~()I~... ()f.f..·....... ....._............ .......... 

• 	 'I think the proof of the pudding was in the 
eating. Anybody who invested £ I ,000 three 
years previous made nearly £ 18,000. You 
wouldn't get that from a building society and 
you wouldn't get it from an off-shore account. It 
l11ust have worked. We had a product that we 
staried off with and managed to sell for £8 
million. ' 
Appendix 12(xxvii) 
-- ,-- ---, - ---- - - .. - --- -------- . __ .. - --- -- --·--:0.--·-----·-------0-- ----ADDendix 12 	 _._-- ----- -----. - ~-- ----0--- -~··-r--·-' - _.- "-;/ 
Respondent type Respondent no. Role 	 Main advantages of ESO Main disadvantages of ESO What would you have done 
Trade union officers/ I 
representatives 
--- .-...............- .. ,..._- ....... --" 

2 
,,. 
Managers 3 
,..._"........... . ....... .. 

................. 'OUH ... 

4 
-~ 
-" 
Branch chainnan of the 

GMB (formerly 

Company (A)) 
~ ,.~......- ......................._- .......... - .." ... _....-_ .. _--....­
Foreman (formerly 
Company (AJ) 
Engineering manager 

(fonnerly Company (AJ) 

~............................... ,,'-- .................................................- .. 

Garage staff manager 

(formerly Company (AJ) 

• 	 'There were fewer accidents • 'There weren't any.' 

because employees were being 

more careful. They owned a 

little part of that family.' 

_... ••.•••• _. ___._..• ·, __ ··•._.•. _... _.·H.... ••••• _.._ ..._ .••_.. .••._•........ _ ........._.. ,, __. ... _..... 
-..... -, .._..•....,,-_.......................- . -'"- .....­
• 'Financial reward.' 
• 	 'Giving people a greater 
interest in coming to work-
giving people a bit more than 
just ajob.' 
• 	 'Encouraging people to 
become more involved.' 
• 	 'Giving employees a different 
perspective - making it more 
than just a 9-5 job - you're in it 
for different reasons.' 
• 	 'None, because it drew 
everyone closer together. I 
think it was an advantage.' 
• 	 'Trying to get across what we 
were really trying to do. We 
stumbled occasionally on some 
of the policies that we needed 
to adopt. 
• 	 'It really was a struggle telling 
the troupes that we couldn't 
afford to give them a pay rise.' 
-..........................__._..... - .._........_...................-.. ............._...._.- .." ..._......- ......... ......... .................. ................. - .....-..... --........ _......._... " .....- .--... _.._... -._ ......... -........
~ 
• 'I suppose the biggest one was 
that everyone was working 
towards the same goal.' 
• 'We were all trying to make us 
into the best company that we 
possibly could.' 
• 	 'The employees actually felt 
they were a part of it. They all 
had the opportunity to have an 
input and it gave them that job 
satisfaction. ' 
--_._-_.­
• 	 'There was a constant concern 
that if you got it wrong, you're 
not costing the council any 
money, you're costing the 
workers money.' 
• 	 'I thought, if this goes pear-
shaped, my career is finished.' 
• 	 'Tt caused concern about 
whether you were doing it right 
or wrong, but I really can't see 
any other real disadvantage to 
it.' 
--- -_._-_._­
differently? 
• 	 'Nothing - I think it was great 
the way it worked out.' 
• 	 'Tfyou wanted to buy shares 
you could buy shares, but we 
also had free shares as well.' 
••••••••••••••••__.• ______• ______ •• _ ....m.__ ••__ mm"_•••___... ""M_" 
......--.--­
• 	 'I would buy more shares. 
Other than that, we couldn't have 
done any better.' 
• 	 'If someone came up to me now 
and said they wanted to purchase 
their company, I would use ours 
as a yardstick because I think our 
way was as good as any.' 
• 'I don't think so.' 
• 	 'Thc thing was, a lot of the 
things we did, we did for the first 
time, and there were times when 
we sat there with the board and it 
was quite frightening thinking 
that what we were doing was 
quite powerful. There were 
some serious decisions to be 
made, but we got there.' 
._............................_... 

• 	 'No - not really, because we i 
knew when we went into it that it 
was going to be a relatively 
short-lived experience.' 
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role 	 Impact on employee efficiency Impact on attitudes to work Impact on attitudes to the trade 
unions 
Trade union officersl 2 Foreman (formerly • 'Well we won an Investors in • 'I think it's all down to how • 'A trade union is there for the 
representatives Company (A) People award. Share people are treated and how benefit of the people.' 
ownership was part and parcel they feel. If they feel 'The employees knew that • 
of it. People felt part of the involved and a part of the they still needed the union - a 
company whereas before, they company, that is what union is probably an insurance 
just said - "oh well, we're matters. ' 	 policy. You either believe in it 
with the council".' 	 or you don't. If you don't, it's 
still a good thing to join~r 
because you never know.' 
Managers 3 Engineering manager • 'Whether their efficiency • 'I think their attitude to work • 'There was not a conscious 
(fonnerly Company (A) 	 was that much better I don't probably changed for the "we don't need them anymore". 
know. We've always had a better. But we'd always had a I just think the union felt 
problem with sickness and good reputation. Employees "relocated" a little.' 
when we became owners, we enjoyed knowing that they 'We deliberately included the • 
went to an external had a stake in the company - union when we first considered 
consultancy that dealt with they were proud of the buying the company. We werc 
sickness and medical matters organisation. ' all in it together, we were 
and things improved greatly. buying the company and 
However, that was more to do needed to be in it as whole.' 
with the methods that the 
consultancy used to track it 
than a general change in 
attitude. ' 
•••••••••••••• _ ...... _....OH. __-.••_ •• _.. _"'_"'_."' •• M •• _ ..__ ·· .. ····pri_·· ___ •.. ·_·_· .... _" ............ "' .___ ._ . •••••••• _ ••••• ............................ ..M ...............__• ________••••• __ ••_ ••••• _ ......._ ••• . .................. _.._.........._..... -. . ....... -..... ..............._........ -.....---_............._.....................-...-.-...........,- ..........._......._.......... 

4 Garage staff manager • '[fwe'd got a graph of • 'We spent a lot of time • 'A change did come about. 
(fonnerly Company (Aj) efficiency on lost mileage and explaining to the troupes what But trade unionists were 
revenue 1 should think that it was all about and that every shareholders themselves and 
efficiency would be fifty passenger we carried meant a despite being shareholders, the 
times greater when we had more profitable company. union would act in a "trade 
share ownership.' They picked up as many union capacity" when it became 
• 	 'They've just not got the passengers as possible. It was necessary. Because of the 
incentive to perform at their their company and they were comm itment of staff towards 
best any more.' making it stronger.' the company, we never had to 
• 	 'After share ownership their really test it.' 
attitude to the company and 
their work completely 
.,.. changed and you can see that 

in the first six months of their 

sickness and absence reports.' 
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role 	 Did employees feel like owners? Did employees care about ESO? Employee attitudes to the demise 
Trade union officers/ I Branch chairman of the 
represcntatives GMB (fonnerLy Company 
(A)) 
I 	
.~•..-....~-...~- ......- .......................................-... ........-......._.. , ...•........................._........._...-.. ,., ............_...- ......... 

2 	 Foreman (formerly 
Company (A)) 
~, 
Managers 3 	 Engineering manager 
(fonnerLy Company (A)) 
.•·.N._·..· ............................ ........_, ..- ............................... - ........... _...... 

4 	 Garage staff manager 
(formerly Company (A)) 
" 
• 	 'Yes. We were a small 

company but we were also a 

family.' 

. ...........-..•..• - ...........- ............._.........................-.- ..- " ....." ... _..... - ................­
• 	 'The majority felt they had 
something to give, which 
made them ask a lot more 
questions of management -. "I 
own the company - what's 
going on?'" 
• 	 'There was only a 64% take-
up of ownership at the time of 
the purchase. It's not an 
overwhelming response, but it 
has also got a lot to do with 
the fact that people generally 
couldn't afford it.' 
• 	 'Yes, I really believe they 

did.' 

• 	 'Yes. Because we were a 
small company everybody 
knew everybody else. We are 
now part of a much bigger 
company. The managing 
director likes to think we're a 
family but it's not like how 
we were.' 
....................- .............-............... ...__.- ...- ..-.....__...... 

• 	 'They cared about the 

company. Shares are just a 

piece of paper aren't they? 

• 	 'I think it made them more 

aware of where the company 

was going.' 

D 'A lot of them did, a lot of 
them didn't. Some carried on 
as ifnothing had happened.' 
• 	 'On the preamble up to it, 
there were a lot of "anti" 
comments but there were no 
real strong objections to it. 
There were very few people 
who didn't want to invest in 
it. There were people who for 
one reason or another couldn't 
invest in it. Once they got 
into the share ownership itself 
and they became P31t of the 
company, it was probably the 
best thing that happened to 
us.' 
ofESO 
• 	 'We were all very vety sorry, 
but it had to be. ' 
•••• ••••• • ••••••_ •• , •• , ....~ ....... H ••··_.··· ............................ •••••••••••••••••••••••_ •••••••••• H 

• 	 '1 think they were sony 
because they had felt part of 
something for three years. 
They had worked hard to build 
it up into something.' 
• 	 'It was a sad day when it 
ended. Okay, they got money 
but it wasn't just about money. 
It was about something we'd 
created that they actually 
enjoyed. ' 
• 	 'I think they're sorry they lost 
this family atmosphere. ' 
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! Respondent type 
Trade union officers/ 
I •
representatives 
I 
, 
I 
I 
, 
Managers 
" 
Other 
_. 
...... ... a"_ .... ,....... __ ___ .. __ ..... , __ ,."'" ........ _ 
" ..... ----. ................... -_ ........... _... _v .....y ........ ,.., ... ., ~,... -~ 
-
ResIlOndent no. Role Main objectives of ESO 
1 Branch representative for • 'Maybe the directors thought they were giving 
the TGWU the drivers a stake in their own future, but I don't 
ever remember that being said.' 
......... _ ......_ ···············'·'·m··.··.··_.··· ......... . ....................._..... . ..-.- ...... -- ... -_..... 

2 Company convenor • 'People were given the opportunity to buy shares 
- that's it'. 
• 	 'If you're offered something for nothing then 
.--.•...._....... ,.....-..•.... -- ....... -...._.. ,,- ....__...... ,...- ........................._..............._......_.... ........ i.--Yc:>.~' II take it.' 

3 Branch secretary of the • '1 don't think it was ever done to include people. 
TGWU I think it was something the directors had to do. It 
was the lesser of two evils.' 
• 	 'My view of it was a tiny bit of money for us and 
a lot of money for somebody else.' 

4 Garage general manager • 'Job security was one of them.' 

• 	 'In buying the company, we became our own 
bosses effectively - we broke away from London 
Transport. ' 
• 	 'We became our own negotiators, our destiny 
was in our own hands and control of the company 
was in our own hands as a whole group, including 
..." .............................,_.............." ........... .................................................................._..... . ....... -.... ................ t.I:~.~l11.p~gy~~~:.:................._..m........ . .. ..............................." ............._......._.......-..... 

5 Service quality manager • 'It was so that we could control our own destiny 
to a certain extent. ' 
...................... • ••••••m. ........ ........_..........-...._..............................." ................................... ......... ....................... -.............................-...... ... ......................-.. - ..............._...
" 
6 Traffic manager • 'I don't think the directors had a lot of choice. If 
they hadn't, it would have been sold on to 
someone else. So the management buy-out was 
really the only way to go forward.' 
7 Service controller • 'Profit. I can't honestly see any other reason for 
it.' 
Were the ob.iectives met? 
• 	 'By the time the three years was up, we had had 
such a dramatic changeover of staff, probably only 
a third of people here had shares'. 
• 	 'Until such time as they found out that their shares 
were walth more than their original value, people 
just didn't think about them.' 
• 	 'It was purely financia1.' 

'1 think they were met in the end - judging by 
• 
what the directors got out of it.' 
........ ,........... _........ - ......._ ......... _................
............ • ......M .. _____ .....• ......._ ............__......._ ... 

• 	 Because ofthe issue with the ordinary shares I 
suppose I closed my eyes to a lot of it because 1 
would not in principle accept that fact. I probably 
switched off from it and didn't see any advantage.' 
• 	 'Yes, because we've been successful.' 
• 	 'The shares that everybody benefited from, even if 
they were only free shares - people got quite a 
good return from that.' 
• 	 'We went from strength to strength to the point 

where we became wOlth a much higher price than 

we were originally bought for. ' 

• .................."'...... ·_ ..• ..• .. • .... ·._·... _______.H '" ......... ".,.............. ,_.........." ...... ,. • 
 .....-................ ........................._..-.... 

• 'It was done because it was the "in-thing" to do at 
... ..... .!~~_!iI1:~:r.t~<l~p<lyillg~:!ip:S.~t:y!c.:~'::'......_._ 
• 	 'Being in a company buy-out - it was the best 

thing that could have happened to the staff.' 

• 	 'I think people who invested money got their just 

rewards.' 

• 	 'Well, in making money - yes, but at everybody's 
expense.' 
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Respondent type Respondent no. Role 	 Main advantages of ESO Main disadvantages What would you have done 
differently? 
Trade union officers/ 1 Branch representative • 'Initially, most people would not • ' At worst, share ownership was • 'In hindsight, knowing what I 
representatives for the TGWU have given it a thought. ' a small pay-out, and at best, a know now, I would have sold my 
• 	 ' As their penny shares became 30 large payout of money for house and bought as many shares 
pence, 70 pence, 90 pence, then employees who had never put up as they would let me. I believe I 
there was a difference.' 
~ ................-........................ p._ .... _ •.••••••.••••• ...•__....... •••••••••.••••.
............ ............_ _ _~ ...............M.' 
.._.... ..M•.·.····•...H··· _.........___......•.._.... _. __.. ............._...........__l.ll~y i~.i~~l.lI!~\I~st!1:1~.~t.' ................._.~p.~_l.l~ ..~?r.l.!l?st people.' ·n_"··" ..··•· .. · .............. --_ .. 

2 Company convenor • 'Profit and what you could get out • 'Some people got nothing at • 'I never got involved in the 
of it.' all. ' 
........._........._.......-......- .............__.. 
_..... ...........-.......... ..... -.--......-.. ".-. .. . _................._...........__.........•._......._.........__ ....... - .......- ............. _......................_..•..... _... ...._......._........._... ........_....... . . ._gell:lil~gS(?!:!.~~!!I~ll:.I~~~c,:~.~!!lt:_:'._..m
~ 
3 Branch secretary of • 'The tree shares 1 suppose.' • 'Wages had been decreased by • 'I would have liked a level 
the TGWU • 'I got a windfall, but considering so much.' playing field.' 
the money I had lost in privatisation • 'There wasn't enough time to • 'If there could have been any way 
,r 
... nurture any feelings of- "let's of being fairer.' 
do something with this".' 
Managers 4 Garage general • 'The company has perfonned much • 'Some people who had only • 'In the main, I think we can look 
manager better because the responsibility is been with the company five or back and say it worked very well. 
on us.' ten years who were in a position 'If there was once concern, it was 
• 	 'It's down to us as employees at to put in a lot of money - they 
· that it had to be velY heavily 
whatever level to make the company made a lot of money out of it. financed by outside financial 
work.' Some would say they made a lot backers.' 
of money out ofthe older 
........................................._._ ......................... 
..............•.......... I..··················..·.. ·· 	 worker. ' ....-............ ........" ..... ,... ··········m·..· ................... _ ' ..... __ .. _.........._ ......... _ ...•_. 

5 Service quality • 'Financial gain' • 'I don't think there were • 'People didn't understand.' 
manager • 'I was financially motivated and it disadvantages. It's just that • More user-friendly information 
was worth the risk at the time.' people weren't aware of the could have been provided.' 
advantages. ' 
_..... ................. .............. 

• ............................................................................. '_ ••••••••..·u........................... _ •• 

6 Traffic manager • 'Basically, employees saw it as a • 'It may have disillusioned those • 'If there had been a lot more 
chance to make some money and people who couldn't afford it.' ordinary shares going around, I ~, belong to a family again.' think that employees would have 
bought them.' 
Other 7 Service controller • 'It gave employees a few bob- • 'We didn't really have a lot of • 'In hindsight, I would have liked 
they got some free shares and they influence. We did have to have bought some more shares 
sold them.' 	 employee directors and a bit of and made a lot of money.' 
money in our pockets, but that 
was it.' 
-~ 	 -~ 
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Appendix 12(xxxiii): Stage Two respondent views on ESO and employee behaviours - CompanySix 
Respondent type I Respondent no. 
Trade union officers/ I 1 
representatives 
2 
3 
r 
Managers 4 
5 
6 
t-
Other 7 
I Role 
Branch 
representative for 
the TGWU 
Company convenor 
Branch secretary of 
the TGWU 
Garage general 
manager 
Service quality 
Iln(\f1(\g~r 
Traffic manager 
Service contro tier 
I Impact on employee efficiency Impact on attitudes to work 	 Impact on attitudes to the trade 
unions 
• 	 'I doubt if it made a quarter of 1 • 'For most people, the amount of • 'I don't think there was any real 
per cent difference in the way money they had tied up in this change, because I don't think 
people worked and felt about their company was only the shares they people actually believed they had 
daily routine, and that's what most had been given, and it was a fairly a stake in the company - not a real 
people would tell you.' insignificant amount of money. ' stake - not with a few penny 
shares. ' 
I. 	 'People who had invested a lot of • 'The majority just got on with • 'You still need people who can 
money in the shares put a lot of their work, they didn't care represent the workforce.' 
complaints in about others who whether the shares went up or 
were messing around.' down until the actual time of 
...... + 
• 	 'Because it was such a poor deal 'It affected very few people in • 'With privatisation people are 
and so few people could put that regard.' now guarded against the unions. 
money into it, the directors were A lot of it stems not tram how 
left with a demoralised share ownership was handled, but 
disillusioned and inefficient the unions' inability to stop any of 
workforce. ' it.' 
• 	 'There were those who were truly • 'The commitment was there • 'They were guided by and relied 
interested in the success of the according to what you put into the heavily on the trade unions to find 
company. For others it was a case company and what you wanted to alit what was going on', 
of "today, we're part of London see come out. ' 'I don't think tbey ever felt they • 
Transport, tomorrow we're [XXX] were misinformed or treated badly 
and the day after that we're by tbe unions, or unfairly 
working for [XXX]. Who cares?" represented. ' 
There was lot oftha!.' .. 1 	 .L.. 
• 	 'So few people actually bought shares that it didn't really make any di f'terence.' 
I 
.. 'They didn't seem to be able to grasp tbat by being a shareholder, the way they did tbeir work totally governed the 

way their shares went. It took an awful long time for people to realise they were a part of it.' 

• 	 'It started to show when you had staff rep0l1ing other staff for not doing their job properly.' 
• 	 'I don't think that shares have got any real influence on people ~ not in this • 'There was no difference in 

industry. I had no perception that I needed to work harder.' attitude at all.' 
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Appendix 12(xxxiii): Stage Two respondent views on ESO and employee behaviours - Companjl Six 
Respondent type I Respondent no. I Role I Impact on employee efficiency Impact on attitudes to work Impact on attitudes to the trade 
Trade union officers/ I 1 Branch 
representatives representative for 
the TGWU 
2 Company convenor 
3 Branch secretary of 
the TGWU 
... 
Managers 4 Garage general 
manager 
5 Service quality 
.. I Inallager 
6 Traffic manager 
.... 
• 	 'I doubt if it made a quarter of 1 
per cent difference in the way 
people worked and felt about their 
daily routine, and that's what most 
people would tell you.' 
• 	 'People who had invested a lot of 
money in the shares put a lot of 
complaints in about others who 
were messing around.' 
• 	 'Because it was such a poor deal 
and so few people could put 
money into it, the directors were 
left with a demoralised 
disillusioned and inefficient 
workforce. ' 
-
'There were those who were truly 
interestcd in the succcss of the 
company. For others it was a case 
of "today, we're parl of London 
Transport, tomorrow we'rc [XXX] 
and the day after that we're 
working for [XXX]. Who cares?" 
........ Thcre was a lot of that. ' I­ I .... 
• 'For most people, the amount of 
money they had tied up in this 
company was only the shares they 
had been given, and it was a fairly 
insignificant amount of money.' 
• 'The majority just got on with 
their work, they didn't care 
whether the shares went up or 
down until the actual time of 
selling. ' 
• 'It affected very few people in 
that regard. ' 
• 'The commitment was there 
according to what you pUl into the 
company and what you wanted to 
see come out.' 
unions 
• 	 'I don't think there was any real 
change, because I don't think 
people actually believed they had 
a stake in the company - not a real 
stake - not with a few penny 
shares. ' 
• 	 'You still need people who can 
represent tIle workforce.' 
• 	 'With privatisation people are 
now guarded against the unions. 
A lot of it stems not from how 
share ownership was handled, but 
the unions' inability to stop any of 
it. ' 
'They were guided by and relied • 
heavily on the trade unions to find 
out what was going on'. 
• 	 'I don't think they ever felt they 
were misinfOlwed or treated badly 
by the unions, or unfairly 
represented. ' 
f----------+-------.j----------j-
Other 7 Service controller • '\ don't think that shares have got any real influence on people - not in this - 'There was 110 difference in 
industry. I had no perception tlla! [ needed to work harder.' attitude at a[l.· ---.----..1 
Appendix 12(xxxiii) 
'SO few people actually bought shares that it didn't really make any difference.' 
I 
• 'They didn't seem to be able to grasp that by being a shareholder, the way they did their work totally governed the 
way their shares went. 	 It took an awful long time /01' people to realise they were a part of it.' 
'It started to show when you had staff reporting other staff fOl~lOt d()in~ theirj~b properly_.'---------------1
Appendix 12(xxxiv): Stage Two respondent views of employees' attitudes to ESO - Company Six 
Respondent type Respondent no. 
Trade union officers/II 
representatives 
2 
3 
.. 
Managers 14 
5 
6 
r 
Other 17 
I Role 
I Branch 
representative for 
the TGWU 
I Company convenor 
Branch secretary of 
the TGWU 
Garage general 

manager 

I Service quality 
manager 
Traffic manager 
Service contro lIer 
1 Did employees feel like owners? 
• 	 'They took a keener interest in 
the profits the company was 
making and in the share price.' 
• 	 'They were only really interested 
in the money.' 
'No - it was just "something forI • 
nothing".' 
.......... --. -......._" ... 

• 	 'Share ownership was put 
forward very much as a fait 
accompli. I don't think any of us 
felt it was anything we had control 
over.' 
,. 
• 'The financial side - yes. 
Everybody felt it was their 
company and that they could 
benefit from it. However, their 
performance showed that there 
wasn't the interest.' 
'I certainly didn't. 1 didn't think 
about the company any 
differently. ' 
• 	 'No - not to the degree that they 
were willing to come in and do 
extra and above what they were 
supposed to do.' 
• 	 'No. You can't feel like an 
owner when you're not made to 
feel a patt of the team.' 
Did employees care about ESO? 
• 	 'Yes - I'm sure some of them 
did. The question is, was it 
anything to do with this company, 
or was it purely oriented towards 
making money? Would it have 
.. 111Iltt~I:~.~... ~hi.~.~_~?ll1EIlI1Y....\!... ':"~?..?:...... . 
• 	 'No - because a lot of them 
didn't actually buy shares.' 
• 	 'I don't think it ever occurred to 
employees to have ownership of 
the company or to have any say in 
the company.' 
• 	 'If you were to turn the clock 
back, they would say it was a bad 
thing. It took them away from 
their comfort zone - of being paJi 
of London Transport.' 
....... 1 

• 	 'Those who had shares may have 
been interested in what was going 
to happen, but 1 don't think it was 
(l[)igissue. ' 
• 	 'Shares are someone else's 
problem, and then the employees 
suddenly see others making 
something out of it.' 
• 	 'The shares were just a sholi­
term thing to buy a new car or go 
011 holiday - that's all it was.' 
• 	 'Involvement .. "it's something 
for other people".' 
Employee attitudes to the demise of 
ESO 
• 	 'It was a sum of money that they 
were going to get for something 
they had not had to payout for. ' 
• 'Once the shares were sold, 
everybody just grabbed what they 
could and that was it. ' 
...................................................................................................·...·..1 
• 'I don't think they were sad to see 
it go.' 
.. 'I wouldn't say they were sorry. 
don't think anybody really got to 
grips with it because nothing has 
changed. We still have the same 
directors, the same garages, the 
..sall1~ll1at1Clger~~: 
• 	 'Those who bought shares did 
well out of it and for those who 
hadn't bought them, it made no 
difference. ' 
• 	 'Now they've got nothing to work 
for. ' 
.. 	 'Having secn people make some 
money, 1think they'd be intercsted 
in owning sha,:;:r..;,c=.s.'-'______--I 
• 	 '[t would have bccn nice jf 
employces could have got a little 
bit morc money.' 
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APp~IIUIX ~",~I); ~lag~~ 1 WU .-espunuenI vIews un emJlwyee IIIVOlvemenl ano commllnlcanon - all com paliles 
Respondent no. Company One CompallY Two Companl' Three Company Four Company Five Comeanl' Six 
I • Employees can only • During ESO • Disseminating • Lots of scope for • Notices about • Virtually none. 

cxpress views through employees had more information to involvement but company Commercial interests 

the union (TU) input. They are kept a employees is down to managers are not activities/profits/ are the main priority 

lot more in the dark the trade unions (TU) interested (TU) losses in depots (TU) (TU) 
now (TU)
. .---.---_._ .... _- .................... ....................., " ........... ..._---_.............__._.....- ........... .................--- ........... .......... .......... . . ..... 
·· .. ·m.···. ............................................................. . . ........ . ........................_-_....... ........................................... 

. h . b2 • Employees have no • DrIvers know t e JO • Notices are displayed • Consultative • Managers give out • Employee directors 

real expectations- but managers don't in depots but there is committees but rarely information and hold do surveys and find 

they just want to be consult with them very little else (TU) occur (TU) one-to-one meetings out what employees 

kept informed (TU) (TU) (TU) think (TU)

..............._...__...-. 
..........-.......................................... . ...__........-..................__ ..............-.. __ ..... 
3 • Employee directors • Very little employee • There are too many • Seminars and • Opportunities for • Notices posted in the 
are the main channel involvement under the notices. Employees briefings during ESO managers to talk to depots/monthly union 
of communication for ESOP. Won·t be any don't read them (TU) - an 'open' staff. Communication branch meetings but 
employees (TU) under the new environment. No is encouraged (M) lack of interest (TU) 
__.. ~l\\ nership (TU) __ longer the case (TU) 
4 
~-
• There needs to be • Only interest to • Employees can make • Communication • Managers and trade • Difficult to get all 

more communication become involved suggestions to leaves a lot to be unions are both used employees together. 

and consultation (M) came at £6.40 a share management but desired (IU) to disseminate Use notice boards/ 

... ........................... ........-...........-.. ...- ............... ......... .....................................,....................._.._-_.... ... . .......__._.... .......... 

(M) should go to the union information (M) written information 
,·_..._...00._......._._.........._._ ................ ......._..............._...._..........-._. ................... ..................__............. __................ ....... .. . first (TU) [M) 

5 • Through employee • Employees will not 
~~ 
• Managers will • Use 'word of mouth'. Notices posted in the Usc of notice boards. 
directors, employees risk profits. They are implement suggestions Give information to depots. Increase in the Employees ask 
can get their point more switched on (M) if they are reasonable ·key' drivers to pass last couple of years managers rather than 
across at board level and cost-effective (M) on (M) (TU) their union (M) 
(M) 
...n'..... .................................. ....H• ....._......................... . ...................................... . ..................-....... ...... .............. "M ................_ ..... ..........

····..···.·.H···_..·.._n. 
6 • Employee • No secrets between • In-house newspaper • Divisional • In-house newspaper • Managers don't talk 
directors/works management and trade but samc contributors consultative and 'talk-back' to employees enough 
committee (M) unions but less time each time (M) committees and sessions but could bc - too much paperwork 
for discussion (M) occasional seminars improvements (TU) (M) 
(M)
.M...................

.. - ............~- ..... .....M __'_'_ •••,. .......-......................_._ .............._..............- ......- ..... •................HH... ............... . ........ . ........................................... .. ...,............. 

7 • Employees' • Limited scope. • Procedures for 

expectations are not Mainly rely 011 the informing staff are 

fully met (M) unions (M) fine but very limited 

~~~~~~~.......... involvement (0) 

8 • More consultation is • Managers 

needed (0) encouraged to talk. 

Communication is 

........__.... ".H ................................. ................................_.__........._...... ..................... • • ...H·H·.. ...................................__ ... ................_........... • .......................M ...... .. .. - ................... 

......__.. 
............................. _ ..• .. • ...n ....................... _._...... _.'_ .... .................... ............·_·n·__ .. .......................... . ~ ..~~~~~~~~~~.~~go.od .. a.!!y':Y.!~Y...{r~::D ....
._.H.H......._ ....· ..............,............................... .................................. 

9 • Managers should still 

be allowed to manage 

(0) 

TU = trade union respondent 
­
M = management respondent 

0= other 
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Appendix 13(ii): Stage Two respondent views on company industrial relations - all companies 

Respondent no. I Company Olle Compall)' Two Compall)' Three Compalll' Four Company Five , Compallr Six 

I 	 I. Employees and the • Worst it has been for a • Consultative and • Never known • Fairly okay. Have • Managers do their 
unions don't trust long time (TU) working towards co- industrial relations to moved from a small best but will break 
management (TV) operation (IV) be at such a low (Ill) family to a big family agreements when it 
(TU) ..~~i!~!he!!!JTYL. 
2 • 	 A pretty 'laid-back' • Industrial action is • Very co-operative • Very very weak (TU) • Reasonable - not • Senior managers are 
company. No strikcs imminent The unions but little flexibility on excellent (TU) fine to deal with. 
among engineers in won't be trodden on some issues (TV) Problems at lower 
(TU)
... _.!~I?~I1t.yt:(lt~.(IY.l .... .......................... . It:,:,els . .crY)
3 • Management tries to • Every chance of • Consultative. • Current climate is • Managers consult • Less consultative 
involve the unions industrial action - Previously expected adversarial (TU) with the unions but than it should be. Not 
every step of the way nature of the bus that it 'should' be managers should be enough union 
I··························· ......- ...•....................... +........-...\..:...::::.L ..........._ ........................... ........ ,............ I............ ",J~,~~:~.!!.d'.(I:~).. (l~':'t:!~ati'.l.I(T!.:Ll ... ........... . 	 <l]:>I~!gl!l~~JCl.il:gt:J1y!L. . involvement 

4 I • Everyone is still on a • Without co-operation • Consultative at • Co-operation by • There is co­
high. Don't know what industrial relations present but swings and default Managers do operation. Good co­
will happen in thc cannot work (TU) roundabouts (TV) what they want so operation comes from 
future (M) why challenge them? good consultation (M) 
(M) 
5 • Fairly co-opcrati ve • Engineering unions are • Neither good nor • Very consultative. • Unions don't get I • More consultative 
industrial relations very apprehensive and bad. Just keep Lots of arguments but everything thcy want than anything else (M) 
climate (M) TGWU may be in for plodding along as we parties work together but no point in making 
some surprises (M) always have done eM) to reach compromises threats (TU) 
JIylJ 
6 • Full discussion • Targets have to be met • Balanced at the • Managers and trade • Co-operativc climate • A very good 
between managers and regardless - whether by moment, but it can unions consult on but it has been an relationship between 
stop stewards. Union friendly dialogue or swing between most matters. uphill struggle (TU) management and the 
strength has not been threats (M) consultative and Sometimes arguc but unions. Previously a 
diluted (M) adversarial (M) not confrontational lot of bitterness ­
. themalldus'(1y!L
··········1 I .............. (~~) ... 
7 • Can get things done • Managers makc I • Everybody has to 
without wielding a big every efrort to consu It pull in the same 
stick (M) but could do morc (M) direction otherwise it 
'yoll'lwork (0) 
8 • Issues discussed in 
I 
• We talk to people 

depth. Things have informally and get 

not changed since the problems solved (M) 

•.... 
bl1)'~0 utJ())I· I t 	 I+9 • Only have problems 

during the wage 

negotiations. 

Flexibility is 

.-..L_--:.i:.:n~lp0l1al1t (0) ___....i__~ 	 _ ..___,t__ 1-_____ l_~~.HI :;;;'lrndc union respondent ..-----	 " 
M = management respondent 
0== olher 
Appendix 13(ii) 
AppenOIX Ijllll): ~tage I wo responoent views on me enecuveness OJ management m runnmg tne com pany - all compames (traoe unlOn/otner responoents om ) 
Respondent no. Company One 
1 • Management is out of 
touch (TU) 
,- 2- .... _- .............................__ ....- .............. ~~... 

• 	 They could be better 
but no real problems 
(TU) 
...... ....... ..........-......-................... .... . .............._, .... .... ............................................... 

• 
-' 
3 It is in their interests 
to be effective. They 
have a lot to lose if the 
company is sold (TU) 
4 
5 
6 
,............................................................. 

9 • I do not always agree 
with their methods but 
they seem to be 
managing (0) 
TU = trade union respondent 
M = management respondent 
o ~ other 
Company Two Compa/ll'Three 
• 	 New managers will • Managers are not 
make sure that the effective without the 
company's profit trade union. Both 
margins will be the share the same 
biggest yet. There interests in some 
wi II be greater respects (TU) 
.....__.~ffl~.i_~!1EY.JIY) ..m.. .-.- .... _.... 
• 	 Previously some • ('olnpany Three is 
managers were not the most sllccessful of 
progressive. There all the privati sed 
will be more companies. Managers 
investment now must be doing 
because the new something right (TU) 
owners want bigger 
_... pr.(?~!~(I~). 
.... ................ ,,-, ..................... .. .............. 

• 	 There is now a more • They are as effective 
professional but as any management 
tougher management. (TU) 
More profit-consciousl 
determined to get their 
own way (TU) 
• 	 Senior managers are 
effective. Below 
senior levels there are 
problems (TU) 
........... 

............... .......................................... ............ 

................._--_................................................ I· 

Company Four 
• 	 There is no such 
thing as discussion 
and consultation (Tll) 
..- ..........- ..........._--_..... 

• 	 Managers are unable 
to manage. All 
decisions come from 
head office (TU) 
.... -........................................... ....--.......--.......-....... 

• 	 Profitability is at 

record levels so 

management mllst be 

effective (Tll) 

• 	 Everything is money-
oriented. Managers 
want their pound of 
flesh (TU) 
........................................................... -............................ 

Company Five Company Six 
• 	 Management does • Insofar as buses run 

not know what it is on time and the 

doing. It is a lot company retains its 

diffcrent to how it was routes (TU) 

previously (TU) 

..... ....................._...__.__..._-_._........._..................................._.... -.. . ....................... _...._---_.... 

• 	 They're making • Managers could do 

profits and winning better. They cut 

awards so they must corners and don't 

be doing something communicate as much 
right (TU) as they should (Tll) 
,,"no ..........._._._-_.._--_........................................ 

• 	 They are effective 
because they cut 
wages and had to start 
running a profitable 
business (TU) 
............................................._..... . .......................................... ......._.... _.....- .... 

...................... .. ................._...... 

• No company is ever 
perfect. The company 
.__....__ }s effective (TU) __ 
• 	 Management is too 

effective for the 

unions sometimes. as 

the unions are 

constrained by law 

(TU) 

......,......... . ............. 

Appendix 13(iii) 
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Respondent no. Company One Company Two Compuny Three 
I 	 • Management does • Managers will expect • Longer-serving 
not have the human more commitment than employees 'go with 
touch it used to have before. Severe the flow'. Younger 
(TU) 	 consequences if that people just want to 
.. __......._---...-- .. ...............--.... .._--,.... ._....- .......- .....................................•..- .. -..--.... ........9..'?~s ..I?g~ll(1pp~~..r[y} ....... ....... '!l.(1~eI~gll.ex(TY) .. 

2 
~-~ 
• People are just happy • Managers don't • Some employees 

I that their jobs have distinguish between don't get to see the 
been secured (TU) good and bad senior managers as 
........._._..._-_.........._.. _.......-...._-..........- ... ...__ .. _--_...- ......................._..__., ... ..............._....... ...c:lllp!~y.~es (T!:!). .. ................ .... ......gf.!~I1 ...,ll1yl1l.()rc:.,(T~J) 

3 • We try to avoid a • Employees saw very • In any company, 
'them and us' situation little evidence of good employees will never 
(TU) relations under the support managers, but 
ESOP. There will be things have improved 
none under the new here (TU) 
..................... .."". - ............................._._. .._- ........_ ......... 	 ... _~~Il(;:E~~ip(TlJ) .... . __. ........_.......... ......................._....... 

4 
~ 
• There is distrust • 95 per ccnt of staff in • As long as managers 
between managers and the company are are looking after 
employees. ESO has motivated to work. You employees' interests, 
not been good for will never motivate the employees will 
everybody (M) othcr 5 per cent (M) support mmmgers 
(TU)
......................"._._ .................,,,,,.......,............. • _ ......._ ·.··_' •• ~_HH ........_ ............................. _ •..•• . ..... ......._.... ... ......... , ............. 

5 • Managers are very • Employees arc under • Employees go on 

approachable but no illusions. Targets union 
platfol'm staff go have to be met (M) recommendation ­
through the union (M) they want to be led 
......................... .........__..._- . -_..... • __..... __........, ••••••••••••••__H •• __•••••_ ........._ •••••••••••• ___.... _._........._.................... ................_ .............._.. 
.CM) 

6 • Managers do their • There is less loyalty to • There is loyalty to 
best under the the company. individual managers, 
circumstances (M) Employecs are not but not as a group (M) 
.- ....................................-..........._··.._· ..·........._..H_._··.. ......_...... ...i.l1tf:r(;:stf:<:Il:\I~~'llloEf:J.ML ....__._."... ......... 
7 • Company is on a 
fairly even keel - co­
..... _._...............,., ........... ()P(;:Eil!iyf:(MJ.......... ..... -.__._.. 

8 • Managers ful fiI their 

obligations to 

employees (0) 

..... ................. .....--_..... •••••••••••••••_ ....... ou ............. 	 .....................•.... 

9 
· 
It is in employees' 

interests to work with 

management (0) 

ru = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

Company Four Company Five Company Six 
• 	 People will not do • Employees don't • Most people 
anything to help the support managers for a wouldn't think twice 
company-no variety of reasons about looking for 
allegiance whatsoever (TU) another job (TU) 
.... ([11) 	 ... _.....__.................... .. ................................._-_...... . .._..... 

• '"' ..m,.....• ..•• 
• 	 Employees think that • Without the • Majority of 
managers and unions employees, employees wouldn't 
do nothing for them management hasn't support managers 
(T~!) ...................... _.. . . ........g,()t.(jI1)~~i!lK(T!:!) (TU) 

• 	 Managers are only • Managers will never • Around 80 per cent 
driven by greater satisfY everybody. of drivers in the 
profits. There is no You will always have company remember a 
time for employees cmployees who object much better job (TU) 
(TU) to everything (M) 
.................... .... ,_ .......__ ..... . ........ .- .-- ........__.__........ . ........._..... .. .............................._.... . ...._- ............._.. ,. 

• 	 Employees support • Employees do their • Gone through a 
local managers but not job and that's all they period of change but 
managers at a higher want to do (M) employees now 
level (TU) understand why it 
happened (M) 
............... 

• 	 Most employecs • Employees do not • There is a split. 
support managers but support managers but Some employees are 
you won't make would not tell the finc, others are not 
everybody happy (M) managers directly (M) 
(TU) 
.......................... .............-......... 

• 	 A good relationship • Employees have becn • Always 'them and 
locally, but there are beaten down over the us'. Employees 
problems across the years (TU) 'prcfer' a barrier (M) 
..colllPil11y(I\i1) , ................. ......... ....... -_.- ........ 	
. ........... 

• 	 Managers have had • Managers make 
to make some harsh themselves available 
decisions 
.............................. 
... . . ...I'()renl pl()y(;:es((), 
• 	 Some employees will 
always criticise how 
managers run the 
.............. .... 
conlpanxC£\1) . 
.. .......I 
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....... ~__ -. ...... L_~ ..... ~ ______ , __ •• _ 

~-- -~-----.. . ­
Res ondent no. Com all' One 

1 • Relationship has just 

got worse (TU) 

2 
~.-.....--... ....- .. "'. .... -..-._.-......-.-.....-.. .......................-.-... --­
• 	 Good working 
relationship but more 
flexibility is needed 
_........._........._........._.- (IY.L 

3 	 • Very good. 

Managers try to talk 

things through with 

the unions (TU) 

• 	 Poor at times. The 
unions make 
unreasonable demands 
5 • Okay but the parties 
can't be seen to agree 
on everything - have 
to 'save face' (M) 
........................-.... --........_. . .... ........-.......... 

6 • 
~~ 
Satisfactory, but 
unions don't 
appreciate the realities 
of the trading situation 
........................... _..... 

7 • Relations are quite 
good. No rcaI change 
since ESO (M) 
...................................- .......................... 

8 • Managers recognise 
that they have to 
consult with the 
llllioll.s. (Q) 
9 Managers involve the 
unions too much -­
they are too 
accol11modatin . (0) 
I'U = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

~ •• ______ •• _ ••______________ ~~._~_._ 
~--
Com Jail ' Two Com atll'Three Co an Four 
• 	 Prior to the new • A lot of sacrifices • Local line managers 
ownership, there was have been made. cannot make 
give and take on both Managers give out the agreements because of 
sides. Relations have wrong signals (TU) repercussions from 
now become much above (TU) 
~grs.~"..Q.:YL ... 
.... __........._..-.................." .. ....... ............-....... 

• Relations had started • Tremendous • There aren't any 
to improve but it's now improvements. Used management/un ion 
back to 'them and us' to be ·them and us' relations (TU) 
• 	 We'd built some • Steady improvement • Bad and getting 
bridges. Now waiting since 1994. Relations worse. Untrusting and 
to see what the new are stilll110ving confrontational (TU) 
owners are going to do upwards (TU) 
. ... -.- .. ........-.... ................................... 

• 	 Both parties know • Pretty good - a . give • Managers have to put 

where the other is and take' game (TU) up with the unions so 

coming from (M) they do (TU) 

...................................................................._.... 

• 	 Reasonably healthy • Co-operation quite • Give and take on 

management/union good all round (M) both sides. Don't 

relations (M) always agree but good 

working relationship 
• 	 Relations haven't • Times when there is • Fair. Some issues are 
changed. We've been tension but relations a bit strained (M) 
more involved with are generally good 
redundancies (M) (M) 
--_._~.-
Co an' Five 
• 	 Relations are not too 
bad (TU) 
..- ...............- ...-....-.... 

• 	 Reasonable. Each 
side has to tolerate the 
other, othenvise it 
doesn't work 
• 	 Fairly co-operative-­
compromise takes 
place. Never reach a 
stage of deadlock (M) 
........ ................ 

• 	 Very good 

management/union 

relationship (M) 

..........................................................._.. 

• 	 We wouldn't have to 
tight so hard in an 
ideal worfd but 
relat ions are pretty 
.. ....gp()dQ:U) 
• 	 Reasonably good. 
Unions may not get 
what they want but 
managers will alvvays 
·. . .. IistCII(Tid) 
• 	 Excellent. Not 
always agreemcnt, but 
reasonable disclIssion 
(M) 
• 	 Very high degree of 
co-operation aeross 
the hoard (M) 
-~---------- -.~------.-
CompanJ!.Six 
• 	 Fairly good working 
relationship (TU) 
• 	 Not too bad. The 
odd problem but that's 
part ofthe job (TU) 
....................................- '-""._'---"-.'''-'.... 

• 	 Company has held 
management/union 
industrial relations 
courses. Relations are 
.. .. ..pr~tt.ygog.~JT.y) __ . 
• 	 V cry good - very 
open. Mutual respect 
(M) 
• No problems now 
(M) 
• 	 Not a soft 
relationsh ip hut a good 
working relationship 
(M) 
• Quite good (0) 
~----.~--.--- .. -- -_.__ .- -­
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Respondent no. Company One Company Two Compan~ Three ComEuny Four Company F;ve CoJ1ll!tlIlY S;x 
I • Some employees • The union was put in a • People join unions • Industrial action • Employees have had • Unions would not get 
think that the unions compromising position mainly for protection would be fully to support themselves as much support for a 
aren't as powerful because of the EBT (TU) supported by the halfthe time (TU) strike now as 
..................•-............._---_..._.....__..... ______..... l:i'~yl!l()Et:(IY) .............,..._,..., (TU) workforce ('I"lJ) .............. p~e.:v.i.'?l!..?.IY.(T.YL .. 
2 • Engineering staff are • The bus industry is • Some longer-serving • There's an apathy • The unions don't • There is so much 
frustrated that the very union-oriented. employees felt let among the workforce have a lot of power legislation that 
TGWU has more say Employees appreciate down by the unions that the unions do nowadays - they are restricts the union, but 
(TU) the benefits e.g. the after privatisation nothing for them (TU) seen mainly as employees don't see 
...... ............ .....• ............... _0. ___........ . ................ ....... ..c!i~!~e.~_~ll!Ec!.!TY) ... __ ..... (TU) 	 _.il1sUHlI1Ce (TU)__ th!;It (TV) .......... ....., . 

3 • Unions are given • People need their trade • Employees had to • Over 80 per cent of • The union is there so • Members' feelings 

infonnation every step union to secure the best make a major sacrifice the drivers have people feel that they are weaker than the 

of the way to pass on dcaL The ESOP did not at the time (TU) reccntly sUPP0l1ed should he a part of it unions would wish 

to employees (TU) complicate that (TU) taking industrial (M) (TU) 

action (IU)
..,' ..•..... ............ . .......................................................... ••••••• ••_ •••••• w ....................................................._ ••___ ................__...... 	 .M ..............._...•••• _ .........._......._...•.• 

4 • Drivers get a lot of • Drivers will say • About 75 per cent of • The unions have thc • There's a lot of • Employees know it is 
information from their they've got bad terms the workers support support of the apathy among the best to have 
union but other and conditions no the un ion, bu t others cmployees but not to younger members (M) representation (M) 
sections less so (M) matter what (M) can't move out of the the same extent as 
-.__..... 
....................................__._--- ............................... 
......................._....,...,.......,., ..............._................ .El:i?t (IY) ..... "".,,""....... ..___E~t:-"i()~?!y(rlJ) . . ............ ...........................-_......._........ ................ .. .. -..... . ............................................. 

5 • Workers supp0l1 thc • During the ESOP, the Long-servers stili • People are now kss • Above depot level, • Some employecs 
· unions but the unions dual role ofthe union carry their interested in thc trade union officers are support the unions­
havc to make a few muddied thc waters (M) membership card with unions (M) removed and remote some don't (M) 
\\laves (M) 
__ pri~t:J1'1.L 	 (TU)
.. .......__...... ................................ 

6 • Unions generally • There is a good • Unions sometimes • Relations are • Employees pay their • Presently the unions 

represent the views of relationship. The union have a problem tentative - there are a union dues which don't have a very 

the workforce (M) is not in management's convincing the couplc of different would be difficult to good rapport with the 

pocket (M) 	 workforce that they're factions. People justify if they didn't statf(M) 
not in bed with blame them [the support the unions 
managers (M) unions] for the change (TU) 
(M) 

7 • Workers support the • Union membership is • People have got less 

unions in somc areas still very elose to 100 faith in the unions-

but not in others (M) per cent but the unions they teel let down (0) 
havc lost some of their 
....... ..........--.--...--....... . ·.. ···M·__ ... _....._ ....M.............._.....___._ .............................. ................ ......... .,........................... , ............ 	
......" ..- H_"_' • ......................................" ..... 

..........----..... ...... _..............._........... • M .. .. ....................... __ .M._._.......... .. .......... ...................... .. ........................ 	 following (M) 

8 • The unions have a • Few workers sec the 

secure position within union role as vital but 

the company (0) union oftlcers are 

...................-..-.........................................................-..--- ............. ....._..... .-................_._._...... .................... I.................. sl:itisfa<;t()Q' (1'1.) 	 ...._..........__..........._..
.......... t···················
9 	 • Most of the workers 
are in the union (0) 

TU = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 
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Respondent 110. Companl' Olle Company Two Compall)' Three Company Four 
3 
-.-..-.---.--..-.-_..- ......----. ....- _.. - .....•..._- ........._--_....._...... ....__.-.._........ _.....-......,.--.~... ,,- .... .. -............" ...-~ ................- ." ........_..... .................._..,,, ·····.····.··u ... , •... 1·-·

4 • They try to do their • There is no problem 

best for the workers (M) 

(M) 
..__. 
_..._.-.-_.....__ .. __.._._•... - ....... 
..- .......... _.._....._............. ,._... ,_................................ ..._...........-....._..- ... - ........_- ............._........_..... _. 

5 • Union officers are • Depends on the • Union officers try to • Pretty effective. 
effective (M) 	 individual. During the get as much as they They tell their 
ESOP, some officers can for their members it's in their 
did not divorce members. Some interests to accept 
themselves from the have the interests of certain things (M) 
union. Others had a the company at heart 
........ _~i~~t:I11l:gt!I~~<i(l\If) ........... i._Illor~ than others (M) 

6 • Fairly effective (M) • Union officers have • Ul1Ion officers are • Full-time officers 
coped well in very effective. need to try and 
extremely difficult Sometimes there are educate people on the 
circumstances (M) problems but they shop floor a little bit 
deal with them (M) more (M) 
••••.... ••• ....•••.... •• ..••....H ..._' ..................". . -..............................-..................... _---. ....._.... 	 . ........................ ,,_ .. ..............,,~.... 

Hm.... _.. __............................"_ ........._ ..... .._...................._--.-. ..........._..................---- .... .~" .._...... ..__..... 	 ....... " .. ..~...... 

7 • Lack of realism. 

Some officers don't 

want to know that the 

company can't afford a 

. ................. - ............... -.......
.......... p':lyris(:{l\If) . ....._........ 	 .....-._.. 
................. 

8 
............_..............._--_._- ......... I·· 
 ....... I·············· 

9 • Sometimes the unions 

are there to help you. 

Sometimes they are 

only out for 

themselves (0) 

ru = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

Company Five 
• 	 Some are better at 
being a leader than 
others. Some take on 
the job because no 
one else will (M) 
• 	 They're effective in 
leading their 
members and getting 
a fair deal (M) 
• 	 Very effective. It is 
in their interests to 
get the best for their 
members (M) 
. .... 
• 	 They have the 
I 
leadership skills. It 
is better to deal with 
people with those 
skills(l\If) 
--_.__._-­
COn/pam! Six 
..,.,.........- ........._..... ........- ."".........- .. " .. .. --.,...... ..........
'" 	 ~ 
• 	 VelY good at the top 
level. At grass roots 
level it is very weak 
(M) 
• 	 They are all out for 

themselves rather 

than working for 

their members (M) 

• 	 Good union officials 
are very important. 
Ifthey are passing on 
the wrong 
information it can 
calise plublcolilS (M) 
• 	 Very good at 
present. People 
complain but there 
isn't really a problem 
._ .. 
. ...... 
__________..1 
Appendix 13(vii) 
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Respondent no. I CotnpanJ' Olle i Company Two Compall\' Three Company Four Company Five Compan\' Six 
f 3 • About the right I amount. It averages 
out across the 
I 	 I
1 	 I 
l 	 I 1- c()Il1Ea,ny (tv!).-~- ~ ...._. i4 ! • Some of the • 1-.1anagers and unions 	 • Branch meetings are • Unions know that 
I 
demands made by the work alongside each 
unions are not other (M) 
feasible (M)

I 

--_ .. ----- I ............ ,...................... 
S II The unions have • The company has • The union probably 
influence but always had a has about the right 
managers should be consultation process amount of power at the 
allowed to manage that allows for union present time (M) 
(M) 	 input, but decisions 
have to be made at the 
.. - ...............- ............_._.-- .. ._.._- _.......__ .. _....._... " .........._......._....- .......... . 
........~.r.!~ ..of.tll~Aa,y.(f\i)... 
............ .._•••h ....... _ ...._ .....
~...... 
6 • Consultation is far • There won't be the • In the 1970s the 

and wide - it is very time for dialogue in unions had too much 

extensive compared the future. Each side power, then it went 

with some can have input but management's way in 

organisations (M) targets have to be met 1993-4. Now there is 

(M) 
.....--....... _.-_... -. 
........._.__._..... 	
a balance (M) 

7 • The TGWU has too 

much influence. 

Drivers can be taken 

off the road for a 

. _..............-
... .... .1!lir.!orquibb.l~(f\i1._ ..... ...... __ ... 
......................-- .................•._._....... 
••••••_ 
8 
......._.- .".....................~--.-- .... ........ .....................................................-..._..._..._. . ............- ...... .........._._._... _..•.•...._.... 
9 Managers involve 
the unions at an early 
stage in most things. 
It helps to smooth the 
way for change (0) 

TV = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 
I 	
• 
very poorly attended. 
Power comes from 
the support of the 
nl(!ll1.~ers(M)
... -- ....... ...... 

• 	 Some think that the 

unions have too 

much power, but 

they don't have as 

much power as 

previously (M) 

..............,,­
• 	 Probably about the 

right amount (M) 

. ..- ..........................................-.. -... -.-.-."......- .............-.. ..... "'-.-~--.. 

• 	 The balance is about 
right but power can 
swing from one side 
to the other (M) 
••- ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••......·_••••__ .... • •• h ••••••••••••••••_._•••_.__ ......M ................................................... ........... 

• 	 Probably about 
right. I wouldn't 
want them to have 
more power, but 
there are benefits in 
..... .h!l\,ir.!g.l:l..I:II1.i()I!.(f\it 
the managers have a 
relatively free hand 
but the managers 
don't abuse that (M) 
• 	 It varies. They [the 
unions) get involved 
in issues where they 
shouldn't get 
involved and vice 
versa (M) 
...... 	 .............._....._, .... ...._........... 

• 	 In the past they [the 
unions] have had too 
much. Now it's 
about right. There is 
a good working 
...... E(!!.a,tion.~~.ip ..(M1.._ 
• 	 There is a nice 

balance compared 

with the 1970s when 

they [the unions] had 

!9.21l111~hjJo~~E{Q) ... 
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Appenatx U(IX): ::;taj!'e 1 wo rcsponaent Views on the unIOn as me malll commumClItion cnannel to em plOyees on company POliCY - all compames \managememfomer responuems OUlY I 
Respondent no. Compam' Olle Company Two Company Three Compa"I' FOllr CompallV Five CompallY Six 
3 • There should be 
consultation with the 
unions but they should 
not be the main 
communication source 
(M)
.... -..................•........_ ...•..•. ..........................._.... .............-.~.--..... ................._- ...-.- .......­
4 • Workers should • There are differences • Unions are a major • The unions are 
consult more with but also a good communication recognised hut there is 
managers (M) working relationship channel but not the concern about how 
between managers and only one. It is good effecti ve they are in 
union representatives. for managers to communicating 
Each side respects the communicate with information (M) 
C?!hC;:E_>_rol~(Mt__..._ 
................................ ............ .........__..... 
s(aff<:l.!E~~!JX ..(~1) ............ __.__._ ....._.... 

5 • Worker directors • There will be less • It is better if every • Some union officers • Members do not gct to 
provide employees time for consultation employee is a union pass on information as hear the information 
with a lot of undcr the new member - it makes intended. Others rut because they do not 
information (M) ownership (M) communication easier their own 'slant' on it attend union meetings 
(M)
"'.................................- .........._........._.................. .. ......................... .._....... .f().r.I!1.~ll~g~~S ..(I\1Q........... (M) .............................. . ...... ......................-. 
6 • Worker directors • Managers are not • The unions are relied • It is right that the • Has to be discussion 
have a big input in secretive. If upon too much at company has trade between unions and 
communicating policy information is needed. times. Information is unions and collective managers to establish a 
to employees (M) trade unions receive it not always passed on bargaining. It 'common ground' (M) 
(M) effectively to encourages a 'tcam 
...................." ........................................................... ............................................................-......................__.-..... ......... ...~I!1pl()Xc;:~s(tyl) . .......... ............ .1!1(;I~~~li~y(tyl) .. . ..........................................--.. ,.............. ' ......_­
7 • Managers and unions • Trade unions are a • If unions are doing 
both have a role to good medium but their job propcrly and 
play in managers should have communicating with 
communicating with direct contact with employees, that's fine 
..............................-----.-.-~.. -........ 
... ..~I!lpl~y~c;:s.(Ml employees (M) (0) 

8 • Unions communicate • Unions are used to 

policy to employees some extent hut they 

but they are not the are not the main 

only channel (0) communication 

... ..............•........... . ... -.. ,~ .......... ................. ............- ............. ' ....... _..._.. 
(;ll(lflll.el ..(tyl) .... 

9 
~ 
• If management gets 
the union on side the 
rest of the staff wi II 
follow (0) 
TU = tradc union respondcnt 
M = management respondent 
0= other 
Appendix 13(ix) 
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A dix 13(x): S T d he ob' fESO- C ....• F, c Five (A) and C 7111 pam' S:~ ~ ~ ~ , . -­
Respondent no. CompallY Four CompallJ' Fh'e (A) Compalll'Sbc 
1 • 'To get the best deal for the workforce and • 'Maybe the directors thought they were giving 
break free from local authority control.' the drivers a stake in their future but I don't 
.ClY) 
. . ..... .. .......c' r~Ill~!Il:~~r!~':l!~~~i!1g~':lid.:'(T~) .................._........ 
~.--12 • 'To involve employees in owning a part of • 'The whole idea was to have share ownership • 'People were given the 0ppOitunity to have 
the firm.' (TU) for three vears and avoid a hostile take-over shares - that's all.' (TU) 
bid.' (TV)
.. ._..._.__.- ..._......_.....- ._ .. ..............- .---............... ............ , ..................-.....- ..... ..................... 

3 
~ 
• 'The directors could not persuade the • 'There were distinct advantages to buying the • 'It was never done to include people - it was 
council to sell to a management buy-out and firm ourselves. We wanted to control our own the lesser of two evils. It was a tiny bit of 
the trade unions wanted equality for the fate but we new it wouldn't last forever.' (M) money for us and a lot of money for somebody 
workforce.' (TU) else.' (TU)
....-- ..... .. -...- ..-..- ............_......................._.... 

4 
~ 
• 'We knew best how to run the firm. We • 'We knew we could be a target for some • 'To provide job security and to put our destiny 
didn't want other people coming in who did fierce competition. It also provided employees in our own hands. We broke away from 
not know what they were doing.' (TU) with a stake in the firm and gave them a celtain London Transport and took control of the 
amount of kudos.' (M) firm.' (M) 
5 • 'An ESOP was the only option the trade • 'We could control our own destiny to a certain 
unions and the local council were willing to extent.' (M) 
...__.-
.._..........-_....- ...........':l~.~.~pt.:.' .....(M) ...._.~_. . ............._....._.__. 
·· ..···.·._···_..·M.·.··· ..· 
 _~_...... _...... ·_·_ ••R ........~w••_ ...... ....................__..... .................._..... . ._....._........... . - .- ...__._---_._.... • _........_ ....... H ... ................_...... 

6 • 'The opportunity was there and it was easier • 'The directors didn't have a lot of choice. If 
to raise the money to pursue the strategy that they hadn't bought the firm, it would have 
we chose.' (M) been sold on to someone else. The buy-out 
• ......~n_______ ..... •
...........-~.-. ..........._.__._.__......--.-..-- .. -.............._................--.........__.._....... . . --.~.........._.......... . ...... ...-...-..... .. ................... .._-.... ......_..._.._...... 
~vas the~gl~~!y way forw.':l1:.9.' (M)
....._..._.- ......................-....._....._. 

7 
~ ~ 
• 'Profit. There was no other reason for it.' (0)
-_.-
- ­
TU = trade union respondent 
~ 

M = management respondent 

0= other 
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Respondent no. 
1 
. . _.....__ ...._.. _.. 
12 
I 
"J 
I 
, 
4 
5 
•• __ H._.··•••••__ 
__...-._..- .........­
............................ 

6 
7 
0-1_",ull-a;:;,""" 'l'YV l'-"~~VllU"" •• '" "I",Y.::J VI .. ~ ...... "\..f-YQ. ..... a~"~ U~ a;,,>.J''-' ,--v,."ple-,'_y ~ V_" _LfT,.,p ...... y .... •'r ... \ ... .I/ _ ...... '-'''''''''''1''--••• 
Company Four 
• 'You learned a hell of a lot. It was a way of 
protecting your wages and conditions at the 
.. -. 
......- ....!!.11lt:.:..:..<IY.1 . _....._. .. ........ ._ .... ..... .... ... 
• 	 'When we had share ownership we could go 
into meetings and threaten the directors with 
strike action because their money was on the 
line.' (TU) 
• 	 'You were on the inside of all decisions and 
I had five very interesting years.' (TU) 
• 	 'The main advantages were job security and 
a chance to try and secure our own future.' 
(TU) 
• 'J don't actually think it worked. There was 
no effort made to say what an ESOP was and 
. .... .._.~I~~!~"'9.~I~..~c;.~~~IIY...happel1:: ..(fliX ............................. 
• 	 'The main advantage was probably the 
consultation and communication process. 
People wanted to know what was going on. 
Financially, people benefited when we sold 
the firm.' (M) 
TV = trade union respondent 
M = management respondent 
0= other 
Company Five (AJ 
• 'There were fewer accidents because people 
were being more careful - they owned part of a 
. fa~Ux~'JTY.L 
• 	 'Financial reward was the main advantage.' 
(TU) 
• 	 'People had a greater interest in coming to 
work - it was more than just a job. They were 
encouraged to become more involved and had 
a different perspective. It was more than a 9-5 
iob.' (M) 
.. 	 'Everyone was working towards the same 
goal. We were all trying to make it into the 
best firm we possibly could and employees felt 
a part of it. They had the opportunity to have 
an input and it gave them job satisfaction.' 
(M) 
...-_... ......... .. •••••• _ ............HH •••__ .'M' ...._.... 
.._...- ............••.........._ 

Company Six 
'Initially most people did not gi ve share• 
ownership a thought, but there was a difference 
once the shares rose in value.' (TU) 
........... 

'Profit and what you could get out of it were• 
the main advantages.' (TU) 
..................-......... 	
...................._......................... 

• 	 'The free shares and the windfall afterwards 
were the main advantages, though we lost a lot 
of money at privatisation.' (TU) 
.--------. 
......................._...._.........._..........................-.. --._..--_..•..... 

• 	 'The firm performed much better because the 

responsibility was on us. It was down to us as 

employees at whatever level to make it work.' 

(M) 
•••_ ................ _.. • ••••_... • ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••_____•••••••• • ..................._ ................_ ........···.~.... u ..... 

• 'Financial reward was the main advantage.' 
(M) 
.......... .._••••••••• , __.ou........_ ••_ ...... _ ..............._. ". ............. -, ••_ ••••••• . ................ -..................._......... 

• 'Employees saw it as a chance to make some 
money and belong to a family again.' (M) 
.......... -......- ...................._........ ...........................................................................--........... ---............_.. 

• 	 'Employees got some free shares and a bit of 
money.' (0) 
Appendix 13(xi) 
I 
Annendix 13(xii): 
Resnondcnt no. Comoam' Four ComomH' Si\: 
• 	 'None really. I would have preferred to stay 
in public ownership but we had to protect 
what we had and the ESOP was the best way 
t?_~?._it:.~J!,~)........... __...........__......... _.....__...... _.. 
2 • 'The ESOP was the right strategy but the 
mechanism we used wasn't sufficient to keep 
_~\'.~r.y~()_9yJ~y~I:'(I!l) .... _ .......... __ 
3 • 'The disadvantage was that we couldn't give 
a more equal share to all.' (TU) 
4 • '1 don't think there were any disadvantages. 
We had to wake up and grasp the nettle.' 
(TU) 
5 • 'Very few people were interested in share 

ownership and the unions had too much 

6 • 'Overall, we looked inwardly. There was a 
lack of investment and we didn't take the bull 
the 
7 
TU = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

• 'There were no disadvantages.' (TU) 
• 	 'There were no disadvantages. Share 
ownership drew everyone closer together - it 
,
was an 
• 	 'It was difficult trying to get across what we 
were trying to do. We stumbled occasionally 
and it was a real struggle having to tell people 
that we couldn't afford to give them a pay 
rise.' 
• 	 'There was a constant concem whether you 
were doing it right or wrong. If you got it 
wrong you were costing the employees 
• 	 'At worst, share ownership was a small pay 
out and at best a large payout for those who 
had never put up any initial investment.' (TU) 
• 	 'Some people got nothing at alJ from share 
ownership.' (TU) 
• 	 'Wages were reduced and there was not 
enough time to nurture any feelings of 
ownership.' (TU) 
• 	 'Some employees made a lot of money out of 
share ownership - perhaps at the expense of 
other employees in the firm.' (M) 
• 'I don't think there were any disadvantages. 
It'sjust that people weren't aware of the 
'People who couldn't afford to buy shares 
may have become disillusioned.' (M) 
'We didn't really have a lot of influence. We 
had employee directors and some money in our 
Appendix l3(xii) 
l 
Res ondent no. Com an Four 
I • 'I think we would have gone for the same ESOP 
as before. We couldn't have bettered it.' (TU) 
2 	 • 'I would have bought shares.' (TU) 
I 3 
• 	 'The 51 :49 split should have been different and 
there should have been more co-operation 
between employee directors at different bus 
, 
4 • 'Employees should have been invited to put 
money in. They would have been more interested 
[in ESO] but they weren't asked.' (TU) 
5 • 'If employees had been required to invest money 
it would have created a better environment for 
success.' 
...........................................--- ... -.. _.... 

6 • 'If employees had been able to invest in the firm 
it would have given them a greater incentive. As 
a group they had 49 per cent but as individuals, it 
meant little to them.' 
7 
ru = trade union respondent 
M = management respondent 
0= other 
Com an Five (A 
• 	 'We would have done nothing differently. It 
was great the way it worked out. You could buy 
shares if you wanted or you could just have free 
shares. ' 
• 	 '[ would have bought more shares but other than 
that, we couldn't have done any better. I would 
use our firm as a yardstick for others because our 
as 
• 	 'r don't think we would have done anything 
differently. We had to make some serious 
decisions but we got there.' (M) 
• 	 'We wouldn't really have done anything 
differently. We went into it knowing that it was 
going to be a relatively short-lived experience.' 
.........................,.-..-. ........................-... 

. -.. -
- ----, ----- ---- - - - ,- -.,r - ----
Com an 'Six 
• 	 'In hindsight, I would have sold my house and 
bought as many shares as I could. I think I speak 
for most people.' (TU) 
••• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _•••••••••••••••••••••••• __ .....h ..... ............................._....... 

'1 never got involved in the dealings of the share • 
scheme so I can't comment.' (TU) 
.........•............_......_..... 

• 	 'I would have liked a level playing field and for 
things to be fairer.' (TU) 
.. _...... ................ _........ - .......... 

• 	 'Overall we can look back and say it worked 
very well. If there was one concern it was that 
we had to be financed very heavily by outsiders.' 
• 'People didn't understand the scheme. More 
user-friendly information could have been 

............. PE()y!4~ci:'(rv1J_._"

• 	 'Ifthere had been more ordinary shares available 
I think that employees would have bought them.' 
(M) 
• 	 'In hindsight I would have liked to have bought 
some more shares and made a lot more money.' 
(0) 
Appendix 13(xiii) 
_ _ _ _ 
Appemllx 15(XIV,: :stage I wo res[lonaent vIews on E~U anCl employee etllclency- LompaUjI 1'0ur, LompallY l'Ive (A) ana L ompllII 1~1X 
CompallY Five (AJ 
............- ........ • •••••• ._.M •• _••••••H •••••••M.H..................................._ •• ...-------.---­__ 
• 'We won an Investors in People award and share 
ownership was part and parcel of that. Employees 
felt a part of the firm whereas before it was just a 
case of being ownedby the council.' (TU)
f 
• 'I don't know whether their efficiency improved. 
We've always had problems with sickness and when 
we became owners we brought in external 
consultants who dealt with these matters and things 
improved greatly. However, the improvement was 
more to do with the methods the consultants used 
· ... E~th~r~h.<lI~..!lg~I1~r.~1 ~ha!l:g~}!lIl!!itl1.~~.:.( !'.i.J .... 
• 	 'I think that efficiency was probably fifty times 
greater under share ownership than it is now. 
Employees haven't got an incentive to perform 
anymore.' (M) 
............................._ .. --..........................................................._..... 

........-...... ~.............--...... • .....N .............~ , ............ ._............
~.... ................., ........... "............ .N.... 

TV = trade union respondent 
M = management respondent 
0= other 
CompallY Six 
• 	 'I doubt if ownership made a quarter of I per cent 
difference to the way employees worked and felt 
about their job. That's what most people would tell 
you.' (TV) 
.......' ........ _. _____...._ ••••_•••••__ ••••••H ••••_H.' ••••M ••____ • ___• _____ • __ ........ •••••M •••__ 

....H. 
'Employees who had invested a lot of money in• 
buying shares started to put in complaints about 
others who were messing around.' (TU) 
• 	 'Because share ownership was such a poor deal and 
so few people put money into it, the directors were 
left with a demoralised. disillusioned and inefficient 
workforce.' (TV) 
~..... •.....--.-...._..... --.- ....... -......... -......_.....................,."""..._........................................... 

• 	 'There were those who were truly interested in the 
success of the firm. For others, it was a case of 
, 
being owned by London Transport today. someone I 
I 
else tomorrow and someone else the day after that. I I 
,IThere was a lot of that.' (M) 
........-........................ " ... .. ......._....... 

• 	 'So few' people actually bought shares that it didn't 
really make any difference.' (M) 
. ............... " ... _...........- .........-...... " .........."....... ...... _............_............__........._... . ._-........._.... . ......... .. .. 

• 
--~ 
'Employees didn't seem to be able to grasp the fact 
that by being a shareholder, the way they did their 
work dictated how the shares performed. It took an 
awful long time for people to realise that they were a 
part of the firm. It started to show when you had 
staff reporting other staff for not doing their job 
properly.' (M) 
• 	 'I don't think that shares have got any real 
influence on people, not in this industry. I had no 
pereejJtion that I needed to work harder.' (0) 
Appendix 13(xiv) 
Respondent no. 

1 

_ ...H •••••__•••••__ .....__._. __ .....__ •••• _ ....... '._••• H 

2 
3 
4 
.......... .. __....- ............- ........- .......-.__........ 
5 
• _ ...N ...__......._ ......._._........__........._ ... 

6 
"N..............- ....... ......... ...... ........... 

CompallY Pour 
• 	 'Share ownership made no difference to employee 
efficiency. The job was still the same. The only 
difference was that we got more information on the 
firm's budgets. We knew exactly what profits the 
. .........f!r'!!.\'1~.~~~~i.llg~'(E!.2......_...._ ....... ... . ..... 

• 	 'Because employees did not have a financial stake 
they couldn't care less. They had the attitude that 
they were going to get their money at the end of the 
week regardless.' (TU) 	 .................... 

• 	 'At the beginning, owning the firm provided 

employees with more motivation.' (TV) 

• 	 'Share ownership did not change employees in any 
way. I don't think they even realised that they 
owned a part of the firm. We could have been more 
dominant and we could have forced issues. I know I 
never felt like a part-owner. [was just an 
..... 5:'!~plg)'~~:'"(IYL.......... ...................... .....m. .......... ................................. 

• 	 'Employees certainly weren't very efficient in the 
early years. Efficiency was terrible and productivity 
.....~a~.~x.:!Et:'!.l.~Iy.Is>.:y::_(~).. .. _.............. _.._ ..................... 

• 	 'I don't believe that attitudes overall changed 
towards the job from pre-ownership to ownership. ' 
(M) 
........._..--.... _..... .............. .. ..........................- .....................................-,.......... - ................................................_..... 

7 
I 
A dix 13(xv) St T dent . ESO and attitud k-C Fl C FiI'e (4) and C s: 

Res~ondent no. ! Coml!.alll' Four Company Five (A) C011lpanr Sh: 

~ ---0- -. - - -- '----------- -~- - - - - '- - - - -- - - - - - - - - -- - -- . - - -
- - --:.L_, ---. ~ - , -- ..~ 
I • 'We didn't get a great number of shares from the 

ESOP. The only time that share ownership meant 

anything was when the firm was sold. The carrot 

r········..··..······ ........................ ....... _.... ................ ~1l~ ..d.~!gl~~.1l..~d.....~.ll!pJ(')y~I'!~.. !99~.i!:'_ .. (I..ld)................ 	 .... ........_.... ................... 

• 'When employees had free shares they weren't • 'It's all down to how people are treated and how 
! 2 interested. In their eyes they d idn't have shares - they feel. If they feel involved and a part of the 
there was no value to them.' (TU) firm, that is what matters.' (TU)
I 
3 • 'Employees had access to a lot more financial • 'I think their attitude to work probably changed 
information when we owned the firm. The result for the better, although we'd always had a good 
was a knowledgeable workforce and an obvious reputation. Employees enjoyed knowing they 
change in attitude to their work.' (TU) had a stake in the firm and were proud of the 
.............. ..__...__....- .... -.-- ..._..._.__ ..... ..-.-..-.... .... , ..--...... ..... ............. _.. _....... 

firm.' (M) 
~ 
4 • 'Share ownership did not change employees in • 'We spent a lot of time explaining to employees 
any way. I don't think they even realised they what ownership was all about and how every 
owned a part of the firm. We could have been passenger we carried meant a more profitable 
more dominant and could have forced issues. 1 finn. They picked up as many passengers as 
know 1 never felt like a part-owner. I was just an possible. It was their firm and they were making 
employee.' (TU) it stronger. After share ownership their attitude 
to the firm and to their work completely changed 
and you could see that in the first six months of 
~ 	
their sickness and absence reports.' (1\11) 
5 • 'Employees were actually complacent because 

they were owners. Now we have targets set for 

the group. Before, as an ESOP finn, budgets 

. .... ......_.-.... ...._.........._.- ....................._~~~~ .. tl?~..~.E~yi..s..~.~ ...~y.~r.y ..?_~;x:.lll()!.I.!b~..:'......(l\1.L....... 
. ..... ......-_.... ................ .........._..._..... 

6 'A lot of people here just come along every 

_.........._.... ..-..........-................... ............................. _._........................- ............. ........................." .........,,_...- ...... . ..........._...- ........-.- ......_...... 

II 
week, do their job, pick up their money and go 
home.' (M) 
....._._....__..... ........_._........ H····_·_.__·.. ·· .......... ................ ........-.__..... ................. ........._........ .................... 

7 
lU = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

• 	 'For most people, the money they had tied up in 
the firm was only from the shares and it was a 
fairly insignificant amount.' (TU) 
~ ~ ~. _............-.............. -- ..............._..........._....._..... "" " ...,... ................,........ "'......._......... .... ..... 

• 	 'The majority of employees just got on with 
their work. They didn't care whether the shares 
went up or down until the actual time when they 
were sold.' (TU) 
• 	 'ESO affected very few people in terms of 

changing attitudes to work.' (TU) 

...._....._-...- ...._........._-_ .. _... _....._.....__........-.-- ..... _._._......_­
• 	 'The commitment was there according to what 
you had put into the firm and what you wanted to 
see come Ollt.' (M) 
• 	 'So few people actually bought shares that it 

didn't really make any difference.' (M) 

.............-.... ......... .•..__....... 

• 	 'Employees didn't seem to be able to grasp the 
fact that by being a shareholder, the way they did 
their work dictated how the shares performed. It 
took an awful long time for people to realise that 
they were a part of the firm. It started to show 
when you had staff repOliing other staff for not 
......doil1g!~~~rjob.p~l?p~rlx::(f\,!\) 
_........._..... 

• 	 'I don't think that shares have got any real 
influence on people, not in this industry. I had no 
perception that I needed to work harder.' (0) 
Appendix 13(xv) 
Appendix 13(xvi): Stage Two respondent views on ESO and attitudes to the trade unions - Comp(tny Four, Compan)' nve (4) aJ1~ Company Si'( 

Respondent no. I Company FOlir Company Five (AJ ---- __~!,,!I.eaflY Six 

I. 	 .I think that everybody stayed in the trade union !. .I don't think there was any real change because 
and everybody knew it was still the trade union. I people did not actually believe they had a stake in 
Managers still had to manage, we still had to be I the finn. It was not a real stake - not with a few 
there to represent our members.' (TU) I pel1ny shares.' (TU) ~2 l~-" 'Si1af~~w~ership did not chang~en;ployees' .'A trade union is there for the benefit of the /.. • 'Y~~ still n~~cipe~pie who can represent the 
attitudes because the shares were not worth people. Employees knew that they still needed \vorkforce.' (TU) 
anything to them. In their eyes they didn't own the union. It was probably an insurance policy­
1-3 .m... - .... +- shares.'X() \1 11 e~'~r k.11()'W'W~ el1)!()1l111ightl1<:e~ .i~.: (Tid ) 
• 	 'There was no change in attitudes.' (TU) • 'There was not a conscious attitude that the • 'A lot of people are now guarded against the 
unions weren't needed anymore. Their role unions. It stems from privatisatioll - not from 
perhaps shifted a little. We deliberately included how it was handled, but the unions' inability to 
the union when we first considered buying the stop any of it.' (TU) 
firm. We were all buying the firm and needed to 
be in it as a whole.' 
4 • 'Share ownership did not change employees in • 'A change did occur. The trade unionists were 'Employees were guided by and relied heavily • 
any way. I don't think they even realised that shareholders themselves but despite being on the trade unions to find out what was going 
they owned a part of the firm. We could have shareholders they would still act in a trade union on. I don't think they ever felt misinformed, that 
been more dominant and we could have forced capacity when it became necessary. Because of they had been treated badly by the unions or that 
issues. I know I never felt like a part-owner. I staff commitment to the firm we never really had they had been unfairly represented.' (M) 
..:"yCl~J..':I~!.~1!~ll~plgy.~~::(Il}).. ...... .... ...... ..... .!()!est !!.:.: .(~) 
5 • 'I don't know whether it was as a result of the • 'So few people actually bought shares that it 

ESOP but the majority of staff now approach didn't really make any difference.' (M) 

manacrers with their problems.' (M) 

,1. ..I 6 . . ............. j';- ····;·wh~i~~;;~pi~Y~~~~~~ii~~dth~~~I~~~f tl;~ fi rm 

• 	 'Employees didn't secm to be able to grasp the 
they asked why they could not have invested in it. fact that by being a shareholder, the way they did 
They believed they had been sold out by the their work dictated how the shares performed. It 
unions.' (M) took an awful long time for people to realise that 
they were a part of the firm. It started to show 
when you had staff reporting other staff for not 
\'I"..m 	 mm!.j doingtI1eirJo~properl)':' (~) 

7 • 'There was no difference in attitude at all.' (0) 

TU = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

Appendix 13(xvi) 
1 
, 	 - - - --- - --- ---- - - ---., - - -- - ----. - -. - ,~-'" - - - --- ---- ---­
Respondent no. Compan~ Four 	 Comp_allY Five (AJ CompallY Six 
1 • '[fyou put £50,000 in, it will mean • 'Employees did feel like owners. We were a • 'Employees took a keener interest in the 
something. But I still think we took the right small firm but we were also a family.' (TU) profits ofthe firm and in the share price. They 
decision - it was the right way to do it.' were only really interested in the money.' 
(TU) (TU) 
2 • 'The shares were worth nothing to • 'The majority of employees felt that they had • 'Employees did not feel like owners. It was 

employees in their eyes so share ownership something to give so they asked a lot more just "something for nothing".' (TU) 

didn't change their attitudes.' (TU) questions aboLlt what was going on in the 

firm.' (TU)
._ .......-......_ ................_..-....__...... 
..__.. . --_. .. ,...........,......._- ............................•.- ................... ... -- ....-...... ... .... .... .... 	 ................... ......, ...-._-----.---,.. . . . .................. -..-- --.. ...- ......- ........_... .. .......... ... ... - _. .. _.•.. _....
~- -~-	 ~ 
3 • 'The reality was that the managers still • 'There was only a 64 per cent take-up of • 'Share ownership was very mLlch a fait 

controlled the Jives of employees day-to-day, shares at the time. It wasn't an overwhelming accompli. I don't think any of us felt that we 

so allY feelings of ownership soon wore off.' response but people generally couldn't afford had very much control over it.' (TU) 

(TU) it.' eM) ___ 

--_... ........_.. _.. ···.···H.·..·······.··__ .................................~_ ..........___... .•.. __ ....•....._.......................-- .•.•. _.._-...•••.•••.... .._.. 

4 	 • 'Employees did not feel like owners.' (TU) • 'I really believe that employees did feel like • 'On the financial side, employees were 
owners.' eM) 	 interested. Everybody wanted to benefit but 
their performance did not indicate that the 
interest was there.' (M)
•••••••_ ••••••••_ ................... _ •••• h ••_ ............. 
h ••••••••h •••••••h •• ____ •• · __________• ___••h ••__ •••••_ ••_•• ..... ____.___.._.h. . · .....h.. ,............_.....~_..__.........."..,._....._... ........._ .......... ......•..•..•. _..................._••. ..... "__••.• ,.................,,,........... ....•._._...................... ............ ............_ ........_.... ........._H. .. ...................._..• 	 i 

I5 • 'There might have been a few employees 
~ 
• 'I certainly didn't think any differently about 
who felt like owners. We did provide the firm.' (M) I 
information at seminars but people just 1 
weren't interested.' (M) 
.................__........_.H.H•..... ·. __•...•.._.__ •. 

" ...._................H•••_.' ......"•.H........ ......................._ ....................··· ..._.·_........."H.._•....... __ ................ 

6 • 'Owning the finn actually meant very Iittl~' • 'Employees did not feel like owners to the 
to employees. A lot of people resented the extent that they were willing to come in and do 
fact that the managers owned 51 per cent.' over and above what they were supposed to 
(1\1) do.' (1\1) 
7 • 'You can't feel like an owner when you're'~;t 
made to feel part of the team.' (0) 

TU = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

I 

Appendix 13(xvii) 
A dix 13(xviii): S T 
Respondent no. Company Four 
1 • 'We still get the odd gripe that employees 
should have been able to buy shares but we did a 
deal which meant employees got their share of 
the firm at no cost.' (TU) 
........_..._...-- .. _.._.- .... -..__..... _,....-........_." ..... _...._... -.. --,. 

2 • 'There were actually quite a few employees who 
opted out of receiving the free shares. They said 
they didn't want them.' (TU) 
... _...... -. __...._-_..__._-----_... 
......•........._--_... ,.............. "._......._............ 
3 • 'Employees only cared about share ownership 
for a few months when the shares had real value.' 
(TU) 
4 • 'The majority did not care about ownership. 
However, now that people can buy shares in the 
new firm they are looking in the paper to see how 
the shares are performing. That's because 
they've actually got money invested.' (TU) 
dab ESO-C Fi compon 
CompanJ'five (A) 
• 	 'Employees cared because we were a small firm 
and everybody knew everybody else. We are 
now paIi of a much bigger firm. The new 
managing director likes to think we're a family 
but it's not like how it was.' (TU) 
• 	 'Employees cared about the firm. The shares are 
just a piece of paper. I think it [ESO] made 
employees more aware of where the firm was 
.........g~!.llg:..'(T!:J) 

• ................" .........._ ••~ •••••••••••_ •••••••••n ••• ' ••••• 

• 'A lot of employees cared but a lot of them 
didn't. Some carried on as if nothing had 

""PP"""U ' (M) 

• 	 'At the outset there were a lot of negative 
comments but no real objections. There were 
very few people who didn't want to invest in it 
but there were people who couldn't afford to 
invest in it. Once they got into share ownership 
and became a part ofthe firm it was probably the 
........_- ...-. _.... ,...... _........._._......._-_ ..... . ................ _........._..... ...... .........._._~~~!.t.~.\~g.t.~<l.t ..~<lpp~.~.~.9....!?.ll.~~:JI'0.L...... 
5 • 'Employees only cared when the firm was sold 
and they saw the cash.' (M) 
n_~• • ••• · ••••••__ ....... _____ • •• _"._.__ ••••••• •• ••• ··_· ••__• . ...__........._._........._.....,....... _..... 

6 	 • 'Employees did not care about ownership until 
the end.' (M) 
·.._n. _____ .._. __.., 
.... .... 	 .. ..................".__ ..... 

7 
~ 
TU = trade union respondent 
M = management respondent 
0= other 
Five (A) and C S,' 

Con1fJ!lflV Six 

• 	 'I'm sure some employees did care about share 
ownership but was it to do with the firm or purely 
to do with money. Would it have mattered which 
firm it wasT (TU) 
..... . ... , ..._.. •• __• __ ••H.H•••• __ •••__••• • 	 .............. -.
~-.--.--. 
• 	 'Employees did not really care about share 
ownership because a lot ofthem didn't actually 
buy shares.' (TU) 
• •••••••••••••__••••••_ ............._ ••••••••••~............_m•••• 

• 	 'I don't think it every occurred to employees 
that they were owners in their firm or had a say in 
their firm.' (TU) 
• 	 'If you were to turn the clock back employees 
would say share ownership was a bad thing 
because it took them away from the comfort zone 
of London Transport.' (M) 
• 	 'Those who had shares may have been interested 
in what was going to happen but I don't think it 
__ "'_~.(l...~.igJ~sll~~.'.(ML........_. 
.._----._......-,.......•••_......................,.--....... 

• 	 'The shares were seen as someone else's 

problem until employees saw what others were 

...... _.ll~a.~irlg?1l!.?.f!ll~'.~:'(M1 
. ..................... ­
• 'The shares were just seen as short term -­
something to use to buy a new car or go on 
holiday. 'Involvement' was seen as being 
something for other people.' (0) 
Appendix 13(xviii) 
'" 

A dix 13( . s T d ---- . __ .. - ----hed fESO-Co F, c Five (A) and C, s: 

Respondent no. Company Four Compall}, FIve (.4) Compalll'Sir: 

1 • 'At the time, employees did not care who 'We were all very very sorry but it had to be.. • 'It was a case of getting a sum of money for 
• 
was taking over the firm - they saw the (TU) something they had not had to payout for in 
money and grabbed it. Most of them are now the first place.' (TU) 
.. --'i~ng.toregreUt.'.Cr.y)...... 
2 
--.------ ~.-- --...-_.-,- -._.... 	 . .. 
• 	 'Employees were not really bothered • 'Employees were sorry because they had felt a • 'Once the shares were sold it was just a case 
because they had not invested anything into paIi of something for three years. They had of everybody grabbing what they could and 
the firm themselves.' (TU) worked hard to build the firm up into that was it.' (TU) 
someth ing.' (TU) 
.... 	 .-.....-......._.•.... 

.) " 	 • '99 per cent of employees votcd to sell the • 'A lot of employees were sorry - it was a sad • 'There may have been a few employees who 
firm. The offer made was enough for day when it ended. They got the money but it were sad to see the end of share ownership, but 
anybody.' (TU) wasn't about the money. It was about the majority were not.' (TU) 
..-... _-.-.._...... -...-... ....-.. .--.................................................. 	 ............ s()ll~~th.~~1.g!!1~y~~<:!c;E~~~t:9·'(l\i) ............................................................................... -................................ 

4 • 'One day employees had shares they didn't • 'It was not a case of them being sorry about • 'Employees had never really got to grips with 
really own and the next day someone was not being shareholders any longer. They were share ownership because nothing really 
offering them £10,000. It was a ridiculous sorry that they had lost the "family" changed. We still had the same directors, the 
""........... ....... "_.~~~i!)..i.~J,1 ..!~...~.~~...~I1.y.?~.~y.. !gl~.Cl:~c:.:' .....(IY) (It!.!10~P~~E.e:'..(l\i) ............ ........s~.Il!e.g.ar(lge~...(lI1:?t~~".!)Cl:I.~.~ ..!!l.(lI.~llcgt:t!):..~......(l\i).......... 
5 .. 'The employees all just saw the pound 'Employees who had bought shares did well 
~ ~-. 
• 
signs.' eM) 	 out ofthe sale. It made 110 difference for those 
............ ......... 	
...\VI~g .. hCl:g.. !!~t... ~~L!g~t~~.~I:~S.:..'.(l\i)..... 

6 • '99 per cent of them voted to take the • 'Employees perhaps are sorry because now 

money. It wasn't as if they had been getting they've got nothing to work for. Having seen 

anything out of the ESOP.' (M) some people make money, I think they'd now 

......... .._._.. --.--_...................-- .. .................. ._ ....... ,,---. .. .... 	 .......~e.i.l1t~Ees~~d ..i.l1g.'Yn.i!!g .~.ba1·e.S.'.. (l\-!)
-...... 	 .......-- _ 

7 	 • 'It would have been nice if employees could 
have got more money from the sale.' (0) 

TU = trade union respondent 

M= management respondent 

0= other 

Appendix lJ(xix) 
A 
I • 
I 
I COn/pam' Six 
2 • 'Objectives weren't met because we got derailed 
half-way through. Directors were motivated by 
greed and were keen to save money and employees 
did not pay for their shares so share ownership 
meant nothing to them.' 
3 • 'Objectives were met. The directors had wanted to 
control the strategy and direction of the firm and this 
was achieved for the duration of share ownership.' 
(TV) 
• 'Objectives were met although we could have done J 
better in hindsight. We knew how to put buses un 
the roads but we've had to learn how to make a 
profit out of doing it.' (TV) 
• 	 'Objectives were not met because people weren't 
really interested. Very few people used to attend 
meetings - they jus! wanted to come into work. get 
P.<l!4_.<lJ:.~ .. g?.ll?r11.i':.:.' .... i!:;'l)...._......... 	 ..+ 

6 	 • "Objectives were met in that directors had control 

of the firm for five years. However, there had been 

an expectation that share ownership would be a 

longer-term project. We didn't go into it to sell the 

.....fi r.!!l:...0\1t:: .Y~<lrs ..d()\VJ1!.he._~()a~.:'.....(!:;'I). 
7 
TV = trade union respondent 

M = management respondent 

0= other 

• 	 'The directors kne\1 they could run the firm for 
about three years before running into trouble. 
Employees also got an excellent return as well. 
£ 1.000 became £ 18.000.' (TlI) 
• 	 We decided to take share ownership and do 
something with it. We changed the culture. bought 
new vehicles and got a lot of interest going, 
knowing that we could not survive but it was great 
fun. There was never a minute to sit back. We 
enrolled ourselves on a limited time of ownership 
but it was better than the uncertainty of being sold 
• 	 'Anyone who invested £1,000 made nearly £ 18,000 
three years later - you wouldn't get that from a 
building society. We had a product and managed to 
sell it for £8 million.' (M) 
• "ESO was the "in-thing" to do at the time and we 
were paying "lip-service".' (M) 
• 	 '\\'c had such a dramatic changeover of staff over 
the three years that probably only a third of people 
had shares by the time the firm \Vas sold.' (TU) 
• 	 "Objectives were met in the end judging by what 
the directors got out of it.' (TU) 
. I closed my eyes to a lot of it because I could not 
accept it in principle. I probably switched off and 
didn "t see any advantage.' (TV) 
• 	 'Objectives were met because we were successful. 
The shares benefited everybody, even if they were 
only free shares, because people got quite a good 
return. We went from strength to strength in that we 
became worth far more than what we were 
()I:igitlii'ly~.9ug):1t/:(JL .'jl'v1) 
• 	 "The buy-out was the best thing (hat could have 
happened to the staff. People who invested 1110ney 
got their reward.' (M) 
• 	 'Objectives were met because we made money hut 
it eanw at a nrice.' (OJ I 
Appendix 13(xx) I 
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Appendix 14: K-W ANOVA - ESO satisfaction 
Ranks 
Mean 
Company N Rank 
Satisfying 1.00 49 96.62 
2.00 95 112.08 
3.00 104 148.98 
Total 248 

Stay 1.00 
 48 91.03 
2.00 95 111.45 
3.00 103 149.74 
Total 246 

Own 
 1.00 50 98.04 
2.00 95 118.52 
3.00 104 143.88 

Total 249 

Care 
 1.00 47 106.16 
2.00 94 119.53 
3.00 104 133.75 
Total 245 

Important 1.00 50 96.46 

2.00 95 128.26 
3.00 104 135.74 
Total 249 

Proud to own 1.00 50 101.70 

2.00 95 119.63 
3.00 104 141.11 
Total 249 
Test Statistics",b 
Care Imoortant Proud to ownSatisfvinQ Stay Own 
Chi-Square 23.702 28.119 16.073 5.743 11.146 11.619 
df 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Asymp. Sig. .000*** .000*** 0.000**" 0.057* 0.004** 0.003*· 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Company 
••• Significant at 0.001 ** Significant at 0.01 • Significant at 0.1 
Results of the K -W test above verifY results of the ANOV A test presented in Section 6.2 
in Chapter 6. The test found significant differences between the companies for all six 
variables ('satisfying', 'stay' and 'own': p =0.001; 'important' and 'proud to own': p = 
0.01; care: p=O.l). 
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Appendix 15: K-W ANOVA - organisational commitment 
Ranks 
Mean 
NEWCO N Rank 
Proud 1.00 56 109.85 
2.00 100 126.76 
3.00 111 152.70 
Total 267 

Feel 1.00 
 56 105.87 
2.00 100 135.82 
3.00 111 146.56 
Total 267 

Effort 
 1.00 56 118.73 
2.00 100 134.10 
3.00 112 142.75 
Total 268 

Contribution 
 1.00 56 123.09 
2.00 100 132.73 
3.00 111 140.65 
Total 267 

Financial 1.00 56 113.18 

2.00 99 124.70 
3.00 111 151.60 
Total 266 

Money 1.00 56 115.28 

2.00 100 125.14 
3.00 111 151.43 
Total 267 
Test Statisticsil,b 
Proud Feel Effort Contribution Financial Monev 
Chi-Square 13.678 10.976 3.823 2.123 11.958 10.84E: 
"2 2 
Asymp. Sig. 0.001*** 0.004** .148 .346 0.003** 0.004*" 
df 2 2 2 <. 
a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Company 
••• Significant at 0.001 •• Significant at 0.0 I 
Results of the K-W test above verify results from the ANOVA test presented in Section 
6.3 in Chapter 6. The test found significant differences between the companies for four 
variables _ 'proud' (p = 0.001), 'feel', 'financial' and 'money' (p = 0.01) - but found no 
significant differences between the companies for the variables 'effort' and 
'contribution' . 
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Appendix 16: K-W ANOVA - desired participation mean ranks 
Company N Mean Rank 
Desired policies 1 90 381.44 
2 104 391.69 
3 186 404.39 
4 212 414.96 
5 121 399.08 
6 94 420.06 
Total 807 
Desired own depot 1 88 412.55 
2 105 377.98 
3 186 402.15 
4 212 427.61 
5 121 388.23 
6 93 387.02 
Total 805 
Desired own Job 1 89 404.62 
2 105 365.25 
3 187 399.40 
4 210 416.74 
5 121 417.61 
6 93 401.28 
Total 805 
DeSired wages and 1 89 425.74 
bonuses 2 105 384.41 
3 188 414.62 
4 210 401.09 
5 121 403.15 
6 93 387.17 
Total 806 
Desired health and safely 1 89 41483 
2 105 356.87 
3 188 420.07 
4 210 415.32 
5 121 390.23 
6 94 406.68 
Total 807 
DeSired staffing 1 89 419.24 
2 104 386.41 
3 185 409.15 
4 210 414.92 
5 121 381.60 
6 94 386.25 
Total 803 
Desired new products 1 89 413.93 
2 105 388.11 
3 186 401.61 
4 210 405.14 
5 121 409.11 
6 94 399.39 
Total 805 
Desired new machinery 1 90 432.26 
2 105 389.08 
3 183 416.58 
4 211 408.51 
5 120 373.52 
6 94 380.B2 
Total 803 
Desired investment 1 90 378.37 
2 105 356.96 
3 185 401.52 
4 211 432.44 
5 120 440.48 
6 94 36701 
Total 805 
DeSired recruitment 1 90 415.93 
2 105 38913 
3 185 382.23 
4 211 423.90 
5 121 424.73 
6 94 376.38 
TOlal 806 
Desired training 1 90 44352 
2 105 397.96 
3 186 380.45 
4 212 412.76 
5 121 420.05 
6 93 378.81 
Total 807 
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Appendix 17: K~W ANOV A - actual participation mean ranks 
Company N Mean Rank 
Perceived pOlicies 1 89 394.75 
2 104 38803 
3 187 384.87 
4 215 440.95 
5 122 410.03 
6 93 388.91 
Total 810 
Perceived own depot 1 89 412.93 
2 104 386.06 
3 187 38542 
4 215 450.51 
5 122 393.90 
6 92 366.89 
Total B09 
Perceived own job 1 89 399.53 
2 104 419.69 
3 188 387.75 
4 215 466.00 
5 122 373.10 
6 93 338.23 
Total 811 
Perceived wages and 1 89 345.50 
bonuses 2 104 435.12 
3 188 415.87 
4 214 44446 
5 122 412.71 
6 93 309.74 
Total 810 
Perceived health and 1 88 392.22 
safety 2 104 374.59 
3 188 416.15 
4 213 45138 
5 122 375.25 
6 93 357.02 
Total 808 
Perceived staffing 1 89 417.29 
2 104 41027 
3 186 380.57 
4 214 445.32 
5 122 381.07 
6 93 370.47 
Total 808 
Perceived new products 1 89 421.38 
2 104 403.37 
3 187 386.80 
4 215 442.50 
5 122 391.09 
6 93 363.66 
Total 810 
Perceived new 1 89 412.38 
machinery 2 104 421.14 
3 187 380.17 
4 214 429.29 
5 120 406.64 
6 93 363.13 
Total 807 
Perceived investment 1 89 39009 
2 104 413.27 
3 186 385.02 
4 215 426.61 
5 122 41743 
6 93 383.70 
Total 809 
Perceived recruitment 1 89 404.30 
2 104 402.16 
3 186 381.37 
4 215 440.75 
5 122 39641 
6 93 384.72 
Total 809 
Perceived training 1 89 403.48 
2 104 422.47 
3 187 381.84 
4 215 440.87 
5 122 384.43 
6 92 377.26 
Total 809 
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Appendix 18: 'Participation gap' - Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test 
Actual and desired participation (means) at Company One 

Decision Actual Desired Gap Sift 

.g~:Pd~;of·21i~i~~t1j········J·· ~:~~ ....... jjb ................. ~:66}:·:·:··· 

Own job 	 3.49 2.00 l.490:60"}"***·· 
~............. "' ....... ......-..............-..,.. 

3.96 2.21 l.75 	 0.001***.~<l:g~.~<l:!1.~.. ~<:J!111~e.s 
Health and safety 3.83 2.12 l.71 0.001*** 
2.64 1.74 0.001***.~~~ff'i!1g ..... ....... . ..~}? .......... . 	 ...-.. ,... , ...................._.............. 

Newpr()cluct~ . 4.35 2.55 l.80 0.001*** 

INe'vVl11achin~ry 4.42 2.79 l.63 0.001*** 

Investment 4.37 2.91 l.46 0.001***

................................... +.......................:.:.~ ...:..................... ·1············=·: 	 ..................................................... 

Recruitment 4.38 3.12 1.26 0.001 *** 
Training 4.25 2.89 1.36 0.001*** 
*** Significant (two-tailed) at 0.001 
At I andd· d partiCipatIOn (means) at Company Twoc ua eSlre 

Decision Actual Desired Gap Si2: 

2.49 1.78 0.00 I *** 
-~.....~<:J~p~!1.y ..p()li~.i.e..s..... 4.27 ....................................................." .. .......................... ....." ................." 

4.02 2.09 l.93 0.001*** 
Own job 3.64 1.76 l.88 0.001 *** 
f9wnctepot 	 ......................................"." ........,_... 

Wages and bonuses 4.37 I 2.06 2.31 0.001*** 
...... 
Health and safety 3.68 11:85 l.83 0.001*** 
.............. 

4.33 2.45 l.88 	 0.001 *** St~ffing ..................... 	 ................ ... "' ....... , 

4.30 2.39 l.91 	 0.001 ***New products 
2.52 l.96 0.001 ***INew:hinery 4.48 .................. 
1 
4.49 2.78 1.71 	 0.00 I ***Investment 	 .....""........................ 

4.37 2.95 l.42 	 0.00 I ***Recruitment 	 ...........,,~ 

............" .. ,............, 

4.29 2.62 l.67 	 0.00 I ***Training 

*** Slgmficant (two-tailed) at 0.001 

Actual and desired 

Decision 

~()~p<l!1YP<:Jli~i~~ 
2.24 1.75Own~~.t~~, .........................m·············I·m ............~.:.~..~ .................... +............. ~:~c············ +............. ::==............ I ··~·~;:···~·~·:~I 

2.01 1.39 0.001***Own 3.40 
0.001***4.31 2.30 2.01 
0.00 I ***3.91 2.24 l.67 
0.00 I ***4.24 2.59 1.65 
0.00 I ***4.20 2.48 1.72 .,......... .. ........." ..."-,,....................

.]\!.e."!...PT()cI.ll~.~.~..... 1***New 4.27 	 2.73 l.54 
0.001***3.05 1.29 	 . " .Investment 4.34 	 ....... ............................ ... 

0.001 ***2.91 1.32Recruitment 4.23 
2.55 1.50 0.001 *** Trainin 4.05 

*** Significant (two-tailed) at 0.001 
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Actual and desired participation (means) at Company Four 

Decision Actual Desired Gap 

0.001 *** 
0.001 *** 
••• •••••..... ••• ••••• ....w ..... ••• 
0.001*** 
........., .................................... ,.........".................... .. ,............-....•._" ..... 

0.001*** 
0.00 I *** 
~.~,~'!l(l~~i~,~~y , 4.50 
...........-.~,.........." .,. 
2.68 
................."....... 
0.001*** 
Investment 4.56 3.24 
.................................... 
1.32 
. 
0.00 I *** 
.......... - ........................... ,.",.........~. 
Recruitment 4.60 3.18 1.42 0.001*** 
................",................." ..,. 

Training 4.46 2.75 1.71 0.00 I *** 
*** Significant (two-tailed) at 0.00] 
Actual and desired participation (means) at Company Five 
Decision Actual Desired Gap Sif,( 
"••••~~','~"":,:"P"d'::(l",e:n:p!:y"()."i:,p",,,C?,,,,I,,,,i,,',~}"e,'"""'~,,',,,,'.""",,,',,",,"',,""""I""'''''''''''''''''''''''''''':''''''':'''~:''';'''''''''''''''''I'''''''''''',.;",,: 5i ";""",,"',,,''',,, "",,, ,,",,",,"1''''''''''''''".":,,,,,:,,~,,.~,,,,,,,, ,of ",~:~~:;;;",,, 
Ownjob 3.36 2.05 1.31 0.001*** 
'"' ,. .........'" ..... ,-~" .. .. 

Wages and bonuses 4.30 2.10 2.20 0.00]***
",,'" '''''''II,,''''''''''·'' ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,··,,,·1·,,'"'''''''''·''''''''''''''''''' """""" "'" """"" 
Health and safety 3.72 1.93 1.79 0.00]*** 
Staffing 4.24 2.41 1.83 0.00] * * * 
I'"''''':''''''''' """'~,.".•:'''' ,,",," ",'" '''''''"."" •• , I,,·,,'''''''''''··'''' "··"""",·,1"",·""",,,,,, "."'"',.,,''''' ·i""""" .".'''". """""""""'" "'" '" ' 
New products 4.30 2.54 1.76 0.001 *** 
Newmachinery 4.49 2.44 2.05 0,001 *** 
Ic"""""""""'''' <""""""""""""'1""""""""""""","""""""""""""i""',,"""""""'+""""".""",. 
I!ly'~stm~nt.. 4.56 3.28 1.28 0,001 *** 
Recruitment "."",4}?, 3,17 1.22 0.001*** 
Training 4.21 2,76 1.45 0,001 *** 
*** Significant (two-tailed) at 0.001 
Actual and desired participation (means) at Company Six 
Decision I Actual Desired Gap Sia 
0.00 I *** g.9.'!lP(lI1Y,,'p'9.,!,i£!~? .. ,...,......,..,.~:17~.~~ ......... m 1. 53
", 
Q,~l1m~~P9.,!. 3:8?......."...... 2.13 1.69 0.00 1*** 
Own job 3.08 1.97 1.11 0.001*** 
Wages and bonuses 3,78 1.98 1.80 0.001 *** i""",:·:",C.:,<;I:,C::".":,:,:,:,::"":::,.:.:,:,:.:,:,,:,::,,,,"""" + ,,,""'" ""''','','' , """ "'"''''1''''''''''''''''' ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,ml"'"'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' "'" " '" '"'' "" """ ",,""'" 
Health and safety 3.59 2.05 1.54 0.00] *** 
Staffing 4.13 2.43 1.70 0.001*** 
New products 4.04 2.47 1.57 0.001 *** 
Newmachinery 4,12 2.49,,,,,,,,,,, +''''''''""..",,,1,,....,..6.•:3:,,,,,,,,''''',,,,,,,,+0.,.:,0""0,,,1:""*:"*'''*:''''''''1 
Investment 4.24 2.85 1.39 0.001*** 
Recruitment 4.24 2.87 1.3 7 0.001 **;j;,m, 
Training 4.02 2.51 1.51 0.001 *** 
*** Significant (two-tailed) at 0.001 
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Appendix 19: K-W ANOVA - employee-manager relations mean ranks 
Company N Mean Rank 
Social division 1 89 431.20 
2 102 433.80 
3 184 380.64 
4 213 416.91 
5 120 418.64 
6 92 311.95 
Total 800 
Ideas and experiences 1 89 420.48 
2 101 395.23 
3 184 383.30 
4 214 443.26 
5 119 395.59 
6 92 323.91 
Total 799 
Managers efficient 1 89 453.63 
2 101 454.00 
3 183 368.53 
4 214 415.13 
5 120 391.65 
6 92 327.13 
Total 799 
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Appendix 20: K-W ANOVA - employee-trade union relations mean ranks 
Company N Mean Rank 
Easy to be loyal 1 87 326.82 
2 100 349.15 
3 161 334.15 
4 204 414.36 
5 102 409.25 
6 77 313.32 
Total 731 
Talk up 1 87 390.07 
2 100 340.50 
3 161 369.65 
4 205 363.19 
5 102 359.75 
6 78 389.27 
Total 733 
Hard to agree 1 87 375.99 
2 100 348.93 
3 160 372.05 
4 201 381.51 
5 102 366.95 
6 79 314.44 
Total 729 
Important role 1 87 348.97 
2 100 345.07 
3 162 370.39 
4 204 383.70 
5 102 383.07 
6 78 343.50 
Total 733 
Concessions 1 86 386.58 
2 99 337.98 
3 156 341.95 
4 203 369.07 
5 101 393.30 
6 78 346.56 
Total 723 
Co-operate 1 85 403.11 
2 100 348.29 
3 162 330.89 
4 202 360.33 
5 102 422.80 
6 79 357.01 
Total 730 
Lost influence 1 85 442.46 
2 98 338.15 
3 162 367.82 
4 200 342.15 
5 102 323.90 
6 76 393.74 
Total 723 
Worker influence 1 87 310.87 
2 100 354.36 
3 161 388.25 
4 202 361.36 
5 102 375.09 
6 76 383.01 
Total 728 
Survival 1 87 380.36 
2 100 363.64 
3 162 370.67 
4 203 354.93 
5 101 374.08 
6 79 366.32 
Total 732 
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